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ABSTRACT
This paper is a study of contemporary Korean politics with, 
special reference to the issues and politics during the Korean- 
Japan treaty crisis of 1964-1965* against the background of the 
historical? social? political and other critical determinants 
that have influenced the political behavior of Koreans and shaped 
the Korean political culture., system and process.
By utilizing a combination of various research methods and 
techniques of social science? this paper examines political 
parties? political elites? major groups, and their roles in the 
political process of Korea in an effort to shed new and 
systematic light upon some selective aspects of the Korean 
politics and to advance some generalizations about Korean politics.
With the examination of these aspects? this paper purports 
to explain the problems and causes of the chronic crisis of 
political legitimacy? the instability of political system? and 
the incapacity of political institutions and organizations in 
resolving national issues through normal political and consti­
tutional process - - which were dramatized by the prolonged and 
acute political crisis during the treaty struggle when the 
extreme confrontation between the opposing forces and the mass 
movement in the streets had brought about a virtual breakdown 
of the normal political process and the constitutional order.
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PREFACE
The purpose of this paper is to examine political parties, 
political elites, major groups, and their roles in the political 
process of Korea (Republic of Korea or ROK) in an effort, first, 
to shed new and systematic light upon selected aspects of the 
Korean political culture, system and process, and, second, to 
make certain generalizations about them.
The central theme of this paper, as a case study, concerns 
Korean politics during the ROK-Japan treaty crisis of 1964--1965s 
which dramatized the chronic crisis of political legitimacy, the 
instability of political system, and the incapacity of political 
parties and elites to resolve national issues through the normal 
political and constitutional process. In particular, the case 
study of politics during the treaty crisis purports to illustrate 
and validate.- the certain generalizations about Korean politics 
and process. The political aspects dealt with in the paper are 
examined to reveal how they are inter-related functionally or 
dysfunctionally in the political process and how they are operative 
in relation to the problems of developing a viable political system 
in terms of political stability, political legitimacy, and capacity 
of resolving national issues, and effective relationship between 
the political elites and the masses.
The significance of the topic of this paper may be stated in 
the following terms. The ROK-Japan treaty of 1965 had finally 
normalized a long standing hostile relationship between the two 
countries. However the treaty issue was very explosive for several 
reasons1 the bitter Korean experience of Japanese colonial rule 
in the past made many Koreans fear a renewed interest of Japan in
Korea| the settlement of the outstanding issues between the two 
countries involved seridus national interests as well as national 
prides and, above all, because of these reasons, the treaty issue 
provided a great political opportunity to the opposition to exploit 
it against the government while providing a severe test of survival 
for the government.
Such was the nature of the treaty issue, it prompted a massive 
anti-treaty and anti-government struggle which resulted in the 
most intense political crisis in the history of the Republic of 
Korea. The treaty crisis mobilized almost all the political and 
social forces of significance in Korea| numbering some three and 
a half million people, representing all important sectors of 
Korean life, who had participated in debates, lectures, position 
statements in newspapers, and violent street demonstrations in 
opposition to or in support of the treaty and the government. 
Irrespective of theii' motives, this was an impressive demonstration 
of political a?ra.reness and participation of Koreans in terms of 
magnitude and sustained activities. Such a heightened public 
response was a totally new experience in Korean politics. In 
this respect alone, the mass movement during the treaty struggle 
was a significant landmark. Because of such degree of public 
awareness and, hence, of the consequence implicit in the outcome 
of the struggle, the government and its ruling party employed all 
available tactics and political resources at hand in support of 
the treaty and in combating the growing protest activities. On 
the other hand, the opposition, mainly in alliance with college 
students and intellectuals, conducted vigorous extra-parliamentary 
struggle by appealing to Korean nationalism, by arousing a fear
Vof Japanese re-domination and by fermenting a popular revolt 
against the government.
Despite fervent polemics between the opposite forces on the 
treaty issue in their respective versions of "enlightenment 
campaigns" among the masses throughout the country, the real 
significance of the treaty struggle lay in the issue of legitimacy 
of the present, government and in the test of capacity of the Korean 
political system in resolving national issues through peaceful and 
constitutional means.
The prolonged acute treaty crisis produced a virtual break­
down of the normal political process and the constitutional order 
when the opposing forces confronted each other with extreme tactics 
and when the opponents of the government were repeatedly crushed 
by the military. The functioning of the National Assembly was 
seriously impaired by repeated violence and irregularities within, 
and in the end the National Assembly ended up as the so-called 
"one-party National Assembly" after the opposition members resigned 
en masse. Over the disputes on tactics and strategies of con­
frontation in the struggle, both the ruling and opposition parties 
were also severely incapacitated by factional struggles and both 
parties could hardly function responsibly and provide necessary 
political leadership and rational deliberation in resolving the 
treaty issue. The disaster of the opposition was so complete that 
it finally disintegrated. The treaty crisis also exposed the 
critical weakness of the rulihg party, in spite of its overwhelming 
strength in the National Assembly.
The treaty crisis is now a part of history, and some obvious 
consequences of the crisis are well-known. However, there are still
some fundamental questions left largely unanswered in explaining 
some critical political aspects of the treaty crisis, although 
they are subjects of speculation. Was the disintegration of the 
Korean political process a temporary phenomenon brought about 
primarily by the treaty crisis or was it a manifestation of a 
latent instability inherent in Korean politics which was only 
triggered by the treaty issue? Why was the government weak in 
spite of the overwhelming strength in the National Assembly? Why 
were the existing political institutions and organizations not 
effective in resolving the treaty issue? Why did the opposition 
place such heavy emphasis on extra-parliamentary tactics? Why 
was there wide support for the extra-constitutional measures of 
the opposition? Was the massive political awareness and partici­
pation of the people an indication of progress toward a popular 
democracy? Why did the students and the military play such vital 
roles in the treaty struggle? Why did the government have to 
resort to the extreme measures against the treaty opponents? 
Finally, what are the rising quotients in political attitudes among 
Koreans? This paper attempts to answer systematically these and 
other important questions and to advance certain generalizations 
about Korean politics and political process.
Chapter 1 presents the background which, with broad strokes, 
examines the nature, the pattern and the general trend of con­
temporary Korean political culture, system and process by analysing 
some critical determinantss the historical aspects of Korea's 
social and political experience, the division of Korea and its 
impacts on political ideological development, the constitutional 
changes and politics, political parties and elites, and the
vii
political attitudes and behavior of the masses.
Chapter 2 deals with the background of complex issues and 
fourteen years' protracted negotiations between Korea and Japan 
and the contents of the ROK-Japan treaty ,and agreements of 1965®
In spite of the fact that other factors were involved in the 
anti-treaty struggle., the treaty issue was nevertheless the key 
factor that prompted the political crisis of I964-I965 Korea.
For this reason, a lengthy examination on the treaty issue is 
given in this chapter. Another reason for the length of this 
chapter is that the existing writings, mostly, by Koreans and the 
Japanese on this subject are not only poor in details but also 
biased or distorted in presentation of factual accounts due to the 
lack of data from both Korea and Japan and, perhaps, their diffi­
culty of overcoming national predispositions. I think that it is 
very important for somebody to present a balanced and impartial 
picture on this particular topic in detail and length.
Chapter 3, an extension of Chapter 2, focuses on the external 
and internal factors on both sides of Korea and Japan which con­
tributed to the speedy conclusion of the treaty. However the 
primary purpose of this chapter is to examine an international 
and domestic — - political, economic and military - - setting of 
Korea within which Korea must maintain herself and against which 
both the government and the treaty opponents have regarded the 
treaty issue.
Chapter 4 deals, first, with the basic positions of the treaty 
supporters and the treaty opponents?- secondly, with the fundamental 
causes at root that motivated the treaty opponents and aggravated 
the treaty crisis? and, finally, with a brief factual account of
the mass movement and politics during the treaty crisis.
Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the background of the political 
climate preceding the treaty crisis, the motivational aspects of 
political actors and forces, and some selected aspects of politics 
at the time of the treaty crisis.
Chapters 7 and 8 examine in detail the political parties and 
elites in terras of their origin, goals, leadership, membership, 
organization, structure, operation and intra-party politics from 
the point of view of institutionalization of political organizations 
and process. The main purpose of these two chapters is to examine 
the reason why the parties failed to provide certain functional 
requisits particularly during the treaty crisis.
In the light of the failure of political parties, Chapter 9 
deals with major groups in Korean society with special reference 
to the military and the students who play significant roles in the 
political process as the extra-political forces in Korea.
The scope of this paper covers the political and related 
aspects of Korea during the two decades, (1945-1965)? of its 
existence as a nation. Additionally the coverage of this paper 
extends to some distant period preceding the independence of Korea 
in 1948. However the main focus of attention is given to the recent 
years before and during the treaty crisis.
In this research, I have combined various methods and 
techniques, which are essentially similar to those used by Robert 
A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, Parties and Politics in 
Contemporary Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeless University of 
California Press, 1965). The primary methods and techniques employed 
are historical approach, case study method, analytical method in
terms of structural-functional analysis, group theory in terms:of 
group conflict and power analyses, and behavioral approach, in 
combination with various other methods and techniques including 
quantitative method although the utilization of these methods and 
techniques are not rigorous and precise. I have attempted to 
support my analyses with available empirical data on political 
behavior and socio-political characteristics of groups. The 
quantitative data contained in this paper are presented in simple 
statistical tables and they are analysed in substantive terms.
In view of the lack of systematic studies on Korean politics and 
of the limited nature of quantitative data on socio-political 
aspects, a highly rigorous quantitative analysis of Korean politics 
is beyond my capacity at the present time.
In view of the fact that the subject of my research is vast 
and complex, that the data are fragmented and less than satis­
factory, and that the methods and techniques of handling this 
subject require a broad and complex research skill, my task in this 
research has been overwhelming. In presenting certain controversial 
points here, I might have overlooked the data and made some errors 
in interpreting them and in presenting the factual accounts, 
although I have scrutinized all the data which have been available 
to me. However, I have made every effort to support my assertions 
with reliable data and impartiality*
A few apologetic words must be said to my countrymen, Koreans. 
In pursuit of factual accounts and objectivities, I might have 
offended the feelings of certain persons or groups in my country 
by suspecting or misrepresenting their motives in certain events 
in my paper. I can only hope that they will not, however, question 
my intention of complete honesty and impartiality.
X1 am grateful to my supervisor, Professor Stuart R. Schram, 
who has been yery generous in providing his precious time to 
scrutinize my paper with critical comments and helpful suggestions. 
I am also indebted to my former teacher at University of 
Pennsylvania;, Professor Chong-slk Lee, who has provided me a 
number of materials for this research and made invaluable comments 
at various stages of my paper. I have to express my deep appre­
ciation to Mr. B.C. Bloomfield; Deputy Librarian of the School of 
Oriental and African Studiesj who has allowed me free access to 
the Korean section of the library where I found a valuable 
collection on the., subject.
X have followed the customary rule of presenting Oriental 
names with the surname first. With a few exceptions the trans­
literation of Korean names, terms and titles generally follows the 
McCune-Reischauer system of romanization of Korean names and 
language.
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CHAPTER 1 
KOREAN POLITICAL CULTURE AND PROCESS:
A  PATTERN OF STABILITY
The political history of Korea since 1945 is a history of instability.
During the past twenty years (1945-1965), the Korean people have experienced
1. 2 six regimes, * three violent upheavals, * and five constitutional revisions*
The characteristic features of Korean political instability are: fragmenta­
tion of political elites; alienation of the masses from politics and the 
government; recurrent crises of legitimacy; political changes and solutions 
through extra-constitutional and extra-parliamentary means or through extreme 
conflicts; violence and mob politics; and artificial stability of the 
government maintained through manipulation of the "popular will," elections, 
monopoly of key political resources and systematic corruption* The Korean 
political system, therefore, has yet to evolve into a viable one in which 
political legitimacy is unquestioned, politics and government are based on 
consensus and by constitutional means, and political elites are capable of 
solving national issues through peaceful means and volunary mobilization of 
the masses.
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to examine selected aspects 
of the Korean political culture and process and to establish the nature and 
styles of politics that have impeded development of a stable democratic 
political system to which the Korean people have aspired since 1945. The root
1. The six regimes are: (l) the American militaiy government, September 
7, 1945 - August 15, 1948; (2) the first Republic with President Rhee Syngman,
August 15, 1948 - April 27, I960; (5) the interim government of H5 Ch&ng,
following the ouster of Rhee by the April Student Revolution, April 27, I960 - 
August 15, I960; (4) the Second Republic of President Yun Po-s&n and Prime
Minister Chang My6n, August 15, I960 - May 16, 1961; (5) the militaiy junta
(the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction) of General Park Chung-hee, 
May 16, 1961 - December 17, 1965? and (6) the Third Republic of President 
Park Chung-hee, December 17, 1965 - present.
2* The three upheavals are: (l) the Korean War, June 25, 1950 - July 27, 
1955; (2) the April Student Revolution on April 19, I960; and (5) the 
military coup d'etat, May 16, 1961.
2cause of Kora's incapacity to solve the ROK-Japan treaty issue in 1964-1965 
through normal constitutional and political process lies in the failure of 
developing such a political system.
For the purpose of analysis, the following aspectsoof the Korean political 
culture and system will be examined* (l) a historic view of Korea's social 
and political experience; (2) the division of Korea and its impact on 
ideology and politics; (3) the Constitution and politics; (4) political 
parties and elites; and (5) political awareness and participation of the 
masses.
A HISTORICAL VIEW OF SOCIAL AMD POLl'lICAI. EXPERIENCE
In Korea the introduction of modern democracy modeled on Western theory
and institutions is a new experience which started with the liberation of the
country from the Japanese colonial rule in August, 1945* As such, it has
been difficult to maintain and has not corresponded well with the traditional
idea of power and politics still prevalent in Korean society.
Historically, modern democracy grew and spread from Western Europe over
the past three centuries, along with the developing of ideas of individualism
and human rights and with the emergence of socio-economic structure appropriate
for supporting these ideas. Modern democracy, as historian Edward H. Carr
observes, rests on three main propositions; the individual conscience as the
ultimate source of decisions; a strong fundamental harmony of interests among
different individuals and groups for peaceful coexistence in society; and
rational discussion among individuals and groups as the best method of reaching
3
a decision in society. ’ The success of democracy also requires, as Professor
Rupert Emerson points out, "the more basic tradition of standing up to do battle
4.for their rights against the remote and superior authorities. Bertrand 
Be Jounvenel adds that liberty, a principal hallmark of democratic society,
3. Edward H. Carr, The Hew Society (Londons Macmillan, I960), pp.61-62 .
4. itupert Emerson, From empire to nation (Bostons Beacon Press, i960),
P*279*
has historically been a status gained through struggle, maintained by energetic
defence and guaranteed by privileges extorted from authorities. * The Main
propositions cited above presuppose that modern democracy requires a tradition
or element of individualism, rationalism and spirit of liberty.
In absence of this tradition, democratic theory and practices adopted by
Korea after 1945 were alien ideas, whieh were the products of neither the mass
of Korean people nor of the evolutionary development of Korean society as a
whole, mven among small elites who were educated in the West or came under
influence of Western ideas, the difficulty of adopting new ideas to the
practical life of Korean society remains considerable. This difficulty is at
the root of the so-called "confusion of ideas’* as pictured in a life of a
Korean intellectucal “who keeps Nietzche’s, Sartre's and other Western books
in his library while sitting cross-legged in the inner-room with traditional 
"6feudalistic habits. * As serious doubt and pessimism about democracy were
recently disturbing the minds of many Koreans under the impact of series of
political upheavals in recent years, the confusion of political ideas is 
7.increased.
In examining the political values of contemporary Korean society, one has 
to refer to the traditional social and political values and structure of the 
Yi Dynasty (1392-1910) and to the colonial rule of Japan ^1910-1945), both of 
which left strong imprints on the contemporary Korean political process.
Although there are some Korean scholars who have sought some positive
social values and institutions in traditional society of Korea in developing
8
a modern democracy there ‘or who have lamented the disappearance of traditional
5. .Bertrand Be Jouvenel,
Growth (Boston: Beacon Press,
6. Hong Sa-chung, "Various Stages of Adopting Modern Ideas," Hong I-sc5p 
and Cho Ji-hun, ed., I ship seki ui hankuk (The Twentieth Century's Korea),
Series ho.5 (Seoul: Pakusa, 1963*), p.133-
7. See Hwang San-d6k, "Democracy: Its nature and an fhtrinsical Condition," 
ibid., pp.186-7
8. E.g., Cho Yun-je, "National Culture in A Historical View," Sasangge,
January 1966, pp.125-32. Cho says that, for example, the procedures in selecting 
a leader in a Confucianists Meeting ^Yurimhoe) and the manner debate in a 
clan council were the proto-types of modem democratic practices. See also, Pale 
Chong-hong, "Ideology in the Korean People's Life: Democracy in Practice,"
Korean Affairs, Vol. 1, No.4, 1962, pp.381-9.
On Power: its Nature and
49.
values that harmonised the society, old. values and institutions that interwove
the traditional society were predominantly authoritarian and feudalistic,
not only inhibiting the development of individualism and a liberal society
but also fragmenting the ruling class into hopeless factional cliques,1 *^
In the agrarian society of the Yi Dynasty, a rigid social and political
structure was sanctioned and maintained by Confucian precepts. At present
no systematic study of the history of Confucianism in the Yi Dynasty is 
11.available. ‘the version of Confucianism adopted by the Yi Dynasty was
however known to be "Neo-Confucianism," especially teachings of Chu Hsi 
12(1130-1200) * who synthesized practically all the important ideas of early
Neo-Confucianists of the Sung Dynasty (960-1279) and who gave Confucianism
a new meaning which influenced greatly the thinking of the Chinese, Koreans 
13.and Japanese. * The importation of Chu Hsi's teachings was closely related 
to the establishment of the Yi Dynasty. As a school advocating social and 
political reform, particularly in favor of political order maintained by 
sage-kings and scholar-officials, based on the principles of "the investiga­
tion of things" and "the extension of knowledge,"^"’ Chu Hsi's school had 
great attraction for the Korean scholars of the later part of the Koryo
Dynasty (918-1392) which had become corrupt and weak under the domination of
15decadent Buddhist monies in the court. Chu's version of Confucianism was ideal 
for the scholars in combatting the decadent features of Buddhism and of the
9. E.g.,Kim Ha-tae, "Scientific Understanding of a Value System," 
Sasangge.May 1961, pp.54-61.
10. Edward W. Wagner, "Modernisation Processiin Korea: Some Historical 
Considerations," Korean Quarterly, Vol.5, No.3, Autumn.1963, p.32; and
George M. McGune, Korea Today (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950),p.l9-
11. Hong Yi-sup or Hong I-s8p), Silhak School's Criticism on Feudal 
System," Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, Bulletin of the Korean
Research Center, No.20, June 1964, P»2.
12. For Chu Hsi (Chu Yuan-hui) and his school, see Chan Wing-tsit, A 
Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1963)7 pp.588-653.
5^. ibid.. p.588; Hong 1-sop, Silhak School's Criticism on Feudal System," 
op.cit., p.3; and W. Theodore De Bary, "A Reppraisal of Neo-Confucianism," 
Arthur F.Wright, ed., Studies in Chinese Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1953), p.88.
14. See Chan Wing-tsit, ibid.,pp.588 and 592; and W.Theodore De.Bary, 
ibid., pp.87-105*
15. See Shannon McCune, Korea: Land of Broken Calm (Princeton:
D. Van Nostrand, I960), pp.22-3.
5officialdom in the Koryo Dynasty and for providing a viable religions and
16philosophical substitute in reconstructing the society.
After Chu's teachings played a significant role in the overthrow of the
old dynasty, Confucianism became the state philosophy of the Yi Dynasty. A
drastic land reform which was designed to strengthen the new dynasty chiefly
17.benefitted the scholar-official class. * The court of the Yi Dynasty was
reorganised along classical Confucian patterns modelled on the legal code of
,the Ming Dynasty in China; "the loeal government of seholar-magistrates and
18provincial governors gave political order throughout the peninsula. ’ As
19.had happened in China, * the more vital teachings of Confucianism such as
jen (humanity), benevolence, wisdom and righteousness were however soon lost
in the political sphere, and Confucianism became the foundation of oppression
and corruption of the officialdom in the Yi Dynasty. Although there was,
after the devastation of Korea by the Japanese(Toyotomi ,Hideyoshi) invasion
in 1992, such reform movement as the Silhak (Practical Learning) School which
20attempted to revitalize Confucianism and the Yi feudalism, 'the Confucian
precepts degenerated and remained decadent as an autocratic political and
21.social ideology of the ruling class.
16. Ibid.. p.23.
17. See Hadata Takashi, Chosen sbi (Korean History) (Tokyo: Iwanami
shoten, 1951*) pp.111-4.
18. Shannon McCune, op.cit.. p.24.
19. See W. Theodore De Bary, op.cit.. p.85.
20. See Hong I-sftp, "Silhak School's Criticism on Feudal System,"
op.cit.. pp.1-10.
21. On this subject, see, e.g., Lee Man-gab, "The Yalue Structure of 
Korean Society," Sasarigge, May 1961, pp.62-7; Lee Man-gab, "Today's. Village 
Society in Korea," Sasangge, March 1965, p.78-9; Hyon Du-il, "Village Culture," 
Hankuk nongch'on sahoehak yonkuhoe (institute of Sociology of Korean Rural 
Areas), ed., Hongch1on sahoehak (Sociology of Rural Areas) (Seoul: Minchosa, 
1965), pp.203-34; The U.S. Department of Army, Foreign Areas Studies Division, 
U.S. Army Area Handbook for Korea (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office
1964), pp.59-115; Han Bae-ho, "Mature of Social-Political Change in Contempo­
rary Korea," Korean Affairs. Vol.I, Ho.2, 1962, pp.150-61; Kim Du-hbn, 
"Confucian Influences on Korean Society," Korea Journal. Vol.Ill, Ho.9,
September 1963, pp.17-21; and Lee Chong-sik, The Politics of Korean Rationalism 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), PP*3-16•
6The dominant political aspect of Confucian teachings was authoritarianism
conceived in a hierarchically arranged natural order in human relationships
22and society. "Three Bonds and Five Relationships" (sankang wulun) * was the
pillar of the authoritarian values that governed all human relationships.
The Three Bonds moralized complete mutal binding as virtue in three paired
relationships; king and subjects (or ruler and ministers), parents and
children (or father and son), and husband and wife. The Five Relationships
stressed obedience to king by subjects; respect for parents by children;
supremacy of male over female; deference to elders by juniors; and trust
between friends. Obviously the most important political implication of these
relationships was the legitimization of obedience as a basis of rule within a
family, between social classes, and between the ruler and the ruled.
The basic social unit in society was the extended family, which was in
turn a member of a clan whose members were grouped usually in the same village.
Within a family or clan, relationships between members and the norms of
individuals were strictly regulated by a hierarchical order of paternalism in
accordance with the Confucian precepts. As such, the family or clan system was
the hotbed of paternalism, authoritarianism and irrationalism that discouraged
23individual initiative, participation, decision and independence. Individual 
status, authority and responsibility were derived not from ability or achieve­
ment but from patrimonial position as a head of the family or an elder of the
, 24.clan«
Since social status of an individual was not an individual but a family 
matter, identification of an individual with his family or clan was assumed a 
natural obligation. If a member of the family moved up in government position,
22. See Chan Wing-tsit, op.cit.. pp. 105, 277 and 614; and Chen Li-fu, 
Philosophy of Life (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948), pp.91-8.
23. See Lee Man-gab, "Today's Village Society in Korea," op.cit.. p.78;
and Hyon Du-il, op.cit.. p.211. Also cf. H.G. Creel, Confucius and the Chinese
Way (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), pp.125-7.
24. See the U.S. Department of Army, op. cit.. pp.110-1.
ff
M s  family as a whole moved up. It was quite natural for one to feel an
obligation to use one’s new official position for the benefit and welfare of
25.one's family and relatives. * This was a contributing factor to a widespread
corruption of the officialdom of the Yi Dynasty —  still a persistent
phenomenon in contemporary Korean society* Mother negative aspect of the
strong identification with family —  epitomised in "To whose family does he
belong?" —  was that it bred exelusivism and compartmentalized the society by
family and c l a n . i n  the bloody power struggles that severely fragmented
the ruling class, a family or clan (or a group of families or clans) was,
hence, typically the basic structure which provided an organizational basis
2?.
and division in the Yi Dynasty's infamous factional struggles.
Based on the same Confucian precepts, the ruling class built a social
structure and justified the ethical aspects of its authoritarian control over
28the ruled. The society was divided into three classess * the ruling class 
(yangban) which was composed of high government officials (both civil and 
military) and their families who became virtually all large landowners; the 
class of commoners (sangmin) which comprised small farmers, agricultural 
laborers, merchants and artisans; and the class of the despised (ch'onmin) 
which was the lowest in the social scale and was composed of slaves, serfs, 
petty monks, butchers, travelling peddlers and others. The ruling class was 
distinguished from the lower classes by prestige, power, wealth, education, 
dresses, and social manners.
Since it was a rigid class society where vertical social mobility was
25. Ibid., p.110; and Han Bae-ho, "Nature of Social-Political Change 
in Contemporary Korea," op.cit., p. 1515*
26. Hybn Du-il, op. cit.. p.212.
27. For an illuminating history and nature of factionalism in the Yi 
Dynasty, see Kim Ky&m-kon, Yicho Tangchaeng sawa (A Historical Tale of 
Pactional Struggles in the Yi Dynasty)1" "(Seoul; Samchungdang, 1967).
28. The U.S. Department of Army, op.cit.. pp.61-6.
j
8virtually impossible except among members of the ruling class and which was 
rigorously sanctioned by the Confucian precepts which stressed a vertical 
relationship among men and classes, the power of the ruling class was 
virtually total, structured through vertical control of the officialdom
PQ
which directly reached to the level of county (hy6n). In this society 
authoritarian government by the ruling class was not only unquestioned but 
also regarded as legitimate. Thus government was viewed neither as a 
contractual arrangement between the ruler and the ruled nor as a "government
30by law", but as a "government of men," ideally, of the learned and virtuous.
In theory the government in the Ti Dynasty was virtuous and benevolent. 
Occasionally there were enlightened rulers like King Sechong and his wise 
court. However, more often than not the Icings and their courts were corrupt 
and despotic, as history has always witnessed it in a "government of men."
In such a society where any other role but the political and governing was 
a disgrace, the attainment of high government positions was the supreme 
ambition and the measurement of men's success among members of the ruling 
class. It was the only significant criterion of social mobility. The highly 
rigorous and competitive imperial examination system (kwag’6) * — • the only 
formal channel of recruitment of high government officials —  had thus the 
effect of tightening the rigid social and political structure, with the 
ultimate establishment of a highly centralized, feudalistic bureaucratic state.
An official position was the basis that brought•numerous formal and 
informal economic and social privileges and benefits, including the ownership
29. See Yun Ch'on-ju, "The Political Behavior of Koreans," Asea ydnku 
(The Journal of Asiatic Studies), Vol. Ill, No.l, June I960, p.8,
30. Cf. Edward S. Corwin's foreward in Hsu Leonard Shihlien, The 
Political Philosophy of Confucianism (Londons George Routledge and Sons,
1932)," pp. viii-ix.
31. Edward V/. Wagner, "Modernization Process in Korea* Some Historical 
Considerations," op. cit.,p.33•
32. See Lee Hahn-been, "Bureaucracy and Politics," a draft chapter for 
Lee Chong-sik and Hong Sung-chick, ed., Politics and Society in Korea (a 
forthcoming books publisher and publication date unknown), p.3•
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33.of large lands and exemption from taxation. The power of officials was
so great that they could grab'and enrich themselves and could abuse their 
authority when the central authority of the government was weak. Especially 
during the latter half of the dynasty, it was not uncommon that government 
positions were sold to the highest bidders who usually amassed their
34.fortunes through exploitation of and extortion from innocent people.
Thus such an authoritarian-servile attitude as ‘'Respect Officials and Despise
Commoners" (Kwanjon-minbi) was characteristic of the relationship between the
ruler and the ruled or the government and the people.
Moreover, the very limited number of high positions available for the
growing number of those with upper class origins gave rise to deadly compe-
35.tition within the ruling class. This was the proto-type of factionalism
—  prevalent among the contemporary Korean political elites —  which
contributed in a significant degree to the chronic social and political
instability and the eventual downfall of the li Dynasty. On this aspect,
Professor Edward Wagner says:
Severely limited movement into and out of the privileged 
class —  one might even postulate that most such mobility 
was the direct result of factional strife itself —  
contributed to narrow, atomistic loyalties and thus to 
sharply defined cleavages. 36.
In Summary, the traditional society of the Yi Dynasty was, ideologically,
socially and politically, an authoritarian society built on the principle of
absolute obedience and dominated by patrimonial heads within a family and
by feudalistic bureaucrats within the state, it was a society where
33* See ibid., p. 4; and Hadata Takashi, Chosen shi, op. cit., pp.120-22. 
34. Por an excellent study of corruption, nepotism and sales of official 
positions, see Han U-kfin, "On the Office-Uuhtingj A Historical Examination,"
35. Lee Hahn-been, op. cit#. p.4; and Lee Chong-sik, The Politics of 
Korean Rationalism, op. oit». p.7*
36. Edward W. Wagner, "Modernization Process in Korea: Some 
Historical Considerations," op. cit*, p.33.
January 1961, pp.144-51.
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individualism was stifled by familial and social status; where the mass of
the people were not only excluded from participation in governmental and
social affairs but also without any opportunity of social mobility; and
where the government was of and for the privileged few who were often corrupt
and despotic and who were internally fragmented by vicious factionalism.
This was, thus, a society which not only inhibited the evolution of
individualism and liberalism, but also inculcated the political inertia of
the masses, the corruption of government, and the factionalism of ruling
elites —  all of which the contemporary Korean society has inherited as the
most serious factors contributing to its social unrest and political instability.
When Japan annexed Korea in 1910, she established a colonial administrative
machinery known as the Government-General of Korea (Chosen Sotokufu). Its
sole function was, of course, to administer Korea with efficiency and
stability with varying styles of totalitarian control such as outright military
dictatorship (budan-seiji) or cultural and thought control through systematic
37police surveillance and torture.
The Japanese colonial rule destroyed much of the predominent political
position of the traditional ruling class, enhanced that of other classes,
and created some meager urban elements chiefly through legal abolition of
the traditional class distinctions, introduction of modern education,
industrialization, and creation of nationalist elites drawn from all classes.
It did not, however, fundamentally alter the traditional social structure and
authoritarian values! it did in effect reorganize the former and reorient
38.the latter to a more efficient Japanese rule of Korea.
57. See Hadata Takashi, Chosen shi. op. cit.. pp.203-4,207-11, and 
221-3; and Lee Chong-sik, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, op. cit..
pp.89-126.
38, See Han Bae-ho, “Nature of Social-Political Change in Contemporary 
Korea," op. cit.. p.151.
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Under colonial rule, the downfall of the traditional ruling class was
39.neither complete nor uniform. Those who held high offices in the govern­
ment of the li Dynasty were replaced by the Japanese, and some of them were 
reintegrated, as lesser officers, into the colonial administration.^*
Although some of the ruling families lost their lands to the Japanese, most 
of them however retained their lands as absentee landlords. The land reform 
carried out by the Japanese actually worked against the illiterate small
fanners who were not familiar with claim procedures for land titles, while it
41.strengthened most of the old landowners or created new landlords. The
advisory councils (chushuin) at provinci-and central levels created as
sounding bodies of the Koreans were made up predominantly of men from the
traditional ruling class. Even some of the top noblemen and officials of the
former dynasty joined the Japanese aristocracy as peers. Together with these
upper class men who joined the new masters, the Japanese created a highly
centralized bureaucratic machinery with the help of Koreans recruited and
trained for the lower ranks of government service.
The Japanese instituted a more tightly organized society than ever
partly through utilization of the traditional social structure, for it was
42more compatible with their colonial aims. * in many cases, the Japanese
protected and promoted the remnants of the old ruling class as landlords or 
43.officials. * One outstanding example of using the traditional structure 
was the development of village administrative structure based on clans or 
kinship groups, {,for the purpose of facilitating sudi matters as increased 
production, the delivery of goods, collection of taxes, military conscription,
39. William A. Douglas, "South Korea's Search for Leadership,"
Pacific Affairs. Vol. XXXV11, No.l, Spring 1964, p.20.
40. See Lee Hahn-been, op. cit*, p.5.
41. See Lee Chong-sik, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, op. cit.,pp.
93-5.42. See Han Bae-ho, "Nature of Social-Political Change in Contemporary 
Korea," op. cit., p.153.
43. Lee Man-gab, "The Value Structure of Korean Society," op. cit..
p.68.
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and the commendeering of resources which were necessary for the forceful 
execution of Japan's war p o l i c i e s  .'^v Consequently, the Japanese rule changed 
very little the traditional pattern of the ruling class among Koreans. Even 
those families who lost their former official positions and lands continued 
to be held in social esteem.
Aside from economic, cultural and other imprints left by Japanese rule, 
the most important was perhaps the legacy of the Japanese bureaucracy intro­
duced into Korea. It was a re-imported model of Prussian type which was noted
45for its legalistic, rigid and authoritarian traits. Since the Japanese 
bureaucracy —  though it provided stability —  was no better than that of the 
Yi Dynasty in the eyes of the Koreans from the viewpoint of their patriotism 
or in terms of the exploiting nature of colonial administration, it was 
universally detested as the symbol of oppression and exploitation. The 
relationship between the bureaucracy and the people was that of mutual dis­
trust and contempt —  manifested in the arrogant and aggressive attitude of 
officials towards the people, and in the people's subservience in front of
officials and contempt behind their backs and in breaking and evading the
46.laws and taxes. * Thus contemporary Korean society inherited a "bureaucratic
47culture" from both the Yi Dynasty and the Japanese rule. * Since the people
44. See Lee Man-gab, "Korean Village Politics and Leadership,"
Korean Affairs. Vol. I, No.4, 1962, p.'398.
45* See Lee Hahn-been, op. cit., p.6; and Kim Sung-yup, "Past 
Present and Future of the Civil Service System in Korea," Koreana Quarterly. 
Vol. 5, No. 4, Winter 1963, p.45.
46. Cf. Lee Hann-been, op. cit., p.5*
47. See ibid., p.6; Jun Jong-sup (or Ch&i Ehong-s<Sp), "Some 
Considerations of the Role of Bureaucracy: Effecting Modernization of Korea,"
Koreana Quarterly. Vol. 10, No.l, Spring 1968, p.27; Chbng §i-kyu, "An 
Analysis of the Effects of Japanese Bureaucracy on Contemporary Korean 
Administration and Our Resolution," Ch1 oeko ^ hoeuibo (The Supreme Council 
Review), a publication of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction 
(the military junta), No.13, October, 16, 1962, pp.106-10.
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see and regard their government largely through officialdom, the Koreans’ 
experience with "both the bureaucracies undoubtedly created a serious 
problem of malting the government closer to the people.
Therefore, until 1945 the traditional social structure and values of 
Korean society remained largely unchanged and Koreans never had experienced 
a popular government either under the Yi Dynasty or under Japanese colonial 
rule.
Since 1945 the traditional order of Korean society underwent rapid 
change. The latent social transformation during the Japanese rule suddenly 
unleashed its effects. It was during Japanese rule that many Korean 
intellectuals and nationalists at home and inutile were exposed to Western
48.social and political theories, notably nationalism, liberalism and Marxism.
It was also during this period that education and enlightenment of the masses
as the vehicles of Korea's eventual freedom and independence were stressed by
nationalists.^* Through their struggle for independence, there emerged a
universal aspiration among nationalists that the future society of a new
Korea was to be built on the principles of popular government and 
50equali taxianism.
With the return of Korean exiles from abroad with Korea's liberation
from Japan in 1945, the access to political corps d1 elite became no longer
the exclusive monopoly of the traditional ruling class. Furthermore, the
three years of administration by the American military occupational forces
(1945-1948) in southern Korea introduced a number of social economic and
educational reforms as well as steps towards a popular government, all of
51.which, undermined the traditional social order and structure. * The land
48. The U.S. Department of Army, op. cit., p.203; and Han Bae-ho 
"Mature of Social-Political Change in Contemporary Korea," op.cit., pp.156-7.
49. Dee Man-gab, "The Value Structure of Korean Society," op.cit., p.68.
50. E.g., Item 8 of "The Immediate Policy," of the Korean Provisional 
Government (exiled in Chungking), September 3, 1945» available in Hong Sdng- 
man et al, ed., Haebang iship nv8n (The Twenty Years of the Liberation),
Vol. for Materials (Seoul? Semunsa, 1965), p.201.
51. About the American Military Government, see Cho Soon-sung, "The 
Failure of American Military Government in Korea," Korean Affairs. Vol.II, 
Dos.2 & 4, 1963, pp.331-47? Edward G. Meade. American Military Government 
in Korea (lew York: King's Crown Press, 1951); and Fak Mun-ok, Hankuk 
cnongbu ron. (Korean Government) (Seouls Paky&igsa, 1963), pp.293-382.
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reform ‘ initiated by the Americans in 1948 and carried through by the new 
Korean government in 1949 further weakened the economic basis of the tradi­
tional ruling class.
The foremost factor that accelerated the social change was, of course, 
the division of Korea. The division brought the influx of millions of 
refugees from the north. "Their social backgrounds were varied, and in the
53.south some rose far above their former station while others sank in status"
Finally the Korean War, which not only produced a second massive wave of
refugees in both sides of Korea but also uprooted economic bases of many
traditional families while giving opportunity to some to rise rapidly through
wartime financial operations, erased the last traces of the traditional social
54.order and precipitated disintegration of old values and attitudes.
By the end of the Korean War Korea came close to having no classes
55.except the unchanged status of poor peasantry. This is one of the reasons
that Korean political parties have no relation with social strata or classes.
Today there is no upper class which can be clearly identified as a social and
political elite. Today's elite comprises those families of heterogenous
social origins who have recently entered into leading positions in government
56and politics, business, land-holding, education, arts and professions.
Accordingly, the membership of this upper structure has been not only fluid 
and unstable but as a whole it has failed to provide a force of social and 
political stability, which was formerly supplied by the traditional ruling 
class and the bureaucrats in the Yi Bynasty and the Japanese colonial period.
52. See C. Clyde Mitchell, "Land Reform in South Korea," Pacific Affairs, 
Vol.XXll, No.2, June 1949? pp.144-54; and Koh Yeong-kyeong (or Ko Y$ng-ky5ng), 
"Land Reform and Agricultural Structure in Korea," Korean Affairs, Vol.I,
No.4, 1962, pp.428-39.
53. William A. Douglas, "South Korea's Search for Leadership," op.cit., p.20.
54. Ibid., pp.20-1.
55* William A. Douglas, "The Current Status of Korean Society," Korean 
Affairs. Vol. I, No.4, 1962, p.391.
56. William A. Douglas, "South Korea's Search for Leadership," op. cat., 
p.21; and Yamada Akira, "On the Whereabouts of Yangban Politics," Asahi 
Janaru, Vol.3, No.3, January 16, 1966, p.20.
15
In spite of the disappearance of the conditions that supported the 
traditional social order and the emergence of new elements of the elite, 
the change for modernity has neither been accompanied by a substantial 
transformation of Korea's socio-economic structure nor has completely 
eradicated the traditional attitudes and behaviors of the masses. The 
strong imprint of traditionalism is more apparent in the political attitudes 
and behavior of the rural masses who have hardly improved their economic, 
social and political positions. Here lies the root of political manipula­
tion of the masses, authoritarian political leadership, and the wide gap 
between the government and the people,
THE! DIVISION Off KOREA AMD ITS IMPACT 01 IDEOLOGICAL 
AND POLITICAL DEVELQPMBIT
The division of Korea and the gradual consolidation of rival political
regimes in southern and northern Korea ever since the Japanese surrender in
August 1945 have profoundly effected the characteristics of political,
economic and social development in both sides of Korea. The 38th parallel
which demarcated the division was originally a military line for the purpose
of accepting the surrender of the Japanese troops in Korea by the forces of
57.the U.S.A. and of the U.S;S.R. respectively in the south and north. But
subsequent political disagreement between the two rival occupying powers on
the unification of Korea made the military division into a political and 
58.
ideological one. * The division was hardened by the Korean War and perpetuated 
by inability of the southern and northern regimes to agree on the methods of 
unification and on the structure of a unified Korea. The continuing division
57* for the origin of the division, see the statement of Hugh Borton, 
Chairman of the Japan-Korea Secretariat, the U.S.Department of State, The Voice 
of Korea, January 28, 1947; '‘Report of the United Nations Commisions on Korea," 
United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, 5th Session,
Supplement No. 16(a/i35Q)» 1950, p.5; and George M. McCune, "Korea: The first 
Year of Liberation," Pacific Affairs. Vol.XX, No.l, March 1947, pp.4-5.
58. See United Nations, ibid.. pp.4-7; George M. McCune, ibid.. pp.14-5; 
and Leon Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959)» pp. 1-25.
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is essentially a reflection of the wider and more fundamental differences of 
outlook of the two opposing ideologies which have dominated international 
politics since the end of the Second World War.
The division has been artifical and unnatural to the Korean people who 
have a common race, language and culture. Economically the division had an
59.
disastrous effect by cutting the industrial north from the agricultural south. 
This economic disruption was further worsened by the sudden withdrawal of 
Japanese who formerly ran the Korean industries which were developed as an 
integral part of the larger Japanese economic system.
But the deepest impact of the division was the ideological one which has 
shaped the political development in the south. As a peaceful political solution 
to unification became an increasingly remote possibility, the most serious 
problem faced by the southern part of Korea was safeguarding the stability and 
national security against Communists —  both southern and northern —  who have 
resorted to violence of varying degree and methods ranging from sabotage to 
open aggression (e.g., June 25, 1950).
Under the continuing threat of a Communist take-over, anti-Coimnunism was 
elevated to the guiding principle of the Republic of Korea. The salient aspects 
of this development were: (l) the complete domination of the political scene by 
right-wing anti-Communist conservatives; (2) the strengthening of authoritar­
ianism and a repression of political freedom; and (3) the construction of an 
ideological monolith which has restricted programs of political parties to a
59- See George M. McCune, ''Economic Chaos in Korea," The Voice of Korea, 
June 6, 1946; and Andrew J. Grajdanzev, "Korea Divided," Far Eastern Survey. 
Vol.XlV, October 10, 1945, pp.281-3.
60. E.g.* before the Korean War (upto April 1950) the Communist
terrorists and guerrillas caused the 36,000 dead, the 11,000 wounded, the 
50,000 houses burnt and the 432,000 persons dislocated, Hankuk hySkmy&ng 
chaep'an sa p'ySnch'an wiwonhoe (The Editing Committee of the History of the 
Korean Revolutionary Court), Hankuk hy&any&ng chaep'an sa (The History of the 
Korean Revolutionary Court), Vol. I "(SeoulT" 1962), p*6.” See also United 
Nations, 5th Session, Supplement No. 16(A/T350) op.eit.,- pp.26-7. For the 
Communist activities in the south immediately after 1945, see Henry Chung,
The Russians Came to Korea ^Washington, D.C.: The Korean Pacific Press, 1946), 
pp.105-31.
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narrow sphere of action.
Immediately after the liberation, leftists including the Korean Communist
Party in the south had considerable strength. The coalition of leftists and
nationalists, known as the Preparation Committee for the Pounding of the
Nation (K&ikuk chunbi wiwonhoe or Konchun), was able to organise an ad hoc
61national government, the People's Eepublic (September 1945), * which was soon
dissolved by the American occupation authorities. The downfall and subsequent
.elimination of the leftists from the political scene were attributed to their
internal division, lack of prestigious leaders like Rhee Syngman, serious
tactical mistakes, and violent subversive actities which invited suppression
by the American authorities. But the foremost factor in the virtual elimina-
tion of the leftists was the Americans' campaign against the left and their
62policy of strengthening the rightists, *after the Russians in the north 
intensified their policy of establishing a Communist government. In pursuing 
this policy, the American administration enlisted virtually all former collab­
orators with the Japanese, particularly policemen, who were for the most part
63anti-democratic reactionaries, still under the influence of Japanese methods.
In opposition to the left, the rightists were initially consolidated under 
Ehee, Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik who were the leaders of the Korean Provisional 
Government exiled in China. Because of disagreement over the issue of holding 
general elections and establishing a government only in the south, Rhee, who 
favoured such measures in the light of Stalin's intention in the north, soon
61. For the Preparation Committee, see Lee Chong-sik, "Institutionaliza­
tion of Political Parties in Korea," a draft for Lee Chong-sik and Hong Sung- 
chick, ed., op. cit.» pp.3-4; and George M* McCune, Korea's Postwar Political 
Problems.Secretariat Paper No.2 (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1947), 
pp.11,—  3*.
62. George M. McCune, ibid., pp.15 and 21; and Cho Soon-sung, op. cat., 
pp#338-9.
63. George McCune, ibid.. p.21; and Lee Won-sul, "The Embryo of 
Korean Bureaucracy in 1945," Nonmum .iio (Collection of Theses) of Ky6nghui 
University, Seoul, Vol.3, October 1964, pp.280-2.
separated himself from the two Kims who opposed Rhee's position. In the 
process of separation, Rhee consolidated his personal position by allying 
with the Korean Democratic Party (Hankuk minjutang), the foremost 
conservative group under the leadership of well-known nationalists Song Chin-u 
and Kim Song-su. Led by leading conservative elements and supported by the 
most wealthy and educated strata —  businessmen, financiers, landowners and 
former officials, the Korean Democratic Party (iCDP) was most cooperative in
65.assisting the American military government.
In the struggle against the leftists and, later, the neutralists, the 
ICDP felt the need of cooperation with the "former collaborators" who also
66.needed political protection to reinstate themselves in government positions.
As a consequence of cooperation between these two groups, the coalition of 
conservatives led by Rhee and the ICDP had clearly emerged, towards the end of 
the American rule, as the most powerful group that monopolized power in Korea. 
This was the beginning of the present domination of politics by the conserva­
tives .
After the establishment of the Republic of Korea through the 1948 general
elections, which the extreme leftists and neutralists rejected, anti-Communism
became the official ideology of the nation. The 1948 elections under the strict
control of Rhee’s conservatives were not free and fair, for the highest turn-out
(95*5$) of voters in Korean history was evidently engineered by them to create
an impression of an overwhelming popular support for the forthcoming Rhee's
67.
government. The new government under Rhee was from the outset beset by
64* Por the Korean Democratic Party, see Lee Ki-ha, Hankuk ch&igtang 
paltal sa (The History of the Development of Korean Political Parties) (Seoul: 
uihoechdngch* isa, 1961), pp.58-65; and Ch'oe Hung-cho, Minjikukmintang^ ui 
naemak (The Inside of the Democratic Rationalist Party) (Seouls Shinmun ui 
shimiimsa, 1957), pp.17-8.
65. Lee Ki-ha, ibid., p*62; and Cho Soon-sung, op. cit., p*339»
66. See Lee Won-sul, pp. cit,, pp.281-2.
670 See Yun Ch’&n-ju, "The Authoritarian Power Manipulation and the Party 
Formation in Korea," Asea yonku, Vol. IV, No,2, December 1961, pp.53-4.
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increasing Coramunist agitation and violence® In this circumstance, the
60
National Assembly enacted the National Security Law in November 1948,
The law outlawed the Communist party and allowed the arrests of Communists
and their nfellow travelers," But this law, subsequently strengthened by
several amendments, has become the foundation of suppression of the press,
69,the opposition and the critics of the government.
With the outbreak of the Korean War, anti-Communism became the personal 
instrument of President Rhee. Rhee consolidated his power under the proposi­
tion that he was the only leader capable of fighting Communism, Rhee viewed
any opposition to his rule as potentially subversive and hence to be suppressed
70.in the national interests. * In his victorious power struggle with the
National Assembly in 1952, Rhee arrested his opponents under martial law on
71.the charge of conspiracy with Communists. This was the first major step
that paved the way for his dictatorship. As the popularity of Rhee and his
Liberal Party sharply declined in the 1956 presidential elections and in the
1958 general elections, Rhee amended the National Security Law to suppress the
press and the opposition on the pretext of strengthening the law against
72.Communist subversion. Under the revised National Security Law which went
into effect in January 1959, the Progressive Party (1956-1959), & democratic
68. For the law and its effects, see United Nations, 5th Session,
Supplement No. 16(A/l350), op.cit., pp.25-6; and Taehanminkuk kukhpe samuch'o 
(The Secretariat of the National Assembly, ROK), Cheh&a kukhoe kaeyo (The Summary 
of the Constituent National Assembly)(Seoul, 1965), pp.45-9•
69. See United Nations, ibid., p.26; and Hankuk hybkmyfoig chaep'an sa,
Vol. I, op. cit., p.7.
70. E.g., Rhee stated at a press conference in September 1956, "If the
opposition comes to power, Korea will become red and everybody will die and be 
perished." Quoted in "Rebutal to the View that Attempts to Identify the Opposition 
with Communism," a statement of the Democratic Party, September 17, 1956,
Minjutang (The Democratic Party), T'uchaeng ui chokchbk (The Footmarks of the 
Struggles) (Seoul, 1957), p.90.
71. See Rhee's statement "On the Political Conspiracy," June 15, 1952, in 
Taehanminkuk kongboch'b (The Office of Public information, ROK), Taet1 ongryong 
yis&igman paksa tamwha jip (Collection of Speeches of the President, Dr. Rhee 
SyngmanJ7 Vol. for Politics (Pusan, 1952), pp.216-20.
72. See Hankuk hybkmy&ng chaep'an sa, Vol. I, op. cit., pp.92-7;
and "A National Security Law Amendment Bill Proposed," Sasangge. October 1958, 
pp. 168-9.
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socialist opposition, was outlawed and its head, Cho Bong-am, was executed in 
July 1959. Cho and his party were charged with anti-state conspiracy with 
Communists. But the real reason was that Cho, as one of the major presid-
73.ential rivals to Rhee since 1952, had to he eliminated. * Another well-known 
abuse of anti-Communism was the use of the Anti-Communist Youth Corps by 
Rhee's party in terrorizing the opposition and rigging the I960 presidential 
elections.
After the military officers came to power through the coup d'etat of
May 1961, the military government also- enacted the Anti-Communist Law (July 
7A
196l) " to strengthen the anti-Communist posture which was already vastly
stiffened by the existing laws. Allegedly to support this new posture, the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), a super police-intelligence apparatus,
was created in June 1961. In 1964, the opposition and the press charged that,
instead of devoting its energy to the problem of national security, the 370,000
men working for the CIA had been engaged in spying on colleagues, invading the
privacy of neighbors, creating distrust among the people and dividing the
75opposition in the interest of the ruling clique.
The flagrant abuse of anti-Communism and its apparatus has been markedly 
lessened since the departure of Rhee from politics. However it has become a 
stereotyped pattern of the successive governments to identify any criticism 
of the government with support for Communism in order to cover up their own
73. See "The Witness of A Half-Century,” Series Mo.39 (The Progressive 
Party Incident), Chosuit Ilbo, March 2, 1965; Hwang. J'ae-un,ltCho Bong-am and 
the Progressive Party Incident,” Shint'aeyangsa, ed., H^kmak (Bark Curtain) 
(Seoul, I960), pp#80-§3; and Im. Hong-bin, "Death of Cho Bong-am and Judicial 
Power,” Shindong-A, December 1965, PP*169-81.
74. See the text of the law in "Report of the United Rations Commission 
for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea,” United Rations, Official 
Records of the General Assembly, 16th Session, Supplement Mo. 13 (a74900)/1961, 
pp.22-3*
75- The editoi’ial of Tong-A Ilbo. January 29, 1964.
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76failures and repressive policies. * During the ROK-Japan treaty struggle
the government not only created the impression that the treaty opponents
77.were controlled by infiltrators from the horth, but also did not hesitate
78,to punish some students under the anti-Communist Law. Manipulation of
anti-Communism was not entirely the monopoly of the government. In the 1965
presidential elections, the opposition candidate Tun Po-son slanderously
79.attacked General Park Chung-hee of the ruling party as a pro-Communist.
The attack antagonized many potential voters for Tun.
In confrontation with the Communists in the north, the Republic of Korea 
is virtually an armed camp with a huge military establishment and a vast 
security apparatus. Anti-Communism is the ultimate policy of the nation that 
can determine the extent of freedom of the citizens. The problem has been how 
to achieve a balance between freedom and the security control and how to define 
an "enemy." More often than not, the government and its ruling party have 
abused anti-Communism ruthlessly to protect their own selfish political 
interests. Therefore, anti-Communism became the most potent symbol of justi­
fying authoritarianism of the government and its rulers.
Under the rigid enforcement of anti-Communism, Korean politics since 1948 
have been continuously dominated by conservatives whether they be ruling or 
opposition party. All the conservative parties have offered progressive 
programs such as economic planning, equal social and economic opportunities, 
equitable distribution of wealth, and social welfare, or have identified with
76. See Yang Ho-rain, "The Basic Posture of Anti-Communism," Chosun Ilbo. 
January 12, 1965; Han ICi-shik, "The One and One Half Party Systems in the Par 
East," Asea ySnku, Vol. V, Ho.2, November 1962, pp.82-3; and Lee Chong-kiftc, 
"Freedom of Expression and Establishment of A Cabinet System," Sasangge, March 
1956, pp.145-6.
77. For statements to create such impression, see, e.g., the statement 
of Minister of Interior Yang Ch*an-u, in Chosun Ilbo. August 8, 1965; and 
the statement of the government-sponsored Korean Anti-Communist League in 
Chosun-llbo, April 20 and May 11, 1965.
78. E.g.,, Chosun Ilbo, September 1, 1965.
79* See Yun's statement of September 24, 1963, Chosun Ilbo,
September 25, 1963*
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Sothe interests of poor urban and rural masses. * But their programs have 
been largely lip services, not only because they have been designed only to 
attract votes but also because they cannot be carried out too far beyond the 
principles of the so-called "liberal democracy" and "free economic system."
More fundamentally, the failure of these programs to become actual policies 
has bee inevitable in view of the fact that the programs have been ironically 
sponsored and offered by the very force which has been least interested in
81the success of the programs because any success would undermine its position.
Because of this apparent conflict of interests, the political parties have
82been "progressive" in programs but "reactionary" in outlook.
Since all political parties have to operate under the anti-Communist
policy which is even hostile to neutralism in foreign policy and democratic
socialism in domestic policy, they have to be extremely conservative and their
basic policies have been accordingly predetermined. In foreign policy, the
parties have maintained a unification of Korea only through "victory over
Communism" (sung-kong) and a staunch pro-Americanism. In domestic programs,
they have adhered to liberal democracy and capitalisms in practice, this
means that they have not been allowed to advocate any radical social, political
and economic change and they have not been able to tailor their programs to
appeal to the class consciousness of the working class. Even the labor move­
s'?rnent has been sometimes regarded with suspicion.
80. See the platforms and programs of the leading conservative parties, 
the Korean Democratic Party (1945-49), the Democratic Nationalist Party 
(1949-55), the Liberal Party (1952-60), the Democratic Party (1955-61 and 
1965-65), the Democratic Republican Party (1965- ), the Civil Rule Party 
(1965-65) and the Mass Party (1965-67), in Hong Sung-man et al, ed., Haebang 
iship nybn, Yol. for Materials, op. cit.» pp.247-52.
81. Cf. Ko Y&ng-bok, "The Postwar Ideological Current and Self-Efface­
ment," Hong I-s&p and Cho Ji-hun, ed., op. cit.. p.159.
82. See Song K&n-ho, "A New Political Force is Desirable," Sasangge, 
October 1965, pp.67-8.
85. Pak Mun-ok, op. cit., p.548. Se also ChSn Chin-han, "The Route I 
Followed^and the Route ^1 Will Follow," Kim S&k-y&ng and Hong My&ng-sam, ed., 
Ma ui chongch'i paek so (My Political White Paper) (Seoul? Shiht1 aeryangsa, 
1957), p.145.
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In order to challenge the conservative domination and to infuse new-
ideological quotient into politics, there have appeared a number of democratic
84.
socialist parties, including the Progressive Party, the first and the only
leftist movement of significance, which polled more than two million votes
(23.55^  of file total) in the 1956 presidential elections. After Rhee was
overthrown, a number of leftist parties emerged under the constitutional
guarantee of the Second Republic and freely participated in the I960 general 
86elections. But the leftist movement was soon crushed by the advent of the
military government which threw the leaders and officials of the leftist 
parties into jail* With a few exceptions the leftist parties were both anti­
communist and social democratic, and their programs were less radical than 
those of the socialist parties in the Western European countries. 87. Never­
theless, the military government, like Rhee's government, believed that the real
81intent of the leftists was to subvert the nation in conspiracy with Communists. 
According to the military, the leftists1 position on a peaceful unification and 
neutralization of Korea was in line with the propaganda of the Communist regime
I 0G
in the north and hence subversive.
84. For the Progressive Party, see especially Bee Ki-ha, op.cit., pp.258-86.
83. See Chungang s6nk& kwanri wiwonhoe ^The Central Election Management 
Committee, ROK) (hereinafter referred to as CEMC) , Taehanminkuk s&nkS sa 
(The History of Elections in the Republic of Korea) (Seoul, 1964),p. 478. The 
percentage of votes is calculated by me.
86. For the leftist movement during the Second Republic, see Ko Y&ig-bok, 
"The Meaning of the Social Movement After the Revolution," Sasangge, April 1961, 
pp.90-1; and "Agony and Prospect of the Reformists," Chosun Ilbo, September 22, 
1966.
87. See, e.g., the platform and the basic policy of the Socialist Mass 
Party (Sahoetaejungtang), in Han T'ae-su, Hankuk ch&ogtang sa (The History of 
Korean Political Parties) (Seoul; Shint‘aeyangsa, 196l), pp.390-400.
88. For views of the critics of the government attitude towards the left, 
see "The imprisonment of Reformists," Chosun Ilbo. January 25, 1964; and the 
statement of Assemblyman Kim Tae-jung, Kukhoe hoeuirok (The Proceedings of the 
Rational Assembly), 39th Session, Plenary Meetings, No.9 (December 28, 1963), 
pp.4-5.
89. See, e.g., the court records of trials of the leaders of the Reformist 
Party and the officers of the Nationalist Daily (Minchok Ilbo). the organ of the 
Socialist Mass Party, in the military revolutionary courts, in Hankuk hy&kmy&ig 
chaep'an sa. Vol. Ill, op. cit., pp.546-53 and 203-15.
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Despite the current government policy tolerating the formation of leftist
parties, as evident in the existence of the Unified Socialist Party, the
90Democratic Socialist Party and the People’s Reform Party, * the hostile
measures against them have not been mitigated. For instance, in July 1966
the head of the Democratic Socialist Party So Min-ho, an anti-Gommunist and
former Vice-Speaker of the legislature, was arrested for his position 011 the 
91.unification issue.
The weakness of the leftist movement in Korea is also attributed to other
factors. The first is obviously the weakness of socio-economic bases from
which the left could draw strength. The two million votes cast for Cho Bong-
am in 1956 were largely anti-Rhee votes; otherwise, most of them would have
gone to the major conservative candidate who died during the campaigns. The
weak electoral strength of the left was clearly proven in the I960 general
elections in which all leftist candidates drew altogether less than 7 percent 
92.of votes cast. Another problem has been a distorted and misunderstood
93notion among the people of terms "leftist" ‘Socialist" and "reformist."
Among the Korean people who are basically conservative, these elements have
always been associated, in their notion, with "fellow travelers" of Communists.
Because of popular suspicion and fear of reprisal, the leftist parties have
94been in a greater difficulty in recruitment and fund raising. A partial 
responsibility for inviting suspicion lies in the leftists themselves who have 
invariably tried to distinguish themselves from the conservatives by emphasizing
90. See "Agony and Prospect of the Reformists," op, cit.
91. See the indictment against S$, Chosun Ilbo. July 12, 1966.
92. The CEMC, Taehanminkuk sbnk# sa, op.cit*. p#435.
93* See Ch'oe Chu-ch*&L, "Criticism of the Progress Party Movement," 
Sasangge, October, 1956, pp.62-73; and Lee Bang-s&k, "The Ordeals and the 
Revival of Reformist Parties," Sasangge, March 1964? pp.91-9.
94. See Cho Kybng-hfti, "Hi^LmangMagazine Interview; A Politician Cho 
Bong-am, "Chugan Il&imang (The Weekly Hope), No.48, November 23, 1956, p. 18; 
and Chang K8n-sang,"0n Chang K&n-sang,""Huimang ch'ulp*ansa, ed. P Sashil ui 
chonpu rul kisul handa (All Truths are Told) (Seoul, 1966), p.443.
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the ■unification issue, instead of domestic programs. Another critical element
that weakens the leftist movement has been factionalism, a universal trait of
Korean politicians. In view of their limited role as a reformist force in
Korean politics, there has been indeed very little room to proliferate diverse
ideological differences, as evident in more or less identical programs of the
leftist parties. However the left in Korea has repeatedly failed to consolidate
its meagre strength behind one or two parties, mainly due to factionalism
95.stemming from personality differences.
With the leftists practically rooted out of the Korean political scene,
Korean politics have been the politics of the status quo by the conservatives 
96who, * in a sense, have rotated political power among themselves. Their only
ideology was a narrowly defined "liberal democracy" forcibly maintained by
anti-Communism. Since the nature and scope of liberal democracy itself has
been severely restricted in practice by the necessity of anti-Communism, it
has failed to provide competing political programs and issues that can be the
bases of political contests. This has inculcated the tendency of political
97.contests on personality and factional differences rather than on issues.
Due to the lack of programs and exaltation of personalities, political parties 
have not been able to develop coherent programs and sufficient internal cohesion 
and have failed to elicit popular support and to build genuine mass parties 
(see Chapters 7 and 8). In this political soil, authoritarianism of the 
rightists has flourished and the "politics of manipulation" have become a 
distinction of Korean life.
95. See Chang K&n-sang, "On Chang K&a-sang," op, cit#, p#441; and Cho 
Kyong-hiti,"Huimang Magazine Interviews A Politician, SiTliang-il," Chugan 
Huimang, Wo#46, November 9» 1956, pp*29-30.
96. Han Bae-ho, "Korean Political Culture," Sasangge, April 1966, 
p#115.
97. Por this aspect, see Song Kon-ho, "The Background of the Issue 
Contest," Sedae (The Generation), June 1967, pp#99-105.
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THE CQHSTITUTIQH AMD POLITICS
For the first time in Korean history a constitutional government was
introduced with the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948. The
essence of a constitutional government is limiting the government by the
terms of a constitution and requiring those who govern, to confirm to law and 
98rules. * But since 1948 the trend of the constitutional development in
99. . - . .Korea has been towards authoritarian constitutional principles, giving a
birth to the supremacy of the executive branch of government over the legis­
lative and judicial branches.
The frequent breakdown of constitutionalism in Korea is amply attested 
100by the following facts. * During the past twenty years, the transfer of 
political power from one group to another has never been accomplished by 
constitutional means. The Liberal Party government of Rhee (1948-1960) was 
ousted by the April Student Revolution in I960 and the Democratic Party 
government of Chang Mybn (1960-1961) which came to power through the student 
revolution was in turn overthrown by the military coup d'etat in May 1961.
The present Democratic Republican Party government of Park Chung-hee was 
installed in power through the initial political advantages gained during his 
military rule (1961-1963) (see Chapter 6). Moreover, their rule has been 
perpetuated largely through manipulation, revision and abuse of the Consti­
tution and other legal machinery. During this period, martial law has been 
declared four times by the rulers without valid reasons for national emergency
98. See K.C* Wheare, Modern Constitutions (London; Oxford University 
Press, 1966), p*137j and Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and 
Democracy, Revised Edition, (Boston; Ginn & CoT, 1950), pp* 121 and 123*
99, See Han Tai-yun (or Han T*ae-y&a), "Constitutional Development in 
Korea," Koreana Quarterly, Vol. 5, Mo* 1, Spring 1963? pp* 45-55; Mun Hong- 
chu, "The History of Korean Constitution," Koreana Quarterly, Vol* 7? Ho*3, 
Autumn 1965? pp* 11-25; Yang J'oon^ mo (or Yang Chun^no), "Judicial Supremacy 
in the Korean Constitution," Korean Affairs, Vol* XII, Mo.3? December 1964, 
PP*346-63; Han Trae-y6n, Hftnp&b (The" Constitution) (Seoul; Pbbmunsa, 1963); 
and Mun Hong-chu, Hankuk h^pob"~(The Korean Constitution) (Seoul: Pobmunsa, 
1964).
100* For a concise summary of the constitutional breakdown since 1948, 
see Kim Chin-bae, "Twenty Years of the Constitution," Hong Sung-man et al,
Haebang iship ny&n. Vo!» for Records, op* eft*.
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prescribed by the Constitution. The acute instability of constitutionalism
was aggravated by frequent attempts to revise the Constitution, There were
seven such attempts out of which five revisions were successful.
Constitutional development in Korea has revolved largely around the
power struggle among political groups and political expediency. The Con3ti-
tution that came into force on July 17, 1948, was a mixed one that attempted
to combine both the presidential and cabinet systems without having clearly
101defined the executive and legislative roles. * The original draft of the
Constitution was for a British type of cabinet system^. reflecting the wishes
102of the Korean Democratic Party (JCDP) * which was then the only party capable
103of organising a cabinet under such a system. However, when Rhee, the
universal choice for President, strongly objected to the original draft, the 
ICDP and the draft committee capitulated to him and agreed to a mixed system.
Hhee argued that Korea was not mature enough to adopt a cabinet system which 
required a firm establishment of a political party system and that the presi­
dential system was necessary to establish a stable, strong government to lay a
105.firm national foundation. Rhee‘s argument was supported by the existence
of internal and external conditions requiring a stable government built upon 
a strong executive.
The reason that the ICDP had to agree was that it was in no position to 
challenge Hhee, who then commanded an extraordinary degree of popularity. *
101. For the features of the Constitution, see Han T^ae-yon, "Constitutional 
Development in Korea," op. cit.. pp.46-8; Mun Hong-chu, "The History of Korean 
Constitution," op. cit.. pp. 15-6; and Taehanminkuk kukhoe samuchl6, Chehfoi 
kukhoe kaeyo, op. cit.. pp.9-17.
102. The 30-man constitution draft committee was dominated by 14 members 
of the ICDP, See the footnote (6) in Pak lun-ok, op.cit.» p.385.
103. See Dee Yo-han, a member of the Constituent Rational Assembly,
"Various Aspects at the Time of Making the Constitution," ICukhoebo, (National 
Assembly Review), No. 46, July 20, 1965, PP*77,
104. See Yu Chin-o, Minju chdngch‘1 ehi kil (A Road to Democratic Politics) 
(Seoul: Ilchokak, 1963), p.137, Dr, Yu was largely responsible for drafting the 
Constitution.
105. Yu Chin-o, Shinko hbnp&h haefti (New Interpretation of the 
Constitution) (Seoul: Ilchokak, 1953), p. 27, and Han T‘ae-y<5n, "Constitutional 
Development in Korea," op. cit.. p*46.
106. See Taehanminkuk kukhoe samuch*&, Chehffn kukhoe kaeyo, op,cit.. p. 17.
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The KDP was, unofficially, a ruling party during the American military occupa­
tion and, as a consequence, it lost popularity among the people. Xn order to 
maintain its position in Hhee*s administration, the KDP needed the continuing 
alliance with Rhee. As long as the KDP had Rhee on its side, it believed that
it could be able to control the government regardless of the power structure
107in the Constitution. * As the subsequent events had proved, however, Rhee 
had a different idea when he insisted on the presidential system.
As soon as Rhee became the President and started to organize his first 
cabinet, a conflict between Rhee and the KDP developed. Since the KDP with the 
support of minor parties and independents manipulated the Constituent National 
Assembly, the power struggle between the two became a constitutional struggle 
between the executive and the legislature for assertion of what each had sought 
as its proper sphere of power. The battle initially started when Rhee unexpect­
edly selected non-KDP members to the premiership and other cabinet posts (except
\ 108
two posts for the KDP). * The KDP was indignant at Rhee’s ingratitude for
the support given M m  in the establishment of the Republic. Rhee believed
that the KDP was now a liability to his one-man rule and that he could govern
110the country by M s  personal prestige. *
Rhee interpreted M s  executive power much more broadly than the Constitu-
tion's provisions, wMle the legislature under the control of the KDP tried to
limit his power by vigorously exercising parliamentary control}, over his policy 
111and actions. Taking advantage of the atmosphere of general antagoMsm
107. Lee Yo-han, op. cit,, p*78.
108. For his cabinet, see Hankuk hyokmy&ng chaep"an sa. Vol.I, op,cit.. p.5.
109. See Kim Chin-hak and Han Ch’lSl-ybng, Chehbn kukhoe sa (The History of 
the Constituent National Assembly) (Seoul: Shineho eh‘ulpan-sa, 1954), p.110; 
Taehanminkuk kukhoe saraucMo, Cheh&n kukhoe kaeyo. op. cit.. pp.33-5; and Lee 
Bom~s$k, "On Lee B&m-s&k," Huimang ch*ulp‘ansa, ed*, Sashil ui chonpu rul IdLsul 
handa, op. cit*, pp.86-92.
110. See Hankuk hyftkmyong chaep’an sa, Vol. I, op. cit,, p*5? and Lee' 
Yo-han, pp. cit., p#78,
111. For details of the conflict, see United Nations, 5th Session, 
Supplement No, 16 (A/l350), op. cit., pp.21-3.
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between the executive and the legislature created by the critical report on
administrative policies by a legislative investigation committee in January 
11?1950, "* the KDP introduced a constitutional amendment bill for a cabinet
system in order to alter the hitherto ambiguous sphere of power into a clear
113supremacy of the legislature. ’ Since the KDP was the only party to benefit 
by a cabinet system, the motive of the bill was transparently partisan.
Curiously enough, in his argument against the bill Rhee also invoked his 
constitutional duty as the guardian of the Constitution against frequent
T T A
revisions, * It was Rhee himself who later amended the Constitution twice
at his pleasure. Although the KDP mustered support of more than the necessary
two-third of the members before voting, the bill was lost because of massive
abstentions due to pressure of the government which ingeniously devised a
115system to spy on voting.
The first revision to the Constitution was made by Rhee while the govern­
ment was in Pusan, the wartime capital. Despite a heavy defeat of Rhee's
116opponents, especially the Democratic Rationalist Party (DNP), ’ in the 1950
general elections, Rhee's position within the National Assembly was not improved
mainly due to the continuing self-assertion of the legislature, increasingly
117.
antagonized by Rhee's arbitrary and personal rule. m  the face of growing
112. Ibid.. p„21.
113. Nor the bill, see Taehanminkuk kukhoe samuch‘6, 'Cheh&skukhoe kaeyo. 
on. cit., pp.56-7.
114. See Rhee's statement, "Resolute Opposition to the Constitutional 
Amendment," January 27, 1950, Taehanminkuk kongboch‘8, Vol. for Politics, 
on. cit., pp. 54.
115. Lee Yon-han, op. cit.p.78. A secret ballot is required in voting
on constitutional amendment bills, proposals for non-confidence in members of
the State Council (cabinet), impeachments, measures concerning personnel or 
various elections held in the National Assembly, bills returned from the 
President, and any bill or proposal on which the National Assembly may resolve 
to vote by secret ballot, The National Assembly Law of 1963? however, newly 
provides that voting on any constitutional amendment bill shall be made by means
of casting ballots with the names of the Assemblymen thereon. See Article 105
of the National Assembly Law (Law No. 1452, November 26, 1963) in the Secretariat 
of the National Assembly, The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea 
(Seoul, 1964), p.89.
116. In September 1949? the KDP was reorganized into the DNP by 
absorbing minor parties and independents,
117. See Hankuk hy&kmy&ag chaep'an sa. Vol.I, op.cit., pp.23-5.
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opposition to his rule in the National Assembly, which was empowered of election
of the President, Rhee in November 1951 proposed two amendments to the
Constitution, 'the bill aimed at prolonging his rule through direct election of
the President and "Vice-President by popular vote instead of by the National 
118Assembly. * But the amendment bill was rejected in January 1952 by the 
National Assembly by a vote of 143 to 19.
Since his presidential term would end in August, Rhee in anxiety launched 
in February 1952 the so-called ’’recall campaign” by urging voters in each 
constituency to recall their .Assemblyman who voted against his amendment bill
119.in the-hope that popular pressure might reverse the decision of the legislature.
Rhee maintained that, even if there was no constitutional provision on ••recall,"
the permanent constituent power of the popular will could change any part of the
Constitution and that the recall campaign was an exercise of this power against
120the legislature which defied the popular will. ’ The so-called "popular will"
mobilized in the recall campaign was thoroughly organized and manipulated by the
121government and Rhee’s own mass organizations like the Korean Youth Corps.
Rhee also used in this campaign such terrorist organizations as "the White 
Skelton Corps." Rhee’s supporters held massive demonstrations in Pusan and other 
cities and besieged the National Assembly building throughout the constitutional 
controversy (February 18 to July 4, 1952).*^*
118. See ibid.,pp.25-6.
119. See Rhee's statements, "The Voters’ Recall of the National 
Assemblymen Are Not illegal," February 16, 1952, and "The Reply to the Questions 
of the National Assembly on the Recall of National Assemblymen," February 26, 
1952, in Taehanminkuk kongboch'^, Vol. for Politics, op. cit., pp. 158-9 and 
160-4.
120. See Rhee's statement, "Concerning the National Assembly Resolution," 
March 6, 1952, in ibid.. pp.171-5.
121. For the detailed account of the massive demonstration of the "popular 
will" by Rhee's supporters, see Chbnkuk chibang uiwon tongjihoe (The National 
Comrades Association of Local Representatives), Mindl ui siimni (The Victory of 
the Popular Will) (Pusan, 1952)
122. See Hankuk hybkmybng chaep*an sa. Vol. I, op. cit.. pp.27-8 amd 30; 
and "Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabili- 
tationnof Korea (UNCURK) * "United Nations, Officia 1 Records of the General 
Assembly, 7th Session, Supplement No.14 (a/2187), 1952, pp.6-10.
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In counter-move, on April 17, 1952 the National Assembly on the initiative
of the BMP introduced its own constitutional amendment hill calling for a cabinet
system. Against this bill, Ehee reintroduced on May 14 another version of the
123,bill which was rejected in January. In order to exert further pressure on
the defiant legislature, Ehee unilaterally declared martial law on May 25 in 
Pusan and its vicinity, and arrested several opposition leaders and even kid­
napped forty-seven Assemblymen who were riding in an official bus to attend 
the National Assembly meeting."^* The arrested were accused of anti-state 
activities in conspiracy with Communists.
On July 4, the National Assembly under siege of Rhee's police was forced
125to pass a compromise bill. The amendments to the Constitution included
Rhee's two main proposals for direct election of the President by popular vote
126and for creation of a upper house ' to make the legislature bicameral and
the opposition's proposal for individual or collective responsibility of the
127.cabinet to the legislature under certain circumstances. The outcome was a
clear victory for Ehee.
in 1954 Rhee was successful, for the first time, in building his Liberal
Party into the majority party 1,136 seats out of the total 203) in the National
Assembly through manipulation of the 1954 general elections and absorption of
independents by illicit pressures. * in September 1954 Rhee's party
proposed a constitutional amendment bill to change twenty-eight articles in
129the Constitution, The main points of the bill were to strengthen the
123. See Hankuk hy&kmy&Qg chaep'an sa, ibid., p.29.
124. See ibid.. pp.31-2; and United Nations, 7th Session, Supplement
No.14 U/2187), op. cit., pp.7-9.
125. See Hankuk hybkmybng chaep'an sa, ibid., p.38; and United Nations, 
ibid., p. 10.
126. Ehee never held elections for the upper house in violation of the 
revised Constitution.
127. See Han T'ae-y&n, "Constitutional Development in Korea," op.cit., p.48.
128. Lee Ki-ha, op. cit., p*236.
129. See Kukhoe t'aimsd sa (The National Assembly Times, Inc.),
Kukhoe uichong sa, 1954-1955 (The History of Parliamentary Politics of the 
National Assembly, 1954-1955) (Seoul, 1956), pp.286-7; and "Report of the 
UNCURK," United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, 10th 
Session, Supplement No. 13 (i/2947)» 1955» pp.4-5*
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executive by making it closer to the American presidential system. But the 
most important point of the bill was to remove the constitutional barrier 
forbidding Rhee's third consecutive four-year term and to make him a dictator 
for life.
The bill was defeated in the showdown vote of November 27, 1954 when
Rhee's party, by a single vote, failed to muster the required two-tjiird
majority (136 votes). * The defeat was declared by the presiding Vice-
Speaker Ch'oe Sun-jo. Nevertheless, by order of Rhee on November 29 Ch‘oe
reversed the previous declaration of defeat and declared the bill passed.
Ch'oe explained that two-thirds of 203 being 135.33, the fraction of 0,33
should be counted as one vote since a person (or vote) could not be divided
into fractions. Thus the Liberal Party recorded that the final count was
in effect 136 votes in favor of the bill. Rhee's highly irregular manner was
131denounced by many prominent constitutional scholars including Yu- Chin-o.
In the wake of Rhee's ouster by the April Student Revolution in I960,
the presidentulsystem of government was replaced by the cabinet system by the
132I960 amendment or the Constitution of the Second Republic. * The revision
which went into force on June 15, I960 was the reflection of popular belief
that the presidential system was intrumental in the emergence of Rhee's 
133.dictatorship, * The change was also influenced by a desire to make the
130* Por the vote and the subsequent development, see United Rations, 
ibid., p. 5 s Bee Ki-ha, op.cit., pp.243-4; and Min&Lwon samuch'& (The 
Secretariat of the House of Representatives), Kukhoe iiisa jinhaeng sonrye 
(The Materials on Precedents of Procedures in the National Assembly) (Seoul, 
1959), pp. 388-410.
131. See the views of Yu Chin 
chaep'an sa, Vol. i, op.cit., pp.63-4.
132. Por explanations of the new Constitution, see Yu Chin-o, Minju 
ch&agch'i e&i ld.1. op. cit., pp.137-51s and Mun Hong-chu, "The History of 
Korean Constitution," op. cit., ]p;p.20-«l»
133. See Han T'ae-ybn, "Constitutional Development in Korea," op.cit., 
p.50, and Yang Chun-mo, op. cit,, p.350, The cabinet system was also the 
key program of Rhee's opponents. See the platform of the Democratic Party, 
Minjutang, T'uchaeng ui chokchblc. op. cit., p.3*
-o and Han T' ae-ybh in Hankuk }
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134.legislature the main repository of power.
135Under the present Constitution of the Third Republic which came 
into force with restoration of civilian government on December 17, 1963, 
the presidential system revived. Although the Constitution was formally 
approved by the popular referendum of December 1962 conducted by the 
military junta, it was drafted without sufficient and free debates and 
without participation of political groups. Many important provisions of 
the Constitution were drafted to reflect the views of military leaders who 
anticipated control of the forthcoming civilian government (see Chapter 5)•
The brief examination of the constitutional revisions has revealed that
manipulation of the Constitution for the purpose of strengthening the legal
authority and power of certain groups has prevented the principle of
constitutionalism from talcing root as a strong force of stability in political
process. The Constitution has been frequently revised in the direction of
authoritarian principles often by illicit and unconstitutional means, the
preoccupation of the rulers in exploitation of the Constitution only as the
legal source of their arbitrary rule has nourished an attitude, “Law makes
right." This attitude has led also to enactment of countless laws without
136regard to public opinion and in violation of the Constitution. As a 
result, the Constitution has proved ineffectual as a means to limit the 
rulers, to provide rules of political fair play and to insure an orderly and 
peaceful transfer of political power. Due to this ineffectiveness, the
134. “Report of the UNCURK," United Nations, Official Records of the 
General Assembly, 15th Session, Supplement No. 13(i^4466 and Add. 1), I960, 
p.4*
135. For the main features of the Constitution, see Kim Ki-b&n,
"Certain Features of the Constitution,” Korean Affairs. Vol* ill, No. 1,
April 1964, pp.20-8.
136. See Lee By&ng-rin, "Which Route for Constitutional Government," 
Sasangge. January 1966, p*119j and Hyfm Sftng-chong, "Inflation of Laws," 
Sasangge. December 1962, pp»3Q™7.
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Constitution has neither been respected as the basis of legitimacy of govern­
ment nor functioned as an effective symbol in unifying diverse forces in society.
POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELITES
Korea has yet to develop a stable and meaningful political party system
(see Chapters 7 and 8). Since 1945 no less than five hundred parties have
157appeared on the political scene. * But none of them has been able to 
consistently maintain its existence* The present ruling Democratic Republican 
Party (DRP) which came into existence in 1965 is in fact the oldest surviving 
party. This phenomenon indicates the extreme instability of the Korean parties 
as well as the extreme fragmentation of the political elites. In an effort to 
end this instability and fragmentation of parties, the Constitution, the 
Political Party Law and the election laws of the Third Republic contain an. 
extensive list of provisions to foster the stability of party politics. But 
in the 1965 general elections twelve parties still competed.
The chaos of party politics is evident in the large number of parties and 
in the high percentage of independent candidates in the general elections 
(see Table l). Many parties were literally ’'one-man*' parties to sponsor a 
single candidate (see Table l). Until the 1965 general elections, a large
TABLE is NUMBER OF PARTIES, NUMBER OF "ONE-MAN" PARTIES,
& PERCENTAGE OF IHDBPEBDEKTB PARTICIPATING IK THE GENERAL
ELECTIONS
Election. No* of Parties. No. of parties for % of Indp.
1948 48 25 44*0
1950 59 18 68*5
1954 14 6 66.0
1958 14 5 42,4
I960 14 5 64.4
1963 12 -* -*
137. Ko Y&ng-bok, "Political Parties and Factionalism in Korea," 
Koreana Quarterly, Vol. 9? No,2, Summer 1967, p. 18. In 1947 the American 
military government in Korea reported that there were 344 political parties 
and groups registered with it. See Pak Mun-ok, op. cit*, p.377.
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TABLE II s NUMBER OF PARTIES M D  PERCENTAGE OF 1KDEPMDE1HTS ELECTED
IN THE GENERAL ELECTIONS
Election No. of Parties % of Indep#
1948 16 42.5
1950 11 60.0
1954 5 35.4
1958 4 11.6
I960 6 21.1
1963 5 -*
Sources for fables I and II s The figures are extracted from 
the CEMOj Tahanminkuk sbnk6 sa, op. cit. » pp.583-466.
* Independents and "one-man" parties are eliminated by the 
Political Party Law of 1962.
number of independents had been elected to the National Assembly; at one time,
they outnumbered party members among the elected (see Table II).
Since it already has been implied that the characteristics of Korean 
parties are not found in ideology, policy, or class, in view of the level of 
socio-economic development and of the division of country, this section will 
focus on the following* aspects of parties which shape them to a significant 
degrees (l) the idea and the development of party politics; (2) the predomin­
ant characteristics —  "personalism11 and factionalism; (3) the membership of 
parties at the grassroots; and (4) inter-party politics.
Unlike parties in many developing nations, the Korean parties did not
138.originate from the nationalist movement against Japanese colonial rule.
The Japanese rule was so severe in restricting any political movement by Koreans 
that until 1945 no movement or organization existed which could become the basis 
for party development in Korea. The efforts of the nationalists' organisations 
abroad were not able to communicate with the masses in Korea because of the 
problems of distance, smallness of number and factionalism. Any meaningful 
start of mass organization, thus, began with the liberation of Korea.
But the mass movements and parties that emerged immediately with the 
liberation were torn apart by the ideological and factional tension among the
138. See Lee Chong-sik, "Institutionalization of Political Parties in 
Jiorea," op. cit#. pp.2-3*
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139former nationalist leaders. ' in this process, such mass organizations 
as the leftist Preparation Committee and the group of the Korean Provisional 
Government collapsed. Rhee's own mass organization, the Rational Association, 
was no more than his personal organization, formed to promote an early 
independence of the southern half of Korea and, as such, was a mass organiza­
tion not designed to be transformed into a mass party. Rhee had pictured 
himself as a national leader above all partisan politics.1^ 0* The ICDP was 
then the only party of influence with organization. Rut it was a closed 
party of the rightists and wealthy classes, which had indeed little popular 
support as it was not able to get more than 24*6 percent of the votes in the 
1948 general elections.
142Because of his extraordinary popularity and prestige among the people
and in the Constituent National Assembly, which elected him President by an 
143.oven-helming vote, * Rhee expected that he —  as the supreme leader of the 
nation —  could govern the country without party organization. This was one 
of the reasons that he severed his relationship with the ICDP and that he 
stressed the non-partisan nature of his government. Rhee viewed a party as 
a factional clique or secret club of the privileged class engaged in power 
struggles and dividing the nation. His distrust of party politics was 
reinforced by M s  intense dislike of the ICDP. For instance, in the 1950 
general elections Rhee actively urged the people not to elect any candidate
139* See Han Tae-soo (or Han T'ae-su), "A Review of Political Party 
Activities in Korea (1945-1954)," Korean Affairs. Vol.I, No.4, pp.415-24.
140. Lee Chong-sik, "Institutionalization of Political Parties in 
Korea," op* cit., p«7.
141. The CMC, Taehanminkuk sonk'd sa, op. cit., p.387.
142. E.g., according to a public opinion survey in 1946, Rhee was the 
choice of 29% of the people for the first President of Korea over such giant 
rivals as Kim Ku (11$), Kim Kyu-sik (10$) and Yo Hn-hyong (lC$), Tong-A Ilbo. 
July 23, 1946.
143. Rhee received 180 votes out of 196. See Kim Chin-hak and Han Ch‘6l- 
y&ng, op. cit.. p.109.
144. See Rhee's statement, "Instruction on the General Elections," May 
1950, Taehanminkuk kongboch'Vol. for Politics, op. cit., p#72.
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145* 146.sponsored by party. As a result of M s  personal crusade, independents
occupied 60 percent of the seats in the National Assembly following the
elections (see Table II). During the early period of Rhee's rule, therefore
the so-called parties in the National Assembly were actually parliamentary
147negotiation groups without mass support and organization.
Ironically enough, however, it was Rhee himself who, having disparaged 
the utility of party, set the turning point for the development of the party 
system. In the course of M s  power struggle with the defiant legislature in 
the constitutional controversy in Pusan, Rhee felt the need for his own party 
to mobilize mass support against his opponents. Rhee, who had argued against 
party politics as late as June 1951,^^* suddenly came out in August 1951 in 
favor of the formation of a mass party for the interests of workers and
149farmers, arguing that the people were now mature enough for party politics.
The Liberal Party (Ghayutang) was, accordingly, formed in December 1951.^°*
The formation of the Democratic Party (Minjutang) in 1955 as a grand 
coalition of all opposition groups was directly stimulated by Rhee's subsequent 
utilization of M s  Liberal Party (LP) to strengthen his arbitrary rule. This 
was the beginning of the domination of the two major parties: the ruling and
opposition parties. With the formation of the LP, the role of party organiza­
tion also began to emerge from the 1954 general elections as the effective
macMnery for nominating candidates, supplying campaign funds and rendering
151organisational support to party candidates,  ^* fco?he effectiveness of large
145. Sec ibid.
146. See Hankuk hy&kniy&og chaep'an sa, Vol. X, op.cit., p.9.
147. Gf. Lee Chong-sik "Institutionalization of Political Parties in 
Korea," op, cit., p.8; and Pak Mun-ok, op. cit., p.523.
148. See M s  statement, "Elimination of Confrontation and Division,"
June 8, 1951, Taehanminkuk kongboch‘8, Vol. for Politics, op. cit., pp.195-9.
149. See Rhee's "Commemoration Speech on the Third Independence Day," 
August 15, 1951, ibid., pp.134-5.
150. Por the origin of the Liberal Party, see especially Hankuk 
hydkmyhng chaep'an sa, Vol. i, op, cit., pp.39-42.
151. Pale Mun-ok, op., cit., p„54; and Lee Chong-sik, "Institutionaliza­
tion of Political Parties in Korea," op. cit,, p,10.
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party organization was evident in the decline of the number of minor 
parties successfully participating in the elections and in the decline of
j CQ
independents elected (see Tables I and I I ) ’ Although party politics 
as a whole is still chaotic and weak, a general trend has been nevertheless 
towards a two-party system.
Why are political parties and the political party system still weak?
The obvious answer is that parties have been unable to institutionalize
153themselves. The foremost factor responsible for this is strong "personalism” 
Personalism characterizes the authoritarian nature of Korean parties which 
stress vertical relationship between a political leader and his followers, 
and it is the foundation of atomistic loyalties that breeds factional struggles 
within parties."^'
Without exception, all Korean parties are dominated by one personality 
or a few key personal leaders in their establishment, organization and 
operation. One clear indication of this is the fact that the life span of 
parties is dependent on the life span of current leaders: the Korea Demo­
cratic Party (Choscm minjutang) disappeared with Cho Man-sik, the Korean 
Independence Party (Handoktang) with Kim ICu, and the IP with Rhee, The 
inability to survive or failure to adapt to change is inevitable, for parties
are essentially personal organizations of a single or a few leading personali-
155ties who assembled their personal followers to make parties, Since the
152. See also Kim Kyu-taik, "A Statistical Analysis of the Elections in 
Korea," Koreana Quarterly, Vol. 9, No.2, Summer 1967, p.73.
153. See Oh Byung-hun (or 0 By8ng-h8n), "Party System in Korea,"
Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities," the Bulletin of the Korean Research 
Center, No. 21, December 1964, p»59; Kim Ch’&L-su, "New Dimension of Korean 
Political Parties," Sasangge. October 1963, pp.82-3; Ko Y(5ng~bok, "Political 
Parties and Factionalism in Korea, op. cit.,27-9; and Pak Mun-ok, op.cit., p.546.
154. Kim Ch1 &L~su, ibid., p.83; See also Kim S8ng-hui, "Korean Political 
Parties," Shinseitye (The New World), January 1963, pp.66-7.
155. For the characteristics of the followers (i.e. party members), see 
Kim Tong-my&ng, Chbk gwa tong.ji (Enemy and Comrade) (Seoul: Ch'angp'y&ngsa,
1955), p.196; Om Sang-s&p, Kvrolryok gwa chayu (Power and Freedom) (Seoul:
Ky&igku ch'ulp*ansa, 1956), pp. 261-7; and Lee Ch’&l-b&n, "Political Realities 
and Leaders in Korea," Kukhoebo. No.47, August 20, 1965, pp.62-6.
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parties are not the assemblages of the persons who share some durable political
ideals and objectives (Cf. Chapters 7 and 8); the fate of parties are invariably
156.dependent on the fate or actions of individual leaders. Thus, the success
of a party has been closely related to the exceptional quality of a single 
leader or to the strength of a number of well-known personalities who can 
attract followers as well as voters. For this phenomenon, one can argue, 
from the point of view of circular causation, that the weakness of organiza­
tional foundation of parties is also responsible for heavy dependence on
157prestige and quality of individual leaders.
The IP of Rhee and the recent DRP of Park Chung-hee are typical of a
highly personalized party dominated by a single personality. The IP was
created by Rhee to prolong his personal rule, adopted his personal ideas as
158.
the ideals of the party, operated by the dictate of his personal whim,
and suddenly disappeared with him. It was the "overflow'’ of Rhee's personal
cult or charisma that enabled the IP to develop a certain degree of party
159structure and to generate some diffuse support. Although Rhee's author!ta-
160rian leadership > * was never challenged within the party, the IP as a coterie
of heterogeneous politicians without common ideological ties constantly
161suffered from power struggles among factional leaders. in 1956 there
was a strong reform movement inside the IP to ameliorate its deteriorating
156. Cf. Cho Hyo-won, "An Analytical Study of Some Characteristics of 
Korean Political Parties," Sahoekwahak (Journal of Social Science), Ho.2,
March 1958, p.145.
157. See ICo Yong-bok, "Political Parties and Factionalism in Korea," 
op.cit., pp.28»30.
158. See, e.g., "The May 15th Elections: Activities of the Liberal Party," 
Chugan H&Lmang. No.19, May 4, 1956, pp.6-7; and Tun Ch'On-ju, "The Authori­
tarian Power Manipulation and the Party Formation in Korea," op.cit., pp.63-70.
159. Dee Chong-silc, "institutionalization of Political Parties in Korea,"
Pp.Clt. , P.12 e
160. Rhee himself is a fascinating subject for his authoritarian character. 
About him there are a number of studies, See Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee:
The Man Behind the Myth (New Yorks Dodd, Mead, 1954); Richard C.Allen, Korea's 
Syngman Rhee (Rutland. Vt.s Tuttle, I960); Song K&i-ho, "Political Ideas of 
Dr. Syngman Rhee," Shindong-A, September 1965, pp.214-9; and Shin Sang-ch'o,
"An Outside View of Syngman Rhee," Shindong-A. September 1965, pp.201-7.
161. See Kim Tong-mytfng, Ch&k gwa tongji. op. cit„, pp.124-46;
and Pale Yong-man, KyOngmudae nihwaCThe Secret Stories at Kyongmudae) (Seoul: 
Samkuk munhwasa, 1965), pp.190-211 and 228-43. Kyongmudae is the Presidential 
Palace, known now as Ch1Onghwadae (Blue House).
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position among the people. But Rhee's refusal to accept the reform programs
162put an end to the movement. * This is one of the critical inabilities 
commonly found among "personal parties," The LP, thus, never developed into 
a party that could transcend the personal fat© of Rhee.
The organizers of the DRP had professed that theirs was based on a set 
of perspectives and organizational strength, not on personalities. Neverthe­
less, the DRP was from the outset a party of one faction of the military junta 
to support Park's presidential candidacy. The party soon became a personal 
party of Park spying him only as an electoral instrument and its majority in 
the legislature became a mere sounding body to support Park's programs (see 
Chapter 7). Bike the IP, the DRP, no less an assemblage of diverse personali­
ties, has been unable to function with cohesion due to constant factional 
struggle. The DRP is ipso facto a party of parties,
Unlike a ruling party which has a single powerful leader who commands his 
party by virtue of his powerful presidential office, the emergence of a single 
supreme leader in opposition parties is almost impossible. Nevertheless, the 
opposition parties always suffer severely from factional struggles of leading 
personalities (see Chapter. 8), The old Democratic Party (DP) and the recent 
Mass Party (MP) were the coalitions of leading personalities, each commanding 
an autonomous political base and followers inside the parties. The issues in 
conflict among them were always on the matters of party hegemony and presiden­
tial nomination. Due to the intense factional struggle, the old DP was 
immediately divided into two parties along the factional line as soon as Rhee —  
the chief target of their coalition —  was overthrown, for the same reason, 
the MP was not able to provide an effective opposition during the R0K-Japan 
treaty struggle and eventually divided into two parties.
The effects of the domination of politics by conservatives with tendencies
162. See "The Liberal Party in dilemma,” and "Bar Politics of Good Sense," 
,n Huimang. No*24, June 8, 1956, pp«4™5 and 12.
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to political contests on personality and factional differences rather than 
on issues were already discussed in connection with the ideological develop­
ment. This may be an original circumstantial reason for the lack of ideology 
and issues in Korean politics. It can be also said, however, that personalism 
and factionalism among politicians are responsible for inhibiting development
163
of party politics based on ideology and issues. This aspect will become
implicitly clear again in Chapters 7 and 8.
Closely related to personalism, factionalism is, perhaps/the most
cancerous feature of Korean parties as well as of all other organizations in
Korea. The present discussion is confined to the general nature and effect
of factionalism. The nature of factionalism in contemporary Korea is
essentially same as that in the Yi Dynasty regarding the struggle for position
and wealth and the atomizing activities centred around the leadership of one
dominant personality. Sociologist William A. Douglas describes the prevalence
of factionalism in Korea as follows;
Political parties, labor unions, student groups and businesses 
are often merely factions composed of one leader and his 
personal followers. This makes it difficult in Korea to build 
any organization larger than the number of persons one man can 
personally gather around him. Larger organizations can be built 
only by putting various factions together, and therefore they 
suffer from disunity. Koreans often seem to have no clear concept 
of an organization as an entity in itself ... the Korean tradition 
of factionalism is a serious block to progress. 164*
Since position and wealth are the main objectives that bring politicians 
together and divide them in the morass of emerging, merging, separating and 
disappearing political parties, an ideal factional leader or boss must be a 
well-known personality who possesses considerable political experience, the
163. Pale Mun-ok, op. cit,, pp.546; and 0 Byc5ng-h'6n, "Party System 
in Korea," op. cit., pp»59«6G.
164* William A. Douglas, "The Current Status of Korean Society," 
op.cit., p.395. For an illustration of factionalism, see Kim Sbng-jin, 
"Eradication of Aca demic Factions," Kim Sdng-jin et al, ed., Ch&aja ch^uncl^u 
(Seoul; Chinmunsa, 1955)* pp*28-30*
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ability of procuring and distributing political funds, the capacity of
attracting and controlling his followers of diverse origins, and even the
3 65
know-how in manipulation and conspiracy, * The relationship between a
leader and his followers demands a total commitment to the norms of the
faction, and "deviation on even peripheral issues is regarded as a sign of
166defection or betrayal." * This is the reason why a party —  a federation 
of factions —  faces the crisis of disruption when factions strongly disagree 
on certain issues.
All the Korean parties have been financially maintained by funds 
illicitly collected from industrialists and businessmen. But in absence of 
a single channel of collecting and distributing funds, factional leaders
167maintain their own sources of political funds to command their followers.
The wide dispersion of factional "pipelines" of political funds is one of the
main factors contributing* to continuing personalism and factionalism. Due to
the manner of illicit and secretive fund raising activities, political funds
are also often the quid pro quo for special interests and favors for the 
168donators ’ —  the foremost factor for corruption in politics and business.
In view of the more or less permanent rule of the party in power under 
"one and a half party system" and, hence, of greater opportunity for powerful 
position and wealth, factionalism is much more intense under the seemingly 
calm surface of the ruling party. In case of an opposition party, the 
intensity of factionalism directly varies with the chance of becoming the next 
ruling party. Although factionalism is a pattern of power struggle within a
165. Han Bae-ho, "Twenty Years from the Viewpoint of Party Factions," 
Kukhoebo, No.47, August 20, 1965, p,53.
166. Lee Chong-sik, "Institutionalization of Political Parties in 
Korea," op. cit,, p,27.
167* For the cases of the current parties, see, e„g., "Political 
Funds," Series Ho*6 (The Genealogy of Political Funds and the Factions),
Ohosun Ilbo, June 14, 1966. For the case of the IP, see Kim S6ng-hui,
"Korean Political Parties," op. cit., p,66.
168. Han Bae-ho, "Twenty Years from the Viewpoint of Party Factions," 
op. cit., p.53.
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party, its "spill-over11 effect is bound to set up the same pattern of
struggle between the ruling and opposition parties,since opposition
parties are formed by the factions eliminated through power struggle from
the original inner ruling circle.
How does factionalism effect politics in Korea? Professor Han Bae-ho
170suggests the following effects? (l) factionalism cultivates exclusivism
detrimental to the development of party cohesion; (2) as it prevents
institutionalization of central party leadership and structure, it is
responsible for discontinuity and instability of party politics and hampers
the development of stable and diffuse support for parties; (3) due to its
irrational struggle, parties can hardly serve as the normal training ground
for future political leaders; (4) it is responsible, to a great degree,
for nepotism and corruption in the government and parties; (5) the constant
factional bickerings are detrimental to making and executing consistent party
policies; and (6) elusive and irresponsible factional politics makes it
difficult to develop a responsive and responsible politics.
171The membership of parties at local level 'indicates the weakness of
parties at the grassroots. A local party unit is also a collection of
several personal groups usually gathered around a National Assemblyman or
prospective candidates. The members of each group are recmSiited through
172money, blood relations and geographical affinity. ' Depending on party
affiliation of factional bosses in the center, local party bosses and their
173followers change their; party affiliation* Observing this constant shift
of party allegiance, one prominent political commentator lamented, "To expect 
integrity from politicians of this country is as foolish as to expect chastity
169. Han Bae-ho, "Korean Political Culture," op*cit*, p.1X6.
170. See his views in ibid. and his "Twenty Years from the Viewpoint of
Party Pactions," op. c i t * p*54.
171* See especially Ch'oe S&k-chrae, "The Placenta of New Political 
Parties," Ch*oeko ifetiiho. No* 16, January 16, 1963, pp.52-6.
172# See ibid. p.53j and Kim S6ng-hui, op, cit* * p*67.
173«> See Ch‘oe S6k-ehfae, ibid.
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from prostitutes
Because politicians have indulged in selfish personal gains and party
activities are often the source of potential personal troubles in the light
of frequent political upheavals, parties and party functionaries are widely
discredited and looked upon wijjh suspicion and apprehension among ordinary
175people. Furtheimore, because of the laws which prohibit joining' of
parties by public officials, military servicemen, educators, students, and
employees of public or semi-public corporations, the number of potential
party members among those who can exercise independent political judgement
and contribute party fees is radically reduced to the minimum. Most of
'’professional*' party members at provincial and district levels are thus the
political illiterates, the unemployed and the poor who invite further contempt
176of parties among the people.
Socially respectable members often found in the ruling party were there
by pressure of local government authorities (police^or without their personal
knowledge by virtue of their membership in some non-political organizations
178which were forced to join the party en masse. * In the case of opposition
parties, the lower quality of members is constant because few respectable men
179can withstand the indignity of persecution and pressure of the government.
Due to the reasons cited thus far, parties are still regarded with 
suspicion, distrust and contempt, and have yet to develop into organizations 
with stability, respectability, and mass support.
Another significant aspect of partypolitics in Korea that hampers and 
disrupts political development is the perpetual imbalance of power between the
174. Kim Tong-my&ng, Chbk gwa tongji. on. cit., p.58.
175. E.g.t Article 17 of the Political Party Law.
176. See Ch’oe Sbk-ch'ae, "The Placenta of New Political Parties," op. 
cit.. pp*54~5. Eor socio-economic status of party members in a local district, 
see Tak Hui-jun and Lee Ch&ng-jae, "Movement in the Tague Community,'*
Sasangge, May 1961, p.170.
177- Kim S&ng-bM, op. cit*. p.67.
178. See Ch’oe S6k-ch*ae, "The Placenta of New Political Parties," 
op.cit,, p.54.
179. Ibid.
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ruling party and the opposition —  tile pattern commonly described as “one
180and a half party system," * The relationships between the LP and the DP
during' the First Republic, between the DP and the New Democratic Party during
the Second Republic, and between the DRP and the Civil Rule Party (or later
Mp), are typical of this pattern.
The political contests between opposing sides are so prejudiced against
the opposition that the outcome of contests, whether in elections or in the
legislature, is always in favor of the ruling party which ruthlessly controls,
exercises and manipulates all available political resources, i.e. adininistra-
tive and coercive apparatus, economic power, electoral laws and machinery,
and even the Constitution and laws. The victory of the ruling party in
elections, therefore, is a foregone conclusion, and accordingly, there has
never been a peaceful transfer of power by constitutional means. The basic
cause of the recurrent crisis of legitimacy stems from this fundamental
imbalance between opposite political elites.
Because the ruling party perpetuates power and governs the country
through procedures and means which the opposition regards as illegitimate and
unlawful, the substance of issues in conflict between them always starts from
181fundamental procedural issues, * such as the unconstitutionality of govern­
ment policy or acts, irregularities in elections, and encroachment on basic 
freedoms. Therefore the opposition Struggles against the government with 
extraordinary zeal of an "opposition of principle," The opposition in despera­
tion often resorts to extreme militant measures and becomes irresponsible and 
, 182,
adventurous; the government reacts with coercion and force. This is also 
one major reason why militant factions on both sides can dictate the tactics
180. For this aspect, see Han Bae-ho, "Korean Parliamentary Politics 
from the Viewpoint of the Theory of Conflict," Kukhoebo, No.46, July 20,
1965, PP®57-9; Bee Kific-ch'an, "The Task and Pathology of the Opposition," 
Sasangge, March 1964? pp*76-80; Pak Mun-ok, op, cit,, pp.549-50; and Han 
Ki-shik, op. cit., pp.83-4.
181. As to how "procedural issues" become "substantial issues" that 
create the problem of consenses in constitutional politics, see Herbert J. 
Spiro, Government by Constitution (New York; Random House, 1959), pp.363-71*
182. See Hwang San-d8k, Chahwasang (Self-Portrait) (Seoul1 8hin-a 
ch'ulp'ansa, 1966), pp.248-9.
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and strategies of confrontation in times of crisis. Under these circumstance, 
political decisions or changes have been made very often by extra-constitutional 
and extra-parliamentary means, largely through violence and mob politics in the 
streets.
Why is the ruling party unwilling to abide to the rules of the game? Of
course, it can be traced to the authoritarian tradition of Korean society in
183which the rulers tend to personalize political power and position. ' The
authoritarian trait of the rulers is manifest in their indifference to public
opinion and their intolerance of the opposition,which, in their eyes, is
a subversive group undermining the integrity of the nation. The latter
attitude is evident in the abuse of anti-Communism against political foes of
the government. Another basic problem is the lack of opportunity for wealth
and prestige in professions other than politics. There must be somewhere
positions of influence, prestige and affluence available for defeated political
aspirants. ’’Where political defeat brings a ticket to oblivion,- competition
.185.
for office may become bitter. Since political positions in Korea are the
source of power, wealth and prestige and the positions are quite limited to
the members of small ruling group, the struggle for power is constant and bitter
and the elimination through this struggle means often the danger to personal 
186safety. ’ This is a where “each side comes to regard the victory of the
187.other as a fundamental threat to some highly ranked values." Thus once in
power the ruling group entrenchs itself in power by all means and, as a result, 
the peaceful transfer of power between opposing political elites becomes difficult
183. See T u b  Ch’on-ju, "The Political Behavior of Koreans," op.cit,,t p p .6-23
184. See Bee Kuk~ch‘an, "The Task and Pathology of the Opposition,"
op.cit., p.78; and Pak Mun-ok, op. cit.. p.549.
185. Bruce M. Russett, Trends in World Politics (New York; Macmillan
Co., 1965), p.138.
186. See 0 By&ng-hon, "The Political Pattern of Korea," Shindong~A,
June 1965, pp.60-2; and Han Bae™ho, "Korean Political CultureT^ WTcrtT, p. 115.
187. Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago;
University of Chicago Press, 1956), P*96.
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A brief examination of the selected aspects of political parties and 
elites reveals that the immaturity of party politics and chronic political 
instability stem from (l) the lack of tradition and experience in party or 
organized politics; (2) the non-institutionalization of parties as mass 
organizations due to strong personalism and authoritarianism; (3) the extreme 
fragmentation of political elites due to factionalism; (4) the fragility of 
parties at the grassroots; and (5) the imbalance of power between the ruling 
and opposition parties,
POLITICAL AWAMESS AMD PARTICIPATION
Since 1945 political awareness among the Korean people has considerably 
improved, particularly through the expansion of education, rapid economic and 
social changes brought about by the division of country and the Korean War, 
political awakening under the impact of two violent political upheavals (the 
student and military revolutions) and experience in holding electoral contests. 
The high awareness is also partially stimulated by an ever-widening gap between 
the increasing level of popular expectation and the inadequacy of governmental 
performance,
188Despite this change, political attitudes and behavior of most urban * and 
rural masses still remain traditional, inert and negative, and the extent of 
their political participation ends with casting votes in elections. Apart 
from the factors of poverty and ignorance, they are still psychologically 
inhibited from freely forming their own political judgement and from exercising
188, The total urban population (living in cities of 20,000 or more) 
in Korea increased from 27.5!$ in 1949 to 38,5^ in I960. But urbanization 
in Korea is not an "industrial urbanization" which accompanies all the real 
attributes of social changes necessary for political development. The Korean 
urbanization thus contains various traditional and rural characteristics. See 
Lee Taik-V4i£ » "Urbanization and Its Political Implications in Korea," Korean 
Affairs, Vol, III, No« 3, December 1964, pp.304-14.
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189their political rights for their own interests. The persistent pre-modem
pattern of political behavior of the masses is, in a greater degree, an
indication of the failure of political parties in developing themselves into
mass organizations which educate the people, formulate issues for them, meet
the needs of the people, and develop party identification. Because of this,
there exists a big gap between the masses and the political elites. This is
primarily responsible for political apathy among the people who dutifully
march to the polling stations but occasionally register their protest as in
the case of the 1956 presidential elections.
Although electoral participation and voting behavior in Korea also vaiy
with demographic characteristics (such as education, income, age and sex), or
with geographical areas (urban and rural), the overall voting behavior of
Koreans still reflects the traditional socio-economic pattern and the level
of political underdevelopment. The majority of the people are indifferent
to political and governmental affairs. A survey indicates that only about
11 percent of the voters have ever involved in political or public activites
to redress their grievances.This is predominantly due to the traditional
191servile attitude towards officials and due to the sense of helplessness.
Even among those who are informed and have critical opinions, they are 
reluctant to express their opinions in public and to take part in political
189. Since I960 there have appeared a number of empirical studies 
on political attitudes and behaviors of Koreans based on surveys. The 
important ones are: Yun Ch'cSn-ju, “Voting Behavior of tEup* Inhabitants," 
Asea yonku, Vol. IV, ho. 1, June 1961, pp. 1-52? 0 BySng-h6n, “Analysis 
of the July 27th Genera.1 Elections,*1 Asea yfoiku. Vol. Ill, No.2, December 
I960, pp.29-64; Ch^ng Duk-kyu, “Voting Behavior in the Province of 
Ch&Llanamdo," Honmun lip (Collection of Theses) of Ch6nnam University, 
Kwangju, Vol. 10, 1964, pp.1-47; and Kang Ky6m-kun, “Political Analysis 
of Korean Regional Society," Haengch&ag nonch1 ong (Collection of Theses in 
Public Administration) of School of Public Administration, Seoul National 
University, Vol. II, No.l, 1964, pp.126-56.
190. Yun Ch'&n-ju, “Voting Behavior of ‘Eup* Inhabitants," op.cit.,
]p & 31 *
3i$l. See Lee Man-gab, “Korean Village Politics and Leadership,*' op. 
cit», p.401: and Han Bae-ho, "Korean Political Culture," op.cit.. p.Tl7.
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192.or protest activities because of fear of earning displeasure of the authorities.
Still under the influence of patrimonial and kinship bonds and authoritar-
193ran tradition, as well as due to ignorance and poor access to mass media, 
most of the voters, especially in the rural areas, are influenced by family
members, relatives and "influential persons" in forming their views on candidates
 ^ • 194.and campaigns.
Even though the voting rate has been steadily declining both in urban and
1QR
rural areas, ^‘it has been nevertheless high, especially in rural areas. The
high voting rate reflects the fact that many voters are obliged to go to the
polls for the particular candidates under persuasion or pressure of "influential
196persons" or "notables" in each area. ’ In the past the voters in remote areas
197went to vote in fear of retaliation by authorities for their failure to vote.
Often they were under various pressures to vote for the candidates of the ruling 
198party. * This is the reason why in the past the ruling party took votes of 
peasants for granted. The decrease in voting rate in the recent elections is 
attributable partly to the disappearing of this type of coercion, and, mainly, 
to the growing doubt among the voters in the efficacy of elections in particular 
and politics in general.
What are the criteria of choice in elections? All the surveys' confirm 
that the voters make their choice based on the personality of candidates, not
192. Lee Man-gab, ibid.
193. See Richard G-arver, "Communication Problems of Underdevelopment:
Cheju-do, Korea, 1962, "The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XXVI, No.4.
Winter 1962, pp.613-23.
194. 8ee Lee Man-gab, “Korean Village Politics and Leadership," op.cit.. 
p.403; Ch6ng Luk-kyu, op. cit., p.22; and Lee Joung-sik, "Voting Behavior 
in Korea," Korean Affairs. Vol.II, Nos, 3 & 4, 1963, p.358.
195» The highest in the 1948 general elections decreased to 72,3$
in the 1963 general elections. For an analysis of the trend of voting rate, 
see Kim Kyu-taik, op. cit., pp,62-7*
196. Ibid,, p.66.
-*-97. Ibid., p®67.
198. According to Yun Ch*&n-ju*s survey, 79*7$ of the voters were pressed 
by the Liberal Party to vote for its candidates in the 1958 elections, Yun Ch'&n- 
Ju, "Voting Behavior of ‘Bup* Inhabitants,11 op.cit., p,45.
199. Kim Kyu-taik, op.cit,, p.62; and Lee K^k-ch'an, "Political 
Indifference and the Crisis of Democracy," Sasangge, April 1961, pp.60-9*
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on party identification and party platforms. * This is not surprising in
view of the fact that parties are hardly organized at the grassroots, that they
are collections of personalities and that they fail to campaign on issues and
programs,, The lack of voters4 indentification with parties is also revealed
by the tendency that the voters rarely vote for the same party they voted for
previously. For example, throughout the 1954, 1958 and I960 general elections,
one survey indicates that only 38 percent of the voters had consistently voted
201.for one party. * Another obvious reason for the weakness of party indenti­
fication is that their choice is determined by such irrational and traditional
elements as personal relationship, familial and kinship relationship, deference
20?to "influential persons" and immediate material benefits. * The irrationality 
of the voters is congruent with the attitude of most candidates, ifh.o consider
2(75
elective office as a source of personal gain. Electoral contests,
especially in rural areas, become the contests among personal groups, organized 
by candidates1 families, their kinship groups, and their friends through extrava­
gant expenditure and promises to purchase votes.
Since the elections have been such, there has been a great potential for 
manipulation especially by the candidates who belong to or who are supported by 
the ruling party and the government. An overwhelming majority (90$) of the 
people believe that the elections have been rigged^0^ * mainly through public 
officials and purchase of votes,2^* The easiness of manipulation of elections
200. E.g., in a government survey, 12,T/° of the voters made choice based
on "personality of candidate," and 14•Tfo on "party and platforms." See Hankuk 
Ilbo, December 28, I960. See also other similar indications in the surveys of 
0 By8ng-hon, "Analysis of the July 27th General Elections," on. cit., pp.47-50. 
of Yun Ch'&n-ju, "Voting Behavior of ‘Eup1 Inhabitants," op, cit., p#36; and. 
of Ch&ng Duk-kyu, op. cit., p.26,
201. Yun Ch'&i-ju, ibid. p.39.
202. See Ch&ng Duk-kyu, op. cit., pp. 31-2; and Kang Kyom-k^n, op.cit., 
pp.153-4.
203. See Lee Man-gab, "Korean Village Politics and Leadership," 
op.cit., p.403.
204. See Shin B&m-shik, "Electoral System and Election Management," 
Sasangge. July 1962, p.72.
205. Yun Ch’on-ju, "Voting Behavior of *Eup* Inhabitants," op.cit., p.46,
206. Ch&ng Duk-kyu, op. cit., p.40.
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directly increases with the high degree of concentration of traditional rural
characteristics. This is clearly evident in the electoral statistics, for the
rural areas with high voting rates haye been traditionally the strong bases of
the ruling party while the urbanized areas with relatively low voting rates
207have been the main pockets of the opposition.
What conclusions can be drawn from the voting behavior of Koreans?
The obvious thing is that, in spite of the heightening of political awareness 
and the establishment of formal institutions of democracy such as universal 
suffrage and political parties, the rural and urban masses in Korea are hardly 
exercising their political rights or participating in political decision-making 
due to their own social and political inertia and the constant manipulation by 
politicians and the government. In this sense, their participation is a 
11 totalitarian participation.” This means that the overwhelming majority of the 
people is effectively alienated from politics and neglected by the government. 
In their place, smaller but articulate elements in the urban areas —  the 
military, students, bureaucrats, professionals, the press, businessmen and 
industrialists —  play certain roles, which are often out of proportion and out 
of their proper sphere to the point of endangering the general interests of the 
people (see Chapter 9).
207. See Yun Ch'&n-ju, "Voting Behavior of ‘Eup‘ Inhabitants," 
op.cit,, pp.11-8.
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CHAPTER 2
THE RQK-JAPAH TREATY AND ITS BACKGROUND 
After two decades of antagonism and Hostile relations 
following Yforld War II, on June 22, 1965 the Republic of Korea 
(hereinafter referred to as the ROK) and Japan finally took a 
step towards friendly and normal relations by signing the 
Treaty on Basic Relations and other agreements.’*'* Negotiations 
between the ROK and Japan had commenced with preliminary talks 
on October 20, 1951* fke complexity of the issues and 
negotiations between the two countries is told by the seven 
formal conferences, not to mention numerous other informal 
contacts and talks, which took place during the fourteen inter­
vening years, and by the number of documents signed by both 
countries.^*
The purpose of this chapter is to present and analyze the 
issues involved in the negotiations, and the. contents of the 
treaty and of the agreements concluded on June 22, 1965, in Tokyo.
1. The treaty and the related agreements were subsequently 
ratified by the National Assembly of the ROK on August 14s 19^5 
and the National Diet of Japan on December 11, I965* 
instruments of ratification were exchanged in Seoul on December
18, 1965.
2. Besides the Treaty on Basic Relations, the important 
agreements which required ratification were the Agreement on the 
Settlement of Problems Concerning the Property and Claims and
on the Economic Cooperation, the Agreement on Fisheries, the 
Agreement on the Legal Status and Treatment of the Nationals of 
the Republic of Korea, and the Agreement on the Art Objects and 
Cultural Cooperation. In addition to these agreements, twenty 
other documents were signed on the same date. For an authentic 
text in English of the Treaty on Basic Relations, see Oemupu 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROK), Taehanminkuk oekyo ny&npyo, 
pu chuyo munhon 1965 (19^5 Yearbook of-the Republic of Korea 
Diplomacy with Important Documents) (Seoul, 1966), pp. 324-5*
For other related agreements in Korea, see Chosun Ilbo,
June 23, 1965? and in English prepared by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Documents”, The Japanese Annual of 
International Law, No. 10, 1966.
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The preliminary talks opened in October 1951 were the first 
official contact between the two countries after the defeat of 
Japan. The talks were urged and arranged by General Douglas 
MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SOAP), after 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan had been signed but 
before it took legal effect on April 18, 1952. Both sides agreed 
to place the following issues on the agenda: the legal status
and treatment of Koreans residing in Japan and the question of 
title to the vessels in Korean harbors at the time of the 
Japanese surrender (as of August 9> 1945)* The ROK1 s request 
to include the issue of fisheries was refused by Japan. In 
late 1951 the preliminary talks were suspended without any pro­
gress in resolving the issues.
The first foxtnal ROK-Japan conference (February - April
1952) discussed the issues concerning basic (or diplomatic)
4.relations; the ROIC's claims to compensation for losses of 
property and lives under Japanese rule; and the Japanese claim 
to compensation for property formerly held in Korea, in addition 
to the issues already opened to discussion in the preliminary 
talks. During the successive conferences a number of important 
issues were added —  some of them deliberately provocative - -
3. This is the date on which Japan accepted the terms of 
the Allied powers spelled out in the Potsdam proclamation,
July 26, 1945* The SOAP ordered the Japanese authorities to 
return all vessels registered in Korea but removed to Japan 
by the Japanese after the above date. See Taehanminkuk 
chongpu (Government of the ROK), Hanil hoedam paeks& (White 
Paper on the ROK-Japan Talks) (Seoul, I965)> PP. 190-1*
4. The words, "basic relations," and "Treaty on Basic 
Relations" were coined by the Koreans. The Treaty on Basic 
Relations is in reality a treaty of friendship and trade.
The ROK did not want to use the word "friendship" in fear of
a possible reaction by the Koreans who were not really friendly 
towards the Japanese. See Kim Yong-shik's explanation in
ibid., p. 191.
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to the already tense negotiation list. They were: the Peace Line
or the "Rhee Line” as it is called by Japan; the question of title 
to Dokto (or Takeshima, in Japanese) which consists of two small 
islands; the ROK's demand for the return of Korean art objects 
removed to Japan; the fate of the Japanese fishermen interned in 
the ROK in violation of the Peace Line, and of the Koreans de­
tained in the Japanese detention camp in Ohmura, Japan; the 
repatriation of the Koreans residing in Japan to North Korea; 
and above all, the question of "two Koreas" and jurisdictional 
control of the ROK in the Korean Peninsula.
For the purpose of analysis, these issues are grouped under 
the following categories: (l) the basic relations, which deal 
with the validity of past relations, the jurisdictional control 
of the ROK, and future relations; (2) the problem concerning 
property claims; (3) the problem concerning fisheries, including 
the limit of continental shelves in connection with the Peace 
Line and future cooperation in fisheries; (4) the problem 
concerning the legal status and treatment of the Koreans residing 
in Japan; and (5) the dispute over D o k t o . T h e s e  are the points 
of dispute which produced many side issues and triggered the
5* For different positions taken by both sides, see Hanil 
hoedam paekso, op. cit.; "Materials on the ROK-Japan Problems 
Summary of Positions Maintained by Both Sides along the Major 
Issues," Kukhoebo, No.42, March 25, 1965? PP* 115-8; Kimura 
Shuzo, "Details of Japan-ROK Negotiations," Nihon kokusaisei- 
jigaku kai (Japan International Politics Sodefcy), Nikkan kankei 
no tenkai (Development of Japan-ROK Relations) (Tokyo, 19^3), 
pp. I-Ht-27 ; and Won Yong-sok, Hanil hoedam shipsa nycfo (Fourteen 
Years of the ROK-Japan Talks) (Seoul, Samwha ch’ulptansa, 1965), 
pp. 1-288. For a Japanese legalistic view of the issues and the 
contents of the treaty and the agreements, see Oda Shigeru, "The 
Normalization of Relations Between Japan and the Republic of 
Korea," The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 61, No.l, 
January 1967? PP* 35-56*
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exchange of hostile words and actions between the two countries 
while arousing emotional hatred of the peoples in both countries* *
THE BASIC RELATIONS 
Dr. Yu Chin-o, a leading intellectual and the former president 
of Korea University who was a member of the Korean delegation to 
the first ROK-Japan conference and the chief of the Korean dele­
gation to the fifth conference, described the impasse in ROK-Japan 
negotiations as due to the fact that the attitudes of the two
countries were ’‘diametrically opposed rather than basically 
7different*” These attitudes were in evidence throughout neg­
otiations in designing bases for future ROK-Japan relations. The 
ROK maintained that normalization of relations between the two 
countries must be preceded by a Japanese apology for the unfor-
g
tunate past. * The ROK insisted that normalization of relations 
should be formalized in a "treaty” in which Japan explicitly 
recognized that the unfortunate past between the two countries 
was mainly due to the immoral and illegal Japanese occupation 
of Korea, and in which Japan also specifically repudiated all the 
previous treaties or agreements, from the very beginning of their
6. For objective analyses of the emotional problems, see 
especially Lee Chong-sik, "Japanese-Korean Relations in Per­
spective, ” Pacific Affairs, Vol* XXXV, No.4* Winter 1962-63*
PP* 315-26; and Lawrence Olson, Japan and Korea» The Bitter 
Legacy, American Universities Field Staff Reports Service,
East Asia Series, Japan and Korea, Vol IX, No.7* June 10, I96I.
7* Yu Chin-o, "What Prevents the Successful Conclusion of 
the Korea-Japan Conferences?” Korean Affairs, Vol. I, No. 2,
1962, p. 122.
8. For the ROK’s position, see Hanil hoedam paeksft, op. 
cit., pp. 14-5*
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conclusions* which had successively subjugated the old empire of
Korea into a part of the Japanese colonial empire.9’ The Koreans
felt that a true and friendly relationship could not be built upon
the remnants of unequal status and humiliating stigma inflicted
on the Koreans by the Japanese agression. Such a treaty was,
therefore, desirable for the purpose of restoring dignity to the
Koreans as well as for the sake of eradicating suspicion on their
part of possible Japanese re-aggression.
The Japanese position was that relations should be normalised
by a joint ROK-Japan declaration, instead of a formal treaty, and
that the status of the old treaties or agreements should not be a
subject for discussion since they were no longer valid nor
effectively in force following the separation of Korea from Japan 
10in 1945.' * Besides, the existence of the old treaties or agreements
was a historical fact that no one could deny. The important thing
was to draw a historical lesson from these facts and to work for
11.the mutual prosperity of the two nations.' * Thus, while the ROK 
regarded the ROK-Japan negotiations as negotiations for a kind of
9* These treaties or agreements ares the “Agreement Between 
Korea and Japan,** August 22, 1904, hy which Korea became obligated 
to accept the Japanese advice on matters of foreign affairs and 
finance; the “Convention Between Korea and Japan," November 17, 
1905, by which Japan assumed control of foreign affairs of Korea; 
the "Agreement between Korea and Japan", July 24, 190?, by which 
Japan took control of the internal administration of Korea; and 
finally the "Treaty of Annexation," August 22, 1910. See Qemupu 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROK), Hanil kwange oh1amko munsojip 
(Collection of Reference Documents on the ROK-Japan Relations; 
Seoul, 1958); and "Documents" relating to Korea-Japan relations,
Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, the Bulletin of Korean 
Research Center, Seoul, Mo. 23, December 1965, PP* 49-57*
10. Hanil hoedam paeksM, op. cit., pp. 14-5? and see also 
the recollection of Foreign Minister Lee Tong-won, "The First 
Year of the ROK-Japan Normalization and Prospective," Kukhoebo,
No.51, January 15, 1966, pp. 86-7.
11. E.g., the editorial of Asahi Shimbun, February 21, 1965*
57
peace treaty aimed at resolving the problems arising from the
Japanese occupation, Japan refused to see the problems in the
Korean context. The Japanese refusal to admit their past misdeeds
in Korea or to express their regret for the past was evident in
the first ROK-Japan conference, as the following episode, revealed
by Dr. Yu Chin-o, indicates*
Dr. Yang Yu-chan, the chief of the Korean delegation, 
read a prepared speech (I understand this speech was given 
directly to Dr. Yang by President Rhee at that time).
Included in this speech was a phrase "... let us bury the 
hatchets.1' Mr. Chiba, the Japanese alternate chief dele­
gate who was listening to the speech in silence, said one 
thing at the end. He said, "What are the hatchets to bury?" 
In other words, this suggests tfoat Japan never invaded 
Korea against Koreans1 wishes.
The position of the ROK on the importance of Japanese apology
in basic relations had been consistently pronounced by the leaders
of the ROK. Rad this basic requirement been satisfied, relations
between the ROK and Japan would have been quite different.
President Rhee Syngman's hostility towards Japan is well known.
But it should be noted that President Rhee was not always as
hostile and arrogant towards Japan as he appeared later. He was
one of the first Korean nationalistic leaders to favor early
establishment of amicable relations with Japan, provided this
13.basic foundation was laid. * On October 22, 1948? immediately
12. Yu Chin-o, "What Prevents the Successful Conclusion of 
the Korea-Japan Conferences?" 0£. cit., p. 123; see also ICamada 
Mitsuto, "The Japan-ROK Relations Prom the Point of View of 
Korean People's Resentment of Japan," Shinwa, Ho. 143? January 
15, 1965, P. 9.
13* E.g., "Address by Syngman Rhee before the First Congress 
of the Republic of Korea, May 31, 1948," The U.S. Department of 
State, Korea, 1945 to 1948, Publication 3305 (Washington, D.Cs, 
Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 73-7 (Annex 17).
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after the independence of the ROK, President Rhee said, "We are 
trying to forget and will forget the past* If the Japanese would 
meet the Koreans with truthfulness and sincerity, friendly 
relations would be renewed. We believe in a peaceful co-existence 
with a neighboring country."1 *^ He suggested normalization of 
trade relationships between the two countries as the first step 
towards normalization of diplomatic relations, even before a
15.peace treaty was concluded between Japan and the Allied powers.
/ H'President Rhee visited Japan three times; in October 1958
as the guest of General MacArthur, in February 1950 again as his
guest, and in January 1953 as the guest of General Mark Clark,
the Commander of the United Rations Forces, and of the U.S.
Ambassador Robert D. Murphy. The Japanese leaders1 reaction to
his repeated stress while he was in Tokyo on the necessity of
early relations between the two countries sheds some interesting
light on the state of the ROK-Japan relations at the time, and
could explain partly the subsequent hatred of Japan by Rhee.
16In his open letter to Hr. Kakawa Toyohiko, * a wellknown Christian
14. "Speech Concerning the ROK-Japan Trade,*' October 22, 
1948, Taehanminkulc kongboch'o, Vol. for Economic, Diplomatic, 
Military, Cultural and Social Affairs, og. cit., p. 2.
15. "Speech on the ROK-Japan Trade," September 20, 1949> 
ibid., p. 14*
16. Dr. Kakawa had written an open letter, "Appeal to 
President Rhee Syngman," in Mainiohi Shimbun, December 13, 1955* 
He emphasized the historical, cultural and ethnical affinity of 
the two peoples, and appealed for his tolerance of the Japanese 
misdeeds in the past and for improvement of relations between 
the two countries*
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leader, which was carried in a Japanese daily, Mainichi Shimbun 
(December 21, 1955)j Rhee revealed,
When I went to Japan six years ago..., I was interviewed 
by reporters. I told them frankly that, even if X am 
reportedly not a friend of Japan, 1 am willing to completely 
forget the past and am ready for re-starting for new 
relations with Japan if the Japanese show the same coop­
erative spirit.
I expected a favorable reaction to my statement from the 
official spokesman of the Japanese Government. I was 
deeply disappointed when there was no reaction at all*
When I visited Japan again..., I asked Japan to extend 
generosity to the BOK, a weaker neighbor, in the same 
spirit as shown by the U.S. to Japan... While I was 
talking, Prime Minister Yoshida and Foreign Minister 
Okasaki made smiling faces. But they made no comment on 
my speech after all. Your |a,e. Kakawa*s/ apology for 
the forty'years of the Japahese rule over Korea drew my 
serious attention because it was, in fact, the first 
statement of such nature I have ever heard from prominent 
Japanese people. In the absence of such expressions as 
yours, one could understand why we Koreans have believed 
that the Japanese intent is not to be friendly towards 
the BOK, but to re-dominate Korea. ...
Japan does not show her willingness to resolve the 
disputes by negotiating with us. Instead, she has main­
tained that we are violating international law and is 
threatening us that all problems will be settled when 
Japan becomes militarily strong... **
A more recent statement by General Park, then chairman of the
military junta and who, more than anyone else, strongly wished to
bring about normalisation of relations with Japan, represents the
same basic position.
As I already mentioned, we cannot overlook the pos­
sibility that so-called economic cooperation with Japan 
may bring forth another form of Japanese aggression against 
Korea. Therefore, Japan should strictly observe the prin­
ciple of mutual benefit, along with respect for Korea*s 
national sovereignty so as not to repeat the mistakes of 
the past, and should first of all legally settle its past 
aggression against the Korean people. "Maw wine should 
be put in the new bottles only. 11 So, the Japanese people,
17* See also the letters of Dr. Kakawa and of President Rhee, 
in Pak S&ng-ha, Unam yisungman (Unam Syngman Rhee) (Seoul: 
Mybngsedang, 195677”PP* 215-3.
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especially Japanese leaders, should reflect on what they did 
to us during the past 36 years. It is the concensus of our 
national sentiment that Japan*s moral reflection 011 and 
legal expression of its regret for its past aggression should 
precede any cooperation with Japan on our part.-*-°*
The feeling that Japan did commit many misdeeds against the Korean
people and that Japan should apologize for the past before any
normalization of relations took place was widely shared not only
by the leaders of the ROK but all Koreans
Closely connected with their bitterness and moral indignation
over Japanese rule in the past was the Korean's belief that Japan
as the defeated country in the war owed some indemnity to the ROK.
This is a victor complex, and it reinforced the Koreans’ basic
attitude. 'Wftiat is meant by victor complex," Dr. Lee Chong-sik
explains, "is that when Japan surrendered to the Allies in' 1945?
the Korean people automatically identified themselves with the
Allied powers, envisioning themselves as the winners of World War II.
The fact that the liberation of Korea was brought about not as a
result of the Korean people's struggle against Japan did not
20.
concerh the Koreans. It was enough that Japan was defeated."
This complex was in fact widely shared by many Koreans, particularly
18. Park Chung-hee, Our Ration's Path (Seouls Dong-A Pub­
lishing Co. , 1962), pp. 163-4.
19. E.g., see "The Pour Point Resolution," adopted by the 
House of Representatives of the National Assembly, on February 3? 
I96I. A full text translated into English is available in Takita 
Kazuo, "Negotiations with South Korea," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, Vol. XXXI, No. 10, March 9? 1961, P° 4^9? fhe resolution 
adopted by the National Assembly, March 27, 1964? "The Materials 
on the ROK-Japan Problems the Resolution of the National Assembly 
Concerning the ROK-Japan Problem," Kukhoebo, No. 42, March 25,
1965? P* H9l "The Basic Position of the Civil Rule Party on the 
ROK-Japan Talks," Hankuk IIbo, February 23? 1964? a-ftd the opinions 
expressed by artists, clergymen, editors, educators, political 
commentators, students, and writers in "Why Are We Opposed to the 
Present ROK-Japan Negotiations?" Sasangge, Supplement, April 1964, 
pp. 130-44,
20. Lee Chong-sik, "Japanese-Korean Relations in Perspective," 
op. cit., p. 320.
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the Korean nationalist leaders who had been struggling for Korea’s
independence for more than three decades. They were proud of the
fact that the Korean Provisional Government in exile in Chungking
21.did declare war against Japan on December 9> 1941> * and that
Korean military groups had participated in actual combats against 
the Japanese in China and Manchuria, even if the Korean contri­
butions to the Allied war efforts were insignificant and ignored 
by both the Allied powers and Japan. Many Koreans felt that it was 
not totally unrealistic for the ROK, as a belligerent at war with
Japan, to try to become a signatory to the San Francisco Peace
22.Treaty, even if it might be a bit unreasonable. * The Koreans
who really entertained this idea of going to the peace conference
in San Francisco expected that the ROK would be treated as one of
the Allied nations in matters of, for example, the settlement of
Korean property claims and of the legal status of the Koreans in
23.Japan. * The Koreans’ victor complex was reflected in the ROK’s 
position that their negotiations with Japan should be regarded as 
peace negotiations, when the ROK was barred from being a signatory
24.to the Peace Treaty because of the technicality of non-belligerency.
On the other hand, the Japanese position was that she had nothing 
to regret or to pay to the ROK under international law since the 
two countries were never belligerent parties at war. It may appear
21. For the text of the Korean Provisional Government's 
declaration of war against Japan, see Hong Si£ng-man et al, ed., 
Haebang iship ny&n, Vol. for Materials, op. cit., pp. 201-2*
22. Yu Chin-o, "What Prevents the Successful Conclusion of 
the Korea-Japan Conferences?” opt. cit., p. 124* Actually 
President Rhee announced that the ROK will attend the peace con­
ference in San Francisco in order to "recover what we are entitled
Pong-A IIbo, January 9» 1950* For the story of the ROK's 
diplomatic activities to gain a seat in the conference, see Min 
Py&ng-gi, "The San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Korea-Japan 
Relations," Koreana Quarterly, Vol. 8, Bo.4 ~ Vol. 9j No. 1,
Winter 1966-Spring 1967? PP* 69-99*
23* Min Pyong-gi, ibid, p.76.
24. Hanil hoedam paekso, op. cit*, p. 191
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at first glance that the leaders of the two countries were 
quibbling over simple moral and ethical questions. But in fact, 
the admission of "guilt" on the part of the Japanese would have 
had great significance in matters of property compensation and 
indemnity*
When negotiations between the two countries commenced in 
October 1951j Japan had just been restored to sovereign status. 
More than six years had passed since her defeat in 1945 &n(l a 
radically different international situation existed, especially 
in regard to her former colonial possessions in the Far East*
In 1945, the ROK, as well as North Korea, had become de facto
separate states, in accordance with the Cairo Declaration
25 26(November 1943) and the Potsdam Proclamation (July 1945)
The first of these documents promised and the second reaffirmed
the independence of Korea after the war. Thus for the postwar
Japan, the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 was the first
opportunity to accede retroactively to the independence of Korea
from Japan three years after the ROK and North Korea (the
Korean People's Democratic Republic) had respectively declared
27their independence in 1948- Article 2(a) of the Peace Treaty
25. "Joint Declaration by President Roosevelt, General­
issimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Churchill," declared 
November 27, 1943 and released December 1, 1943> The U.S. 
Department of State, Selected Documents on American Policy 
(Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1951), P* 10*
26. "The Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surren­
der," July 26, 1945, The U.S. Department of State, Korea's 
Independence, Publication 2933 (Washington, D.C.s, Government 
Printing Office, October 1948)? P* 17 (Annex III).
27. For the text of the treaty, see The American Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 46, Supplement Nos. 71 and 72, 1952.
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provides:
Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, re­
nounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including 
the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.
When Japan signed the Peace Treaty, she thus recognized Korea’s
independence, and also subscribed to Resolution 195(m) of ik©
United Rations General Assembly, in regard to the ROIC's
independence and her legitimacy in Korea. The General Assembly
declared on December 12, 1948*
..•that there has been established a-lawful government 
(the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effec­
tive control^and jurisdiction over that part of Korea 
when the /UR7 Temporary Commission was able to observe 
and consult and in which the great majority of the peo­
ple of all Korea reside? that this Government is based 
on elections which were a valid expression of the free 
will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which 
was observed by the Temporary Commission;ggnd that this 
is the only such Government in Korea; ...
When the Peace Treaty came into force, April 18, 1952* Japan
thus automatically recognized retroactively the existence and
29.independence of the ROK.  ^ Japan further recognized the ROK
30when she reaffirmed, by a note verbale of April 28, 1952, ’ the
accredition of the ROK Mission in Japan. This mission had been 
in Japan since April, 1949> accredited to the SOAP with the usual 
diplomatic privileges and immunities,
notwithstanding the fact that Japan had thus recognized the 
existence of de jure ROK even before April 18, 1952, doubts of
28. For the text of this resolution, see United Rations 
Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, 1948, 
Part I, Resolutions,
29. The Japanese Government made it clear later that Japan 
recognized the ROK on April 18, 1952, not before this date.
E.g., Prime Minister Sato’s statement, Sangiin Kaigiroku 
(Proceedings of the House of Councillors), 50th Session, Plenary 
Meetings, Ro. 8 (Rovember 19, 1965)j P» 13> and Foreign Minister 
Shiina's statement. Shugiin Kaigiroku (Proceedings of the House 
of Representatives), 50fh Session, Special Committee on Japan- 
ROK, Ro, 8 (Rovember 1, 1965), p. 5*
30. Oda Shigeru, op. cit,, p. 39,
6 4
Korea's independence remained in the minds of the Japanese 
leaders, and even more ambiguity covered the question of the 
jurisdictional control of the RQK in the Korean Peninsula. For 
both the ROIC and Japan, the question of the effective date of the 
separation of Korea from Japan, or the date of Korea's inde­
pendence, was important, for it was the date on which property 
claims would be based. Partly because of this, Japan had 
vigorously asserted that Japan had no apologies to make for the 
past. Instead, Japan maintained that the Japanese rule had been 
benevolent to the Koreans, and if it was immoral at all, it had
been necessitated largely by the game of power politics in the
31.early twentieth century. * If Japan had admitted to the ROIC
32that she was guilty of atrocities and misdeeds * committed against
the Korean people and if Japan had declared that the old treaties
or agreements were null and void from the beginning because they
were illegal and immoral, she would then have to face logically
and affirmatively the ROIC's demand for indemnity. This point the
Japanese had kept in mind. The Japanese government was also aware
that if it made an apologetic statement there would be angry cries
33.from opposition forces and nationalists at home.
31. Ishihara Shintaro, "The Japanese Views of Korea," Chosun 
Ilbo, December 18, 1965.
32. To cite only two large incidents, in the Samil Movement 
(the March First Movement for Korea's independence in 1919)>
6,670 Koreans were killed, 14,610 injured, and 52,770 detained 
by the Japanese authorities; and in the earthquakes of Kanto, 
Japan in 1923, thousands of the Koreans in Japan were indis­
criminately murdered by the Japanese as scapegoats, see the 
statement of Assemblyman Kang Mun-bong, Kukhoe hoeuirok, 41st 
Session, Plenary Meetings, Ho . 4 (March 27, 1964)* PP* 5-6.
33* Yoshioka Totao in a discussion, "Anti-Japanese Sentiment 
and Anti-Korean Sentiment," Shindong-A, October 1965* P* 148.
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The contrasting attitudes between the two nations was further 
made obvious by the following incident. The highly charged 
situation produced by these conflicting attitudes came to a head 
during the third conference (October 6-21, 1953)* I*1 atmos­
phere of mutual contempt and resentment, Kubota ICanichiro, the 
chief Japanese delegate, made a highly inflamatory statement which 
instantly prompted the infuriated EOK delegates to walk out of the 
conference for four y e a r s . T h e  important points of Kubota's 
statement were: (l) the independence of the EOK before the signing 
of a peace treaty was not normal; (2) the Allied powers should be 
criticized for disposing of Japanese property in Korea before the 
treaty was signed, and therefore Japan reserved the right to claim 
for property in Korea; (3) the 36 years of Japanese rule in Korea 
were not altogether bad, and in fact had brought spectacular 
advances to Korea in such areas as education, health, trans­
portation and agriculture; and (4) the reference in the Cairo
Declaration to the Korean people as being in "enslavement" was an
35.exaggeration caused by the emotional stress of war.
After Kubota’s statement, there were many statements from
responsible Japanese leaders and officials which further inflamed
the Koreans. Komatsu Shigeo has listed some of these, typical
36.of Japanese official attitudes*
34* Hanil hoedam paeks6t op. cit., p. 199. Japan officially 
withdrew Kubota’s statement on December 31, 1957 and the two 
countries opened the fourth conference. See "Joint Communique," 
December 31> 1957 in Tokyo, between ROIC Ambassador Kim Yu-taik 
and Foreign Minister Fujiyama, "Documents," Japanese Annual of 
International Law, Ro.3> 1959? PP* 221-2.
35* See excerpts of Kubota's statements recorded by the 
Korean delegates, in Yu Chin-o, Minju ch&igch1i eui kil, op.cit., 
pp. 262-64* See also a summary of Kubota's statement by Rakaho 
Yosaku, former chief editor of Keijb RippS (The Seoul Daily), 
in Oriental Economist, April 1958, p. 186.
36. Except Ohira's statement, all are from Komatsu Shigeo, 
"Korean Problem According to My Experience," Saito Takashi and 
Fujishima Udai, ed., Rikkan mondai o kangaeru (Considerations on 
Japan-ROK Problems) (Tokyo: Taihei shuppansha, 1965)? PP* 210-2. 
Ohira's statement is from Mainiohi Shimbun, August 6 , I962.
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Ultimately emphasis of the Japanese diplomacy should 
be given to a close co-operation with America. In order 
to do this* the ROK and Formosa will have to be closely 
related. If feasible, it would be nice to form the_
United States of'Japan with the ROK and Formosa. (Ono 
Banboku, Vice President of the Liberal Democratic Party, 
1958).
Japan should penetrate into Korea, following the 
example of Ito Hirobumi /the Japanese Resident-General 
in Korea who masterminded the annexation of KoreaJ.
(Ikeda Hayato, Prime Minister, 1962). ~
To the ROK, normalization of ROK-Japan relations is a 
matter of life or death. Therefore the ROK is primarily 
responsible for bringing about normalization of relations. 
(Ohira Masayoshi, Foreign Minister, 1962).
Managing Formosa, annexing Korea, and dreaming of co­
operation and peace among the five races in Manchuria, if 
this was Japanese imperialism, it was an honorable im­
perialism. (Shiina Estsusaburo, Foreign Minister, 1962).
It would have been better had Japan ruled Korea twenty 
more years. Even though it was a colony, Japan did good 
things for Korea. (Takasuki Shinichi, the chief delegate 
to the seventh ROK-Japan conference, 1965)*
Statements such as these drew the indignation not only of the 
Koreans, but also of Japanese who were sympathetic to Korean 
resentment of Japanese arrogance. Some thoughtful Japanese cri­
ticized these attitudes as the ’’embodiment of terrible arrogance 
37*and ignorance,11
Professor Hadata Takashi of Japan analyses the Japanese
attitudes as follows:
The basic policy of Japan in Korea was assimilation. It 
was a kind of expansionism of the interior for domestication. 
It was aimed at disairaing the characteristics of the Korean 
people and at Japanizing them.•..Prohibition of using Korean 
in school and meetings, Japanization of Korean names, 
worship at Shinto shrine, thorough memorization of the
37* Komatsu Shigeo, ibid, p. 213; and see also Kurota Hisao, 
the Socialist Party's Chairman of Special Committee Against the 
Japan-Korea Talks, "Why Opposed to the Japan-ROK Talks?" Chuokoron, 
February 1963, p. 202.
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loyalty oath of an imperial subject, etc.... From the 
Japanese point of view, it was assimilation and imperial- 
ization of the subjects. But from the Korean point of view, 
it was the total liquidation of the Korean nationality...
The Japanese rulers believed that this policy of liqui­
dation of nationality had given benefits to the Koreans 
instead of pains and torture to them.
Accordingly for a great many contemporary Japanese, the Japanese
rule over Korea was for the benefits of the Korean people and, in
fact, a great burden assumed by Japan in order to enlighten the
39.Koreans, who were considered incapable of self-rule.
' In contrast to what the Koreans call the "ruling mentality"
or "superiority complex" of the older generation of Japan, the
younger generation of Japan feels either indifference or resentment
towards K o r e a . I n d e e d  many Japanese people, particularly
younger people, honestly believed that they should not feel guilty,
or have to pay compensation to the ROK from their tax money; they
had also suffered and been victimised in consequence of the
irresponsible war waged by the same aggressive militaristic circles
who ruled Korea, The attitude of the younger Japanese people
was direct opposition to that of their Korean counterparts who had
42been given an anti-Japanese education by Hhee Syngman.
38.Hadata Takashi, "A hew Understanding of the Japan-ROK Talks; 
The Japanese View of Korea," Sekai, December 1963, P* 53*
39* Ibid.
40. According to an opinion survey of lovember 1962 among 
Japanese college students by Jijitsushin (the Current Affairs Press), 
reported in The Japan Times, December 22, 1962:
The most popular country: U.S.A. - -  ------ - ---- 37$
U.K.-------------------- 26$
Switzerland -  ------ - 25$
ROK    -------------   - 2$
Others -  ---   - - - 10$
The most disliked country; U. S. S.R. -  -------   - - 43$
C h i n a ------ 24$
ROK - - -  - -  - -  - -  - -  19JS
Others    ----- - -—  - 14$
41* Hadata Takashi, "Japan-ROK Friendship and Japan-ROK Treaty," 
Saito Takashi and Fujishima Udai, op. cit., pp. 16-18.
42. According to an opinion survey of October 1962 among 
college students by Seoul Rational University, reported in The Japan 
Times, December 22, 1962;
The most popular country; Switzerland - -  ------ 28$
W. Germany  -------- --- 25$
U.S.A. - - -  ------ - 14$
Japan  _ -    —  3€
Others - - - - - - - -  30$
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The Korean insistence on an official apology from Japan was 
finally satisfied. On February 17, 19^5 Foreign Minister Shiina 
Estsusaburo, came to Seoul to initial a tentative draft of the 
Treaty on Basic Relations, expressed that "I, ...really regret that 
an unfortunate period existed in the long history of the two nations, 
and deeply reflect on such a past*"^* The Korean reaction to this 
statement was very favorable. Chosun IIbo, in its special repoi't 
on Shiina’s visit, commented that " ...as such an official statement 
is the first one that the Japanese government had ever made in 
sixty years, it is a considerate expression mindful of the Korean 
people's sentiment. One will have to admit that the statement will 
be definitely not a factor hindering the future relations."^'
Article II of the Treaty on Basic Relations of June 22, 1965 
reads:
It is confirmed that all treaties or agreements concluded 
between the Empire of ICox^ ea and the Enpire of Japan on or 
before August 22, 1910 are already null and void.
As it stands, Article II is reasonably clear. But the governments 
of both the ROK and Japan are rather equivocal and interpret it 
differently as it suits them. The government of the ROK has main­
tained that on the strength of Article II the old treaties or 
agreements concluded on or before August 22, 1910 (the date on which
43. See the text of his speech, Chosun 11bo, February 18, 19&5* 
He expressed also the same remarks in "Joint Communique" (English 
text), February 20, 1965* with Foreign Minister Lee Tong-won, see 
Taehanminkuk oekyo ny&npyo, pu ohuyo munhon 1965* op_. cit., 
pp. 78-79. The word "reflect" used in the English is a translation 
of the Japanese word "hansei(suru)." "Hansei" also means "self- 
examination" plus some degree of "regret".
44* Chosun IIbo, February 21, 1965* Reportedly Japan expressed 
a personal apology of Prime Minister Kishi through Yatsuki Kasuo, 
a personal emissary of Kishi, to Px^esident Rhee in May 1958. See 
Yatsuki Kasuo, "The Interview with President Rhee Syngman," Bungei- 
Shunju, July 1958, PP* 182-8.
69
the Treaty of Annexation was concluded) had been null and void 
from the date of their signing.^* The ROK is also of the view 
that Article II is in reality the Japanese legal expression of
A /"*
regret over the past, * On the other hand, a different inter­
pretation has been repeatedly given by the Japanese government.
This is that the Treaty of Annexation became invalid with the
47 •independence of the ROK on August 15, 1948 and all other old 
treaties or agreements concluded prior to this treaty had already 
become invalid by the virtue of comprehensiveness of the Treaty
yjQ
of Annexation, * Therefore, in the Japanese view, the Treaty of 
Annexation was the only one invalidated on August 15, 1948, and 
the invalidation was not retroactive to August 22, 1910. According 
to the Japanese view the ROK could not dispute the legal acts 
performed by Japan during her occupation of Korea, "The only 
justification of the Korean view may be found in the statement of 
the Prime Minister of the ROK that, while the facts of the past 
could not be ignored, they should not be acknowledged in the light 
of self-respect and the honor of the Korean people."^*
The jurisdictional control of the ROK was another basic point
45* Hanil hoedam paekso, op, cit,, p, 195 Prime Minister 
Chong Il-Kwon’s statement, Chosun IIbo, March 18, 1965? and 
Foreign Minister Lee Tong-won’s statement, "The First Year of the 
ROK-Japan Normalization and Prospective," op. cit,, p. 86,
46, "Joint Statement of the Members of the State Council," 
July 13, 1965, Chosun Ilbo, July 14, 1965.
47* Foreign Minister Shiina1s statement, Shugiin Kaigiroku, 
48th Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, No, 7 (March 19, 1965), 
p. 6 and his statement, Sangiin kaigitoku, 50th Session, Plenary 
Meetings, No, 8 (November 19, 1965), PP* 8 and 19*
48. The statement of Director of Bureau of Treaties, Foreign 
Ministry, Shugiin kaigiipoku9 50th Session, Special Committee on 
Ja.pan-RGK, No. 10 "(November 5, 1965), p. 2; and Foreign Minister 
Shiina*s statement, Sangiin kaigiroku, 50th Session, Plenary 
Meetings, No, 5 (October 16, 1965), P* 12.
49* Oda Shigeru, op, cit., p. 41*
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of dispute, developing from the division of Korea and the role
that Japan has been nourishing in the postwar era. The ROK has
maintained that she is the only legitimate government representing
the whole of Korea, and that her administrative and jurisdictional
control covers the entire area. Their national jurisdictional
control is asserted in Article 3 of the Constitution of the ROK,
and based on the authority of the aforementioned 131 Resolution
195(lll) as well as the fact that the majority of the nations have
50.recognized the ROK. * The ROK had repeatedly made clear to Japan
that unless this view was fully accepted by Japan, negotiations
51.for normalization of relations would be put aside.J * At the
beginning of the negotiations, the ROK1s view was hardly challenged,
because at that time Japan was still struggling with problems
brought upon her by defeat in the war, and was still under strong
American influence. But after 1955 her position on "two Koreas”
began to change, as her economic prosperity increased and she felt
the need of active Asian trade, irrespective of ideological
differences with the countries concerned. In the Japanese view,
it became also extremely difficult to isolate the ROK from Rorth
Korea as it was difficult to separate the “two Chinas.”
On May 27, 1955 Japan concluded a fisheries agreement with
52Rorth Korea, ostensibly in the name of the Japanese fishermen. *
At the same time Japanese missions, composed of businessmen and 
industrialists, started to visit Rorth Korea. In December 1956
50. Hanil hoedam paekso, op. cit., pp. 15 and 17. By the 
end of 1967> 77 nations recognized the ROK.
51. Ibid. p. 15.
52. Seoul Shinmun, June 9» 1955
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Japan repatriated twenty Koreans of south Korean origin to North
Korea and since then (from 1959 1° 1965) Japan has repatriated
some 85,000 pro-Gommunist Koreans to North Korea.J These
Japanese arrangements with North Korea were the first signs of the
new Japanese position on "two Koreas,*' as well as calculated
retaliation for the ROK's position on the Peace Line and the
54.seizure of Japanese vessels inside the line. In June 1955>
Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro stated that Japan was free to
negotiate with either the ROK or North Korea "depending on
practicality of the questions, even though she would not conclude
55any official agreement with the North K o r e a . T h i s  statement
was tantamount to de facto recognition of North Korea. The
Japanese ambiguity on the question of "two Koreas" was also among
the reasons why President Rhee, a hard-line anti-Communist, took
56.an increasingly unfriendly attitude towards Japan.
In 1962 Japan publicly stated that there were two Koreas, and
that the sovereignty of the ROK was limited to the area where she
57effectively exercised her control. * Since that date Japan has 
specifically maintained that she would recognize the ROK as the 
only government in Korea in such a sense that the UN Resolution 
195( m )  indicated the specific circumstance of establishing the 
ROK and characterized it as the only legitimate government in Korea
53. See the recollection of Xu T'ae-ha, former chief of the 
ROK Mission in Japan concerning the repatriation, Chosun Ilbo,
March 4, 1965.
54. Ibid.
55* Seoul Shinmun, June 9? 1955*
56. See President Rhee's open letter to Kakawa, December 21, 
1955? op* cit.i and Robert T. Oliver, "Destiny of the ROK and 
Japan," Chugan Hillman;;, No. 44> October 26, 1956, p. 6 .
57* E.g., Foreign Minister Kosaka's statement, Song Munsan, 
"The Japan-ROK Negotiations and the Character of the Park Regime," 
Sekai, May 1962, p. 195*
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under that circumstance. As such the ROK's effective jurisdic­
tional control is practically limited to the south of the armistice 
line.58-
In this connection, opponents in Japan of the ROK-Japan treaty
59.took the views, among others,  ^ that recognition of the ROK as the 
only legal government, and establishment of diplomatic relations 
only with the ROK, to the prejudioe of North Korea, (l) would be 
legal sanction to a permanent division of Korea, (2) would add 
another obstacle to unification of Korea, and (3) would not be fair 
on the part of Japan to have the ROK as the sole agent speaking for
58. This view is widely shared in Japan. See, e.g., the 
editorials of Asahi Shimbun, February 21, 1965 and of Mainichi 
Shimbun, April 4? 1965*
59* Other main reasons that some Japanese —  - nationalists, 
intellectuals, and particularly leftist parties and labor organ­
isations  - opposed to the ROK-Japan normalization were:
(1) the agreements on the property claims and fisheries 
were disadvantageous to the Japanese national interests - - - 
(the position of nationalists and some leftists).
(2) Article IV of the Treaty on Basic Relations, which 
provides a close cooperation between the ROK and Japan "in 
promoting their mutual welfare and common interests" in 
conformity with the principle of the Charter of the United 
Nations, is an open provision which will eventually tie 
Japan with an American sponsored tripartite military pact 
among the United States, Japan and the ROK. Such an alliance 
would be in violation of Article 9 of 'the Constitution of 
Japan which prohibits Japanese rearmament, and it will
intensify tension in the Far East ----  (the position of
leftists, Communists and intellectuals).
For an intellectual view, see especially Sakamoto Yoshikazu, 
"Ideological Transformation of Japanese Diplomacy: the U.S. - 
China Confrontation in the Japan-ROK Cooperation," Sekai, January 
1966, pp. 18-36. For leftists' views, see Ishino Hisao, "The 
Real Struggle Begins Now," Gekkan Shakaito (The Monthly Review 
of Socialist Party), No. 97> June 19^57 PP* 4“9? Ishihara Sakao, 
"American Asia Policy Centering Around the Japan-ROK Talks,"
Sekai, October 1965? PP* 53-8; Nihon Chosen Kenkyusho (Japan 
Institute of Korea Research), Ajia no heiwa to nikkan joyaku 
(Peace of Asia and the Japan-ROK TreatyJ™{Tokyo, 1965)? Eto 
ShinldLchi, "The Logic of Non-intervention," Chuokoron, August 
1965? PP* 50-63; Chairman Ota Kaoru's address at the extraordinary 
convention of Sohyo (General Council of Japan Trade Unions), 
October 6, 1965* Asahi Shimbun, October 6, 1965? and- an article 
on the leftist view, "Five Phases of Japan-ROK Treaty," Part I, 
Asahi Shimbun, September 29, 1965*
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the whole Korea in settlement of the issues.^* Therefore, the
question of "two Koreas" and the scope of jurisdiction of the
ROK was a sensitive issue for the Japanese government to handle
under the pressure of the powerful socialists’ and intellectuals'
opposition as well as in the face of hitter denouncement of the
61.North Korean regime.
Article III of the Treaty on Basic Relations provides!
It is confirmed that the Government of the Republic 
of Korea is the only lawful Government in Korea as 
specified in the Resolution 195(Hl) of the United 
Nations General Assembly.
The ROK holds that by Article III the ROK's assertion of juris­
dictional control over the entire area of the Korean Peninsula
62was fully recognized by Japan, * And as a result of this 
recognition, the ROK maintains, Japan has admitted the illegality 
of the North Korean regime, and is barred from establishing any
sr o
official relations with North Korea. Disagreeing with the ROK's
60. E.g., Saito Takashi, "A Divided Nation, the ROK, and 
the Characteristics of the Park Regime," Sekai, October 1965? 
pp. 45-52; Hadata Takashi, "Japan-ROK Friendship and Japan-ROK 
Treaty," op. cit., pp. 8-9; Kurota Hisao, op. cit., p. 204;
Nomura Koichi, "Japan-ROK Treaty and National Interests of Japan," 
Sekai, October 1956, PP* 75-86; and Sakamoto loshikazu, "Advice
to Japanese Diplomacy," Sekai, April 1965? PP* 56-66.
61. For the North Korean official statements denouncing the 
ROK-Japan normalization of relations, see Japanese texts pub­
lished by Zainichi Chosenjin sfJrengGkai (The General Federation 
of Korean Residents in Japan), Kanichi kaidan £ ronsu (Arguments 
on the ROK-Japan Talks), Korean Problems Series No.23 (Tokyo,
March 1965)? and Kanichi kaidan no sho kyotei wa muko de aru 
(All Agreements Concluded in the ROK-Japan Talks Are Null and 
Void), Korean Problems Series No. 25 (Tokyo, July 1965).
62. Hanil hoedam paeks6, op. cit., pp. 20-21; statement of 
Minister Without Portfolio Won Yong-s^k, Chosun Ilbo, July 15, 
1965; and Foreign Minister Lee Tong-won's statement, Chosun Ilbo, 
August 10, 1965*
63. Prime Minister Ch6ng Il-kwon's statement, Chosun Ilbo, 
August 11, 1965 and Foreign Minister Lee Tong-won*s statement, 
Tong-A Ilbo, August 9? 1965*
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view on Article 1X1, Japan still holds that it does not mean that
 ^A
Japan recognizes the ROK’s jurisdiction over all of Korea.
Japan said, however, that as a member of the United Rations
she will honor the UR Resolution 195(1X1) that the ROK is the
•’only such /legitimate/ Government” and in that sense, Japan,
unrelated to Article III, would not establish diplomatic relations
with Rorth Korea. How will Japan deal with Rorth Korea?
Japan will treat problems concerning Rorth Korea as practical
66.questions, not as legal questions. * It is clear that Japan has 
to live with both the ROK and Rorth Korea as practically as 
possible and to maintain cultural and economic relations with 
both of them.^*
THE PROBLEM CORGEHHIHG PROPERTY CLAIMS 
One of the main issties arising from the separation of Korea 
from Japan after the war was that of property claims which each 
side presented against the other.
64* Foreign Minister Shiina1s statements, Sangiin Kaigiroku, 
50th Session, Plenary Meetings, Ro. 8 (Hovember 19, 1965)? P* 14.
65* Foreign Minister Shiina*s statement, Asahi Shimbun,
October 15, 1965*
66. Ibid; and Prime Minister Sato’s statements, Hihon Keizai, 
October 5? 1965? and Shugiin kagiroku, 50th Session, Plenary 
Meetings, Ro. 13 (December 1, 1965)? P* 3.
67* See Tanaka Raokichi, "Two Koreas and the Japan-ROK 
Formalization,” Kokusai mondai (International Problems), Ho.62, May 
1965? PP* 37-43* For a critical analysis of the Japanese "two 
Koreas” policy, see Cho Soon-sung, ’’Japan's Two Koreas Policy and 
the Problems of Korean Unification,” Asian Survey, Vol. VII, Ro.10, 
October 1967? PP* 7G3-25* Oho argues that Japan’s ’’two Koreas” 
policy might not be harmful to Korea because ”it might facilitate 
communication between the two regimes and thus gradually build 
a mood for unification.” (p. 725)*
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In the first ROK-Japan conference, the ROK outlined to
68.Japan a long property claims list grouped in eight categories.
In summary, the main items of the Korean claims were:
(1) About 250 million grams of gold bullion and some 
67 million grams of silver bullion that Japan removed 
to Japan through the Bank of Chosen (Korea) during the 
period of 1909 to 1945*
(2) Various postal savings, insurance, and pension 
funds, etc., that the Japanese Government-General of Korea 
owed to Korean nationals as of August 9? 1945*
(3) The bank deposits drawn by Japanese nationals from 
banks in Korea and monies transferred or remitted from 
Korea to Japan since August 9? 1945*
(4) Properties of the Tokyo office of the Government- 
General of Korea, the properties in Japan possessed by any 
legal corpoi’ation which had its main office in Korea and 
various assets held in Japan by the banks with their main 
office in Korea as of August 1945*
(5) Claims for negotiable notes, Japanese currencies, 
unpaid salaries, pensions and compensations (of the con­
scripted Korean workers), dividends, etc. that the 
Government of Japan and Japanese nationals owed to Koreans.
(6) 668 vessels that Japan removed from Korean harbors 
after August 9> 1945*
(7 ) Art objects that Japan removed from Korea during her 
rule.
Against the ROK's claims, which Japan refused to discuss,
Japan offered counter-claims for property owned by the Japanese
government and Japanese nationals in Korea prior to the surrender
of Japan. This property had been in effect confiscated by the
Allied powers. On December 6, 1945? the U.S. Military Government
in Korea issued Ordinance No. 33, "Vesting* Title to Japanese
Property Within Korea," which gave title to all Japanese properties
in Korea, including those possessed by corporate, private and public
bodies, to the U.S. Military Government in Korea, as of September
69.
1945* After independence of the ROK, by the "Agreement
68. Hanil hoedam paeks8, op. cit., pp. 44-6. See also 
Yokomichi Setsuo, "My Questions on the Japan-ROK Treaty," Asahi 
Janaru, November 28, 1965) P* 94*
5*9* USAMGIK, Official Gazette, Ordinance No. 33, December 
6, 1945.
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Between the United States and the Republic of Korea on Initial
Financial and Property Settlement11 of September 11, 1948 the United
States transferred to the ROK all right, title and interest held
by the U.S. Military Government in Korea to former Japanese pro- 
70
perties. * Finally under Article 4(b) of the San Francisco Peace
Treaty, Japan recognized the validity of this American disposition
71 •of the properties to the ROK.
However Japan refused to acknowledge the validity of the
measures taken by the United States, and interpreted Article 4(b)
72.of the Peace Treaty differently. * The official Japanese view
of Article 4(b) was stated as follows by Professor lamashita Yasuo:
The Japanese property in Korea was vested in the U.S. 
Military Government for disposition; the disposition made 
by the U.S. Military Government was recognized by the Korean 
Government; and all liabilities including all current and 
future claims arising out of vesting, administration and 
disposal of Japanese property in Korea, passed to the Korean 
Government. Hence, the claims of Japan and its nationals to 
their property in Korea should be regarded as against Korea.
» * •
The fact that Japan recognized the validity of the dis­
positions of the Japanese property made by the U.S. Military 
Government in Korea should not be considered to mean that 
Japan has renounced all title claims to the disposed property.
In other words, Japan took the view that Japan and her nationals
were entitled to recover their property in Korea.
Under this interpretation, Japan could claim for 85 per cent
of the total property in Korea, according to Kubota the chief
74Japanese delegate to the third ROK-Japan conference. This
70. The U.S. Department of State, Korea, 1945 to 1948* op. cit., 
pp. 104-12 (Annex 27).
71. Article 4(b) provides, “Japan recognizes the validity of 
disposition of property of Japan and Japanese nationals made by 
or pursuant to directives of the United States Military Government 
in any of the areas referred to in Articles 2 and 3.“
72. Hanil hoedam paeksfl, op. cit., pp. 41-42.
73. Yamashita Yasuo, “Title Claim to Japanese Property in Korea,*1 
The Japanese Annual of International Law, Ho. 2, 1958, p. 41*
74* Robert T. Oliver, “Destiny of the ROK and Japan,“ op. cit.,
p. 6.
extraordinary property olaim seemed largely intended to cancel out
7 5,
the Korean property claims* The ROK’s position, that the 
Japanese claim to property in Korea had been nullified by her sig­
nature to the Peace Treaty, and consequently should not be subject 
to negotiation, was supported by the U.S. Department of State.
Japan finally withdrew her claim to property in Korea on December 
31, 1957 when she accepted nThe U.S. Memorandum on the Interpre­
tation of Article 4(b) of the Peace Treaty with Japan.
The ROK’s property claims were for the first time put on the 
agenda in the fifth conference (October i960 - May 1961). The ROK 
(under the new government of Chang Myon) argued that the Korean 
property claims were based on legitimate and legal grounds, and
that they were not intended as war reparations, but for restor-
77.ation of property removed from Korea to Japan. * The first
Japanese position was that the ROK’s property claims had no solid
legal basis, and, even if they were legitimate, the effective dates
78.on which the claims were based were all questionable* * Later 
Japan agreed to offer compensation for the property claims of the 
ROK, in so far as the ROK could present solid legal evidence.
75. According to Yu Ohin-o, the Japanese"delegates assured 
the Korean delegates in private talks, ”We would not really claim 
for property in Korea.” See Yu Chin-o, ’’About the ROK-Japan Talks,” 
Kim Song-jin et al, ed., op. cit., p. 110.
76. Japan disclaimed for property in Korea officially in 
’’Joint Communique,” December 31, 1957> between the ROK Ambassador 
Kim Yu-taik and Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro, in 
’’Documents,” op. cit., p. 222. The memorandum was originally 
delivered t.o the Governments of the ROK and Japan on April 29,
1952, but both Governments refused to accept it. An excerpt of 
the memorandum is available in Oda Shigeru, op. cit., pp. 44-5*
77• Hanil hoedam paeks6, op. cit., p. 194*
78. E.g., the editorial of Mainichi Shimbun, September 9>
1961.
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But the ROK was not really able to produce the necessary documents
79.for evidence. ' During the Korean War, the documents which had 
been collected were destroyed or lost. The problem of producing 
evidence was further complicated. For example, identification 
and separation of the names of Korean nationals from those of 
Japanese nationals in the record books was very difficult, because 
practically all Koreans used Japanese names under the Japanese rule.
President Rhee was reported to have instructed the ROK dele­
gation to claim anywhere between $2,000 million to $8,000 million, 
countering the $5>000 - $6,000 million that Japan had claimed for
Soher property in Korea. * In the fifth conference, Chang Myon1s 
government calculated $1 ,250 million based on the eight categories 
of claims, and sounded out Japan's willingness to settle the claims
Sxat $800 million. * Japan recognised first a legal basis for
Korean claims amounting to no more than $15 million, but later
82raised this to $50 million. * The military junta of the ROK 
again demanded $800 million at the beginning of negotiations in the 
sixth conference (October I96I - April 1964)? while Japan was
Q 71
willing to pay the maximum amount of $70 million.
79* Hanil hoedam paeksc$, op. cit., pp. 246-5O; testimony of 
Kim^Tong-cho, former Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kukhoe 
hoeuirok, 40th Session, Committee on I’oreign Affairs, No. 9 
^February 21, 1964)9 P* 24.
80. Statement of Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Ch&ng II- 
y&ng, Kukhoe hoeuirok, 40th Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
No. 6 "(February 12, 1964), P* 14* According to Setsuo, a member 
of Japan's House of Representatives, Korea claimed between 
$1,200 million and $1,400 million while Japan claimed $9,000 
million - $12,000 million, Yokomichi Setsuo, op. cit., p. 91*
* Hanil hoedam pae^ so, ojd. cit., p. 246 5 and Hankuk soshik 
(Nev/s from Korea), Supplement Issue for the ROK-Japan Talks,
April 21, I965, p. 12.
82. Hanil hoedam paeksb, ibid., p. 250: and Yokomichi Setsuo, 
0£.cit., p. 92.
"*"113. Asahi Shimbun, January 14, 1964? Mainiohi Shimbun, November 
14, 1962; and testimony of Kim Ghong-pil, Kukhoe hoetlirok, 40th 
Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, No. 5 "(February 10, 1964)9 
p. 3*
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In 1962 both the ROK and Japan decided to settle the property 
claims of Korea through high level political negotiations. Japan
8 A
was now reported to be ready to compensate the ROK up to $300 million
including much desired economic assistance, provided that all other
issues were settled at the same time. On November 12, 19&2, Kim
\
Chong-pil, Director of the Korean G.I.A., and Foreign Minister 
Ohira Masayoshi reached an understanding, which was not made public 
until January, 1963. This understanding became known as the "Kim- 
Ohira Memorandum" and became a source of controversy because of 
the secrecy shrouding its negotiation and its content.
The "Kim--0hira Memorandum" set guidelines for settlement of
85.the Korean property claims, as follows:
(1) $300 million grant for the Korean property claims 
(payable in 10 annual instalments).
(2) $200 million in governrnent-to-governrnent credits to 
the ROK as economic assistance (at annual interest rate of 
3.5$) to be paid back over a period of 20 years after 7 
years grace period).
(3) $100 million or more in commercial credits (terms in 
accordance with usual international financial practice).
(4) Grant and credits to be payable in Japanese products 
and services.
The Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Pro-
perty and Claims and Economic Cooperation of June 22, 1965 was
drawn up following the guidelines of the "Kim-0hira" understanding,
except Japan understood that the commercial credits to the ROK
86could be increased from $100 million up to $300 million.
Although the Agreement differentiates the amount of $300 million, 
as a grant, from the rest of the settlement as credits for economic 
development of the ROK, it does not clearly state that the grant 
is compensation for the Korean property claims arising from the
84. Testimony of Kim Chong-pil, ibid.
85. Ibid., p. 4; and Hanil hoedam paeks6, op. cit., p. 49*
86. See Exchanged Notes Concerning Article l(2"y~of the 
Agreement»
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’’unfortunate past," as the ROK maintained. While the ROIC sees the
O ff
whole settlement as constituting such compensation, '* Japan regards
it as "economic cooperation", or as a "congratulatory fund for
. n „ 88* independence".
FISHERY PROBLEM AID PIACE LIRE
The fishery problem between the ROIC and Japan had been perhaps
the key stumbling block in negotiations.^* The problem was closely
connected with the origin of the ROIC’s "Proclamation Concerning
the Sovereignty of the Coastal Seas”, which established the so-
called "Peace Line”, referred to as the "Rhee Line” by Japan. The
Peace Line was proclaimed by President Rhee on January 18, 1952,
about two weeks after Japan had refused to negotiate for a fishery
90.agreement in the first ROK-Japan conference.
When Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty, she became 
obligated under Article 9 to negotiate fishery agreements immedi­
ately with any Allied country so desiring. Under Article 21, the 
ROIC was specifically entitled to negotiate with Japan for such an 
agreement. By Article 9 Japan also acknowledged restrictions on 
her right to fish in open waters around the Allied nations and the 
ROIC. Accordingly Japan had concluded fishery agreements with the 
United States and Canada on May 9? 1952. The negotiations for 
these agreements started in November 1951> six months before the
87. Hankuk soshik, op. cit., p. 12.
88. Foreign Minister Shiina’s statement, Shugiin kagirolcu,
50th Session, Special Committee on Japan-ROK, No. 4~T0ctober 27, 
1965)? P» 6 * When the Japanese leaders explained that the claims 
settlement was really a congratulatory gesture 011 the part of 
Japan, the Koreans and some Japanese denounced this as an arrogant 
expression. See, e.g., Kurota Hisao, op. cit., p. 206.
89. For an objective legal study on the fishery dispute, see 
Guenter Weissberg, Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea and 
the Japanese-Korean Fishery Dispute"TThe Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
196 67.
90. Hanil hoedam paeksff, op. cit., p. 256.
81
Peace Treaty went into effect. But at the time she refused to nego­
tiate with the EOK, because Japan was not yet prepared for such
negotiations.”^ * The ROK viewed the Japanese refusal as arrogance,
92.
as well as a violation of the provisions of the Peace Treaty.
The ROK also interpreted the Japanese refusal as a wait-and-see 
attitude until the Peace Treaty became effective, in April 1952, 
and the MacArthur Line, which had been established to restrict 
Japanese fishing activities during the occupation period , was 
abolished. Under this circumstance, the ROK took other measures 
to protect her fishery resources in her coastal waters from
93.Japanese fishing vessels, which always had superior techniques.
This is the origin of the Peace Line. It was declared by Rhee, 
upon advice of the Korean delegates returning from the first con­
ference. It did not originate from Ehee’s hostility as has been 
believed. *^ *
In the Proclamation, President Rhee declared that he was
acting in ’'accordance with established international precedents
and impelled by the necessity of safeguarding permanently national
95.welfare and defense.""^ It established an exclusive fishery zone 
around the ROK bounded by demarcation lines which extended out
91* Ibid., pp. 76 and 256, and the testimony of Yu Chin-o 
Kukhoe ho'eSirok, 40th Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs lo. 9 
(February 21, 1964), p. 1.
92* Hanil hoedam paekso, op. cit., p. 256.
93* Ibid.. p. 76 and the testimony of Yu Chin-o, Kukhoe 
hoeuirok, 40th Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Ho. 9 
(February 21, 1964), pp. 1-2.
94* Chin-o’s discussion with Yu Chang-sun in "Dis­
cussion: The Inside Story of 10 years Negotiations and 6 Con­
ferences", Sasangge, Supplement, April 1964* P* 33? and the 
testimony of Kim Tong-cho, Kukhoe hoeuirok, 40th Session, Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, No. 9 (February 21, 1964)? P* 21.
95* "Proclamation Concerning the Sovereignty of the Coastal 
Seas," January 18, 1952, Taehanminkuk Kongboch1#, Vol. for Economic, 
Diplomatic, Military, Cultural and Social Affairs, op. cit., pp.82-4*
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50 to 60 nautical miles from the Korean Peninsula and its insular 
coastal lines. It also stated that*
(1) The EOK holds and exercises national sovereignty over 
all natural resources, mineral and marine, that exist 
or will be discovered in the future in, or beneath, 
the shelf adjacent to Korean Peninsula and its insular 
coasts, in order to conserve and develop them.
(2) The Government of the EOK places all these resources 
and related industries, particularly fisheries and 
fishing, under its supervision and control in order to 
prevent this exhaustible type of resources from being 
exploited to the disadvantage of the Korean people or 
decreased or destroyed to the detriment of the nation.
(3) The EOK will modify the demarcation lines in accordance 
with new circumstance arising from new discoveries, 
studies or interests that may come to light in the 
future.
(4) This declaration by no means interferesqwith rights of 
freedom of navigation on the high seas. *
In September 1952, immediately following the rioting by 
Communist prisoners-of-war on K&je Island, General Mark Clark, 
Commander of the United Nations Forces, declared a line, an appro­
ximate duplication of the Peace Line, primarily as a military 
defense line, in order to prevent infiltration of the Communists 
and illegal traffic of contraband goods from Eorth Korea and Japan.
This "Clark Line" was also partly intended to mitigate the dispute
97*between the EOK and Japan near the Peace Line. The Clark Line 
ceased to be effective with the signing of the armistice of the 
Korean War in July 1953, and was later abolished. Because of the 
Clark Line, the EOK felt that the legitimacy of the Peace Line as 
a defense line was reinforced.
On December 12, 1954> ^Le EOK enacted the "Law for Conserv­
ation of Fishery Eesources" (Law Ho. 298). The law was enacted to 
provide legal means to deal with the Japanese fishermen caught
96.Ibid. See also Ehee's statement, "Amplification of the 
Proclamation Concerning Sovereignty of the Coastal Seas," February
8, I952, ibid., pp. 84-5.
97. Hanil hoedam paeks6, op. cit., pp. 201-2.
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inside the Peaoe Line.^8* After the proclamation of the Peace Line
(1952-1964)* & total of 232 Japanese vessels were seised, and
2,784 fishermen were sentenced to terms ranging from a few months
99.to more than one year in the Aliens Detention Camp in Pusan.^
The ROK has never denied the unilateral nature of the Peace 
Line, but she has viewed it as a legitimate and proper measure to 
conserve and protect fishery resources, following international 
precedents set by declarations of the United States, Australia, 
Canada, and Latin American c o u n t r i e s . A s  a disinterested 
observer of the Korean-Japanese fishery dispute, Professor Guenter 
Weissberg, however, concluded*
The Rhee Line, which Korea has established under the 
pretext of a conservation measure and whose legality has by 
implication been rejected at the Geneva Conferences, has 
little foundation in international law. Of all the prece­
dents cited by Korea only the equally debatable decrees and 
declarations of less than a handfijJ^of Latin American states 
lend it any semblance of support.
The Japanese reaction to the proclamation of the Peace Line
was an immediate proposal for fishery negotiations, negotiations
for a fishery agreement got nowhere, but the Peace Line gave the
102ROK powerful leverage against Japan, then and later. * Through­
out the negotiations, the Japanese held that the Peace Line was a 
clear violation of international law; that the seizures of Japanese 
fishing vessels were all illegal acts which violated the freedom 
of the high seas; and that Japan reserved all claims for compen­
sation for suffering, damages, and losses stemming from the seizures.
98. Ibid., p. 205.
99. The figures are Oda Shigeru’s, op. cit., p. 51* The ROK’s 
official figures between 1954-1963 are 160 vessels and 1,939 
fishermen. Kongbopu (Ministry of Public Information), Hanil hoedam 
gwa uri ui ipchang (The ROK-Japan Talks and Our Position)’ ’["Seoul,
19647TP. 22.
100. E.g., Seoul Shinmun, October 23, 1958.
101. Guenter Weissberg, op. cit., p. 80.
102. The Rhee’s policy was to use the Peace Line as a long­
term weapon in bargaining for other issues. Hanil hoedam paeks6, 
op. cit., p. 258.
I 1 w w n  | f “  —
103. For Japanese views of the Peace Line, see, e.g., Mura 
Tsuneo, "The Rhee Line," Japan Quarterly, Vol. VI, Ho.l, January- 
March 1959> PP* 26-7.
103.
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The Japanese official position has been not to recognize the coastal
nations' rights in regard to continental shelves, and Japan considers
that such rights are not recognized under international law.^^*
Although Japan aclcnowledges that the necessity for conservation of
fishery resources is now universally recognized, she maintains that
this does not necessarily mean that a coastal nation can enforce
105.unilateral control over fishing in the high seas.
As the Peace Line represented an illegal and unilateral 
exercise of power to the Japanese, the seizure of Japanese vessels 
and the detention of fishermen by the ROK outraged them. After 
1955 a number of rallies condemning the Peace Line and the ROK took 
place in Tokyo and other western Japanese coastal cities. The 
local fishermen, the families of those detained by the Koreans, and 
their representatives in local and national legislatures demanded 
from the government better protection for Japanese vessels, sus­
pension of trade with the ROK, and other retaliatory measures 
against the ROK,^^* As the Korean seizures continued, the Japanese 
Government assigned patrol ships of the Maritime Security Agency 
to escort Japanese fishing vessels inside the Peace Line. The ROK 
reacted to the Japanese measure by strengthening her own patrol 
and by increasing her seizures. In turn the Japanese government
retaliated by restricting economic activities of the Koreans residing
. T 107. m  Japan. 1
In the midst of mutal escalation of hostility, Japan repatriated^
104. Foreign Minister Shiina1s statement, Asahi Shimbun,
October 15> 1965*
105. See the general views of Japanese scholars and also the 
official view of Japan, as summarized by Mura Tsuneo, op. cit., 
pp. 32-3.
106. Seoul Shinmun, December 6, 1955 and December 7> 1955*
^07• Seoul Shinmun, January 15, 1956*
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as mentioned previously, the twenty pro-communist Koreans to North
Korea, as a prelude to the mass repatriation of Koreans that
started in December 1959* The United States, deeply concerned over
the aggravation of relations between the two countries, stepped in
and mediated the agreement of 1957 f03? "tde mutual release of
detainees --  - Koreans held in the Alliens1 Detention Gamp in
Ohmura, Japan, and Japanese fishermen detained in the Aliens1
Detention Camp in Pusan, Korea. *
The agreement provided a cooling spell. But this initial
success was nullified by the failure of the ROKfs efforts to halt
the mass reparation of Koreans to North Korea. The United States
again arranged a repatriation to the ROK of some 6,000 Korean
families residing in Japan (most of them had been conscripted .
laborers during the Japanese rule), in an effort to cancel out the
Japanese plan for the mass repatriation to North Korea. But the
ROK and Japan failed to agree on the minor technicality of selecting
109the proper channel for handling the repatriates1 settlement fees. ^
After this breakdown, the mass repatriation of Koreans to North
Korea began, and it further contributed to aggravation of their
relations. All these seemingly arrogant and ill-advised acts on
both sides are told here to illustrate the emotional stress and
human sufferings generated by the Peace Line and the fishery problem
Towards the end of his regime, President Rhee was said to be
in favor of negotiation with Japan for an exclusive fishery zone
1] 0.of the ROK by modifying the Peace Line, ' * in return for a
108. See "Joint Communique,11 December 31, 1957, between the 
ROK Ambassador Kim Yu-taik and Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama 
Aiichiro, op. cit., p. 222.
109. The recollection of former Ambassador Yu Tae-ha, _og. cit.
110. Rhee!s interview with the AP bureau chief in Tokyo in 
July, 1959, Hankuk soshik, op* cit., p. 8.
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111favourable settlement of the Korean property claims. * Prime
Minister Chang Mybn, who replaced Rhee Syngman, called the Peace
112.Line "a kind of cancer" in ROK-Japan relations * and assured
Japan that the Peace Line would be modified, if Japan showed
113.sincerity in settling the Korean property claims. * Again in
November I96I when General Park visited Japan, he repeated the
suggestion of his predecessor.■^4* Chong-pil, co-author
of the 'TCim-Ohira Memorandum," made the ROK's proposal more honest
by stating that "the Peace Line is not based on international law
and our case is not favorable if we contest in the International
115.Court of Justice." Japan was favorably impressed by the
changing attitude of the ROK on the Peace Line. In return she 
repeatedly indicated that she was willing to take a more accommo­
dating position on the ROK's property claims, if the ROK wotild 
really show flexibility on the Peace Line. * The consensus of 
Japanese public opinion was that any concession on the part of
Japan in the matter of the Korean property claims could be justified
117only by abolition or modification of the Peace Line. *
In this connection, it would be appropriate to mention some 
critical economic consequences of the Peace Line. In Japan the
111. The statement of Ambassador Yang Yu-chkn in Washington,
ibid.
112. His statement on July 20, i960, ibid.
113. The testimony of Chong Il-y&ng, Kukhoe hoeuirok, 39^h 
Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, N0."*5 (January 14, 1964)? 
p. 5*
114»Asahi Shimbun, November 13, I96I.
115. His testimony, Kukhoe hoeuirok, 40th Session, Committee 
^n Foreign Affairs, No. 5 (February 10, 1964)9 PP* 15-6.
116. Prime Minister Hatoyama suggested it as early as 1955* 
See Yu Chin-o, "About the ROK-Japan Talks," op. cit., p. 109, 
and see also Kimura Shuzo, op. cit., p. 121.
117* E.g., the editorials of Asahi Shimbun, January 8, 1965, 
and of Mainichi Shimbun, December 2$, 19^2 5 and the statement of 
Prime Minister Ikeda in Kondo Yasuo, "Economic Basis of Withdrawal 
of the Rhee Line," Sekai, March 1964? P* 119*
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Peace Line had been always a source of political discontent,
especially in the western coastal areas, such as the prefectui’es
of Yaraaguchi, Fukuoka, and Nagasaki, where the victims of the
Peace Line were concentrated. According to Mura Tsuneo, the Peace
Line denied to Japan annually about 2 million metric tons of fish,
1X3valued at 27 billion in Japanese yen. * The waters off the 
Cheju Island alone had prevented Japan from earning annually 
13 billion yen. As a result, 39 per cent of trawl fishing indus­
try, involving sixty different companies, was in a state of 
119.bankruptcy.  ^ The "Peace Line" of the Koreans was the "grudging
120line" to the fishermen of western Japan. *
To the Korean fishermen, the Peace Line was taken for granted
during the long years of its existence. For them it was a "life
line" protecting their underdeveloped fishing industry from the
far superior Japanese fleet. Ironically, the Peace Line which had
allegedly provided protection for the welfare of the Korean
fishing population numbering some 10 million had actually never
served this purpose well. It had instead contributed to the
stagnation of the fishing industry in the EOK,
The government of the ROK reported that each month several
hundred Japanese fishing vessels under the protection of the
Japanese Maritime Security Agency crossed the Peace Line, and took
121out of Korean waters some 230,000 tons of fish each year. * The 
inability to police the Peace Line stemmed directly from the
118. Mura Tsuneo, op. cit., p. 33
119. Ibid.
120. Nishimura Toshio, "The Rhee Line Viewed from Inside," 
Asahi Janaru, March 15, 19&4> P* 6.
121. Hanil hoedam gwa uri ui ipchang, op. cit., pp. 20-1
weakness of the ROIC Coast Guard as compared to the strength of
122.its Japanese counterpart. * Prime Minister Ch&ng Il-kwon
testified in the Rational Assembly that it would cost the ROK
$1,000 million to upgrade the Korean Coast Guard sufficiently to
123.defend the Peace Line. * The wisdom of spending such a large
amount was questionable. The government of the ROK was also aware
of the fact that the total Korean fishery production was not
improving over the years and that the income per capita of the
fishing population had remained at the low level of $30, in spite 
124,
of the Peace Line. An important contributing factor here was
Japanese retaliation to the Peace Line in form of strict re­
strictions on the exporting of fishing vessels and equipments to 
the R0K.125#
In the fifth conference, the ROK and Japan began to discuss
the substantial aspects of the fishery problem. The basic position
of the ROK was that the settlement must include the following
considerations* (l) permanent preservation and development of
fishery resources in the Korean coastal waters, (2) establishment
and maintenance of fishery zones for the exclusive use of the
Korean fishermen, with guarantee of their rights and interests,
and (3) rapid modernization of the Korean fishing industry to the
126.level of that of the advanced countries. * On the other hand, 
the Japanese position was that settlement must (l) be based on
122. See ibid., p. 21.
123. His statement, Kukhoe hoeuirok, 39^h Session, Plenary 
Meetings, Ro. 7 (December 26, 1963)» p. 14*
124. Hanil hoedam gwa uri jli ipohang, op. cit., p. 22.
See also Hishimura Toshio, "The Rhee Line Viewed Prom Inside," 
op. cit., pp. 6-7.
125. ICondo Yasuo, op. cit., p. 123* v
126. Won Yong-s’6k, HaniT"o8p hoedam un wae 6ry8un munje inga 
(Why are the ROK-Japan Fishery Talks A Difficult Problem?) (Seoul * 
Samhwa insaeso, 1965)? P* 5«
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general practices and international precedents, and (2) take into
consideration the Japanese fishery records and the present state
127*of the Japanese fishing industry.
Both countries had agreed on the principle of establishing
fishery zones extending 12 miles, within which each country would
exercise exclusive jurisdiction. The problem was, however, how
to draw the baselines for 12 mile zone from the Korean coastal line.
The ROK insisted on drawing straight baselines connecting the
extreme outward tips of the off-shore islandsj while Japan wanted
to base the 12 mile limit on the low tide line of the coastal 
128.peninsula. * In other words, the ROK wanted 30 to 40 miles in 
average from the coastal line of the Korean Peninsula, while Japan 
would recognize 12 miles from the coast of the peninsula as the 
exclusive fishery zone.
Another problem was presented by the joint regulation zones 
to be set up outside the exclusive zone - - - what should be their 
scope and what regulatory measures allowed?1*^’ The EOK wanted 
wider zones, and power to regulate the Japanese fishery activities 
as much as possiblej while Japan was in favor narrow zones and of 
less stringent control. The final remaining question was that of 
the amount of the loans for the fishery cooperation fund. The 
ROK demanded ^178 million? Japan offered ^30 million.
The Agreement on fisheries of June 22, 1965 is a product of 
compromise. It reflects the ROIC’s position in the exclusive
127. Ibid. See also ’’The Japan-ROK Negotiations Came to Near 
Conclusion," Asahi Janaru, March 22, 1964, pp. 13-5*
128. Won Yong-sbk, ibid., p. 6.
129« For the positions taken by both countries, see ibid., 
pp. 31“4j and Hankuk IIbo, February 1, 1964*
130. Hankuk IIbo, February 1, 1964.
fishery zone, and the Japanese position in the joint regulation
zone. The Agreement recognizes that each country has the right to
establish an exclusive fishery zone of 12 miles limit, provided
that, when a straight baseline is used to establish the zone, the
131*
baseline must be determined by mutual agreement.' * Japan 
agreed to allow the ROK to establish her exclusive fishery zone 
from four straight baselines connecting the tips of the various
I'jp
off-shore islands.
Both countries also established joint regulation zones outside
the ROIC's exclusive zone, and agreed on various provisional
regulatory measures in regard to the maximum number of fishing
133.vessels in the area, size of the vessels, type of fishing. * The
task of observation and enforcement of the regulations, and the
jurisdictional control over the violator of the regulations in the
area are entrusted to each country^ patrol boats whose flag the
134*fishing vessel concerned flies. Along with this agreement,
Japan offered $120 million in commercial loans to the ROK for her
fishing industry ( $ 9 0  million for general purposes and $30 million
for ship-building) as a partial settlement of the property claims.
The Peace Line is not mentioned in the agreement. This raises
the question whether the Peace Line still exists. The ROK at first
stated that "the Peace Line was never discussed, it remains as it 
135.was". Foreign Minister Lee Tong-won later clarified this
131. Article 1*
132. Exchanged Uotes Concerning Use of Straight Baselines,
June 22, 1965, Chosun Ilbo, June 23, 1965*
133. Articles 2 and 3, Annex, and the Minutes of the Dis­
cussion regarding to the Agreement.
134. Article 4*
135. The statement of Minister of Agriculture and Forestry,
Oh'a ICyun-hui, Chosun Ilbo, April 4? 19^5*
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position by saying that it still existed as far as its aims were
concerned., i.e., national defense and conservation of fishery 
136.resources. * On the other hand, Japan maintained that it was not
necessary even to mention the Peace Line in the agreement since
the Peace Line was illegal from the beginning and was never
137.recognised by Japan. However Foreign Minister Shiina stated
that Japan would not object 1the continued existence of the Peace
N
Line as the ROK's defense line since Japan has nothing to do with
military problems o v e r s e a s . F o r  Japan, the most important
thing is that safe fishing operations have been guaranteed. Other
139arguments beside this point are ’’not practical".
THE LEGAL STATUS ARP TREATMENT OF KOREANS IN JAPAN 
The problem of the Korean minority in Japan formed an important 
chapter in the history of the ROK-Japan negotiations*^^* At the 
end of World War II, there were more than 2,000,000 Koreans in 
Japan.^^* Following the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910,
•*■36. Chosun IIbo, October 7> 1965*
137* The statement of Director General of the Cabinet 
Legislative Bureau, Shugiin Kaigiroku, 49fb Session, Standing 
Committee on Budgets, No. 2 "^August 4> 1969) 9 P* 24*
138. His statement, Asahi Shlmbun, October 19, 1969*
139* Prime Minister Sato's statement, Nihon ICeizai,
October 9> 1969.
140. For the origin of the Korean minority in Japan, see 
Richard H. Mitchell, The Korean Minority in Japan (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles* University of California Press, 1967)5 Edward W. 
Wagner, The Korean Minority in Japan, 1804-1990 (New Yorks 
International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1991)? 
and Lee Yu~gan, Zainiohi kankokuj in no gojunenshi (A Fifty Year 
History of the Koreans in Japan) (Tokyo: Shinkibussan, i960),
141* Homusho, nyukoku kanri kyoku (Ministry of Justice, 
Immigration Control Bureau, Japan), Shutsunyukoku kanri to sono 
jittai (Immigration Control and Its Facts) (Tokyo, 1938), p. 12.
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a large number of Koreans, most of them rural origin, uprooted 
from their traditional rural life, had emigrated to Manchuria, 
Siberia and Japan in search of livelihood. The Japanese conquest 
of Manchuria in 1931 (the Manchuria Incident) led to rapid 
expansion of Japanese industry which required a huge labor force 
to meet war needs. By 1933 the number of Koreans in Japan was 
approximately 456,000 and in 1936, 690,000.^^*
In March 1938 the Japanese Diet enacted the National General 
Mobilization Act to meet the labor shortage. Under this Act 
between 1939 and 1945 hundreds of thousands of Korean laborers 
were brought forcibly to Japan. Most of the conscripted
Korean laborers worked in mines or as stevedores. At the end of 
the war the number of conscripted Korean laborers in Japan was 
6 8 0 , 0 0 0 . QThus at the end of the war the number of Koreans in 
Japan was altogether more than 2 million.
Immediately after the war the SCAP facilitated the repatriation
of Japanese in Korea to Japan, and of Koreans in Japan to Korea.
Between August 1945 and August 1947? about 1,390?000 Koreans left
145for the southern part of Korea. But the SCAP directive of
September 22, 1945? which restricted the baggage allowance (to what 
they could carry) and the cash which could be taken (up to 1,000 yen 
per person), discouraged probable Korean repatriates from planning 
to return home.^^* Other reasons for their discouragement were
142. Richard H. Mitchell, op. pit., p. 76.
143* Ibid., p. 78.
144. Ibid., p. 84*
145- Edward W. Wagner, oj>. cat., pp. 43-6.
146. Richard H. Mitchell, o£. cit., pp. 102-35 and Shinozaki 
Heiji, Keisatsujo Keibinika (the Second Section of the Security, 
Bureau of Police), Zainiohi chosen,jin undo (Movement of Korean 
Residents in Japan)"~(Tokyo: Reibunsha, 1955;? P* 43; The SCAP 
decreed such restrictive measures to halt further deterioration 
of economic conditions in Japan, Hanil hoedam paeksft, op. cit.,
p. 190.
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the prospect of a permanent division of Korea, the rapid deter­
ioration of economic conditions, and widespread unemployment in
3 47.the southern part of Korea. As a result more than 600,000
Koreans remained in Japan. Today most of them are still unskilled 
laborers with a very low standard of living and little education.1^*  
They are in general considered undesirable by the Japanese.
In an attempt to clarify the status of the Koreans for
administrative purposes, on November 20, 19469 the SCAP decreed
that Koreans in Japan were to be treated as Japanese nationals.^49*
The Koreans refused to accept the status of Japanese nationals,
and demanded a status equal to that of Allied nationals in Japan.
However in June 1948 the SCAP accorded to the Koreans a special
160status - - "semi-independent" from the Japanese nationality. J *
The SCAP further increased the uncertainty of the Korean status 
when it stated, in a memorandum to the Japanese authority, June 27,
1950, that the status of the Koreans was undetermined until such 
time as the ROK and Japan should conclude an agreement following 
the Peace Treaty.
In the meantime the Japanese authorities had enacted the Alien 
Registration Law of May 2, 1947 which required Koreans to register 
as nationals of either "Chosen" (Korea) or "Kankoku" (ROK).1^2*
On April 28, 1952 the government of Japan enacted Law Ho. 126 which 
permitted continued residence to those Koreans who had entered
147* Homush(5) n^ Cftcotai op. cit., p. 12.
148. See the statistics in Morita Kazuo, Suji kara mita 
zainiohi chosen.jin (The Koreans In Japan Prom the Statistical Views) 
(Tokyo:Gaimusho, ajia kyoku, i960), pp. 9“23.
149* Shinozaki Heiji, op. cit., pp. 14-5 and 27-8.
150. Hanil hoedam paeksb, ojd. cit., p. 25.
151. Lee Chong-sik, "Japanese-ICorean Relations in Perspective," 
cit., p. 319.
152. Oda Shigeru, 0£. cit., p. 50*
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Japan prior to September 2, 1945 and had since resided there 
"until such time as their status and the period of their stay
153,
might be determined by some future law"* J Thus the status of 
the Koreans in Japan was uncertain, varying from that of 
"Japanese nationals", to "special status nationals" or "aliens"*
In October 1951? when the EOK and Japan opened negotiations, 
the basic position of the ROIC was: (l) in determining the status 
of Koreans in Japan, the unique historical circumstance of their 
existence in Japan must be the foremost consideration; (2) therefore, 
a favorable legal status unique among aliens in Japan should be 
given to the Koreans, with the privilege of permanent residence for 
themselves and their descendants, and with freedom to remove their 
personal property and funds to the EOK, when they choose to return 
there; (3) they should be accorded the same privileges and oppor­
tunity in matters of education, health, social security, employment, 
business activities and property rights as enjoyed by Japanese 
nationals; and (4) all Koreans must be treated as the nationals 
of the EOK under the protection of the EOK (not that of Horth 
K o r e a j apanese position was that she would recognize the 
unique origin of Koreans in Japan. But she would not grant
favorable legal status and treatment to the Koreans to the prejudice
155.of other aliens in Japan.
In the first conference in 1952, Japan agreed to classify all
156.Koreans as nationals of the ROK. J * Japan also made concessions
x53. Ibid., p. 49.
154* Hanil hoedam paekso, op. cit., pp. 26-7*
155* Hanil hoedam gwa uri ui ipchang, op. cit., p. 28.
156. Japan insisted on classifying all Koreans in Japan as 
citizens of the ROK, fearing that the ROK might demand Japanese 
citizenship as the right of Koreans in Japan. See the testimony 
of Xu Chin-o, Kukhoe hoeiiirok, 40th Session, Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Ho. 9 (February 21, 1964), PP* 16-7*
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to the ROIC’s demands as to privileges of permanent residence,
157*favorable treatment, and the removal of property and funds*
But in the subsequent conferences the main point of discussion was 
the right of the Japanese authorities to deport the Koreans. The 
ROIC felt that if the Japanese government held full authority to 
deport Koreans, the right of permanent residence to be given to 
the Koreans as well as their property rights could be endangered 
at the discretion of the Japanese officials. Under the Japanese 
Immigration Control Ordinance, a Korean could, for example, be 
arrested and sentenced up to one year of imprisonment for not 
carrying his alien registration card (Article 18) and could then
“i rQ
be deported for having been sentenced to imprisonment (Article 24). *
Further negotiations on the status and treatment of the Korean were
however brought to a standstill by the 1959 mass repatriation by
Japan of the Koreans to North Korea. The mass repatriation to
North Korea provided Japan with a partial solution to the pressing
problems of the Korean minority in the country, but it worsened
159.relations between the ROIC and Japan.
Under the Agreement on Legal Status and the Treatment of the 
Nationals of the ROK residing in Japan of June 22, 1 $6 $, Japan 
granted the right of permanent residence to all nationals of the 
ROK who entered Japan prior to the end of the war (August 16, 1945)>
157* Hanil hoedam paeics6, op. cit ., p. 27.
158, Lee Chong-sik, "Japane se-Korean Relations in Perspective," 
op. cit., p. 319.
159* For the details of the mass repatriation, see “Re­
patriation of Koreans in Japan to North Korea," Chosun Ilbo, March 
4, 1965, and Richard H. Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 139-44* For the 
official reaction of the ROIC, see the statement of Foreign Minister 
Cho Ch&ng-hwan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROK, Speeches and 
Statements by Foreign Minister Chung W. Cho (Seoiil7~1959)T 
pp.84-5• See also the statement of the Korean delegate Yu Chin-o 
at a meeting with the President of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, Geneve, March 16, 1959> Yu Chin-o, Min.ju chongcbfce&i 
kil, op. cit., pp. 291-9 .
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and who have resided in Japan continuously from that date to the
3L 60pi'esent, and also to their lineal descendants. * The Agreement
also guarantees that any national of the ROIC will not be deported
to the ROK unless he is sentenced in Japan to long imprisonment for 
161 •serious crimes.
Thus5 as far as the scope of permanent residence and the
conditions of deportation were concerned, the ROIC’s views were
generally well reflected in the Agreement. On other points, the
ROIC's contentions were sympathetically received by Japan in the
Agreement. Japan agreed to give "due consideration" in matters of
education, protection of livelihood and health insurance to nationals
of the ROIC, and expressed willingness to initiate certain necessary
162.measures to that effect. * Japan also assured the ROK that she 
would give "due consideration" to the matter of removal of personal 
property and remission of funds to the ROIC in cases involving
16 3nationals of the ROIC who renounced permanent residence in Japan.
In all other respects, the nationals of the ROK were subject to 
the Japanese laws and regulations applied equally to aliens.
The Agreement does not clarify the citizenship of Koreans in 
Japan. The original Japanese position was to regard all Koreans 
in Japan as national of the ROK. But after the Korean War Japanese 
policy changed, and Koreans were registered as the nationals of 
either "Chosen" (Korea) or "Kankoku" (ROK); the latter applied
only to those who carried identification cards issued by the ROIC
165. _Mission in Japan. In either case, "Chosen" and "Kankoku" were
160. Articles 1 and 2.
161. See Article 1 and 2.
162. Article 3.
163. Article 4 and the Agreed Minutes Concerning the Agreement. 
164* Article 5*
165* Oda Shigeru, op. cit., p. 50*
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to the Japanese government no more than geographical concepts.
Koreans registered under the column of '’Chosen” were generally
regarded as px,o-Qommunists or neutrals favoring North Korea.
Minister of Justic Ishii Mitsujiro of Japan testified in the Diet
that as of the end of January 1965, 349?407 Koreans were registered
under "Chosen” and 230,072 under "Kankoku.
The division of the Koreans in Japan by ideology or loyalty
was the practical reason for Japan's refusal to assign a single
nationality as demanded by the EOK. The Agreement provides however
that the benefits of this agreement are available only to those
Koreans who present the evidence of citizenship from the ROK.168,
The EOK anticipates that this agreement along with normalization
of over-all relations will immensely strengthen her position among
169.Koreans in Japan at the expense of North Korea. x However the
Japanese government maintains that the Koreans who would not register
with the ROK and therefore are- not eligible for permanent residence
and the diplomatic protection of the ROK, would continue to enjoy
170the same treatment as they have received in the past. 1 *
166. For the past and present view of the Japanese government 
on the nationality question of Koreans in Japan, see "The Unified 
View of the Government,” Asahi Shimbun, October 27, 1965*
167. His statement, Shugiin Kaigiroku, Session, Special
Committee on Japan-ROK, No. 7 (October 30, 1965), P* 6. The 
ROK's figures are different. The number of the Koreans registered 
with Mindan (the pro-ROK Korean organization in Japan) is 230,000, 
with Ch'OsSren (the pro-North Korean organization) 170,000, and 
neutrals 175,000, Hankuk soshik, op. cit., p. 10
168. The Agreed Minutes Concerning the Agreement.
169. Hankuk soshik, op. cit., pp. 10-11; and Hanil hoedam 
gwa uri ui ipchang, op. cit., p. 8.
170. The statement of Prime Minister Sato, Chosun IIbo,
October 19, 19^55 and the statement of Minister of Justice, Shugiin 
kaigiroku, 5°th Session, Special Committee on Japan-ROK, No. 10 
"(November 5, 1965), P* 6.
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PHOBLEM OB TITLE TO LOKTO
Lokto, or Takeshima (in Japanese terminology) consists of two
tiny islands (practically two rocks where no human being can live),
located at 37°9,30"H and 131°55'E in fhe Sea of Jap^n. The dispute
over title to these islands erupted when the EOK took them under
its jurisdiction with the proclamation of the Peace Line in 1952.
Japan immediately counter-claimed that they had been Japanese
territory since 1905? when they were incorporated into the Japanese
prefecture of Shimane; this was five years before the Treaty of
171.Annexation of Korea, * but one year after Japan had already
effectively taken over control of the foreign affairs of Korea by
the treaty of 1904. One of the EOK's arguments was that the
Japanese incorporation of the islands into her territory was in
172reality an annexation under duress. 1 * The issue was not placed
on the agenda of the EOK-Japan conference because both sides felt
that the islands were not a matter to be negotiable. The claims
of both Japan and Korea are supported by the historical and legal
173studies of scholars of both countries.
In June 1953? Japan sent two naval ships to the islands, 
expelled Korean fishermen working on the islands, and planted a 
signpost of Japanese title to the islands. In reaction, the EOK 
immediately took physical control of the islands by stationing a
yiA
small security force there. Following this some minor skirmishes
occurred from time to time, and Japan had proposed that the dispute
17 5be submitted to the International Court of Justice. -
171. Lee Chong-sik, "Japanese-Korean Eelations in Perspective,''
£P* 2li*? P* 317*
172. "The Question of Title to Lokto," Sasangge, Supplement, 
April 1964? PP* 116-7*
173. E.g., Pak Kang-rae, Lokto ui sapobchokin yftnku (A Histor­
ical and Legal Study of Lokto) (Seouls Ilyo shinmunsa, 1965)? and 
Kawakami?, Takeshima no rekishi-chirigokuteki kenkyu (a Historical 
and Geographical Study on Takeshima) (Tokyo, 1966)
174. "Lokto," Tong-A IIbo, February 8, 1964*
175* E.g., the statement of Foreign Minister Kosaka, Hankuk 
Ilbo, Lecember 5? 1962.
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But the ROK rejected the Japanese proposal on the ground that there 
could not be any dispute over territory that is the ROK's without 
question. From the Japanese point of view the ROK’s claim to the 
islands involved encroachment on her fishing rights in the Sea of 
Japan, as well as providing some justification to the extent of 
the Peace Line. The Japanese government assured its people that 
relations with the ROK would not be normalised until and unless 
the dispute was settled, ^ 6*
When two countries normalized their relations, they still had
not settled the dispute over the islands. They agreed however to
seek settlement of any dispute between the two countries by
’’peaceful means, through diplomatic channels, that would be agreeable
with both countries,” as stated in the Exchanged Rotes Concerning
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (June 22, 1965) Irrespective
of the Rotes, the ROK maintains that ’’Japan will not make ^Dokto/,
which is clearly a territory of the ROK, an issue, at this stage.
On the other hand, Japan rebuffed the position of the ROK saying
that ’’Takeshima is a territory inherently belonging to our country.
Since the islands are at present under the physical control of the
1 Ro
ROK, the prospect for settlement by arbitration is dim. * Probably 
Japan will not force a Showdown on the issue, for the ROIC's 
exclusive fishery zone does not include the waters around the islands.
176. Oda Shigeru, op. cit., p. 54*
177. Chosun Ilbo, June 23, 1965*
178* Foreign Minister Lee Tong-won's statement, Asahi Shimbun, 
October 14, 1965*
179* Prime Minister Sato's statement, Eihon Keizai, October
5, 1965.
180. See the report of Vice-Chairman Ito Ushiro, the leader
of the Democratic Socialist Party's Survey Mission to the ROK,
submitted to the central committee of the party on October 14, 1965, 
Tokyo Shimbun, October 14, 1965*
100
CHAPTER 3
CQHTRIBUTIHG FACTORS TO THE ROK-JAFAN RAPPROCHEMENT
THE U.S. PRESSURE
One of the most important factors working towards the
normalization of relations between the ROK and Japan was the
pressure applied by the United States. From the close of the
Korean War the successive administrations of the United States had
been trying to bridge the gap between the two countries. As allies
in the Pacific, closer relations between them was vital to the
interest of the United States. With the disappearance of
uncompromising President Rhee Syngman, the United States became
one of the main forces behind the scenes sustaining negotiations
between the two countries. Pressed by the dollar drain, the
United States wanted a prosperous Japan to take an active role in
1*sharing some of the U.S. burden in Korea. * The United States'
anxiety is understandable. Military and economic assistance of
the United States to the ROK between 1946 and 1964 amounted to
2more than $6 billion. * During this period $3*9 billion had been
3.given in economic aid alone. * In spite of such massive help, 
self-sufficiency for the ROK was still not in sight.
At the first U.S.-Japan economic ministers conference, in 
December 1962, President Kennedy reportedly asked Japan to help
1. E.g., see Ch6ng Kybng-h&i, "Transitions From the ROK-U.S. 
to the ROK-U.S.-Japan", Series Ho.l, Hankuk Ilbo, February 29,
1964; and U Pybng-kyu, "Gains and Losses at the Starting Point of 
Conclusion of the ROK-Japan negotiations", Series Ho.2, Chosun 
Ilbo, February 24, 1965*
2. The U.S. Department of State, Background Rotes: Korea, 
Publication Ho, 7782 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, June 1966;, Table II.
3. Ibid.
4. The per capita GHP grew from $71 in 1953 to $104 in 1964 —  
an average of 4» 5$ growth rate against the annual population 
growth rate of 2.9$. See ibid.. Table I. The official figures
of the ROK are slightly higher. See the Bank of Korea, Economic 
Statistics Yearbook 1967 (Seoul, 1967), Table 21, p. 26.
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5
the U.S. economic effort in the ROK. The U.S. request was 
followed by a series of conferences among the leaders of the 
three countries. In other words the ROK-Japan problem had in 
fact become the problem of the three countries. In early 1964 
David Bell, head of the U.S. Agency for International Development, 
stated that supporting assistance (i.e., grant) given to the ROK 
would hopefully be terminated in three to five years time, 
because there was first of all some indication that the ROK was 
on the way to economic self-sufficiency, and secondly there was
6'now "another economic aid source" in addition to the United States. *
The other source of economic aid referred to by the United States
was Japan. More specifically the United States was referring to
the J&OO million property claims settlement plus other government
and commercial credits that would result from the normalization of
Korean relations with Japan. James S. Killen, head of the U.S.
aid mission in the ROK reiterated, "In a relatively few years,
7 #
Korea will no longer depend on foreign assistance.” *
The ROK officials, who considered continued substantial 
economic aid from the United States to be essential, interpreted 
the U.S. view as preliminary to the imminent transfer of part of
Q
her financial burden to Japan. * According to a Korean wire 
service, the Tonghwa T'ongshin, during the third economic ministers
5* Kurota Hisao, op. cit., p. 201: and the editorial of 
Hankuk Ilbo, January 31, 1964.
See the analyses of Bell's statement in Chosun Ilbo,
January 23, 19&4, and Tong-A Ilbo, January 22, 1964.
7. The Hew York Times, July 12, 1964*
8. The analyses of Bell's statement in Chosun Ilbo,
January 23, 19^4 and Tong-A Ilbo, January 22, 1964*
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conference held, in Tokyo in January 1964? the United States and
Japan discussed the specific problem of future Japanese economic
aid to the ROK, considering particularly the division of the aid
program, %:< the amount of the Japanese share, the coordination
of the program, and the seleotion of aid projects*^*
In October 1964 when the ROK and Japan had deadlocked in
tackling their differences, the United States sent William P.
Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Par Eastern Affairs, on
a mission of reconciliation to both countries. In Japan he pointed
out that, "As a great power Japan bears special responsibilities
to settle outstanding problems with its smaller and heavily
burdened neighbor. The Republic of Korea stands as a bulwark
against the forces of aggression that threaten the peace of the
Far East, and the security of Japan is vitally connected with the
ability of the Korean people to maintain their independence and
to develop a strong and prosperous e c o n o m y , In Korea he also
stated that “normalization of relations between Korea and Japan
would be an important contribution to the cause of peace in Asia,”
and further added his hope that "public opinion in Korea on this
matter would recognize the national interest on non-partisan 
til.basis. * Later Foreign Minister Lee Tong-won told the Rational
Assembly that the Bundy*s mission was a decisive factor in
12adjusting the differences between the ROK and Japan. *
9* Kyunghyang Shinmoon, February 11, 1964.
10; Quotation in Kim Pyoung-hoon, "Korea-Japan Rapprochement," 
Korean Affairs. Vol. IV, Ho. 1, May 1965> ^5*
11. "Five-Point Communique," October 3, 19^4? with Foreign 
Minister Lee Tong-won, The Korean Republic Weekly, October
7, 1964.
12. Kukhoe hoeuirok, 49th Session, Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Ro. 12 (Rovember 20, 1964)* p.6.
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The United States repeatedly denied the Korean view that its
policy sought to place the ROK again under Japanese economic
13dominance, in order to lessen its own burden of aid, and also 
repeatedly assured the ROK that U.S. economic and military aid 
policy would not change after normalisation of relations between 
the two countries.Nevertheless the pressure exerted by the 
United States was great. It extended to such matters as President 
Park Chung-hee's planned visit to Washington, which actually took 
place in May 1965* The Government of the United States made it 
clear that he would be welcome only after the ROK and Japan had 
settled their problems.
Neither was Japan immune from American diplomatic pressure 
nor in a position to antagonize the American government. For 
Japan the continuing partnership with the United States is vital 
in terras of Japan's sustaining economic growth: the United States
is, after all, the largest export market, the supplier of raw 
materials and the chief creditor for Japan1s trading deficits.
The United States also heavily contributes to Japan*s economy by 
spending its huge expenditure there for countries like Korea and 
South Vietnam* Thus a higher posture of Japan*s eoonomic growth
16makes a lower posture of Japan* 3 diplomacy with the United States. *
TUB CHANGING SITUATION IN ASIA AND THE POSITION OF THE ROK 
Another important factor that necessitated the normalisation 
of relations between the two countries was the developing critical
13* The New York Times, February 14, 1965*
14* See "The ROK-U.S. Joint Statement, H January 29, 1964, 
between President Park and Secretary of State Rusk, Hankuk Ilbo, 
January 30, 1964; and ’’Joint Statement,*' May 18, 1965, between 
President Park and President Johnson, Chosun Ilbo, May 19, 1965*
15* The New York Times, February 14, 19&5*
16. For this aspect, see especially Seymour Broadbridge and 
Martin Collick, "Japan's International Policies," International 
Affairs, Vol. 44, Ho. 22, April 1968, pp. 240-53*
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situation in the Far East. The Koreans felt that the tension in
the Far East was heightened when Communist China became a major
military power with nuclear bombs, and with the escalation of the 
17war in Vietnam. '* President de Gaulle1s diplomatic recognition
of Communist China on January 27, 19^4 aroused further the
18apprehension of the Koreans. * In this rapid changing military
and political situation, the Koreans feared that their once stable
position as an anti-Communist defense out-post would lose its
significance while the United States was preoccupied with the war 
19.in Vietnam. This was the ROK's appraisal of her own position,
a view which was sympathetically shared by the United States.
The joint statement of President Park and Secretary of State
Dean Rusk of January 29, 19&4 specifically recognized the political
and military implications of growing Chinese influence. The
statement said that they "discussed the impact of the French
recognition of Communist China on the security of the free nations
in the Pacific. Both agreed that early conclusion of the RQK-
Japan negotiations would contribute to the interest of not only the
two nations but also the entire free world.'^* The growth of
Chinese power made it for both the ROK and the United States more
urgent than ever before to have Japan enlisted immediately behind
21the ROK-U. S. military-economic coalition in Korea. * Japan as 
the only modern industrial power in Asia was indispensable to the 
ROK and the United States in strengthening the security of the 
non-Communist countries in Asia. Normalization of relations
17• Hanil hoedam gwa uri ui ipchang, op. cit., p. 5*
18. Ibid.
19* Ibid*
20. "The ROK-U.S. Joint Statement," January 29, 19^4? QP» cit.
21. E.g., the statement of Prime Minister Ch&ig Il-kwon,
Chosun Ilbo, March 8, 1965? and the statement of Foreign Lee 
Tong-won, Asahi Shimbun, October 14? 19&5* See also Cb^oe So-y&ng, 
"Whan the RQK-Japan Relations Are Normalized," Series No.5? 
Kyunghyang Shinmoon, February 27, 19^4*
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between the two countries would be the first step towards closer 
future political and military cooperation among the ROIC, the 
United States and Japan*
Against this background, the newly installed government of
Prime Minister Sato in November 1964 stated that negotiations with
the ROK were one of the important problems facing them, and that
Japan would exert the utmost efforts to achieve an early and
reasonable solution of the two countries' differences. * Japan's
decision to normalize relations with ROK might have been
influenced by Japan*s belated realization of its own national
security problem created by the relative weakening of the military
and moral strength of the ROK and the United States resulting from
the growing Chinese strength as well as from both countries*
23,
military intervention in Vietnam. * It is not known however how
much Japan's concern for her own national security determined her
decision to normalize relations with the ROK. But it was no
secret that in some extreme conservative circles, including former
Prime Minister ICishi (Prime Minister Sato's brother) and other
influential politicians in the Liberal Democratic Party, the view
was held that the normalization of relations with the ROK would be
a step away from de facto Japanese neutrality, and towards an
24.active adherence to the free world.
Although the leaders of the present Japanese government did 
not take this extreme position, they did believe that prosperity
22. The lew York Times, November 15, 19*54*
23. This view was strongly advanced by many intellectuals and 
socialists in Japan. See especially Professor Sakamoto Yoshikazu 
of Tokyo University, "Ideological Transformation of Japanese 
Diplomacy: The U.S.-China Confrontation in the Japan-ROK
Cooperation," op. cit., pp. 28-30; "The Japan-ROK Problem and 
Future of Diplomacy," Asahi Shimbun, December 12, 19655 and 
"Five Phases of the Japan-ROK Treaty, Part I, o£. cit.
24. "The Japan-ROK Problem and Future of Diplomacy," ibid.
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in the EOK, stimulated "by Japanese economic cooperation, would
contribute to the stabilisation of the EOK, and would in turn
strengthen the security of Japan* Professor Tanaka Naokichi,
an advocate of the normalisation of relations with the EOK,
further elaborated this position, that for the sake of Japan’s
national security, it was necessary to stabilise the ROK*s
economy, because economic imbalance between South and North Korea
26.could eventually destroy the status quo in the Par East.
Asahi Shimbun extended this thesis as follows:
To help the ROK will be to strengthen the bulwark 
of the anti-Communist forces against North Korea and 
Communist China. If the ROK is controlled by North 
Korea and if Pusan (the Korean port across from Japan) 
is covered by red flags, Japan will be flooded by
mountainous waves of communist forces. This is the
way of thinking to defend Japan, which is deeply rooted 
within the Liberal Democratic Party and is common to 
the so-called "Pusan red flag" argument. '*
Commenting on this change of the Japanese viewpoint, former
U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer said, "the Japanese have
for the first time since the war begun to look at the problems
of defense and their relations with neighboring countries, not in
terms of how Japan should react to American or Communist conten-
28tions, but in terms of Japan’s own interest and goals." * It 
would be poliijcally unrealistic for Japan to assume that the 
United States would assume indefinitely the defense of Japan, with
25. E.g., this is the idea of Prime Minister Sato. See 
"Five Phases of the Japan-ROK Treaty," op. cit.
26. Tanaka Naokichi, "Two Koreas and the Japan-ROK 
Normalization," op. cit., pp. 36-42; and Tanaka Naokichi, 
"Positive Meaning of Normalization of Japan-Korea Relations, 
"Asahi Janaru, October 10, 1965? p. 61.
27* "Five Phases of the Japan-ROK Treaty," op. cit.
28. Edwin Reischauer, "Our Dialogue with Japan, " Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. XLV, No. 2, January 1967* P* 220.
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29.no corresponding effort on her part, ^
In spite of some change of Japanese attitude in the problem
of defensej one should not overly believe that Japan was taking
recently more positive role in the containment of communist
forces. George R. Packard cautioned, "It is true, of course, that
Japan has recently shown a greater willingness to take the burden
of its own sea and air defense, and that the naive pacifism of
the postwar period is disappearing. But there is an enormous
difference between these halting steps and full involvement in the
30containment of communism in Asia.11 * Reluctance of Japan* s
involvement in the containment of communism is apparent in the
Japanese attitude towards Communist China. In spite of the
United States' efforts to make Japanese fear Communist China as a
threat, most Japanese believe that their long-range interest will
be better served by developing closer relations with Communist
31China and trying to moderate Chinese militancy. * They do not
regard Communist China as a cold war enemy, partly due to the fact
that a disarmed Japan, leaving her defense problem to the hands
of the United States, has been so comfortable that "she has lost
both desire and the capacity for serious consideration of military 
32.matters." * They see essentially the Chinese militancy as a
passing phase of the Chinese revolution which will disappear as
the Communists gain more confidence in their internal development
33and external relations. *
29« This was also the argument of Professor Sinarayan Ray 
of the University of Melbourne. See his "Korea-Japan Relations," 
ICoreana Quarterly, Vol.7> Ho. 4-Vol. 8, Ho. 4? Winter 1965- 
Spring 196>£>, p. 13.
30. George R. Packard III, "Living with the Real Japan," 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. XLVI, No. 1, October I967, p. 194.
31. Ibid., p. 204*
32. Ogata Sadako, "Japanese Attitude Toward China," Asian 
Survey, Vol. V, No. 8, August 1965j P* 389.
33. Ibid., p. 390
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The depth and dimension of this attitude are, for example, 
indicated clearly by the two rival groups within the conser­
vative Liberal Democratic Party. Although the pro-Peking group 
(Afro-Asian Problems Research Association) is the minority and 
led by junior members of factional groups of the party, as a rival 
to the mainstream* s pro-Taiwan group (Asian Problems Research 
Association), its influence in shaping Japan's policy on China is 
considerable.
Regarding this as a good indication of Japan's general 
positions on the problem of the containment of Communism and the 
extent of its relationship with the ROK, the normalization of 
relations between the ROK and Japan does not necessarily lead to 
some joint security arrangements, as some have speculated. Unless 
there should be dramatic change of the situation in the Par East, 
a military pact between the two countries is a remote possibility 
for a considerable time to come even if the two countries desire 
such a pact. The strong Korean distrust of any Japanese military 
involvement in Korea, as well as the strong opposition of the
34* The factional break-up of the two groups is as follows:
Pro-Peking group Pro-Taiwan group 
Sato faction (3)* 27
Kono faction 17 2
Ikeda faction 8 12 (l'
Miki faction 18 (3^  9 \ 2(
Fujiyama faction 10 ll) 9 12
Ono faction 13 (l) 9 (2,
Kawashima faction 1 4
Ishii faction 0 10
Kishi-Fukuda faction 0 13
Others 1 3
Totals 78 [FJ 96 (7T~
*() indicates members of the House of Councillors.
Source: Reproduced from ibid.t p. 395* The original source is 
"Conservatives and Progressives Are Questioned on Their China 
Policy," EkonomisutOj February 23, 1965* PP* 14-23.
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Japanese socialists and intellectuals to any military alliance
35militates further against such a pact, The possibility was in
fact emphatically denied by repeated official statements of the
36*leaders of both countries. * But it did not mean that Japan was
not concerned for her own security in the face of the growing
military potential of Communist China. There existed certain
political forces in conservative circles that believed that a
closer cooperation with the ROK was certainly desirable in the
interest of over-al'l stability and the maintenance of a favorable
balance of military power in the Far East. In this sense, both
countries' concern for their security appears to have had some
37 *effect on the rapid progress of the ROK-Japan negotiations, * 
although there still remains a larger question of whether Japan's 
security as well as her economic interest would be in the long 
run best served by a strict neutrality.
35. Koreans have always been suspicious of Japanese re­
armament and have opposed any military cooperation with Japan. 
President Ehee said that a rearmed Japan "will be another enemy 
to the ROIC;” see his speech, "Concerning Speculation of Japanese 
Rearmament," February 16, 1949? Taehabminkuk Kongboch'S, Vol. 
for Diplomatic, Military, Cultural and Social Affairs, op. cit., 
pp. 68-9. Former Prime Minister Chang Taek-sang stated the same 
position in March 1965; 800 "Tragedy of Divided Korea," Sekai, 
June 1965? p. 209. For the Japanese view of a military pact, 
see the references in my footnote 59* I*1 Chapter 2. The 
Japanese opposition to any military pact is best illustrated
by the studies on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty crisis of 
May-June i960. See Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, 
Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965)» PP* 125-53; 
Edwin 0. Reischauer, "The Broken Dialogue with Japan," Foreign 
Affairs. XXXIX, No. 1, October i960, pp. 11-26; and George R. 
Packard, Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of I960 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 196(3).
36. See, e.g., the statements of Prime Minister Sato,
Nihon Keizai, October 5> 1965 » nnd Shugiin Kaigiroku, 50th 
Session, Plenary Meetings, No, 3 (October 13, 1965), P* 2; the 
statement of Prime Minister Chfcng Il-kwon, Chosun Ilbo, July 14, 
1965; and the statement of Foreign Minister Lee Tong-won, Asahi 
Shimbun, October 14, 1965*
37* This was also the view of Ike Nobutaka. See his 
"Japan, Twenty Tears After Surrender," Asian Survey, Vol. VI, 
No.l, January 1966, p. 27*
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In spite of reasons to believe that Japan was interested in
the normalization of relations, there was also a fear, on the
part of the ROK, that if the negotiations between the two countries
were not brought to an early conclusion, time would work against
the ROIC* The ROK reasoned that there was a real possibility that
Japan might decide not to establish diplomatic relations with the
ROK after all, if a conclusion to the negotiations was not in
sight soon and if Japan developed more lucrative trade relations,
or a political accommodation with Communist China under the
Japanese practice of "seikei bunri" (separation of politics from 
38.economics). * The Korean leaders were aware that the leaders
39.of the Japanese ruling party knew well the Korean fear. y The 
possibility of Japanese indifference was thought to increase 
appreciably with the ascendancy of Communist China.40, The ROK 
feared particularly that the opposition of the Socialist Party, 
the Japanese Communist Party and the leftist Sohyo (General Council 
of Japan Trade Unions) to an ROK-Japan rapprochement would become 
strong enough to deter the Liberal Democratic government from 
establishing normal relations with the ROK. The ROK was doubtful 
that the Japanese government would risk then its political life, 
in the face of mounting opposition, by undertaking another political 
crisis similar to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty crisis of May- 
June I960.41, Implicit in the possibility of Japan's losing
38. Hanil hoedam gwa uri ui ipchang, op. cit., p. 5*
39* The testimony of Kim Chong-pil, ICukhoe hoeuirok, 40th 
Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Ho.5 (February 10, 1964)? 
pp. 12-13. The statement of Foreign Minister Ohira that "To the 
ROK, normalization of ROK-Japanese relations is a matter of life 
or death" implied this strongly. See Mainichi Shimbun, August 6, 
1962.
40. See Lee Hang-ui, "When the ROK-Japan Relations are 
Formalized," Series Ho. 3, Kyunghyang Shinmoon, February 24, 1964*
41. For the leftists' announcements and plans for maximum 
struggles against the ROK-Japan rapprochement, see Ishino
Hisao, "The Real Struggle Begins How," _oj>. cit.; Hashii Senji, "The 
Seriously Unreasonable Japan-ROK Talks," Gekkan Shakaito, Ho. 97 
June 1965j PP» 10-22; "Analysis of the Japan-ROK Treaty," Gekkan 
Shakaito, Ho. 102, Hovember 1965, pp. 4-29; Hihon Keizai, June 22, 
1965; and Asahi Shimbun, October 6 and 13, 1985*
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interest in the normalization of diplomatic relations with the 
EOK was also a hardening of her "two Koreas" policy. Behind the 
ROK's fear was a sense of being isolated.
In this connection, the ascendancy of Communist China as a 
world power meant also the ascendancy of North Korea vis-a-vis the 
ROK. If Communist China should be seated in the United Nations, 
the U.S.-sponsored position of the ROK in that body was bound to 
become less favorable. The present claim of the EOK to be the 
sole legitimate government in Korea would become hard to maintain, 
especially among the Afro-Asian neutrals whose number was yearly
42,
increasing in the General Assembly. * Thus the sense of isolation 
became a feeling of urgency that stiffened the EOK to press harder 
for normalization of relations with Japan. The leaders of the 
EOK felt that ties with Japan would strengthen the ROK's economic 
and diplomatic resources for the ultimate shov/down with North 
Korea, apart from psychological and moral comfort to be derived 
from them.^*
42. See Nagasue Eiichi, "The Japan-ROK Negotiation and 
Future Calamity," Chuokoron, June 1965* P* 250; Nomura Koichi, 
op cit., p. 79; George Hendricks, "Re-assessment in Seoul,**
Far Eastern Economic Survey» Vol. XLIV, No# 7» May 14, 1964* 
pp. 341“42; and Kim Chong-pil's view in Tong-A Ilbo# February
6, 1964*
43. See, e.g., the statement of Pak Chun-kyu, a National 
Assemblyman and at present Chairman of Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, in a discussion with others, "Why Unification is 
Difficult,'1 Shindong-A, September 1965* P* 153; and the speech 
of Kim Chong-pil, "Design for Modernization of Fatherland," 
October 27, 1967* i» Minjukonghwatang (The Democratic Republi­
can Party), Chftn.jin &  tang gwa tSburS (Forward with the Party) 
(Seoul, 1965), P. 172.
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THE ROK'S SEARCH FOR AN ECONOMIC SOLUTION 
The ROK’s economy had been suffering the heavy strain of 
maintaining a standing armed force of some 600,000 men ever 
since the signing of the Korean War armistice. The ROK was 
annually spending over 33 per cent of its total budget for 
d e f e n s e , a n d  the prospect of cutting military forces and 
reducing defense expenditures was slim. Meanwhile, the active 
interest of the United States in the ROK-Japan talks had been
actually accompanied by a steady decrease of U.S. economic aid to
45.the ROK, ^ particularly by the gradual replacement of supporting
assistance with development loans. This forced the ROK, who had
been depending on the United States for her physical survival, ’
to look for other sources to compensate the shortage of foreign
exchange. Since 1962, the ROK began to examine critically her
traditional "lean to America" economic orientation. At the same
time, in 1962, the ROK launched an ambitious economic development
plan designed to put her economy on a basis of self-sufficiency
and to meet the eventual termination of U.S. economic aid. With
this in mind the ROK also had been actively seeking to diversify
her economic ties with other nations, such as Japan, France, West
Germany and Italy, who could supply capital investments to fill
47the financial gap created by decreasing U.S. aid. *
44* In I960 37$ of the total budget was spent for defense, 
35$ In 1961, 36$ in 1962, 32$ in 1963* 34$ in 1964 &ud 25$ in 
1965. See Ministry of Public Information, ROK, Korean Economy 
(Seoul, 1966), pp. 32-33*
45* The U.S. aid had been decreasing from $(265.8 million 
in 1961 to $(l94.3 million in 1965. See The U.S. Department of 
State, Background Notess Korea, op. cit., Table II.
46, For a critical consequence of Korea’s dependence on 
U.S. aid, see Nakakawa Nobuo, "Economic Aspect of the Treaty," 
Asahi Janaru, October 10^1965, pp. 51-3.
47. Hanil hoedam gwd/ui ipchang, op. cit., p. 7? and see 
Kim Ky&ng-rae, "The Problem of the ROK's Property Claims Against 
Japan," Kukhoebo, No.35* March 20, 1964* p. 75*
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In this gloomy economic picture, Japan was ideally the 
immediate source of substantial relief, provided that the out­
standing issues between the two countries were resolved. The 
Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1962-66) undertaken by the 
military government in 1962 required a huge amount of foreign
48.capital and extensive technical aid* The plan did not specify
how or where to get foreign capital. However Kim Chong-pil did 
expressly state that Japan was expected to contribute substan­
tially to the implementation of the economic plan, following an
49.over-all settlement the ROK-Japan problems." As the negoti­
ations with Japan progressed more smoothly, the leaders of the
ROK openly pointed to this as one of the imperative reasons for
5O.
an early conclusion of the ROK-Japan treaty*
The anxiety of the leaders of the government for the 
earliest possible economic cooperation with Japan was understand­
able. When they took over power by the military coup d* etat of 
1961, the military leaders promised the people "the establishment
of a self-supporting economy" as one of the "Six Revolutionary
51.Pledges."^ ’ In other words, their justification for over­
throwing the constitutional government of Chang depended upon how 
well they could solve the economic problems of the ROK.
48, The plan required a total foreign exchange of ^684 million 
out of the total investment of 321,450 million won (about J22,472 
million) in the plan during the five years. The rate of growth 
of GNP was to be 7*1$ during the period. The emphasis of the 
plan was on the key industries of electric power, coal, fertilizer, 
cement and food production. See The Economic Planning Board, ROK, 
Summary of the First Five-Year Economic Plan, 1962-1966 (Seoul, 
19^2). For an appraisal of the plan, see Hankok Ilbo. January 14, 
1962; and Charles Wolf, Jr., "Economic Planning in Korea," Asian 
Survey, Vol. II, No. 10, December 1962, pp. 22-8.
;49* His statement in an interview with Murakami ICaoru, in 
Murakami’s "Lonely Men of the ROK," Ch&bkgron, February 1962, p. 173* 
:5& E.g., the statement of Prime Minister Ch&ng Il-kwon,
Chosun Ilbo, March 18, 1965*
51. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROK, The Military Revolution 
in Korea (Seoul, 1961), p. 12. This pamphlet is sometimes 
referred to as "The White Paper" on the military revolution.
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However the military government was not successful in solving 
the chronic problems of inflation, unemployment, and shortage of 
foreign exchange. During the 31 months of military rule (May 1961- 
December 1963), the average price of consumer goods increased by 
32 per cent.and the price of rice increased by 64 per cent while
52.
the average wage of industrial laborers increased only 19 per cent. *
During the same period, the acute inflation and shortage of foreign
exchange also caused increases of 34*3 per cent in the average
53*prices of imported industrial goods.* * As a result the goals of
the economic plan upon which the fate of the military government
54depended had to be modified. What the government needed most was 
a quick and massive injection of foreign capital. The heirs of 
the military government, still pressed by the same economic 
problems, consequently continued to look upon an early settlement 
of the disputes with Japan as the most urgent business that con­
fronted them*
Bad relations with Japan had not only prevented the ROK from 
utilizing the property claims settlement fund and discouraged 
Japanese capital investment in the ROK, it had also penalized the 
ROK’s trade with Japan. For example, in retaliation for the Peace 
Line, Japan had severely restricted the importation of Korean 
fishery products, an impoi’tant export item for the R0K.-^#
The Bank of Korea, op. cit., Table 1, pp. 2-3, and 
Table 171, p. 315* ^0^ the Park regime^ economic difficulty since
it came to power in I96I, see 0. I. lEugene Kim, "Korea in the Year 
of Ulsa," Asian Survey, Vol. VI, Ho.l, January 1966, pp. 37-8.
53- jSbk^ Banlc -of - Korea,* ibid-. *, Table 168, p. 303ie 
54* The economic plan was" however successfully completed. Its 
goals in the sectors of manufacturing, power, mining, and services 
were far exceeded. For evaluation of the present state of Korean 
economy, see Princeton H. Lyman, "Economic Development in South 
Korea: Prospects and Problems," Asian Survey, Vol. VI, Ho.7 July
1966, pp. 381-8.
55* Hanil hoedam gwa uri ui ipchang, op. cit., p. 9*
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President Rhee's suspension of trade with Japan in June 1959
a policy disastrous to the economy of the ROK, instead of being a
56.punitive measure against Japan. * Although RQK-Japan trade re­
lations improved somewhat after Hhee Syngman was gone from power, 
Japan did not altogether remove its restrictive measures against
the ROIC's goods. As a result the balance of trade between the two
57.countries was extremely unfavorable to the ROK. 1 * Normalization 
of relations between the two countries, it was hoped, would 
correct the trade situation which had been unfairly disadvantageous 
to the ROK. ^  *
5‘6. For criticism of Rhee's trade policy with Japan, see 
Kim Chae-kon, a member of House of Representatives of the National 
Assembly, "History of the ROK-Japan ‘Trade and a Counter-measure," 
Kukhoebo, No.29, July i960, pp. 10-13.
5f. The volume of ROK export and import with Japan are as 
follows:
unit: million $ 
1963 1964 1965
Total ROK export “8678 (100$) II9.O (100$) 175.1 (100$)
Export to Japan (A) 24.6 (28.5$) 38.1 (29*9$) 44*0 (25.1$)
Total ROK import 560.3 (100$) 404.3 (100$) 463.4 (100$)
Import from Jap.(B) 159*3 (28.4$) 110.1 (2?.2$) 166.6 (35*9$)
(A):(B) in volume 1 : 6  1 : 3  1 : 4
Source: Computed on the basis of the figures given in The Bank of 
Korea, ojd. cit., Tables 158 and 159, pp. 262-5*
58, Hanil hoedam gwa uri ui ipchang, op. cit., p. 9*
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THE PRESSURE OF ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS
A final factor bringing an early conclusion to the negotiations
between the two countries was the pressure exerted by business
groups in both countries. These business groups are closely linked
with the conservative politicians of their respective countries*
The business group in the ROK strongly supporting an ROK-Japan
rapprochement consisted of the business and financial magnets who
belonged to the Korean Businessmen*s Association (KRA).^* A
handful of KBA businessmen, who controlled the economy of the ROK
and were participating in the five-year economic plan, saw great
business opportunities in the prospect of some ^800 million of
Japanese capital which would be brought into the ROK with
noimalization of relations. This was, in fact, the third great
opportunity for expanding their wealth since the ROK* s inde-
60.
pendence. The first opportunity had been the special political
favors received from the government in disposal of the vested
properties (former Japanese properties) after the independence,
and the second developed from manipulation of U.S. economic aid
61and illicit dollar deals during and after the Korean War.
Their monopolistic domestic market was already saturated 
beyond the point of further expansion. The prospect of better 
Japanese relations thus provided them an opportunity of shifting
5% See, e.g., the statement of the Rational Council of 
Federation of Economic Organizations, in which the KBA was the 
leader, in Chosun Xlbo, April 4> 19&5* The KBA was originally 
organized in T9ST by a dozen of the big businessmen such as 
Lee By6ng-ch16l, Lee Chbng-rim, Chbng Chae-ho, Lee Han-hng, and 
Pak Htfng-shik, who were condemned as '‘illicit fortune accumu­
lators” by the military government, in order to protect their 
interests.
60. See, e.g., Tong-A Xlbo, March 31> 19&4*
61. For the illicit and irregular fortunes accumulated by 
the Korean capitalists, see Harikuk hy&kmybng chaep'an sa, Vol. I, 
op. cit** pp. 132-6j and “The Comprador Capital," Series Hos. 1-6, 
Kyunghyang Shinmoon, February 10-18, 1964.
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the orientation of their businesses from the poor domestic
market to the exploration of richer foreign markets, with the
62help of Japanese capital, technology and marketing skills. ' *
The Korean businessmen hoped that the highly developed Japanese
industry would gradually transfer a number of her light industries
requiring a large labor force to the ROK, instead of to Hong Kong
or Taiwan. The Koreans felt that the ROK could take over from
Japan such industries to employ the ROIC’s abundant and cheap but
63.skilled labor force. * The Korean businessmen were also hopeful 
that Japan would liberalize her tariff and eliminate other 
restrictions on the importation of Korean products to improve 
the ROK’s balance of trade.
In Japan those businessmen who promoted an early conclusion 
of the ROK-Japan negotiations were a group of powerful capitalists,
known as the ’’Korean Lobby”, in alliance with the ”Pro-ROK Paction”
f\ A
of conservative politicians. * Most of them belonged to the so-
called "Kansai Zaibatsu”, and among them were the fifteen top
capitalists in Japan, who finance the key factional bosses in the
6 5*Liberal Democratic Party. The pro-Korean lobbists were led,
6.2, See the statement of the KBS president, Kim Yong-wan,
Chosun Ilbo, March 18, 1965? and his ’’Posture and Direction of the 
ROK-Japan Economic Cooperation,” Chosun Ilbo, January 11, 1966.
See also "Koreans Build A Peacetime Economy,” The Business Week,
May 7f 1966, pp. 170-5.
63. "Motive of the Japanese Economic Survey Mission to the 
ROK?” Chosun Ilbo, April 15, 1965* See also "The Underlying 
Current of the Japan-ROK Negotiations,” Sekai, March 1962, pp.178-9 .
6$. See Lee Hang-xli, op. cit. and "The Japan-ROK Negotiations 
came to Near Conclusion," op. cit., p.17.
66* Dee Hang-ui, ibid.
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among politicians, by former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusufce,
Minister Justice Ishii Mitsujiro, Vice President of the Liberal
Democratic Party Ono Banboku, former Minister of Finance Shibusawa
Keizo and former chief of Defense Agency Funada Naka; among
businessmen, by Uemura Kogoro, Adaohi Tadashi, Doko Toshio, Anto
Toyoroku and Ansai Masao, all of major business organizations and
firms* Their formal organization was the Japan-ROK Economic
Cooperation Organization, which included or was allied with key
members of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, of the
Federation of Economic Organizations and of the Japan Federation
of Employers Associations. The primary political organization of
the pro-ROIC group was the Consultative Study Committee for the
Japan-ROK Problem inside the Liberal Democratic Party. Their views
were regularly expressed in the monthly, Shinwa (Friendship) of
the Nikkan Shinwakai (Japan-ROK Friendship Society). Also there
were front youth organizations like the ICotama's, the Miura’s and
66the Machii action groups. *
The importance which they attached to the rapprochement of 
the ROK and Japan is demonstrated by the report that the Korea 
lobbists and the Liberal Democratic Party spent between 500 million 
yen and 900 million yen, mobilized about 150 national organizations 
of various kinds, and distributed about 3 million propaganda
66. Information on these Japanese organizations and the 
leaders of the pro-ROK group is from various sources, such as 
ibid,; Chosun Ilbo, April 15, 1965, The New York Times, August 1, 
19655 Yomiuri Shimbun, October 14, 19^5? Chbng Chong-shik,
“Meaning of *0no,s Visit to Korea," Shinsekye, January 1963, 
pp. 136-415 Lawrence Olson, op. cit., p.9 5 Donald Hellmann,
"Basic Problems of Japanese-South Korean Relations," Asian Survey, 
Vol. II, No.3, May 1962, pp. 19-24? and "Analysis of the Japan- 
ROK Treaty," Gekkan Shakaito, op. cit., pp. 4-5*
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pamphlets of a dozen different kinds, in the publicity campaign
67 *supporting ratification of the ROIC-Japan treaty. * The publicity
campaign was the most massive one that Liberal Democratic Party
had ever undertaken in its party history.
Their argument for a close friendship with the ROK ran
something like this: Japan knows the ROK better and is really
friendlier to her than any other nation; Japan is a reformed
country which has no desire to re-colonize Korea and is able to
contribute economically in rebuilding the ROK and Japan should be
invited to play an active role in the ROK, rather than merely being
68.a supplier of American aid goods to the ROK. - * But the real 
interest of the so-called Korea:* lobbists was in the development
of new markets for their industrial products and the utilization
69.of Korean labor. Between 1962 and 1965 four Japanese economic 
survey missions, including leading figures of industry and finance, 
visited the ROK to explore the opportunities for Japanese
70.
investment there. * Of their former colonial markets, the ROK
67. For the massive publicity and' organization campaign for 
ratification of the treaty, see "Analysis of the Japan-ROK Treaty," 
ibid.; "The Japanese Ratification Diet Just Before the Fierce 
Storm," Chosun Ilbo, September 23, 1965? "The Japan-ROK Treaty 
Diet and the Publicity Activities of the Liberal Democratic Party," 
Asahi Janaru, September 26, 1965, pp. 6-75 and Imazu Hiroshi, 
"Movements for Ratification and Against It," Asahi Janaru, October
10, 1965, pp. 22-3.
68. A paraphrased summary of Nikkan Shinwakai*s in "Promoting 
R0K*s Economic Construction," Shinwa, No. 83, September 15> i960.
69- Teramoto Mitsuro, "How Is the Japan-Korea Economic 
Cooperation Progressing?" Asahi Janaru, May 16, 1965* P* 14-8.
70. The Consultative Study Committee for the Japan-ROK 
Problem had reportedly pressed for the survey missions. See 
Mainichi Shimbun, January 27, 1962.
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was the most ideal one especially in view of geographical and
cultural affinity as well as of their comfortable knowledge of 
71Korea, * Moreover, expanding investments of the United States,
West’ Germany, France and Italy in the KOK in congunction with the
five-year economic plan, caused Japanese businessmen to fear that
they would he eliminated from the Korean market, unless diplomatic
72.
relations were soon established, * Economic cooperation which 
would involve at least $$300 million worth of products and services, 
after the establishment of diploma,tic relations between the two 
countries, was the prime concern of the pro-Korean Japanese 
lobbists.^* Growing Japanese interest in the EOK was clearly 
evident by the end of February 1964 when about sixty leading
74
Japanese business firms had already opened branch offices in Seoul,' 
This was well before the signing of a treaty for normalisation of 
diplomatic relations.
Thus it is clear that considerable pressure was exerted on 
their governments by the capitalists of both countries, especially 
those of Japan, and that this pressure became one of the decisive 
factors in bringing the ROK-Japan negotiations to early conclusion. 
Because of this, Japanese intellectuals and leftists called the 
ROK-Japan rapprochement a "monopolistic capitalists* aggression 
against Korea", "exploitation of the Korean market and cheap labor"
71, Lee Man-s&p, "The ROK-Japan Talks Observed Here (Tokyo),1' 
Hankuk Ilbo, November 8, I96I.
72, Donald C. Hellmann, op, cit., p.21j and "The Japan-ROK 
Negotiations Came to Hear Conclusion," op. cit,, p,17»
73* Lee Hang-ui, op, cit., and "Motive of the Japanese 
Economic Survey Mission to the ROK?" op. cit.
74» Kang Bom-sok, "Transition: From the ROK-U.S. to the 
ROK-U,S.-Japan," Series Ho. 2, Hankuk Ilbo, larch 1, 1964,
121
or even "oppression of the Japanese workers by using the surplus
75,
labor of the ROK at low wages*1. Koreans who opposed to the 
ROK-Japan treaty used similar terms, but in a different context, 
describing the treaty as economic aggression by Japan.
75* E.g., see Ishino Hisao, "The Real Struggle Begins low," 
op. cit., p. 9s and the address of Ota Kaoru, Chairman of Sohyo, 
October 6, 1965, Asahi Shimbun, October 6, 1965. For a detailed 
criticism of the nature of Japan’s economic cooperation with the 
ROK, see loguchi Yuichiro, "False Structure of Japan-ROK 
Economic Cooperation," Sekai, September 1965, PP« 51-61.
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CHAPTER 4
THE REBATES AND THE STRUGGLES IE KOREA
In spite of overwhelming public support in the ROK for normal-
1.ization of relations with Japan, * the ROK-Japan rapprochement was 
challenged by a great many Koreans every step of the way to rati­
fication. There were wide differences of opinion in the ROK as to 
2. 3.’’when" * and ’’how" * the issues between the ROK and Japan should 
be settled in order to bring about a just and equal settlement 
that would still be advantageous to the interest of the ROK. This 
continuing debate created the most massive and intense political 
crisis in the ROK's political history, mobilizing almost all the 
political forces in the ROIC either in support of, or in opposition 
to, the ROIC-Japan negotiations being carried out by the Government.
It is the purpose of this chapter to present and analyze some 
selected points of the arguments in Korea on the ROK-Japan normal­
ization of relations. This chapter will also briefly review the 
opponents1 struggles against the normalization of relations between 
the two countries.
1. According to the public opinion survey of November 1964 by 
the Ministry of Public Information, 99*1$ of Koreans were in 
favor of normalization of relations with Japan. Chosun Xlbo, 
December 23, 1964*
2. According to the same survey referred to in ibid., 69*1$ 
favored the earliest settlement, 12.7^ were opposed to an early 
settlement, and 18.2$ was "don't know," Chosun Ilbo, January 1, 1965 
But among 103 National Assemblymen (out of 175) who responded to the 
Chosun Ilbo survey of January 1964? 48 (46$) favored the earliest 
settlement, 48 (48$) were opposed to a hasty settlement, and 5 (8$) 
were in favor of postponement of the settlement until the ROK should 
be in a stronger position vis-a-vis Japan. See Chosun Ilbo, January
22, 1964.
3. On the question of the property claims settlement, for 
example O^fo of college students polled said that the ROK should not 
compromise with Japan while 44*9/^  expressed that the issue could be 
compi*omised. See survey conducted by Chosun Ilbo, reported on May 8
1965.
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The Arguments in Support of the RQK-Japan Rapprochement 
After Park Chung-hee became the constituJ&onal president of the 
new civilian government (the Third Republic) through elections, the 
aims and attitudes of the government in continuing negotiations 
with Japan were pronounced as follows® (l) to recovei* what the ROK 
is entitled to claim, i.e. the property claims, in order to utilize 
these funds for economic development5 (2) to strengthen the economic
and political bases of the ROK in preparation for the reunification 
of Korea5 (3) to negotiate with Japan in terms of equality and to 
the mutual benefit of the two countries.^'*
After the conclusion of the negotiations, the government argued 
that although the settlement was not of course completely satisfying 
to the ROK, it had achieved all the fundamental aims of the govern­
ment through negotiations conducted in terms of equality and mutual 
benefit* I11 this respect the government, its ruling party and 
their supporters argued that the treaty and the agreements were con­
cluded to the best possible advantage of the ROK. Specifically
6they pointed out to the critics and opponents of the treaty®
(l) All old treaties or agreements that had humiliated the 
Koreans for the past thirty-six years were nullified, effective 
from the date of their conclusion. Furthermore Japan and the
4 * Hanil hoedam gwa uri ui ipchang, op. cit., p. 1 6.
5. For the following arguments, see especially, ’’Special Speech
on the Signing of the ROK-Japan Treaty,” of President Park, June 23,
1965j Chosun Ilbo, June 24, 1965? “Joint Statement of Members of the
State Council," July 13, 1965? Chosun Ilbo, July 14, 19653 "Why is ' 
the Normalization of the ROK-Japan Relations necessary," the 
statement of the Ministry of Public Information, Chosun Ilbo, March 
29, 1964; Prime Minister Ch'6ng Il-kwon and Chairman of the Democratic 
Republican Party CH&ng Ku-ycfng’s arguments in "Debates on Gains and 
Losses At the Final Stage, "Chosun Ilbo, March 18, 1965? "the debate 
between Pu Wan-hy6k, a political critic, and Minister Without 
Portfolio Won Yong-s^k, "Arguments and Counter-Arguments," Chosun 
Ilbo, July 15, 1965? "Diplomacy of Gains or Losses,” Hankuk Ilbo, 
March 27, 1964? Hanil hoedam paeks%, op. cit. pp. 1-9 and 187-259? 
and the following publications of Minjukonghwatang (The Democratic 
Republic Party), Hanil kukkyo ch&ngsanghwa wa ku rnunjech&n (The 
ROK-Japan Normalization of Relations and the Problems), Vol. 2,
(Seoul, 1965), and Maedup chiun hanil hoedam (The Concluded ROK-Japan 
Talks) (Seoul, I965T*
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Japanese people had recognized their past mistakes in dealing with 
the Korean people, and expressed an apology for their deeds.
(2) The ROK was recognized by Japan as the only legal govern­
ment in Korea, and the ROK had successfully prevented Japan from 
establishing official relations with the illegal North Korean 
regime. This strengthened the international position of the ROK.
(3) The fishery settlement was very much in the best interest 
of the Korean fishermen, because it established a larger exclusive 
fishery zone within the straight baselines, as well as the joint 
regulation fishery-zone. This agreement recognized fully the 
legitimate rights and interests of the Koreans in the conservation 
and development of fishery resources. Furthermore, the fishery , 
cooperation fund and technical aid to be provided by Japan would 
rapidly benefit the Korean fishermen and fishing industry. The 
Peace Line was actually not abandoned. 7i/hat had been abandoned
was the ineffective and costly aspect of the Peace Line, in exchange 
for a realistic and efficient fishery agreement.
(4) The normalization benefited the Korean economy^ the pro­
perty claims had been settled in the maximum amount that the ROK 
would ever get, and by the most favorable terms. The settlement 
fund would contribute to the economic development of the ROK. In 
addition Japan is to invest in the ROK and assist in technical 
improvements. This economic cooperation with Japan will enable the 
ROK to expand its trade not only with Japan but also with other 
foreign countries. Economic development will also bring political 
stability to the ROK, by enabling the ROK to achieve the economic 
self-sufficiency needed for true political independence. Close 
economic cooperation with Japan now is a timely step towards the 
gradual replacement of the uneasy bilateral economic relations with
125
the United States by multiple economic relations with all free 
nations* Economic cooperation will also strengthen the national 
security of the ROK in the long run against the threat of North 
Korea, and also give an advantage to the ROK in the eventual 
showdown with North Korea on reunification of Korea.
For these reasons the potential danger of Japanese economic 
aggression is far outweighed by the benefits of the property claims 
settlement and the economic cooperation accompanying it. Irres­
pective of the name "economic cooperation, " rather than "compensation" 
or "reparation" attached to the ^800 million payment in the property 
claims settlement, the important matter is the substance, not
emotionalism, especially since Japan had already expressed an
£
official apology for its past illegal occupation of Korea.
(5) The normalisation secured a favorable legal status and 
treatment for the Koreans in Japan. Although the final details of 
their status in matters of education, protection of livelihood, 
health, and removal of personal property and funds were to be worked 
out further, the important thing is that Korean residents in Japan 
are guaranteed permanent residence rights under the exclusive 
diplomatic protection of the government of the ROK. This will 
destroy the North Korean scheme of control of the Koreans in Japan.
The above arguments are not very different from the position 
that the government of the ROK had maintained in interpreting the
6. According to Kim Chong-pil, the Japanese Government was 
extremely reluctant to settle on a larger amount beyond what it 
found to be legitimate for the ROK’s property claims if the ROK 
insisted on naming the whole settlement "compensation". The 
Japanese Government had a problem of its own in convincing its 
political foes on the question of the legal basis of the amount.
Kim agreed with the Japanese Government *s position. See Kukhoe 
hoe&lrok, 401b. Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, No. 5 
(February 10, 1964)? pp. 4 and 7*
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provisions of the treaty and the agreements. The gist of their 
arguments is that an early normalization of relations with Japan 
was the only realistic way to fullfil the ROK’s long-range economic 
and political aspirations, as well as to meet the immediate 
pressures of economic, political and security problems. Any 
argument that denied, slighted or overlooked these aspects were, 
to the supporters of the ROK-Japan rapprochement, emotional, 
impractical, unconstructive, and even, politically motivated.
The Arguments Against the ROK-Japan Rapprochement
On the other hand, the opponents of the ROK-Japan rapprochement 
held quite different views. It was mentioned earlier that the 
overwhelming majority of the people agreed on the necessity of 
normal relations with Japan. A non-partisan resolution, desiring 
good relations with Japan, adopted by the Rational Assembly on 
March 27, 19&4 was indicative of this. However, the resolution 
stipulated the following pointss
(1) The content of settlement must be ’’convincing and reasonable” 
to the people and the settlement must be concluded only 
under the condition that “the maximum national interest” be 
guaranteed.
(2) The basic relations must be based on “the principles of 
good neighbors, mutual benefit and equality” and must be 
preceded by Japanese recognition of the invalidity of all 
the old aggressive treaties or agreements made under duress.
(3) Although the amount of money would by no means adequately 
compensate the losses and sufferings of the Koreans during 
the Japanese rule, “the maximum amount” of the property 
claims settlement must be received in one payment or, if 
not in one payment, in “a minimum number of installments”.
(4) The settlement of the property claims must be accompanied 
by “sincere Japanese economic cooperation,” for the ROK 
contributed to Japanese economic prosperity during the 
Korean War and has served as a defensive wall against the 
threat of the Communist bloc.
(5) The settlement must at the same time eliminate unfair 
Japanese trade restrictions against the ROK and must put 
amend to the unfavorable balance of trade.
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7
(6) The Peace Line must be defended and preserved.
(The words in quotation marks are the literal translations 
of the original.)
In spite of the non-partisan support for the resolution, such 
phrases as “convincing and reasonable” settlement, "mutual benefit 
and equality," "the maximum amount," and "sincere Japanese economic 
cooperation,” were subject to varying interpretations.
As the negotiations between the ROK and Japan progressed 
rapidly apparently without consideration of the concern of the 
opponents, the latter argued that the contents of the Treaty on 
Basic Relations and other agreements being negotiated were humil­
iating and disadvantageous to the ROK and were inviting Japanese 
economic and political aggression against the ROK. Their appre­
hension was further increased by the growing belief that the whole 
process of negotiation was irregular and illegitimate as carried 
out by the present rulers, who had gained power in the military 
coup d’etat.
Why were the negotiations irregular and illegitimate? Before
the signing of the treaty the focal point of the opponents' attack
was the controversial secret Kim-Ohira Memorandum. In spite of
8.the government's promise of non-partisan diplomacy * and its efforts
to enlist prominent opposition members and critics in a nonr-partisan
9.delegation to the ROK-Japan conference, the opposition parties 
would not believe the sincerity of the government so long as it
7. "The Materials on the ROK-Japan Problem; The Resolution of 
the Rational Assembly Concerning the ROK-Japan Problem,” og. cit., 
p. 119. See also Kukhoe hoe&irok, 41st Session, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, R o . 1 (March 25, 1964)• PP* 1-6.
8. See President Park's "State of the Ration Message of 1964" 
Kyunghyang Shinmoon, January 10, 1964.
9. The Government had tried several times to persuade the 
leaders of opposition parties to serve in the delegation to the 
sixth ROK-Japan conference. See Hankuk Ilbo, January 19, 1964, 
ant^  Chosun Ilbo, January 17, 1965*
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stood fast to the Kim-Ohira Memorandum. The opponents of the 
negotiations urged the re-opening of genuine non-pai’tisan 
negotiations and the scrapping of the secret memorandum?"^* The 
memorandum, which served as the basic political understanding in 
solving the over-all issues between the ROK and Japan, had been 
made unilaterally by the military government in the absence of 
political opposition, or proper consideration of public opinion*
Shin Sang-ch'o, one of the leading political commentators, criti­
cized the memorandum as follows*
Taking advantage of absolute authority the military govern­
ment# which gained power by the May 16th coup d'etat, made 
the Kim-Ohira Memorandum without consent of the people, in 
darkness and in humiliating posture, in order to conclude the 
ROK-Japan negotiations in a hurry, which will have an immense 
impact on our own and our descendants1 destinies*
The opponents of the memorandum strongly suspected that it
involved secret deals on such matters as the Peace Line, in exchange
12for some huge political fund for Kim Ohong-pil's political group.
Kira Ghong-pil, co-author of the memorandum, testified that he 
negotiated with the Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira under the 
instruction of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (i.e. 
the supreme council of the military junta) and that the content
10. See "The 1965 Basic Policy Speeches" of the President 
of the Civil Rule Party, Yun Po-s&n, in Tong-A Ilbo, January 28,
1965, and of the President of the Democratic Party, Pak Sun-ch’on, 
Ilbo, January 29, 19655 and the editorial of Kyunghyang 
Shinmoon, March 27, 1964*
Qbosun H b o , February 18, 1965* See also Lee MyESng-yiSng, 
"The Way I see the ROK-Japan Talks," Kukhoebo, No. 42, March 25,
1965, p. 111.
12. See, e.g., the Yu Chang-sun's argument, "Discussions The 
Inside Story of 10 Years Negotiations and 6 Conference," og* cit., 
p. 35f Kim Sam-kyu, "A Korean View of Ratification," Japan Quarterly, 
Vol. XII, No. 4, October-Pecember 1965, P* 446 j Yang Ho-min, "The 
Posture of the Government and the People in the Negotiations," 
Sasangge, Supplement, April 1964? p. 27| and Kim Y&ng-sam, Chongch1i 
n5n kilko ohongkwon un tchapda (Politics is Long, Power is Short) 
"(Seouli Sasanggesa, 19677; P* 160.
13*of the memorandum was later approved by the Supreme Council*
He insisted that there v/as nothing* irregular either in the
14*negotiation process or in the content of the memorandum. It is 
probable that Kim Chong-pil might have given Japan a strong hint 
that the ROK was ready to make major concessions on the Peace Line
1 ^
although he did not specifically discuss the Peace Line at the time.
However, the credibility of Kim Chong-pil*s explanation was not only
challenged by Kim Chae-ch'un, a former member of the Supreme Council
of the military junta (later Director of the CIA and a leading
16political adversary to Kim Chong-pil), * but also weakened by an
implied admission of such irregularity by Foreign Minister Lee 
17
Tong-won. *
The opposition parties warned the government in early 1964 that
any hasty settlement, in disregard of public opinion, would meet
n ft
a strong protest from the people as well as their parties.
Kukhoe hoeuirok, 40th Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Ho. 5 (February 10, 1964), pp. 3 and 5*
14* Ibid., pp. 3-6.
15. On the Peace Line the ROK had already suggested its flexible 
position in the statement of General Park Chung-hee on Hovember 11, 
I96I. See Asahi Shimbun, Hovember 13, 1961. One reason, I believe, 
that Kim did not make any deal on the Peace Line was, the tone of 
the major Japanese newspapers at the time. If he had made any 
bargain for a greater amount of the property claims settlement, the 
usually well-informed Japanese papers would have commented. The 
newspapers strongly demanded, in fact, a reciprocal concession from 
the ROK on the Peace Line to balance the Japanese concession on the 
property claims. See Mainichi Shimbun, Hovember 14, and December 28 
1962| and Yomiuri Shimbun, Hovember 14, 1962.
16. The Kim Chae-ch^n's statement in "Something Will be Wrong 
With National Defense: Discussion Among Retired Generals," Sasangge, 
Supplement, April 1964, P* 67*
Kukhoe hoe&irok, 45th Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Ho. 12 (November 20, 1964), P* 7*
18. "The 1964 Basic Policy Speeches" of Yun Po-s&i of the Civil 
Rule Party, Tong-A Ilbo, January 14, 19^4, and of Pak Sun-ch'Sn of 
the Samminhoe (a •negotiation body composed of the Democratic Party, 
the Liberal Democratic Party and the Party of People, in the 
National Assembly), Hankuk Ilbo, January 16, 1964*
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The opponents of the negotiations maintained the following positions
(1) The basic (diplomatic) relations must be preceded by a
sincere Japanese apology. The negotiations and the settlement must
be based on the principle of equality and mutual respect. All the
old treaties or agreements must be nullified from the date of their
conclusion. And the legality of the government of the ROK must be
19.reaffirmed. ^
(2) The Peace Line must be maintained for protection of the 
Korean fishermen and as a national defense line. It cannot be in 
any way modified or reduced. Only if Japan demonstrates her 
sincerity in resolving the fishery dispute and other outstanding 
issues, shall the Japanese fishermen be allowed to fish in certain 
limited areas within the Peace Line. But under no circumstances
can the Peace Line be bartered for the property claims or for
, . 20. economic cooperation.
(3) The property claims payment must include compensation for 
property losses, mental sufferings and loss of Korean lives, and 
must take the form of reparation. Under no circumstance can the 
property claims be settled by the offer of !,economic cooperation"
19* Concerning the basic relations, see, e.g., "The 1964 Basic 
Policy Speech" of Yun Po-lon, ibid.u "The Basic Position of the 
Civil Rule Party on the ROK-Japan Talks,” o£. cit.; the statement 
of National Assemblyman Kang Mun-bong of the Civil Rule Party,
Kukhoe hoeuirok, 41st Session, Plenary Meetings, No. 4 (March 27, 
1964)7 p. 7 3 "Why Are We Opposed to the Present ROK-Japan Nego­
tiations?" op. cit., pp. 130-44? and "Review of the Basic Positions 
of the Ruling Party and the Opposition Parties on the ROK-Japan 
Talks," Hankuk Ilbo, February 14, 1965*
20. Concerning the Peace Line, see, e.g., "The Basic Position 
of the Civil Rule Party on the ROK-Japan Talks," ibid.g "The Basic 
Policy Speeches" of Yun Po~s6n, ibid.j the statement of National 
Assemblyman Kim Yong-sam of the Civil Rule Party, Kukhoe hoeuirok,
39'bh Session, Plenary Meetings, No. 7 (December 267" 1963), p. 65 
"Resolution" of the Struggling Committee of Pan-People Against 
Humiliating Diplomacy with Japan, April 17, 1965, Chosun Ilbo,
April 18, 19655 "Statement," of the Federation of the Korean 
Christian Churches, on April 17, 1965, Chosun Ilbo, April 20, 1965; 
"The Seven-Point Resolution" of the Students of the Seoul National 
University, April 10, 1965, Chosun Ilbo, April 11, 1965; Ch&ng Mun-ki, 
"Our Marine Treasures That Japan Desires," Sasangge, April 1964, 
pp. 66-73; Hong Chong~in, "The Peacb Line is being Openly Violated," 
Chosun Ilbo, May 23, 1963; and Lee Kang-u, "Gains and Losses At the 
Starting Point of Conclusion of the ROK-Japan Negotiations," Series 
No. 5, Chosun Ilbo, February 27, 1965*
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or a “congratulatory fund for Korea’s independence.1 The total 
amount for settling the property claims must be $2,700 million 
($1,500 million for the property claims based on the eight cate­
gories and $1,200 million for mental suffering and loss of life).
If Japan promises to correct the unfavorable balance of trade and 
recognizes the legitimacy of the Peace Line, the $1,200 million 
for mental suffering and loss of life can be justed. But the
21.agreed amount in the Kim-Ohira Memorandum is totally unacceptable,
(4) The plans for economic cooperation and introduction of
capital funds must include protection from the danger of Japanese
economic and political aggression, and must be duly followed by
the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. Unless the form
of economic cooperation is carefully negotiated and planned there
is danger that the ROK will become a dumping market for surplus
and obsolete Japanese industrial goods, that Korean businessmen
will become agents for monopolistic Japanese capital, and that
through use of Japanese capital in partisan political funds, the
22“compradors” will then control the politics of the ROK.
21.. Concerning the property claims, see, e.g., “The Basic 
Position of the Civil Rule Party on the ROK-Japan Talks,” ibid.;
“The 1965 Basic Policy Speech” of Yun Po-son, op. cit.; Pak Sun- 
ch'bn, “Debates on Gains and Losses At the Pinal Stage,” Chosun 
Ilbo, March 18, 1965? the statement of Assemblyman Kim Y&ng-sam, 
ibid.; the statement of Assemblyman Kang Mun-bong, Kukhoe 
hoeuirok, 41st Session, Plenary Meetings, Ho.' 4 (March 27, 1964)? 
pp. C T f  Ky6ng-rae, “The Problem of the ROIC's Property Claims
Against Japan,” op. cit., p. 785 "Review of the Basic Positions 
of the Government Party and the Oppositions Parties on the ROK- 
Japan Talks,” op. cit.; “Diplomacy of Gains or Los&<$” pp. cit.;
Hong Chong-in, Inkan"ui chayu wa ohon&n (Freedom and Dignity of 
Man) (Seouls Sudomunhwasa, 1963J, pp. 19~22 and 61-4? and Obata 
Misao, “A Grave Doubt About the Japan-ROIC Negotiations,” Sekai, 
November 1962, pp. 28-30.
22. Concerning the economic cooperation, see, e.g., “The Basic 
Position of the Civil Rule Party on the ROK-Japan Talks,” ibid.;
Pak Sun-ch'on, “Debates on Gains and Losses At the Final Stage,” 
ibid.; “The Spirit of the March First Movement and Settlement of 
the ROK-Japan Problem," the editorial of Sasangge, March 1964, 
pp. 26-27; Ike statement of Assemblyman Kang Mun-bong, ibid., p.8; 
Captain Y and six other ROK Army officers (names withheld), "A 
Proposal for the ROK-Japan Talks," Sasangge, March 1965, P« 157, 
the statement of Yun Po-sbn, Chosun, Ilbo, April 3, 1965? Yang 
Ho-min, op. cit., p. 28; the statement of Cho Chae-ch'bn of the 
Democratic Party, March 21, 1964, Kyunghyang Shinmoon, March 22, 1964; 
and “The Japan-ROK Negotiations Came to" In ear “Conclusion, “ Asahi Janaru, 
March 22, 1964, P»16._______________ ;____________  ~
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Thes© were the main arguments of opponents of the negotiations..
Their demands seemed too unreasonable for the government policy
to reflect them fully in negotiating with Japan* But their arguments
could not be totally ignored by the government. During the sixth
conference? in March 1964? the government was pressed by college
students and opposition politicians to suspend the conference.
And President Park was impelled to assure the peoples
1, mindful of the students' demands? have today instructed 
the Korean delegation to the ROXC-*Japan conference to trxrup 
to the last moment for consummation of our contention.
He pledged also to the people,
We swear before history, with my personal life and the 
life of this Government, that we have acted in the negotiations 
only for the interest of the nation and the people, without 
the slightest personal ambition. 4^*
The strength of the opposition pressure felt by the government was 
indicated by the immediate recall of much-criticized Kim Chong-pil, 
from Tokyo, where he had been overseeing the negotiations in the 
sixth conference. In June, 19^4 he resigned from the chairmanship 
of the ruling Democratic Republican Party and departed for a pro­
longed overseas trip. It was reported that under the pressure of 
the opponents ROK delegates to the seventh conference raised on
several occasions new objections to some details on which both the
25.ROK and Japan had already agreed. However the opponents were
not satisfied with the government and argued that the only change
made by the government was in the style of negotiations, not in the
substance of the agreements, to which the government had irrevocably 
26.committed itself.
23. "The Special Speech of President Park," larch 26, 1964? 
Tong-A Ilbo, March 27, 1964*
24. Ibid.
25. Mori Kyozo, "Japan-ROK Treaties Initialed At Last," Japan 
Quarterly, Vol. KII, Ho. 3, July-September 1965? p. 285.
26. The commentary of Chosun Ilbo, March 31, 1964™
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THE ROOT OF OPPOSITION TO NORMALIZATION
More fundamentally analyzed, the arguments of the opponents
to the ROK-Japan negotiations stemmed from their deep distrust of
Japan and of their own government, and their frustration over the
tragic division of Korea. Distrust of Japan was not confined only
to the opponents of the negotiations. This was a national sentiment,
especially strong among elderly nationalists and intellectuals,
who had known Japanese colonial rule, and among the younger gener-
27.ation brought up under anti-Japanese indoctrination. Even
after the end of the Japanese rule over Korea and the rehabilitation
of Japan, many Koreans could not believe that Japan had purged
itself of former colonialists and reformed itself completely during
28*the short period of the American occupation. * Kim Pyoung-hoon 
lucidly describes an extreme Korean view of the Japanese as follows;
For example, the still picture of a "typical" Japanese 
vividly retained in the "image screen" of a "typical" Korean 
mind might be chronologically arranged like this; In the 
first frame, a Korean sees "The savage and unfeeling Japanese," 
who came to Korea at the beginning of the century to plunder.
In the second frame, he sees "The punished little criminal" 
kneeling before the American liberator in unconditional 
surrender. In the next frame, "The unscrupulous nouveau riche," 
who got rich guick thanks to the War in Korea, where millions 
of Koreans suffered untold sorrow and misery. And now in the 
latest frame, the Korean suddenly encounters "The arrogant 
Japanese," who refuses to recognize Korea's exclusive right 
to fish in the Peace Line. 9^
Mr. Py&n Yc>ng~-tfae, former Prime Minister under Rhee and a highly
respected intellectual, stated?
27. After the signing of the treaty with Japan, the ROK's 
Ministry of Education started to revise the hostile remarks on 
Japan in the textbooks of elementary school children. See the 
controversy of the revision in Chosun Ilbo, July 18, 1965.
28. For analysis of Korean resentment and distrust of Japan 
by a Japanese, see Nishimura Toshio, "The Deep Root of Distrust 
of Japan," Asahi Janaru, May 10, 1964, pp. 8-9? also his, "The 
Complexity of the Undercurrent of Resentment of Japan," Asahi 
Janaru, January 12, 1964? PP* 6-7*
29. Kim Pyoung-hoon, "Korea-Japan Rapprochement," op. cit., 
p. 17*
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It seems that there are some people who believe that we 
can live better only by opening diplomatic relations with 
Japan. It is the story either of the fools or of those who 
want to prolong their political power by Japanese financial 
resources.... Think what Japan did to us. Think what today’s 
Japan is. It is all clear that Japan will again invade and 
dominate us, this time, by cultural*political and economic 
means, even if its form of rule might be different.^*
The Christians, who spearheaded the Korea’s independence movement
and were persecuted most by the Japanese, declared!
The anti-Japanese struggle is not simply a patriotic act.
But it is, we are convinced, a solemn order of God that we 
have to carry out,31*
Anti-Japanese nationalistic sentiment was amply demonstrated by
hundreds of protest rallies end demonstrations throughout the
1964“1965 campaign against the ROK-Japan rapprochment.
Although the significance of the statements quoted above and
of such rallies might be exaggerated, it was symbolic of the Koreans’
32sentiment? the fear of resurgent Japan was real. * They feared
that the ROK was not economically and politically strong enough to
resist the possible economic aggression of Japan, or to protect
33Korean fishermen from the Japanese competition. They believed
30. Pyon Yong-t’ae, ’’What Does the Signing of the ROK-Japan 
Agreements Mean?”, Chosun Ilbo, June 20, 1965.
31. The statement of Hankuk kidokkyo y&nhaphoe (the Federation 
of Korean Christian Churches), April IT, 1965) op. cit.
32. See Kamada Mitsuto, ’’The Japan-ROK Relations from the Point 
of View of Korean People's Resentment of Japan,” op. cit., p. 11.
33. See especially Chang Chun-ha, a prominent political critic 
and the publisher of the monthly Sasangge, Kyunghyang Shinmoon,
March 22, 1964? Chong Mun-ki, the foremost expert on fishery, ’’The 
Present Problem of the Korean Fishing and Fishery Fund,” Chosun 
Ilbo, June 10, 1965? Kim Ky6ng-rae, ’’When the ROK-Japan Relations 
is formalized,” Series Ho. 1, Kyunghyang Shinmoon, February 20,
1964, and his "The Problem of the ROK's Property Claims Against 
Japan,” op. cit., pp. 76-77? "The Spirit of the March First Move­
ment and the Settlement of the ROK-Japan Problem,” op. cit.;
Kim Yun-ky&ng, "Here the Remnents of the Japanese Imperialism," 
Sasangge, March 1964, p. 53? Yang Ho-min, up. cit., p. 28? Mori 
ICyozo, jojd• cit., p. 284.
135
that Japan would shamelessly deplete Korean fishery resources 
within a few years, as recompense for the property claims settle­
ment fund and economic aid given to the ROK. They pointed out 
that even before normalization of relations a number of giant 
Japanese business firms had already made deep inroads into the 
Korean market. Faced with the overwhelming assault and the attra­
ction of Japanese capital, the opposition feared that the weaker 
and immoral Korean businessmen would eventually become "compradors" 
of the Japanese capitalists.
The Koreans' distrust of Japan w%s matched by their distrust
and suspicion of their own g o v e r n m e n t . O n  March 26, 1964
Hational Assemblyman Kim Chun~ySn of the Liberal Democratic Party
alleged that the ruling Democratic Republican Party had already
received a $130 million advance from Japan, from the property claims
settlement fund, and that the government and the ruling party used
35.the money in organizing their political party. His alleged charge 
was a symptom of the widespread distrust and the suspicion that the
34* In a survey among college students in Seoul conducted by 
the Research Institute of Sukmybng Women's University, the students 
gave the following reasons for their demonstrations on March 24,
1964 against the ROK-Japan normalization of relations!
Fear of Japanese economic-political exploitation - - - - 31$
Distrust of the government - - - - -  --  - - - - - - - -  20$
Distrust of the government's method of negotiations - - 15$
Opposition to removal of the Peace Line - - - - - -  --  13^
Others - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  21$
Sources "The Political Awareness of College Students at the Time 
of March 24 Demonstrations," Sae kyoyuk (The Hew Education) Do. 120, 
October 1964? PP* 39-45*
35* See Chosun Ilbo and Tong-A Ilbo March 27, 1967* The 
allegation was not proved in the court, and Kim was sentenced to 
imprisonment of one year and six months for falsification. See 
Chosun Ilbo, July 29, 1965 August 11, 1965.
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ruling party was hurrying the settlement of the issues between
36«the KGK and Japan in order to maintain itself in power. * Distrust 
increased further when it was revealed by the Japanese government 
that the government of the ROK had already arranged several com­
mercial loans of more than $100 million through the Japanese 
government, disregarding its own previous statement that it would
not ask any economic cooperation of Japan before normalization of
37.diplomatic relations.
The opponents of the negotiations argued that the government 
was so corrupt that it could not check Japanese economic and poli­
tical aggression, and that in consequence Japanese economic 
cooperation would enrich only a handful of priviledged businessmen
• ) Q
and corrupt politicians. * The reasons for general discontent 
were not unfounded. The Park government had experienced a series 
of big scandals such as, the so-called "Pour Great Scandals" 
(manipulation of the stock market, embezzlement of funds in the 
Walker Hill resort construction, the illegal disposition of imported 
Japanese automobile parts, and the illegal import of pin-ball 
machines)-5 illegal disposition of the lands of a public park, and 
other public lands? massive corruption in the Office of Railroads? 
special loans to big businesses? and price rigging for excessive 
profiteering by the sugar, flour mill and cement industries --
36. E.g., statement of Cho Chae-ch'&n of the Democratic Party, 
Kyunghyang Shinmoon, March 24, 1964s the statement of Tun Po~s8n, 
Chosun Ilbo, April 2, 1965? and Yun Po-son, Kukuk ui kashipat’kil 
(Rational Salvation Through Thorn Thicket) (Seouls Hankuk 
ch&ngkyongsa, 1967), pp. 181 and 186.
37* "The Problem of Economic Coopera/bion with the ROK," Asahi 
Janaru, July 12, 1964? P* 9? and The Hew York Times, August 1, 1965*
38* E.g., The Mew York Times, August 8, 1965? and the state­
ment of Ch6ng Hae-yong of the Civil Rule Party, Chosun Ilbo,
April 2, 1965.
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all of which involved incalculable amounts at the expense of the
•5Q
people, The resignation of Minister of Finance Lee Ch&ng-hwan 
on November 26, 1964* 3-n protest against excessive favoritism to 
few big financial magnets tells enough of these scandals,^* 
Corruption and abuse of authority were so rampant that the govern­
ment disciplined or dismissed about 1,000 public officials during
41.the first two months of 1965 alone.
The massive demonstration of college students in Seoul, on
March 24*- 1964 against the ROK-Japan negotiations was an indication
of the widespread discontent. On May 29 the college students
passed an Extraordinary Resolution in which they demanded?
Present rulers, you give a clear account of numerous 
iiregularities and corruptions committed, and apologize 
before the nation!... Begin the severe punishment and confis­
cation of country-selling monopoly capitalists to cope with 
the people’s disastrous destitution.42*
Thus the demonstrations and rallies against the ROK-Japan negot­
iations were partly an expression of the people’s distrust of their 
government and discontent with the state of economic, political 
and social affairs in general. This explains also the intense 
determination of the government to achieve an early conclusion of 
the negotiations, in the hope that they would then be able to
39* See Paek Nam-ju, Uihok sok ui 20 ny&n (20 Years in 
Suspicion) (Seouls Kaejoch’ulpfansa, 19657? PP*™ 241-7? 255~9 a:nd- 
278-861 Hankuk Ilbo, January 25? 1964 and February 7? 1964?
Chosun Ilbo, December 24, 1964? January 31? 1965? February 7? 1965? 
March 14? 1965? October 4? 19665 Kyunghyang Shinmoon, February 
20 through February 27? 1964? and Lee B^ng-chmi et al., "Digging 
Economic Scandals," Sasangge, April 1964? pp* 88-101.
40. See Chosun Ilbo, November 27, 1964- For analysis of his 
resignation, see Kwang Yong-ho, "Sick Plutocracy," Hong Silug-man 
et al, ed,, Haebang iship nyftn, op, cit., Vol. for Records, 
p. 717-8.
41• The New York Times, March 7? 1965* For various cases of 
corruption of officials, see Chosun Ilbo, April 5? 1966 and April 
13? 1966.
42. The resolution was censored by the government, and is 
available in English in the article written by an anonymous writer, 
"South Korea's 'Other Side’," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 
XLIV, No. 12, June 18, 1964? p. 593.
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quickly patch up the troubled nation with Japanese economic 
cooperation. The opposition became more suspicious of the moti­
vation of the government as it was intensifying its determination.
At the root of their opposition was also a sense of the help­
lessness of the Koreans over the division of Korea. This feeling 
was stronger among intellectuals and college students. Although 
there are no accurate surveys taken to assess Koreans1 feelings 
about the reunification of Korea, many Koreans in the south feel 
that in the long run their economic plight can be solved only by 
the reunification of the predominantly agrarian south with the 
industrialized n o r t h . B u t  reunification is actually a remote 
possibility, in spite of a strong sense of national identity among 
the people of the two regions.^* Although there are a consid­
erable number of people who desire reunification even by direct
political negotiations with North Korea, the majority of the
4-6south Koreans regard such negotiations as dangerous.
43. In a Chosun Ilbo survey of January 1964 (see the issue of 
January 22, I964J among the National Assemblymen, the following 
were their answers to “What should be the best way in the long run
that our people can live better?”
Depend upon American and Japanese aid - - - - - -  --  W<f0
Early unification - - -  - -  - -  - -  - -  - -  - -  - -  - 39 f0
Patience and economic development -----       44$
Others - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  --  - - - - 6$
See also a special report of Rafael Steinberg. “Korea Eyes Greener 
Pastures,” The Philadelphia Inquirer, February 24> 19&5*
44* ^or the prospect of unification, see especially Lee 
Chong-sik, “Korean Partition and Unification," Journal of Inter­
national Affairs, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, 1964, pp. 221-33*
45* In a survey of November 1964 by the Ministry of Public 
Information, the preference of various methods of unification are
as followss
UN supervised election-----------------   44*9$
Negotiation with North Korea - - -  --— 11.4^
Unification by military force  ----     4*0$
Neutral nations supervised election - - - - --  - - - 1.8$
Elections only in North Korea-------- ------- -—  - 1.8$
Othe r s   ---       1.8$
Don't know - - - -— -------         34*3$
See Qkosun Ilbo, December 23, 1964*
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The RQK-Japan negotiations provided an opportunity for re­
examining the problem of the future of the ROK in its search for 
stable solutions to its economic and political problems. The 
alternatives faced by the Koreans in the south are hypothetically!
(l) unification, (2) dependence on outside support and (3) self- 
sufficiency. But the first alternative is unattainable for the 
foreseeable future. The last alternative is within the realm of 
possibility, but it also presupposes some assistance from abroad 
as in the second alternative. Those who were opposed to the RQK- 
Japan negotiations thus had a feeling of tragedy about the fate 
of their divided country, which had little choice but to nego­
tiate with Japan even at the terms considered disadvantageous to 
the ROK.
To the unhappy Koreans who had little pride in their dependence 
on the United States, the American attempt in the ROK-Japan nego­
tiations to shift financial responsibility to Japanese shoulders 
was alarming. The opposition and the press criticised the United
States for presiding over the Japanese take-over of Korea and
46 •inviting Japanese economic aggression* Former President Tun 
Po-s6n, once a staunch pro-American, became a leading critic of the 
United States and charged that the U.S. attempt to burden' Japan
46in the ROK was to expect "a loan shark to do a philanthropic work.1*'
46. See e.g., articles and editorials openly critical of the 
United States in Bankuk Ilbo, January 28, 1964 and September 15,
1964? and Tong-A Ilbo, September 30, 1964* The Struggling Committee 
sent a strong protest to President Johnson on June 21, 1965, Ohosun 
Ilbo, June 22, 1965* For analysis of anti-Americanism in the ROK, 
see J. Mark Mobium, "The Japan-Korea Formalisation Process and 
Korean Anti-Americanism," Asian Survey, Vol. VI, lo. 4, April 1966, 
pp. 241-8; and Kamada Mitsuto, op. cit., p. 12.
47• Yun Po-son, "Debates.on Gains and Losses at the Final 
Stage," Ohosun Ilbo, March 18, 1965* See also his open letter to 
President Johnson, Chosun Ilbo, October 30, 1966.
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Open criticism of U.S. policy either by such conservative
politicians as Mr* Yun, or in the press was hitherto unheard of in
the ROK. The degree of anti-American resentment reached such an
extent that Marshall Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, had to make personal efforts to
assure Mr. Yun and other opposition leaders of the continuing
support of the ROIC by the United States, and to calm down their
48.vigorous campaign against the ROK-Japan rapproohement.
A significant development during the campaign against the 
ROIC-Japan rapprochement is thus nationalism. That is the resurgence 
of sentiment for unification by the initiative of the Korean people 
themselves. The sentiment was initially small in degree and largely 
confined to the writings of Korean neutral unificationists, intel­
lectuals, and socialists residing in J a p a n , A f t e r  the Student 
Revolution in April I960, there was a rising demand in the ROK for 
a "solution of the Korean problem through direct negotiations with 
North Korea,11 It called for exchange of mail, culture, and goods
48* Chosun Ilbo, May 1, 1965* Shortly before Green's visit 
to Korea, Yun Po~s5n wrote an open letter to General Hamilton H. 
Howze, Commander of the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea, in which Yun 
strongly protested that the tear gas and some U.S. army trucks 
furnished to the government of the ROK by his command were being 
used to suppress the anti-ROIC-Japan treaty demonstrators. See 
Chosun Ilbo, April 22, 1965.
49. In most cases the neutralists1 views are exaggerated and 
misinformed. Among them, Kim Sam-kyu, the chairman of "the 
Committee for the Neutralization of Korea," is most prominent.
His views are regularly expressed in his Japanese magazine, Koria 
Hyoron (The Korea Review), published in Tokyo, See his "A Korean 
View of Ratification," erg. cit., pp. 452-3. See also his Chosen 
no genjitsu (The Realities of Korea) (Tokyo: Shiseido, 19^0)TT!or 
others, see ICim Tal-su, "The Destiny of the Korean People," 
Chuokoron, May 1963, pp. 145-535 Lee Y^ ng-kiln, "Appeal to Japanese 
Intellectuals," Sekai, March 1964, pp. 129-37? Hak D&k-man, "The 
Presidential Elections in the ROK and the Unification Movement," 
Sekai, December 1963, pp. 146-53, and Son S&ng-cho, "The Political 
situation in the ROK After Ratification,” Sekai, September 1965, 
pp. 74^83.
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50between South and North Korea as initial steps towards unification, *
Although the movement was promoted by important segments of college
students and socialists, it was also, significantly, approved by
some conservative politicians, such as So Min-ho, the Vice-Speaker
of House of Representatives, Yang Il-tong, Minority Floor Manager,
ICLm To-y&a, the head of the opposition, and even Yang Yu~ch'an,
51*former Korean Ambassador in Washington* * The movement was abruptly 
suspended by the military government.
The latest appearance of this sentiment was the demand of a 
students1 organization in the ’'Letter to the Editor” of Kyunghyang 
Shinmoon (May 11, 1964) which said, ’’The Government should pave the
way for cultural and economic cooperation between North and South
52Korea, instead of conducting talks with Japan...’1 ' This sentiment 
was further heightened by the much publicised Shin Kum-dan inci­
dent on October 9* 19^4 during the Tokyo Olympics. The heart­
breaking separation of Shin Kum-dan, a North Korean female star 
runner, from her father, who fled from North Korea fifteen years 
earlier, after a ten minute reunion under the watchful eyes of the 
Communist agents dramatized again the tragedy of the division. 
Immediately after the incident, Assemblyman Lee Man-sop of the ruling
50. See the court records of the trials of the socialists in 
Hankuk hy&kmy&ig chaep’an sa, Vol. Ill, op. cit., pp. 203-15 and 
546-53* See also Han Hae-bok, "April Anniversary in Korea," Far 
Eastern Economic Review, Vol. XXXII, No. 5> May 4» 1961, PP* 210; 
and Murakami Kaoru, "Study on the Trouble Spot of the World," 
Chuokoron, February 1963, pp. 109-10.
51. Murakami Kaoru, ibid., p. 110 and Pak I)6k-man, op. cit., 
p. 14B.
52. The letter was purportedly sent in by a "Tforker." The 
heads of the Kyunghyang Shinmoon's management and editorial staffs 
were immediately arrested and eventually the paper was given a new 
management by the government. The letter is available in "South 
Korea's 'Other Side1," op. cit., p. 594*
53* See Tong-A Ilbo, October 10, 1964* See also Hong Sung-man 
et al, ed,, Haebang iship ny8n, op. cit., Vol. for Records, pp. 710-1*
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party,' submitted to the national Assembly a proposal for nego­
tiating with north Korea on arrangements for a meeting place for
54*members of separated families of the south and the north. In 
his proposal, he stated, “Some people say that we must be careful 
about the proposal because it might arouse an undue sentiment for 
unification*. But X do not understand what is wrong with it. 
Unification is the task of our people. It is an historic task
(T pr
rather than a political question!* The proposal died when
President Park ruled that the desire for unification must be matched
by a corresponding ability and that there cannot be any unification
method other than the official policy of general elections through-
56out the south and north supervised by the United Nations.
However a public opinion survey at the time of the proposal revealed
that 56 per cent of the people approved it, and 24 per cent opposed 
57.
it, * The sentiment for reunification was further suppressed by 
the arrest and prosecution in November 1964 of Hwang Yong-ju, an 
intellectual, and president of a private broadcasting company. He 
had proposed a unified federal government following steps of mutual 
recognition of the regimes in the south and north, withdrawal of 
foreign forces from Korea, and reconciliatory approaches by both 
Koreas."^*
54• Haebang iship ny&a, ibid., pp. 714-5*’
55* Ibid., p. 715*
56. His speech at Kwangju on November 3> 19&4? Tong-A Ilbo, 
November 3, 1964*
57* A Chosun Ilbo survey October 29 and 30, 1964? from Hong 
Sung-man et al, ed., Haebang iship ny6n, Vol. for Records, op. 
cit., p. 714.
58* Ibid., p. 716. For a detail of the case, see Lee By&ng-su 
et al, ed.. Haebang iship nyon sa (History of Twenty Years of 
Liberation) (Seoul: Himang ch'ulp'ansa, 1965)? PP* 1190-1•
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In spite of suppression, there was signs of renewed sentiment
for tonification even in some conservative quarters during the
campaign against the ROK-Japan normalization of relations. For
example PycSn Yong-t'aers opposition to the treaty was partly that
59it would create another formidable obstacle to unification.
SiS Min-ho, who eventually led a socialist reform party in the 1967 
presidential and general elections, suggested, upon his return from 
the campaign against the treaty, that "the opposition must now be 
aware of the existence of nation-wide opinion desiring unification. 
Actually the remarks of Py&n and S8 were understatements of their 
views, because of the delicacy and danger of discussing the subject 
under the strict censorship laws imposed to maintain the government’s 
official position on unification. Thus the opposition to the ROK- 
Japan negotiations had also at its roots the national unhappiness 
over the division of Korea, and provided an impetus for the 
resurgence of a spirit of nationalism expressing at once the desire 
for national dignity, the sense of national identity, and the desire 
for unification of Korea.
THE CRISIS OF MARCH 1964 - SEPTEMBER 1965
Because of the reasons mentioned, the opponents of the 
normalization of relations between the two countries maintained a 
massive and sustained struggle against the treaty and .the agreements 
(hereinafter referred to just as the treaty) both before and after
59• Pyon Yong-tfae, op. cit.
60. Kameyama Akira, "Korean Students Shake the Park Regime," 
Sekai, June 1965j P* 199*
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it was signed, on June 22, 1965* The following is a brief account 
of some of the main events in the long, intense, and widespread 
popular struggles in the streets during one and a half years 
from Maroh 1964 to September 1965•
During this period the total accumulated number of about 
three million students and at least a half million others partici­
pated in protest activities throughout the c o u n t r y , i n  various 
forms of rally, street demonstration, hunger-strike, debate, and 
protest statement. Most of the rallies and demonstrations were 
accompanied by violence, and arrests resulted from the clashes 
with policemen and troops. The total number of participants may 
not seem large, but it is quite impressive, considering the 
extremely harsh measures and all-out pre-cautionary efforts taken 
by the government against such activities.
The campaign against KOK-Japan negotiations began on March 6 
1964* The opposition parties in the National Assembly on that day 
formed the "Struggling Committee of Pan-People Against the Humil­
iating Diplomacy with Japan" (hereinafter referred to as the 
Struggling Committee) in order to organize their opposition to the
negotiations more effectively, both inside the National Assembly
62.and among the people. ‘The Struggling Committee was joined by about 
two hundred prominent leaders from various walks of life. It adopted
a declaration calling for immediate suspension of the negotiations
6
in Tokyo. * Between March 15 and 21, the Struggling Committee
61. The figures are my rough estimates based on various news­
paper reports. Bee especially the daily accounts of the protest 
activities before the signing of the treaty in Chosun Ilbo, June 22 
1965? and Hong S&ng-man et al, ed., Haebang iship nybn, Vol. for 
Materials, op. cit., pp.,179“96. See also Kameyama Akira, ibid, 
pp. 194—95 and "The ROK in Upheaval," Sekai, October 1965? PP* 11-7*
62. Chosun Ilbo, March 7? 19&4*
63. Ibid.
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conducted, its first speech-making campaign in major cities of
Korea. The campaign attracted some 120,000 people,including
6535»000 people in the Seoul rally of March 21. In reaction to
the growing strength of the opposition campaign, President Park .
expressed his determination to conclude the negotiations regardless
of mounting opposition to them.^* The opposition leader, Tun
Po-s<3n, countered President Park’s statement by declaring that if
the treaty between the two countries were ratified, he would ,
67.resign his seat in the National Assembly. On March 23 Kim Ghong-pil
and Foreign Minister Ohira agreed in Tokyo on a time schedule which
68set early May 1964 as the date for conclusion of the negotiations.
Angered by the determination of the government to bring the 
negotiations to an early conclusion and aroused by the opposition 
campaign, about 5? 000 college students in Seoul staged their first 
demonstration in Seoul on March 24? 1964? denouncing the ’’humiliating 
diplomacy.” From Seoul the demonstration rapidly spread to all major 
cities, and continued for five days in spite of the introduction of 
some military forces into Seoul to suppress it. The March 24th 
demonstrations involved some 80,000 students. The prime targets 
of the students' attack were Kim Chong-pil, who reportedly said .
64* See Ohosun Ilbo, Kyunghyang Shinmoon, and Tong-A Ilbo, 
between March 16 and 22, 1964*
65* Kyunghyang Shinmoon, March 22, 1964*
66* Ohosun Ilbo, March 17, 1964*
67.- Chosun Ilbo, March 27, 1964*
68. Kyunghyang Shinmoon, March 24? 1964. See also Kim's role 
and activities in Tokyo in "The ROK-Japan Talks Seen from Lobby,” 
Kyunghyang Shinmoon, March 24, 1964*
69. About the March 24th demonstrations, see especially Hong 
Sung-man et al ed., Haebang iship nybn, Vol. for Records, op. cit., 
pp. 682-4? and Lee By'6ng-su et al ed., Haebang iship nyon sa,
op. cit., p. 1174-5* See also Ohosun Ilbo, Kyunghyang Shinmoon, 
an(^  Tong-A Ilbo, between March 24 and 30, 1964* For basic reasons 
for the students' demonstrations, see various expert opinions in 
Hankuk Ilbo, March 28, 1964.
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that he would not mind being called the "second Lee Vfem-yong"
(the last primer of the Yi Dynasty, who signed the 1910 Treaty of
70Annexation with Japan). * if he could bring about the conclusion
71
of the negotiations, * and the controversial Kim-Ohira Memorandum.
The students returned to school only when the government made
concessions to them. President Park praised their demonstrations 
72,
as patriotic acts; * on March 28 he recalled Kim from Tokyo; on
73March 31 he made a direct personal appeal to the student leaders;
and he revealed the Kim-0hira Memorandum partially to the repre-
74.sentatives of the students. In April he suspended the 
negotiations.
In May 1964 when the newly installed cabinet of Prime Minister
Ch^ng Il-kwon (replacing moderate Ch’oe Du-s&n) announced its renewed
75determination to conclude the negotiations by the end of the year,
student demonstrations erupted again. On May 20 a rally at the
Seoul National University openly challenged the government and its
ruling party by staging a "funeral service" of "nationalistic
democracy," the foremost political slogan of the Democratic Repub- 
76.lican Party. ’ The protest rally ignited another wave of
70. Lee .lias been a symbol of treason to Koreans. About Lee, 
see Ch’a Mun-sSp, "Lee Wan-yong," Lee Sung-hui et al, ed., Hankuk 
ui inkan sang (Portraits of Korean Leaders) (Seoul: Shinkumunhwasa,
196577pp. 478-99-
71. Kim blamed the news media for distorting and omitting his 
full statement made in November I962 in Tokyo. See Kulchoe hoeuirok, 
40th Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, No. 5 (February 10,
1964)> P- 6.
72. The statement of President Park, March 26, 1964? Chosun 
Ilbo, March 27, 1964*
73. Tong-A Ilbo, March 31, 1964.
74* Chosun Ilbo, April 1, 1964*
75* Tong-A Ilbo, May 11, 1964*
76. See the resolution and the declaration adopted by the 
students in Tong-A Ilbo, May 20, 1964*
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demonstrations among students all over Korea. The foous of the
students' protest shifted from attacks on the "humiliating
diplomacy" to demands for the "resignation of Park Chung-hee."
On May 29 they issued an ultimatum demanding that the government
77immediately implement their Extraordinary Resolution of May 25* *
In Seoul the May demonstrations were climaxed by bloody street 
battles on June 3 between the students, 15,000 strong attempting 
to storm major government buildings including the Blue House (the
rj Q
presidential palace), and the outnumbered policemen. * The demon­
strations were at last quelled by combat troops called in under a 
martial law declared on June 3 in the area of Seoul. At the same 
time all colleges and universities were closed until the following 
term, assembly was prohibited, and the press was silenced by the 
military censorship. In connection with the May 20th demonstrations,
168 students, 7 reporters and 173 other people were arrested and 
79.prosecuted. y Prom June 3 to July 29, 1964, Seoul was under the
control of the military. However Kim Ohong-pil was forced to
resign from the chairmanship of his party on June 5, and left Korea
80for his second "exile" to the United States on June 18.
In 1965 the campaign against the ROK-Japan negotiations 
commenced with the visit of Japanese Foreign Minister Shiina to
77* Chosun Ilbo, May 29 and 30, 1964* Eor an excerpt of the 
resolution, see the part cited by my footnote ;42. in this chapter.
78. About the May 20th demonstrations, see Hong Sung-man et 
al, ed., Haebang iship nybn, Vol. for Records, op. cit., pp.686-9? 
and Chosun Ilbo, Kyunghyang Shinmoon, and Tong-A Ilbo, between 
May 20 and June 4 , 1964* See also Hew York Herald Tribune, June 
4, 1964? The Hew York Times, June 5, 1964? and Time, June 12,
1964, P. 42.
79* Chosun Ilbo, June 18, 1964.
80. Kim's resignation and departure were reportedly urged also 
by the United States. See The Hew York Times, June 7 and 15, 1964*
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Seoul. He arrived on February 17 to initial a tentative draft of
the Treaty on Basic Helations. On February 19 the Struggling
Committee tried to hold a huge rally in the City Hall Plaza to
impress the visitor with the strength of Korean opposition to
the ROK-Japan treaty. The Struggling Committee failed to obtain
permission from the city authorities to use the Plaza, and before
the planned rally could be held the waiting police force began to
disperse the people. However the angry crowd of about 10,000
tried to proceed with the demonstration, marching behind such
prominent leaders as former President Tun Po-s$n, the head of the
Democratic Party Pak Sun-ch’on, and a well-known religious
leader Ham S£$k-h8n. But the march was also broken up by the
police. In this battle former President Yun’s head was hit by a
swinging police club, and hundreds of people, including two oppos-
isition Rational Assemblymen, were arrested and detained by police.
On March 20 the Struggling Committee succeeded in staging a
protest rally in the Seoul Municipal Stadium, attracting some 
82.30,000 people. Between March 27 and April'4 the Struggling
Committee conducted a series of speaking tours in the southern 
83.provinces. * Again between April 9 an& April 15 the Struggling 
Committee conducted its second major campaign of 19&5 attracting 
a sizable number of people in major cities of Korea. The second 
campaign reached its peak on April 17 when about 45?000 protestors
8l. About the incident on February 19, see Chosun Ilbo, 
Kyunghyang Shinmoon, and Tong-A Ilbo, February 19 and 20, 1965* 
Chosun Ilbo, March 21, 1965*
83. See Chosun Ilbo, Kyunghyang Shinmoon, and Tong-A Ilbo, 
between March 27 and April 5> 1985*
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O  A
were gathered for a rally in Hyoch'ang Park Stadium in Seoul.
After the rally about 5>000 protestors clashed with thousands of
riot-police, who had surrounded the stadium* and in anger attacked
85.a police sub-station. In this violent clash 227 demonstrators 
were arrested and hundreds of both demonstrators and policemen were 
injured (including four opposition Assemblymen). The government 
immediately declared the Struggling Committee an illegal and sub­
versive organization and denounced the demonstration as an open 
insurrection. The opposition on the other hand charged the 
government with deliberate intervention in a peaceful rally, and
declared that the use of riot-policemen, armed with tear gas to
86.suppress a righteous protest of the people, was a criminal act.
In the meantime a student demonstration started in Kwangju--on 
March 31 in conjunction with the Struggling Committee's rally there 
and rapidly spread all over the country. Again the whole month of 
April was literally anarchic, as rallies, demonstrations, and 
violent clashes with local authorities occurred daily. In May 
the ferocity of the demonstrations abated somewhat due to a 
systematic crack-down by the police in combination with the use of 
punishments such as suspension or expulsion from school, induction 
into military service, or criminal prosecution. Nevertheless 
in June the campuses and the streets of Korea were again chaotic 
with the recurrence of students' protest activities, including
84. Chosun Ilbo, April 18, 1965*
85. Ibid,
86. See Chosun Ilbo, Kyunghyang Shinmoon, and Tong-A Ilbo, 
between April 18 and 21, 1965. See also The New York Times,
April 18, 1965.
87. The local authority in Kwangju, for example, ordered a 
number of student demonstrators to report for military service.
When the public learned that some of them were even too young to 
be inducted, public opinion was furious. 13.g., see the editorial 
of Chosun Ilbo, April 13, 19^5*
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hunger strikes. On June 21 the hard pressed government ordered
an early summer vacation for the thirteen colleges and universities
and 58 high schools which were considered to be the centers of 
88.
student movement.
Deeply embittered by the government's brutality in handling
the opposition campaigns against the ROK-Japan negotiations,8^  the
Struggling Committee continued to carry on a determined campaign
both inside the National Assembly and in the streets up to the last
moment before the signing of the treaty on June 22. Shortly before
the signing of the treaty, the Struggling Committee sent a series
of messages to the governments of Japan and the United States as
90.well as to the ROK delegation in Tokyo. When messages were
sent, about 10,000 students were demonstrating, and about 800 students
91.were on hunger strike, in Seoul alone.
After the treaty was signed, the opponents immediately declared
that it was mill and void. They pledged their determination to
wage a maximum struggle to prevent ratification of the treaty and
92.called for redoubled national struggle to abrogate it. The
Struggling Committee and the opposition, restrained from a street
campaign by police rulings, staged sit-in demonstrations at their
headquarters. Tun Po-s&n, Pak Sun Ch'8n, and other leaders of the
opposition were on hunger strikes. On June 23 all opposition
Assemblymen and the leaders of the Struggling Committee also joined
93.in a hunger strike for 24 hours.
88. Chosun Ilbo, June 23? 19&5*
89* E.g., see the interpellation on the Ministers of Home 
Affairs and of Justice, Kukhoe hoefoirok, 41st Session, Plenary 
Meetings, No. 2 (March 24? 1964)? PP*1-25.
90. Chosun Ilbo, June 22, 1965*
91* Ohosun Ilbo, June 23, 1965*
92. Ibid.
93. Chosun Ilbo, June 24? 19&5*
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After several days of hunger strike, the Struggling Committee 
held a massive rally in Seoul on July 5 and declared! (l) the 
"country selling" treaty concluded by the government is invalid;
(2) the Park government must stop the "anti-national" oppression 
of the legitimate expression of public opinion against the treaty;
(3) the United States and other allies must recognize that the 
Korean people are opposed to the treaty because its content is 
contrary to the^principle of mutual benefit; and (4) they are 
resolutely determined to sacrifice themselves in the struggle against 
ratification of the "treacherous treaty.
Because of the early vacation and the effective suppressive 
measures taken by the government, organized student protest 
activities were markedly subdued in July. The activities of the 
political opposition also somewhat lost their energy, as the 
attention of the leaders turned to internal political struggles 
for hegemony of the new Mass Party, a merger of the Civil Rule 
Party and the Democratic Party formed on June 14* At this time also 
there was a rapid shift of the arena of struggle from the streets 
to the National Assembly as it began to deliberate ratification 
of the ROK-Japan treaty.
Although the street campaigns became less frequent and intense, 
the discontent of the people with the treaty and with the govern­
ment’s suppression of opposition continued to be expressed. On 
June 30, the Korean Federation of Educators issued a strong protest^
criticizing the government for its excesses in suppressing the
95.students' protest. On July 1, 77 well-known Christian leaders
94. Chosun Ilbo, July 6, 1965. 
95- Chosun Ilbo, July 2, 1965*
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56 .and ministers issued a statement, which was followed by
97."prayers for the nation" in churches throughout the country.
On July 12, 354 professors representing eighteen colleges and 
universities in Seoul appealed to the National Assembly to defeat
qO
ratification of the treaty. * On July 13 eleven prominent leaders
(eight of them retired politicians) criticized the high-handedness
of the government in handling the ROK-Japan problem, and urged it
99.to respect public opinion. On July 14, eleven well-known 
retired generals expressed their determination to oppose ratifi­
cation of the t r e a t y , T h e  generals included former Prime 
Minister Song Yu-ch’an, former Foreign Minister Kim Hong-il, former 
Defense Minister Son Won-il, former Defense Minister Pale By'6ng-kwon, 
former Minister of Justice Lee Ho, and former Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency Kim Chae-ch’un --- all served under
General Park Chung-hee. In addition a number of other national 
organizations opposed ratification of the treaty for various reasons.
On July 22 thirty-eight persons representing thirteen such
organizations met to unify their individual strengths into a
101concerted opposition to ratification of the treaty. * The 
representatives included students, lawyers, retired generals, former 
politicans, writers and artists, professors, Christian leaders and
102.Confucian scholars, and leaders of several patriotic organizations.
On July 31 they formally organized a non-political, pan-national
96. See their statement, Chosun Ilbo, July 3, 1965*
97. See an analysis of the Christians’ movement, "Christianity 
and Social Participation," Chosun Ilbo, July 8, 1965.
98. See their statement, Chosun Ilbo, July 13, 1965*
99* Chosun Ilbo, July 13, 1965*
100. See their statement, Chosun Ilbo, July 15, 1965*
101. Chosun Ilbo, July 23, 1965*
102. See Chosun Ilbo, July 23 and 29, 1965*
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organization? called the “Consultative Council of the People for 
Protection of the Fatherland" (hereinafter referred to as the 
Consultative Council). The Consultative Council became the most 
militant and powerful pressure group opposed to the ROK-Japan
103„
rapprochement representing broad segments of the population.
Thus it was apparent that the opponents of the ROK-Japan treaty-
included not only the students and the opposition political parties?
but also large and important segments of the community- at large.
On July 14? amidst scenes of violence between members of the
ruling party and the opposition? the ratification bill was placed
on the agenda for the 51®t special session of the Rational Assembly.
But the 51st session ended on July 21? in fear of further head-on
collision between the ruling party and the opposition, until the
following session. President Park and Pak Sun-ch^n? the head
of the Mass Party? met on July 20 and reached a compromise
including agreement on the p o s t p o n e m e n t . T h e  opposition not
only refused to take part in debate on the ratification bill? but
insisted on dissolution of the Rational Assembly and on the election
of a new Rational Assembly with specific instructions for dealing
with such an important bill. The opposition leaders warned the
ruling party that they would resign from the Rational Assembly en
masse if they failed to achieve dissolution of the Rational Assembly?
or to halt ratification. With the initial compromise? hope for a
dialogue between the determined government and the resolute
105.opposition revived somewhat? only to die soon after v/hen the
103. See a special report? “The Consultative Council of the 
People for Protection of the Fatherland?" Chosun Ilbo? August 6?
1965. See also Tong-A Ilbo? August 1? 1965*
104. The talks resulted in the "five-point compromise" 
including adjournment of the 51st session as a step for seeking 
an exit from a collision course. See Chosun Ilbo, July 21, 1965*
105. See "Dialogue Opened?" Chosun Ilbo, July 21? 1965.
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two sides failed to agree on a date for the special session to be
, 106, convened.
Impatient with, the strategy of the opposition. President Park 
convened the 52nd special session on July 29. The National Assembly 
immediately formed the Special Committee for Deliberation on Rati­
fication of the ROK-Japan Treaty. The new committee was a larger
body consisting of 28 members? 17 Democratic Republicans, 10
107.members of the Mass Party, and one independent. * The formation 
of the Special Committee was readily agreed to by both parties, 
but for different reasons. The ruling party favored a large special 
committee to create the impression that the government and the 
ruling party had made a concession to the opposition, and also 
because this would block the opposition's demand for separate sub­
committees, where debate on the ratification bill could be dragged 
out indefinitely as the details of the treaty were examined one by 
one."^^* On the other hand, the opposition hoped that its greater 
representation in a large committee would make it easier to use 
such delaying tactics as filibusters, lack of quorum, and prolonged 
debates, to kill the bill.^^*
But a more serious political crisis was already in the making.
On July 28, Yun Po-s'&i, the leader of the minority "militant"
110faction in the Mass Party, announced his resignation from the party, * 
as part of his movement to dissolve the National Assembly. Under
106. Chosun Ilbo, July 22, 1965*
107. Chosun Ilbo, July 30, 1965.
108. See "Utility of the Special Committee," Chosun Ilbo,
August 3, 1965*
3.09. Ibid.
110. About his resignation, see Chosun Ilbo, July 29 and 
30, 1965,
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the existing law, his resignation from the party would automatically
111*lead to his loss of membership in the National Assembly. * In 
spite of the apparent willingness of the majority faction of the 
opposition party to participate in the Special Committee’s debate, 
mounting pressure from Yun and his faction, as well as that of the 
Struggling Committee and the Consultative Council, made it very 
difficult for the National Assembly to engage in proper parlia­
mentary debate on the bill.
At last, at 11.10 p.m. on the night of August 11, the members 
of the ruling party, in a lightning coup taking less than one
minute, amidst confusion, forcibly concluded the debate and won
112.approval of the ratification bill in the Special Committee.
Taken by surprise and indignant at this irregular and undemocratic
process, on the following day 59 members of the opposition party
113.gave notice of their resignation from the National Assembly.
On August 14 the "one-party National Assembly," consisting of 
110 Democratic Republicans and one independent, approved the rati­
fication bill by 110 votes with one abstention.^4*
The opposition party and the students (upon their return from 
summer vacation) resumed angry protest against the ratification 
of the treaty, condemning the irregular processes of ratification.
111. Article 38 of the Constitution provides? "A person shall 
lose his membership in the National Assembly during his tenure
when he leaves or changes his party, or when his party is dissolved...."
112. See Chosun Ilbo, August 12, 1965*
113. See Chosun Ilbo, August 13, 19&5*
114* See Chosun Ilbo, August 15, 1965*
1 %
But their protest was ruthlessly crushed on August 26 by a 
division of combat troops called into Seoul under the decree of 
"garrison state.
During the treaty crises some three and a half million people 
waged their determined struggles against the treaty. Irrespective 
of the merits of their cause or its motivation, the opposition 
campaign to the treaty demonstrated an impressive degree of 
political awareness and participation among some important segments 
of Koreans. In this respect alone the struggle against the treaty 
will have to be viewed as an important landmark in the contemporary 
political scene of Korea.
115* Chosun Ilbo, August 26 and 27, 19&5* See also, "The ROK 
in Upheaval," op. cit., pp. 15~7» A decree of "garrison state" 
can be imposed by a district military commander at the request of 
a local or provincial government in an emergency created primarily 
by some military contingency. Justification for the decree in 
this case is debatable. The decree has almost same effect as 
martial law, except that it allows continued functioning of civil 
administration and freedom of the press in the area affected.
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CHAPTER 5
THE BiIBRYO OF TREATY CRISIS * THE COHFLICT 
BETWEEM POLITICAL ELITES 
The struggle between the treaty opponents and the government 
resulted in a breakdown of the noimal political process and con­
stitutional order when the demonstrations and other protest activ­
ities had to be quelled by the army under martial law on several 
occasions. In the end the Rational Assembly itself was the scene 
of violence and ended up as a "one-party Rational Assembly'1 after 
the opposition members resigned _en masse. Why did they struggle for 
or against the treaty to such an extreme degree? To focus the whole 
struggle as a political conflict, it was an ultimate power struggle 
in naked strength between the government which was determined to 
stay in power and the opposition which was equally determined to 
overthrow the government and to recapture power, taking the maximum 
advantages of their respective positions on the treaty issue.
In a larger political view, disintegration of Korean politics 
during the treaty crisis was an aggravation of a symptom of a 
latent instability inherent in the Korean society, which was only 
triggered by the treaty issue. In this connection, there are 
important questions. Why did the opposition place such heavy 
emphasis on extra-parliamentary tactics? Why was there wide and 
fervent support for the extra-constitutional measures of the 
opposition? Was the massive public awareness and participation an 
indication of progress towards a popular democracy or was it an 
indication of political malady? These are some of the crucial 
questions which could be perhaps the important lines of inquiry 
into the political aspects of the treaty crisis in order to under­
stand the general aspects of contemporary Korean politics. The 
purposes of the following two chapters are, first, to reconstruct 
in part a background of the political climate preceding this
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crisis; second, to examine the motivational aspects of political 
actors and forces; and, lastly, to analyse some selected aspects 
of their politics at the time of the crisis (see also Chapters 7 
and 8),
ATTITUDES OP THE MILITARY ELITE AND THE CIVILIAN ELITE
The political crisis during the ROK-Japan treaty struggle was
a crisis of political legitimacy. Professor Seymour Martin Lipset
defines legitimacy as “the capacity of the system to engender and
maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are
the most appropriate ones for the society".He postulates that
the political stability of any democracy depends largely on the
legitimacy of its government as well as on the actual performance
of the government. A crisis of legitimacy, i.e., instability,
during a transition occurs particularly if the status of the major
established groups and their values are threatened, or if the
2.major groups do not have access to the political process. If any 
of the above is a sufficient ca,use of political crisis, Korean 
politics before and during the treaty crisis could be characterized 
by both these symptoms. These Symptoms in Korea were manifested 
by rejection of the legitimacy of the government by large segments 
of Koreans.
In politics it was a continuing emotional power struggle, at 
its peak, between the opposition who held the view that President 
Park Chung-hee's Democratic Republican Party (DRP) government was,
1. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (New York: Doubleday,
i960). See his chapter "Social Conflict, Legitimacy, and Demooracy," 
pp. 64-86.
2. Ibid., p. 6 5*
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by origin and by the process of establishment, illegitimate and 
should hence be overthrovm, and Park’s government and his party 
who regarded the opposition as a body of reactionary cliques 
engaged in subversive activities. These fundamentally contrasting 
attitudes between them had carried their old mutual fear and 
suspicion into the treaty struggle, and had contributed to the 
extremity of political conflict in the whole crisis. This was 
the basic reason why the government and the opposition could not 
compromise in that important treaty issue and instead had cry- 
stalized their differences into a deadly power struggle.
The sources of their continuing struggle (and hence of the 
treaty crisis) should be traced, more recently, to the origins of 
the Third Republic, of the present leadership and of the opposition. 
The Third Republic was established in December 1963 as a civilian 
constitutional government through the presidential elections of 
October 15 and the general elections of November 26, 1963, after 
the two and a half years' rule of the military government led by 
General Park Ohttng-hee and his junta.
After his inauguration, President Park appealed to the 
opposition parties for reconciliation of their political differ­
ences, by calling for '’creation of a new political climate of 
cooperation between the government and the opposition parties” and 
by declaring that on his part he "will be ready to modify
government policies on the basis of sound alternative policies
3.from the opposition parties”. * He also declared that the urgent 
task of the new civilian government was, among other things, "to 
restore political and constitutional order to normality".^'* But
3. "The State of Nation Message" of President Park, January
10, I964, ££• cit.
4. Ibid.
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Park's gesture for reconciliation did not appeal to the opposition 
parties. The opposition parties, after a considerable time of 
silence imposed by the military government, were in no mood to let 
the first political opportunity for sharp condemnation of the 
military rule and its performance, for which the present leaders 
of the Third Republic were responsible, be wasted.
In spite of some efforts by the anxious DRP government to
please the opposition parties, for example, by giving one of two
Vice-Speakerships to Assemblyman La Yong-Kyun of the Civil Rule
Party, by prompt and courteous appearances of the cabinet members
to answer the questions of the opposition members in the Rational
Assembly, by soliciting support of the opposition parties in
sponsoring some non-partisan resolutions in matters of foreign
affairs, and by paying greater respect to Mr. Yun Po-s&n, the head
15,
of the largest opposition Civil Rule Party, the Rational Assembly 
became soon the arena of political struggles between the ruling 
party and the opposition. At the first opportunity when the members 
of the first new cabinet were introduced to the Rational Assembly, 
the members of the opposition parties immediately plunged into 
bitter denunciation of the Park government, retroactively charging 
for alleged irregularities in the last elections as well as asking 
for a political account for failures and corruption of the military 
regime, especially enumerating the so-called "Pour Great Scandals", 
economic hardships of the people, inflation, the harsh rural credit 
policy, "deceptiveness" of the Five-Year Economic Plan, responsibility 
for decreasing U.S. economic aid to the ROK, and above all the
5. See Hankuk Ilbo, January 6, 1964*
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irregular processes in negotiations with Japan.
The ominous sign of political troubles of the Third Republic 
became more apparent when former President Tun Po-son, who was 
defeated by Park Chung-hee by a very narrow margin in his bid for 
presidency in the last elections, made a serious statement, in his 
policy speech of January 14, 19^4 for his Civil Rule Party, 
tantamount to denial of the Park government and advocating the 
overthrow of the government by force. A part of that statement 
was as follows*
Mr. Park Chung-hee said that the ^military/ revolution was 
necessary for the sake of anti-Communism, of eliminating 
corruption, of putting an end to irregularities in elections, 
and of solving economic hardships of the people.
But the posture of anti-Communism is now a matter of grave 
concern among the informed people, especially in view of a 
deepening suspicion that among the persons who play very 
important roles in the Park government there are some whose 
ideologies are impure. Corruption is now more rampageous 
and widespread than ever. Irregularities have completely 
now determined the outcomes of the elections. The people are 
now in the extreme economic distress to an unprecedented 
degree.
I ask now the Park government for a plain answer to this 
question: fhether this situation of the present affairs
would or would not justify another revolution overthrowing 
the Park government, in turn, in the name of anti-Communism, 
elimination of corruption, the end to the election irregu- 7 
larities, and a solution to economic hardship of the people.
This bitter feeling was equally shared by Madam Pak Sun-ch'<$n,
the head of the Democratic Party which was the revival of former
Premier Chang My&n's ruling Democratic Party overthrown by the
military coup d'etat. She stated in her party policy speech in 1964
Third, I would like to point out that the present regime is 
in reality nothing but a continuation of the military regime,
6.The speech of Assemblyman (Civil Rule Party) Kim Yong-sam, 
Kukhoe hoeuirok, 39th Session, Plenary Meetings, 3STo. 7 (December 
26, 1963)> pp. 3-9* General Park himself confessed of harshness 
in carrying out the Five-Year Economic Plan and failures in the 
currency reform in 1962, farm policy and food crises, in Park
Revolution and I (Seoul: no publisher
7. “The 1964 Basic Policy Speech" of Yun Po-s6n, January 14: 
1964? op* cit.
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even though it is a pro forma civilian regime.... Fifth, I 
would like to point out that the event of May 16th was not 
a revolution. It was a goup hy the military to take over 
power of the government. *
Even after one year of Park’s government the feeling of bitterness
and illegitimacy of the Park government was still burning in the
minds of the opposition leaders, as evidenced, for example, by the
party basic policy speech of Madam Pak:
"/Park Chung-hee/ is the President who committed a historic 
crime of suspending the Constituion by guns and bayonets and 
of halting development of political democracy and national 
economy by coup d’etat. Nevertheless in order to cover up 
his crime, hg has been preoccupied with explaining away the 
coup d’etat/inevitable because the former regime was 
incompetent...9*
From the above statements of Yun and Pak, it was amply clear
that the opposition viewed the present government as a de facto
extension of the military rule, which originated by a naked military
coup under the false and presumptions assumption that crises existed
in the Second Republic. This attitude was, of course, directly
contradicted by the military leaders. They took theAview that the
military rule was effectively terminated when the function of the
Constitution and political, administrative, judicial and legislative
10.activities were restored to normality. * Furthermore they argued
that it was immaterial in determining the true character of the
new civilian government whether the military leaders participated
11.in the elections or returned to their original military duties.
The opposition also accused the military leaders, in spite of their 
denial, of entrenching themselves in political power by rigging the 
1963 elections to give a semblance of constituional legitimacy.
8."The 1964 Basic Policy Speech*' of Pak-Sun-ch’on, January 
15, 1964, 0£. Cit.
9* "The 1965 Basic Policy Speech" of Pak Sun-ch'&i, January 
29, 1965? op. cit.
10. E.g., ICim Chong-pil, "Modernisation of Korea and A New 
Leading Force," Koreana Quarterly, Vol. 5? No. 4, Winter 1964, P.34.
11. Ibid.
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The speeches of the opposition leaders, particularly Yun's,
aroused the apprehension am|putrage of the ruling party because
the speeches had shattered the President's hope for reconciliatory
and moderate politics based on issues and policies. When Yun Po-s&n
was totally indifferent to the ruling party's demand for apology
for and withdrawal of his "subversive statement," the emotionally
charged Democratic Republicans in the Rational Assembly, after
the opposition members walked out from the Assembly, unilaterally
adopted a resolution which empowered the Committee of Legislation
12and Justice to draft a censure motion against Yun. * The opposition
contented that, first, the ruling party's attempt to censure Yun
was a tyranical attempt of the majority party to subvert freedom
of speech in the legislature as well as to destroy parliamentary
democracy^ and, secondly, such a resolution involving one of its
own members adopted in an open session was in violation of the
13.Rational Assembly Law. * Beginning with the controversy on Yun's 
speech, hope for a hew politics began to die rapidly.
Why was bitterness remaining so strong in the minds of the 
opposition leaders? First of all, it can be traced to the attitudes 
of the leaders of the military government towards the former 
politicians whom they replaced by the coup. After the military 
overthrew Chang Hyon’s government of the Second Republic, it 
repeatedly charged that the old political order was corrupt, 
incompetent and chaotic largely due to the politicians who were 
ideologically unsettled, dishonest in motives, greedy for power
12.See Tong-A Ilbo, January 15, 1964? and the editorial of 
Tong-A Ilbo, January"!^, 1964.
•*■3* Tong-A Ilbo, January 16, 1964* Later the DRP dropped the 
case against Yun Po-s&n,
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and material things, and unsure of their own ability."**^ ' Here 
are some of the reasons in General Park’s own words, that neces­
sitated the military intervention in politics:
The A m y  does not want any part in politics. Neither can 
it have any!
When the April 19th Student Revolution faced a crisis 
because of the shooting by traitors, the Army kept tight and 
just watched the events. To the^ast minute they were faithful 
to their original duty. The people have seen this and know 
this to be true.
But patience and indifference are two different things.
There had to be a limit! It was impossible for them to endure
doing nothing. Must the A m y  adhere to the ostensible duty
of national defence, patient and looking on, while the national 
economy breaks into pieces and is tempered with, society is 
confounded to its extreme by the rashness and crimes of former 
politicians, and the nation is threatened with the imminent 
danger of ruin?...
The May 16th Revolution may be summarise^ therefore, as
rejection of ’’conspiracy” and as a tactical movement, of the
Army, _to destroy the enemy within. 15*
Following the April Student Revolution the social and political
order had rapidly degenerated into chaos and confusion. The Chang
Myon government, with lesser authority than its predecessor under
the new cabinet system, could not successfully cope with the daily
16occurence of street demonstrations by students and' various groups *
14. See Park Chung-hee, Our Nation’s Path, op. eft., pp.176-98? 
and Park Chung-hee, The Country, The Revolution and op. eft.,
PP» 57-8. See also an indictment of Chang's government by the 
military junta in ”The Achievement of the Revolution in Two Months”, 
the statement of Office of Public Information, the Supreme Council 
for National Reconstruction, July 27, 1967? by ICira Chong-uk, ed.
5»l6 kunsa hy6kmyffng yoram (The Survey of The May 16th Military 
Revolution) Vol. IV (Seoul: Chaech&ngsa, 1961)-, pp. 11-2; and Hankuk 
hyokmybng ohaep'an sa, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 185-204.
15. Park Chung-hee, The Country, The Revolution and I, i b i d . ; 
pp. 53-4* The emphasis by underlining is fnine.
16. For example, the military regime gave the following stati­
stics on demonstrations during the period between April i960 and 
March 196I:
Number of Demonstrations since April 19, I960 
Organisation/group No. of Demonstrations No, of Persons Invol.
Political Orgs.
Students 
Labor
Re1igious/cultural 
Others
Totals
Source: Chong Tae-jin, edited, 5*16 kunsa hyokmyong yoram (The survey 
of The May 16th Military Revolution), Vol. 1, (Seoul: Chaech&igsa,
1961), p. 80.
57 76,280
747 527,819
675 219,303
35 40,713
486 310,678
2,000 1,174,802
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and could not meet their excessive demands unleashed by the revol- 
17 •ution. * Although the defenders of the Chang government and the
Second Republic conceded that the xserformance of the government
during its eight months of office failed to bring political and
social order and economic stability to the nation, they had
nevertheless an important claim to make which was of credit to the
Chang government. The claim, it is true, was that the Chang
government was the first government after ROK's independence in
1948 which demonstrated and practised faith in popular government
and liberal politics, even ultimately at the expense of its own 
18downfall. * The fact is more impressive, considering the disad­
vantages of inheriting the political and economic devastation left 
by the Rhee government and considering the fact that the Chang 
government came to power by the revolution made by and credited to 
the students. Because the revolution was the creation of the 
students and the Chang government was established by that revolution, 
the government was mortally weakened by student power and its
17* About the demands and the difficulties of the Chang 
government, see Richard C. Allen, "South Korea: The Hew Regime," 
Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXIV, Ko.l Spring I96I, pp. 54-75 
Yun Ch’c$n-ju, "Illusion of Politics by the Cabinet Government," 
Sasangge, March I96I, pp. 110-22; Ko Yong-bok, "The Meaning of 
the Social Movement After the Revolution," op. cit., pp. 86—93?
Cho Ka-ky6ng, "Spiritual Confusion of the Revolutionary Mainstream," 
Sasangge, April 1961, pp. 70-75 and David M. Earl, "ICorea: The 
Meaning of the Second Republic," Ear Eastern Survey, Vol. XXIV,
Bo. 11, Kovember i960, pp. 169-75*
18. E.g., Pak Mun-ok, _op. cit., p. 399j and Kim Y&ng~sam, 
Ch&ngch'i nKn kilko oh&ngkwon tSTTchapda, og. cit., p. 30. See 
also former junior minister Kim Ki-ch'bl's story about Premier 
Chang Mybn's l’efusal to suppress student demonstrations. Premier 
Ghang told his advisors, "Of course, peace and order should be 
maintained. Nevertheless you must have appropriate laws to take 
actions... We are the very same persons who denounced and fought 
against the Liberal Party's abuse of laws. It is inconceivable 
for me to suppress illegally the street demonstrations." Kim 
ICL-ch'ol in a discussion, "A Round-Table Talks Inquiry for Change 
of Party Politics," Sasangge, January 1966, p. 162.
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excessive demands.^*
Premier Chang’s government was toppled by the military 
revolution in the midst of -‘carrying out his political convictions, 
which he later explained as follows:
While the Democratic Party was still engaged in the bloody 
struggle against the Liberal Party, the thing that the party 
promised to the people was the absolute guarantee of freedom 
and removal of tyranny. Thus we reaffirmed freedom when we 
came to power*.•
Even though the society /of the Second Republic/ was deep 
in chaos by the daily occurence of demonstrations, the 
Democratic Party government could not violate its own pledge 
of freedom that it made before coming to power...
We could not betray the people under the pretext of a time 
of chaos. Of course we could have declared the state of 
emergency on some dubious pretext. But we believed in a ’’true 
democratic order based on freedom”, rather than in a ”super­
ficial order imposed by guns and bayonets”...
In short, ’’Let them once enjoy the unlimited freedom that 
they had been longing for”, was the credo of the Democratic 
Party government. We tried to govern the people by time, 
instead by an iron fist even in the face of increasing chaos. 
In the meantime, we were also preparing some plans of stem 
measures to prevent degeneration of this social disorder 
reaching a certain point where it might endanger essential 
maintenance of national security and welfare.*®*
Chang's faith in liberal democracy even at the expense of the
efficiency of the government was embedded in the thinking of many
civilian politicians of the old regime who had struggled against
21.the authoritarian Shee government. ‘ * The politicians’ credo was
19*For the student power, see Richard C. Allen, "South Korea: 
The lew Regime,” joj>. cit., p. 54? Cho ICa-Ky&ng, op. cit., pp. 72—35 
and ICo Y8ng-bok, "The Meaning of the Social Movement after the 
Revolution,", oj>. cit., pp. 87 and 92. About the excessive claim 
of the students’ role in the revolution, Premier Chang said: His 
Democratic Party’s long struggle was actually a decisive factor 
in eventually bringing down Rhee's dictatorship. Nevertheless 
since the Democratic Party was not directly involved in that 
revolution and did not earn political power outrightly by its own 
right, it was one of the critical factors that crippled his 
governmental authority in disciplining the people. See his "On 
Chang My8n," Huimang Ch'ulp'ansa, ed. Sashil ui ohonpu rul kisul 
handa, op. cit., pp. 390-1.
20. Chang My'6n, "On Chang Mybn, ” ibid., pp. 382-3.
21. For example, former Ambassador, Chang Ri-uk, a close 
friend of Premier Chang bitterly stated that destruction of a 
constitutional government by the military in the name of political 
efficacy would never be justified. Chang ri-uk, "For Reconstruction 
of Political Morality," Sasangge, October 1964, p* 19»
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diametrically opposed to that of the military leaders who were
armies by nature are", Professor Lucian f. Pye has stressed, "rival
of one against the other... He thus has... a greater sensitivity
in their experience and values, the defenders (the former poli-
the political performance of the old regime by the miliary or of 
the military government by the former politicians.
Professor Rupert Emerson observes in defence of democracy 
against the military interventions in developing countries,
The erosion of democracy in the new states has taken two 
characteristic forms? the seizure of power by the military 
and the turn to a one-party system. Whichever way the dice 
come up, a common feature is that politicians and political 
parties are denounced as corrupt, self-interested and divisive 
betrayers of the public interest. Politics itself becomes 
an evil word, and Westem-style democracy is publically 
discredited by its fruits, or lack of them. In contrast, the 
military or the single party are billed as representing the 
creative and unified national force which is needed to promote 
the common good and rescue the country from the disintegration 
with which the politicians and their parties threaten it.23-
In fact many political observers at the time felt that in spite of
its internal difficulties which unduly overshadowed the performance
and perspective of the Chang government, the Second Republic was
24making good progress and maturing along the road of democracy.
Chang My&n himself asserted that his government was nevertheless 
making steady progress towards political and economic stability,
22. Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston 
and Toronto? Little, Brown and Co.,1966), p. 178.
23. Rupert Emerson, op. cit., p. 82.
24* See such as Richard C. Allen, "South Korea? The Hew 
Regime", op. cit., pp. 54-5? Bavid BI. Earl, "Korea; The Meaning of 
the Second Republic," op. cit., p. 174? and United Rations, 16th 
Session, Supplement Ho. 13 (I/49OO), op. cit.-, p. 5*
trained in discipline, efficiency and survival. "First of all,
institutions in the sense that their ultimate function is the test
to weakness in his own society."22 Because of this difference
ticians) and the military leaders polarized their estimates of
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even though he was accused of responsibility for the "incompetent
25.Chang government1* by the military. In retrospect he believed
that he could have done much better if he only had "a little more
time" before he was thrown out by the impatient and self-righteous 
26 •military, * To make a fair assessment of the Chang government, 
one of the main "weaknesses" of the Chang government was its 
refusal to depend on authoritarian measures, and as a result it 
could not keep pace with the expectation created by the April 
Student Revolution.^’
THE MILITARY JUNTA A3SD "PUNISHMENT M L  REFORM"
Believing in their sacred mission of saving the nation from
confusion and chaos at the hands of the irresponsible politicians,
the military junta expressed its repeated determination that, once
a civilian government was restored, it would not tolerate the
country coming again under the grip of former politicians "tainted
28.by corruption and injustice". * The foundation of the new civilian 
government, the military junta insisted, had to be constructed first 
of all on a new generation of politicians in order to reform politics 
in Korea.
As soon as the coup was successful, the military junta immed­
iately prohibited all political activities of the politicians, 
dissolved legislatures at all levels of government, and arrested
10many of the politicians including all members of the Chang cabinet,
25* Chang Myon, "On Chang Myon," op. cit., p. 385. See also 
former Minister of Justice Cho Chae-chLon*s defence of the Chang 
government, in his "On Cho Chae-cH&n," Kim Ch’ang-jin et al., edited, 
Ch&igkye yahwa (Evening Stories About Politics), Vol. II, (Seoul:
Hongu ch’ulp’ansa, 1966), pp. 464-6.
26. Chang My8n, ibid, p. 386.
27. Former President Yun Po-s&n of the Second Republic was very 
critical of Premier Chang, But he agreed with this assessment.
Yun Po-s&n, ICukuk ui kahipat'kil, op. cit., p. 81,
28. Park Chung-hee, Our Nation's Path, op. cit., p. 5*
29. Ibid.; and Park Chung-hee, The Country, The Revolution and I_, 
op. cit., p. 17.
30. See Lecree Ho. 4 (Leelaration of Transfer of Governmental 
Power from the Chang Government to the Military Revolutionary Committee) 
of the Military Revolutionary Committee, May 16, I96I, in Chong Tae-jin, 
ed., Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 20-1. ______
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In the first two months of military rule, the military junta had
consolidated its control by reorganizing itself on May 20 as the
Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCHR) and became the
supreme governing body of the country with the aid of the newly 
31*organized CIA. * The junta summarily suppressed all potential
sources of political opposition. By Decree Ho. 6 of the SCHR,
all political and social organizations except those of non-
political nature engaged in relief, academic and religious activi-
32.ties were ordered to be dissolved. * Accordingly fifteen
existing political parties and 238 various social organizations 
33.were dissolved. * In spite of the SCHR's explanation that “it is
basically not a denial of freedom of assembly but a measure fitting
for their past activities which deviated from their proper spheres
3dof activities and had done great harm to the nation and people," 
the result of the decree was a general uprooting of political 
organizations to an unprecedented degree so that the politicians 
found themselves at the mercy of the military rulers and hardly 
capable of recuperating their political strength when political 
activities were allowed again later.
Critics of the military junta were also harshly suppressed by a
31. For organization and function of the SCHR, see "The Law 
Regarding Extraordinary Measures for Rational Reconstruction" 
(Appendix 2) and "The Supreme Council for Rational Reconstruction 
Law" (Appendix 3), in The Supreme Council for Rational Recon­
struction, Military Revolution of Korea (Seoul, 1961), pp.149-56 
and 157-69.
32. See Decree Ho* 6 (Order for Dissolution of Political 
Parties and Social Organizations) of the SCHR, May 22, I96I, in 
Ch&ig Tae-j in, op. cit., pp. 28 and 38-9 .
33. "The Achievement of the Revolution in Two Months," the 
SCHR, in Kim Chong-uk, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 1.
34* Ibid.
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series of repressive measure, such as censorship of the press and
35*elimination of a number af newspapers and other publications.
and
For example, under Decree Do* 11 of the SCHl/Ordinance Do. 1 of
the Ministry of Public Information, 1,170 newspapers and various
publications were forced to close down because of their failure
“\C
to meet the government standards for publication. * The military
junta explained that the measure was intended to clean out those
phony journalists and publications which were trying to defile the
sacred freedom of the press, and to establish a fresh order in
37.journalism and develop a truly democratic press.
Thus deprived of their political organizations and even of the
support of the press which had been always a natural friend of the 
38.opposition, * the former politicians were not only mercilessly
condemned and discredited for the plight of the country by the
military junta without benefit of right to reply, but also completely
disbanded and silenced in humiliation by the new lulers. Professor
Robert T. Scalapino observed that the attitude of the military junta
towards the former politicians was, as in the early days of the
39.American occupation of Japan, "'punishment and reform".
In order to make the political purge complete, the SCHR issued 
the Political Activities Purification Law on March 16, 1962,^* by
35* Bee Decree Ho. 1 of the Military Revolutionary Committee, 
May 16, I96I3 Decree Ho. 11 of the SCHR, May 23? I96I3 Announcement 
Ho.4 of the Martial Law Command, May 18, I96I3 and Ordinance Ho.l 
of the Ministry of Public Information, May 28, I96I, in ibid., 
pp. 20, 29, 49 and 66-8.
36. The SCHR, Military Revolution of Korea, c>|>. cit., p. 29.
37 * Ibid.
38. About the traditional role of the Korean press in support 
of the opposition see Ch'oe S&k-ch'ae, "Korean Press and Rational 
Elections," Koreana Quarterly, Vol. 9? No. 2, Summer 1967? p. 87.
39• Robert T. Scalapino, "Which Route for Korea," Asian Survey, 
Vol. II, Ho. 7? September 1962, p. 3.
40. For the text of this law, see Kukka chaekon ch1oeko hoeui 
hanlcuk kunsa hyokmybng sa p’y^hch'an wiwonhoe (The Editing Committee 
of the History of Korean Military Revolution, the SCHR), Hankuk 
kunsa hy&kmybng sa (The History of the Korean Military Revolution), 
Vol. I, Ho. I, (Seoul, I963),? pp. 652-63.
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which the military rulers blacklisted 4*369 persons including 
almost all former politicians of the Liberal Party, th© Democratic 
Party, the Few Democratic Party another reformist and socialist 
minority partiesj and including former high government officials, 
the so-called "illicit fortune accumulators" and political activi- 
tists among college students. The law also applied to those who 
were considered to be "apparently politically corrupt" and who 
"obstructed the execution of the revolutionary tasks" - - - 
included in these categories were the former military colleagues 
who were eliminated in the process of the internal power struggles 
of the SCFH but were still considered to be dangerous to the junta 
leadership, andthe newpapermen who were critical of the military
. , 41.junta.
The persons placed on the list were barred from all types of 
political activities, including candidacy for elected office, 
political campaigns, political speeches, party activities, and 
others, for the period of six years (until the end of August 1968) 
unless a person on the list were to be cleared by a screening 
committee of the SCFH and approved by the SCFH chairman, General 
Park. General Park stated that the purpose of the political 
purification law was to prevent recurrence of irregular, corrupt 
politicis by eliminating th© former politicians who had not shown 
the slightest indication of repentance for their past sins, and that 
the law was in effect a step to insure faithful execution of the 
sixth paragraph of the revolutionary pledges, i.e. "After we have 
completed our mission, we shall restore the government to honest
42.and conscientious civilians, and return to our proper military duties."
41. For the scope of the blacklist, see Article 3 of the Political 
Activities Purification Law? and "Judgement on Fitness for Political 
Activities and the Old Politicians," Hankuk Ilbo, larch 26, 1962.
For an analysis of the intent of that law, see Asahi Shimbun, April 16, 
1962| and Han Hae-bok, lt,01d School' Veterans," Far Eastern Economic 
Heview, Vol. XXXVI, Fo.2, April 12, 1962, pp. 54-9.
"42. ilSpeech Upon Declaration of the Political Activities Purifi­
cation Law," March 16, 1962, in Hankuk kunsa hy6kmy6ng sa, Vol. I, Fo.l, 
op. cit., pp. 67-8. The emphasis by underlining is min€..
172
Aside from the stated purpose, the law could have, had it been
successful, eliminated all undesirable elements who could have been
able to frsutrate the military junta and who could be later the
sources of political retaliation against the leaders of the coup
43.d'etat should they successfully return to power. * Thus the law
was, to critics and opponents of the military junta, nothing but
a sinister design to liquidate the enemies of the military junta.
When the law was announced, President Yun Po~s'8n, who remained in
the office as a figure head and was excepted from the blacklist in
appreciation for his service to the military junta as President,
resigned in protest.^* The law was also denounced by former
Prime Minister Chang Mybn and Kim To-y&i, the head of the former
45.opposition party, the Hew Democratic Party.
Among 2,775 persons on the list who applied to the SCHR's
screening committee for examination of their fitness for future
political activities, 1,336 persons were cleared in May 1962.
However in the face of strong resentment and criticism by the former
politicians and critics of the military junta, the SCHR eventually
cleared all but 268 iDersons from the blacklist by the end of 
. 47.
February 1964* But the clearance of politicians from the 
blacklist was so carefully timed^* that the former politicians 
and critics have long accused the military junta of deliberate 
calculation to confuse the already confused c^mp of the opposition, 
in order to prevent the resurgence of a strong unified opposition
43- See Asahi Shlmbun, April 16, 1962.
44* See Yun Po-s5n,' Kukuk ui kasphip'atkil, o£. cit., pp.120-5.
45* See again Asahi Shimbun, April IfT, I962.
46. "Two and a Half Years in Turmoils A Dairy of the Military
Rule?" Tong-A-Ilbo, December 16, 1963.
47* Ibid.
48. The SCHR cleared 171 persons in December 1962 and 168 in 
early February 1963. Then in late February 1963, it cleared all 
but 268 persons, from which additional 192 persons were cleared in 
December 1963 after the elections were over. Ibid.
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party which could have effectively challenged the DRP in the 1963 
elections.
In addition to these systematic suppressive measures against
the former politicians, the military junta, through its vast
police apparatus of the GIA, had vigilantly maintained close su.i>
veillance over the political leaders of the past regime, coupled
with occasional arrests and trials for various counter-revolutionary
activities allegedly plotted by former politicians and the foimer
49.
military colleagues. The numerous arrests and trials, particularly 
of former politicians including Chang My&i, were based on fear and 
suspicion rather than actual evidence. Most of the accused were 
either acquitted, or released after being sentenced to imprisonment.
If extraordinary caution against counter-coups was a normal part 
of a regime established by a coup, it inevitably deepened the 
bitterness of the former politicians and strengthened the convic­
tion of opponents and critics of the junta that the military junta
was merely a political group aiming at total elimination of all
50.major political opposition to it.
G3SMERAL p a r k «s d e c i s i o i to hu e f o r p r e s i d e n c y
In the sixth paragraph of the revolutionary pledges, the 
military promised that it would restore the government to "honest 
and conscientious civilians" and then would return to its original 
duty. But who were these honest and conscientious politicians?
49• See W.D. Reeve, The Republic of Korea; A Political and 
Economic Study (London, Few York, and Toronto; Oxford University 
Press, 1963), pp. 153-9? an^ "The case of Iju Party," Lee By&ng-su 
et al, ed. Haebang iship ny&n sa, op. cit., pp. 1138-9.
50. This was also an observation of Professor Scalapino who 
visited Korea after the military revolution. See Robert T.
Scalapino, "Which Route to Korea," jop. cit., p. 8,
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The question was an important one that remained to be answered soon, 
especially in the light of the military junta's repeated expression 
of distrust of the former politicians.
On August 12, 1961, General Park announced that the military 
government would restore the civilian government in the summer of 
1963 through elections in May of that year and that political
*51»activities would be allowed to resume from the beginning of 1963.
On December 31? 1962, ihe statement which formally allowed 
resumption of political activities in preparation for restoration 
of civilian government, General Park warned the former politicians!
Upon this occasion, the thing that the politicians as well 
as the people should deeply bear in their minds... is that 
should the political society of this nation return to the 
same old state of confusion and violence, it will surely 
bring about an unmanageable ruin to the democratic fatherland.
Especially, most of you, the politicians, should remind 
yourselves that you are of the old discredited generation.
You should keep pace with the change of time and should 
devote yourselves to the rehabilitation of your fallen honor 
by creating a fair and orderly political environment.52*
The seriousness of Park's warning was already demonstrated by the
enactment of the Political Activities Purification Law in March 1962?
although the military junta was finding it increasingly difficult
to keep most of the former politicians tied down on the blacklist.
On February 18, 1963? General Park made an important statement
after having closely watched the political activities of the former
politicians as well as of his military colleagues who were now
retired from the military service and were organizing a political
party (later to become the DRP) to support General Park's
51. "Announcement Concerning the Date of Restoration of 
Civilian Government," in Hankuk kunsa hy5kmy8ng sa. Vol. I, No. 1, 
op. cit., pp. 66-7*
52. "Speech upon Resumption of Political Activities," in
ibid., p. 67.
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presidential bid in the forthcoming elections should he choose to 
run. In that statement, he said:
The revolutionary government is now about to transfer the 
government to civilians, still without having accomplished 
its revolutionary tasks. At this juncture, our supreme 
concern is whether the revolutionary ideology and tasks will 
be carried on by the forthcoming civilian government.
Having observed during the past fifty days the political 
activities which were supposedly to create a new history of 
democratic politics, I cannot but express my utter disappoint­
ment at the political scenes which have hardly cast off their 
old patterns and which have no sign of change of the body 
politic. In view of this development, I can hardly conceal 
my feeling of uneasiness about the future of the nation.
To my deep regret, there is no sincere political party 
which is willingly trying to carry out the revolutionary 
tasks. Instead most of the political parties take the 
attitudes of denying the revolution, of opposing the govern­
ment policy, and of defying the revolutionary ideology.••
As a man responsible for this revolution, during the past 
few days I was impelled to give my concern and thought to 
this grave political situation and its problems. And I 
have reached a conclusion that restoration of the civilian 
government without change of the body politic or termination 
of the military government without guarantee for continuation 
of the revolutionary ideology is in consequence to forfeit 
the significance and the value of the May 16th Revolution 
and to retreat to the point prior to May 16, 53*
With this conclusion, General Park declared that he would not be 
a candidate for presidency of the new civilian government, provided 
that both the politicians and the military leaders would promise 
to him and to the people that they would observe the following nine 
conditions he set forth: (l) The military would strictly observe
neutrality in politics and support the government freely elected 
by the peoples (2) the forthcoming government would promise to 
carry out the revolutionary tasks by upholding the spirit of the 
April Student Revolution and of the May 16th Military Revolution; 
(3) the leaders of the military revolution would be allowed to 
decide individually whether they will return to the military duty 
or participate in the civilian government; (4) the legitimacy of
53. "The February 18th Statement To Heal with the Political 
Situation," February 18, 1963? in ibid., pp. 73~4*
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the military revolution must be accepted, by all and any political 
vendetta against the leaders of the revolutionary government would 
not be made$ (5) all political parties would immediately stop
their slanderous and factional power struggles, and would compete 
to capture confidence of the people in the elections based on 
issues and programs; (6) the new Constitution, duly made and
approved by the national referendum, would be preserved; (7) the 
ROK-Japan issue would be dealt with by non-partisan diplomacy;
(8) the public officials lav/fully employed by the military govern­
ment would not be dismissed; and (9) special consideration would
be given to able retired military officers in government employment 
54.policy.
On February 27, in a pompous oath-taking ceremony in Seoul,
the former politicians and the chiefs of the armed forces made their
solemn pledges to observe the nine conditions in return for General
55.Park's own pledge of non-candidacy. * Civilian participants in 
the ceremony represented twelve political parties. At the ceremony 
General Park admitted the failure of the military junta’s efforts 
in the ”change of generations’* (replacement of the generation of 
old career politicians by a new generation of fresh politicians) 
in the face of determined opposition by opponents of the military
p*/r
junta. * At the time it appeared that in all practical purpose 
the military leaders were ready to transfer power to the civilian 
politicians in accordance with the revolutionary pledge.
54. Ibid.
55* See Tong-A Ilbo, February 27, 1963*
56. "The Statement at the Ceremony of Oath to Peal with the 
Political Situation,** Hankuk kunsa hy&kmy6ng sa, Vol. I, Ho. 1,
°£* oit., p. 75.
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Although General Park’s decision not to run was welcomed by
the people and most of the former politicians and although the
former politicians lost no time in accepting Park's nine conditions,
some former politicians like Yun Po-s6n seriously questioned the
sincerity of Park’s pledge and dismissed it as a ’’grand political 
57 •show”. The skeptics thought that General Park was preparing
a political ground to justify later his reversal of the earlier
pledge of non-candidacy by blaming the former politicians for
continuing political confusion in treacherous violation of the
pledge of February 27th. At the time of his pledge General Park
58.was apparently sincere about his disillusionment with politics
in general and, in particular, with resurgence of the old patterns
of politics such as factionalism and slanderous attacks not only
among the civilian politicians but also among the members of his
59.own military junta.^ In spite of his apparent sincerity, it was 
however obvious that most of the conditions laid down by General 
Park and accepted by the civilian politicians were too impractical 
to be upheld. A pledge to elevate politics to a higher plane 
over-night by a mere ceremony of oath-taking was too inadequate 
and superficial to bring about a change in politics. If this was 
the reason for Yun Po-son’s fear that the whole affair was Park's 
design for the latter's comeback, his fear was soon justified.
57* Yun Po-s&n claimed that he had a reliable information from 
a certain military junta member warning him it was a show. See 
Yun Po-s&u, Kukuk ui kashipat’kil, op. cit., p. 139.
58. On February 18 while General Park was making his speech 
1 had the unique opportunity to observe closely Messrs. Kim Chong-pil 
and Kim Yong-taej the two main architects of the Democratic Repub­
lican Party, who were listening to the live broadcast of General 
Park's speech. As the most active supporters of General Park's 
candidacy, they were utterly dejected by the unexpectedness of Park's 
announcement which they had apparently tried to avert. With the 
recollection of these two men, 1 am strongly inclined to believe 
that the pledge of General Park on February 27 was not a show.
59* "kbe circumstances of Park's announcement of his with­
drawal from politics see Lee ICon, "The Real Facts in the Retreat 
of the Korean Military Regime," Ghudkoron, April 1963? pp* 106-12.
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The political conditions following the ceremony were, as
expected, deteriorating, instead of improving. On March 16 General
Park suspended all political activities and proposed extension of
military rule for another four years subject to approval in a
60*national refrendum. * For this extraordinary counter-measure to
the scheduled transfer of power to the civilian government General
Park blamed the former politicians and the anti-Kim Chong-^il
faction in the SCHR who were arrested on March 10 for a counter- 
61.coup plot. * On April 8, however, General Park was forced to
withdraw his decision of March 16 in the face of indignant opponents
and critics of the military junta, and under considerable pressure
6 2.from the United States * as well as the influence of determined
63arguments for his candidacy by his own supporters. * The above 
was the train of the events that led to Park*s decision to reverse 
his pledge of E'ebruary 27 and to run for presidency of the Third 
Republic. And political activities were again allowed to resume.
About the imperativeness of his candidacy, General Park 
explained, "I arrived at the conclusion that if I turned power over 
these people /i.e. the former politicians/ I was giving them the
Ik /I ^
tinder for a third revolution as well. During the presidential 
campaign his main theme, Y/hich was also the reason of his candidacy, 
was that it was his responsibility, as "a member of the new
60. See “The Statement of March 16th," March 16, 1963, Hankuk 
kunsa hy&kmyong sa, Vol. I, No. 1, op.cit., pp. 75—7•
61. Ibid.
62. About the American pressure, see Kim Ky8ng-rae, “Secret 
Story of Negotiations between the Military Regime and the United 
States," Sasanagge, April 1964? pp.114-20,
63« E.g., on March 15 about 60 army officers of the Capital 
Defence Command in Seoul demonstrated in the front yard of the 
SCNR building to condemn the former politicians and to urge 
candidacy of General Park. See Chosun Ilbo, March 16, 1963*
64* Park Chung-hee, The Country, The Revolution and ][, op. cit., 
p. 103.
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generation”, not to abandon the destiny of the country again to
6b.the hands of former politicians. The 1963 elections were for
the military ultimately a confrontation between an ideology of
66 •his own "new generation" and that of the "old generation".
Expounding on this, he said;
Who is to become President? Who is to control political 
power? These are immaterial. Today we have several political 
parties. They can be broadly classified into two kinds. By 
classification we know there are two streams of political 
groups. One of them is the stream which fundamentally denies 
the May 16th Revolution and is trying to restore all the 
situation back to the point prior to the May 16th Revolution. 
This is so-called "the party of restoration" striving for 
revival of the old order which existed before the May 16th 
Revolution. The other stream is the constructive and willful 
political party which strives to reconstruct this nation into 
a modern nation where we can all enjoy better life, by 
continuously upholding the ideals of the May 16th Revolution 
and developing it into a national revolution.^7*
"CHANGE OP GMERATIONS": A SLOGAN
In a final analysis, the thirty-two months of the military rule 
was on the part of the military leaders a period of relentless 
struggle to change the foundation of Korean politics by forcing 
old career politicians into retirement in favor of a new generation 
of younger politicians - - this is what they called the "change of 
generations". In order to bring about the change of generations, 
the military leaders tried various barriers and resti'ictions against 
the former politicians. The attempt had not only failed, but 
instead had deeply divided the political elites of Korea by
65. See, e.g., "The DRP Nomination Acceptance Speech," August 
31, 19^3, in Shin Bom-shik, edited, Chokuk ui kundaehwa: Pak Taet-*- 
ongryong ui chfoigoh1 i roson (Modernization of the Fatherland;
The Political Route of President Park) (Seoul; Tong-A ch’ulp’ansa,
1965), pp. 81-90.
66. See, e.g., his campaign speech of September 23rd, 196-3, 
in ibid., pp. 108-9*
1>7. His campaign speech of September 28, 1963, in ibid., p. 114.
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irreconcilable emnity. Upon the failure of the military junta 
to find a group of civilian politicians to replace it, the leaders 
of the military junta became themselves the contenders for pol­
itical power of the Third Republic, posing as the new generation 
of "honest and conscientious" politicians so much idolized in 
their revolutionary pledge. The military leaders claimed that 
they were of the young generation, full of ambition and passion 
and keenly aware of a new sense of history, and that they were 
the only ones capable of bimtiging,. solutions to the problems of Korea.
In spite of the military junta's claim that they were forced 
to participate in the new civilian government, it had been spec­
ulated as early as I96I that the military junta had no intention 
of relinquishing power, not only because it is generally true that 
men who have had the taste of power are not in the habit of 
surrendering it voluntarily, but also because the military junta 
had an enormous faith in themselves and believed in their manifest
mission of saving the country from Communism, chaos, corruption,
69.poverty and superficial democracy.  ^ The intention of the military
leaders to stay in power was already expressed by none other than
Kim Chong-pil when he said in Tokyo in October 1962 that General
Park’s presidential candidacy and the junta members' participation
70.in the forthcoming elections were inevitable.
On the other hand to the former politicians, thirty-two months 
under the military rule v/as a period of terrible insecurity. The 
earlier attempt of forcible retirement of the former politicians 
and the continuing intention of the military junta to deny return
68. E.g., Kim Chong-pil, "Modernization of Korea and A Kew 
Leading Force," op. cit., p. 28.
69. See Ellis Joffe, "South Korea After the Military Revol­
ution, " Far .Eastern Economic Review? Vo. XXXIII, Ko. 11, September 
14? 1961, p.517«
70. The statement of Kim Chong-pil, October 12, 1962, Chosun 
Ilbo, October 13? 1962.
181
of power to them became a serious threat to their political future.
The former politicians and critics of the military junta charged
that the seemingly noble slogan of the 11 change of generations*'
was in fact a clever idea of the new military oligarchy in alliance
with certain elements of young intellectuals to prolong their
71personal power by unilaterally suppressing the old-timers.
Against the Political Activities Purification Law, they argued 
that the military oligarchy, fearful of political retaliation, 
intoxicated with the taste of power, and with the growing confi­
dence in governing the people as experience grew, enacted the law
which was really a coercive physical device to carry out the real
72.intent behind the slogan of the "change of generations'*.
There were a number of obvious reasons for the failure of
the stated purpose of the slogan and the law. First of all, the
former politicians refused to accept the central idea of the whole
scheme that they were indeed the condemned ones, as depicted by
the military leaders self-appointed to the tribunal of judgement
on the former politicians, and who proved to be, as the rulers
even with all political resources and absolute authority at hand,
7 3no better than the former politicians. The law was indeed a 
very crude and undemocratic attempt to replace the natural process 
of elimination through election in democratic politics. The 
opposition's argument was in essence that law could not legislate 
a desirable politics.
The equally important case against such an artificial measure 
was that while some individuals undoubtedly should be barred from
71. "The Change of Generations," Tong-A IIbo, December 14? 1963*
72. See e.g. Kim Ch'8l-su, "Dew Dimension of Korean Political 
Parties," op. cit., p. 80.
73. Kim Ky6ng-rae, "Korean Political Parties in Transition," 
Sasangge, December 1963, p. 47*
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future political activities, the country could not well afford
the wholesale elimination of about four thousand persons who had,
nevertheless, played important roles in political and economic
74.fields. Even assuming that the country would be better off
without these persons, critics argued that the elections would be
75.meaningless without real or effective opposition.
Perhaps a more decisive reason for the total indifference of 
the former politicians, who were not totally immune from what the 
military alleged against them, to any of Park’s ideas or pro­
positions for political change was their total distrust of General 
Park. Instead of restraint or critical self-examination, the 
former politicians were increasingly antagonized by anything the 
military junta did. Kim Kyong-rae, the chief of the political 
department of Kyunghyang Shinmoon, an influential Seoul daily, gave 
the following reasons why Park’s appeal for reformation of the 
former politicians, for example, in his speech of December 31, 1962, 
was so repugnant to thems the speech had no impact because it 
came from the man who willfully discarded the sixth paragraph of 
the revolutionary pledges which disclaimed any political ambition 
in the civilian government, and because it came from the man who
7
branded the former politicians as traitors in his various statements.
Finally the idealism of the change of generations for the sake 
of a clean and orderly politics was shattered by the military junta
members themselves --  the very persons who repeatedly told the
people that they had to resort to a military coup d' etat to stamp 
out the evils of the old politics such as factionalism, personal
74* F.g., Yun Po-s$n, Kukuk ui kashipat’kil, op. cit., p. 123 
75* Robert T. Scalapino, "Which Route for Korea," _0|). cit.,
p *
76. Kim Kyong-rae, "Korean Political Parties in Transistion,” 
olt°» P* 47.
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77 •ambition and political corruption. Th© vicious factional struggles,
especially between the so-called !lmain stream1’ (The Kim Chong-pil
faction) and the “non-main stream” (the anti-Kim Chong-pil faction
led by Generals Kim Tong-ha and Lee Chu-il) inside the SCHR for
political hegemony of the forthcoming civilian government, greatly
undermined the image of the military leaders who claimed to be a
group of new elites. In early 1963, when the inside feuds were
brought out into the open by the factions attacking each other in
open forums and in March when the Kim Tong-ha faction was finally
eliminated by the arrest for an alleged plot of counter-coup, the
creditability of the junta's slogans of the "change of generations”,
7 ft
"clean politics”, and a "new elite” was irrevocably damaged*
The slogan of the "change of generations" was further com­
promised, ironically, by General Park himself by his famour formula, 
"idealism 60^, reality 4 0 when the DRP, which had prided itself 
as a party of the new elite, had to accommodate a vast number of 
the old politicians under this formula, either as party nominees
for the Rational Assembly or party functionaries, in order to win
79.the 1963 elections. Among the DRP's nominees, eighteen belonged
to the defunct Liberal Party. Some of the eighteen nominees were
the ones directly responsible for the infamous i960 presidential
00
elections and for other rigged elections. * The compromise of
77 • See especially ICiyomiya Ryu, "The Inside of the ROIC Supreme 
Council,"Chuakoron, March 1963* PP* 248-51? and Daniel Wolfstone, 
"Park Goes to the Polls," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. XLI,
No. 11, September 12, 1963, ppTlTHJ-S.
78. See "The Balance Sheet of the Military Governments Power 
Structure and Political Power", Tong-A Ilbo? December 14, 1963*
79* The DRP admitted that the party had to nominate or recruit 
even those who were "totally unacceptable to the original ideology 
of the party," Minjukonghwatang (The Democratic Republican Party), 
Minjukonghwatang sa ny6n sa (The Four-Year History of the Demo­
cratic Republican PartyJ "(Seoul, I967) P* 127*
Ohosun IIbo, November 1, 1963. Many idealists in the party 
rebelled in dissatisfaction with the compromise and the party was 
in turmoil. See "Six Days' Feudss The Dispute on the DRP Nomin­
ation," Chosun Ilbo of the same date. All eighteen were elected to 
the Rational Assembly, Tong-A Ilbo, September 28, 1963*
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idealism with reality was explained by the DRP as r,a strategic
retreat1' to attain a workable majority for political stability in 
' 01the Third Republic, * Thus any meaningful purpose of the ’'change
of generations" and of the political purification law disappeared,
when all but a few hundred of the persons on the blacklist had to
be cleared in order to give at least a semblance of fair elections,
when the "new generation" (the military leaders) proved not to be
better than the "old generation" (the former politicians) in
political integrity, and finally when the DRP itself had to under-
82.mine its idealism in pursuit of victory in the 1963 elections.
Furthermore the military leaders were the experts (but the
poor handlers) in creating symbols and slogans, such as "old
politicians and old evils", "human reform", "qualitative change",
"change of generations", "a new political climate", "nationalistic
democracy", "national subjectivity", "miracle of the Han River",
and "self-sufficiency", Fo doubt they inspired and captured the
imagination of the people. But it is one of the tragedies of the
revolution that these were unfortunately consumed more for the
purpose of willfully discrediting the old regimes and purging the
former politicians and opponents of the military junta in order to
find some rationale of their coup d'etat and to consolidate their 
83.power.
81, Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa nyon sa, op. cit,, 
p. 127? an& Ham Chae-hui, "Pledges of the Park Regime and An 
Unknown Democracy," Sasangge December 1963, p. 55«
82. See Im Bang-hySn, "SIogan or Ideology?! Criticism and 
Anti-myth of the Change of Generations," Ch1 oekofhoeulbo, Ho. 21 
June 1963, pp. 25-75 and "The Change of GenerationsT^"Iong-A Ilbo, 
December 14, 1963.
83* For attacks by intellectuals on the manipulation of symbols 
and slogans by the military, see Chi Myong-kwan, "The May 16th Coup 
is Hot the Heir of the Spirit of the April 19th Revolution," 
Sasangge, April, 1964, PP* 28-375 an& Ham Chae-hui, "Pledges of the 
Park Regime and An Unknown Democracy," op. cit., pp. 53—9.
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Because of these attitudes of the self-righteous military 
leaders who justified first their military coup hy expressing 
their unreserved contempt of the former politicians and blaming 
them for the evils of the old regimes, and who subsequently pursued 
puritanical politics by forceful elimination of the former politicians 
from politics, the leaders of the military government had not only 
failed in their quest, but in the course of time had implanted a 
seed of bitter political struggle for the future by dividing the 
nation.
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CHAPTER 6
THE 1963 ELECTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY 
The 1963 elections were in a sense a fierce contest between 
the "new elite” of the young generation represented by the military 
officers in alliance with some new politicians and the former 
career politicians thrown out of power by the military coup on 
May 16, I96I. More specifically for the military leaders the 
elections were to terminate formally their military rule and trans­
form themselves as constitutional and legitimate rulers of the 
country by winning popular support. For the former civilian poli­
ticians who had been barred from all political activities and 
silenced during the great part of two and a half years of the
military rule, the elections provided a battleground to oust the
1military from power and to restore themselves to power. *
Although General Parle Chung-hee, who retired from the army
on August 30, 1963 to become a presidential candidate of the DRP,
won the office of presidency, and his party gained a strong
2*majority of seats in the new (Sixth) National Assembly, * the 
elections were in many respects inconclusive, in view of the 
election returns and of the legal and political conditions under 
which the elections were held, for the DRP to claim for a clear
1. See the campaign slogans of major opposition parties, the 
Civil Rule Party, the Party of the People, the Democratic Party
and the Liberal Democratic Party in the CEMG, Taehanminkuk sbnk# sa, 
op. cit., pp. 364-5? and Chungang sbnko kwanri wiwonho© (The Central 
Election Management Committee), Kak chbngtang ui tangh‘6n, ohbngkang 
ohbngch1aek (Charters, Platforms and Policies of Political~PartTes) 
Xsem271564), pp. BO, 107-8, 129-30, and 149-53.
2. For overall reviews of the 1963 elections, see Lee Chong- 
silc, "Korea: The Search of Stability," Asian Survey, Vol. IV, No. 1 
January 1964? PP* 656-65, Yim Hong-bin, "An Analysis of the General 
Elections in 1963,” Korean Affairs, Vol. Ill, No. 1, April 1964, 
pp. 120-8; and Kim Myong-whai, "The Presidential Election in Korea, 
1963," Korean Affairs, Vol. II, Nos. 3 & 4, 1963, pp. 372-8.
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mandate of rule, and, on the other hand, for the opposition to 
concede their defeat. As a result, doubt of the political legi­
timacy of Park's government remained the same as ever in the 
minds of the political opponents.
The central issue of the elections was naturally the nature
of the government to replace the military junta and to bring a
stable democracy to the Third Republic. The opponents of the
military junta argued that a genuine stable democracy could only
be brought about by restoration of civilian leadership, and urged
the voters to reject another form of the military rule in the new
Republic. On the other hand Park and his party maintained that
unless they, representing the new generation, were elected to
leadership, the nation would again face the old vicious circles
3.of corruption, poverty, instability and revolution.
Instead of proposing policy alternatives to the electorate, 
both the military leaders and their opponents waged their campaigns 
chiefly by exploiting each other's personalities, past weaknesses, 
and failures and by blaming each other for the plight of the 
country. The low level of campaigning by attack on personalities 
reached its depth when Park Chung-hee ridiculed Yun Po~son's 
democracy as "disguised democracy" and asserted that his own demo­
cracy was liberal democracy based on nationalism.^* This
3. See especially the speech of Yun Ch'i-yong, the Park's 
presidential campaign manager and at the time the chairman of the 
DRP, in Kwangju on September 29, Chosun Ilbo, October 1, 1963*
Yun Ch'i-yong said in highly inflammatory invective, that if the 
"old politicians" were elected to power, another military 
revolution would be inevitable. His speech became also an issue 
of the campaign.
4 . The campaign speech of Park in Seoul on September 23,
Chosun Ilbo, September 24, 1963.
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5*immediately invited Yun’s attack on Park as a pro-Communist.
The exchange of these personal attacks, questioning each other's 
basic loyalty to the Republic, set the whole tone of the 1963 
elections*^*
The pre-election atmosphere was also darkened by the arrest 
of General (retired) Song Yo-ch'an, former premier of Park’s 
military government and one of the most decorated generals in the 
Korean War. After his resignation from the premiership, he 
continuously criticized the military junta’s decision to enter
7.
politics as a betrayal of the revolutionary pledge. His arrest 
by the CIA on August 11, on the charges of executing a subordinate 
officer during the Korean War and of allegedly ordering troops to 
fire on students during the April Student Revolution (Song was 
then the Army Chief of Staff and the martial law commander), * was 
made three days after he wrote an open letter to General Park which 
criticized Park’s running for the presidency.^* Song’s rearrest
5. Yun Po-son’s statement to reporters in Ch8nju on September 
24? Cho sun Ilbo, September 25? 1963* According to Pak Stfng-hwan,
a veteran reporter who has an immense knowledge of the history of 
Communist activities in the Korean army, Park Chung-hee, then an 
army major, was arrested and summarily sentenced to life imprison­
ment in 1949 by a military court on the charge of his activity as 
an agent in charge of organization of the Communist party in South 
Korea (the South Korea Labor Party) in the army. Pak S8ng-hwan, 
who had access to the late GIC chief General Kim Ch’ang-yong’s 
secret list of past Communists in the army, asserts that Major Park 
was an innocent victim of indiscriminate mass purges after the 
Yosu-Sunch’&n Communist rebellion in 1948. At the outbreak of the 
Korean War, Park Chung-hee was immediately reinstated in the army 
on suspension of the sentence. Pak Scfog-hwan, P ’ado n&n naeil do 
ch’inda (Waves Will Come Also Tomorrow) (Seouls Tong-A ch’ulp’ansa, 
1965)7"PP* 185-9 9. See also Park Chung-hee’s own denial, Chosun 
Ilbo, November Ip, 1963.
6. The people and the press were very critical of these 
personal attacks, see, e.g., the editorial of Chosun Ilbo, September 
26, 1963, and "The Ideological Debates,” Hong Sung-man et al, ed., 
Haebang iship ny8n, Vol. for Records, o r . cit., pp. 672-3.
7- See his statement of January 8, 1963, Chosun Ilbo, January 
9, 1963. See also his memoire, Song Yo-ch’an ”0n Song Yo-ch’an,” 
Huimang ch’ulp’ansa, ed., Sashil iii chffnbu rttl kisul handa, op.cit., 
pp. 472-8.
8. For the CIA’s charges, see the organ of the government,
The ■Korean Republic (an English daily), August 13, 1963. General 
Song was later cleared of these charges.
9. See his open letter in Tong-A Ilbo, August 8, 1963.
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on September 4> three weeks after his release on a writ of habeas
corpus? and the subsequent circumstances that Song had to conduct
his presidential campaign from the Mapo prison cell in Seoul not
only drew vigorous protests from the opposition parties but also
10.aroused much consternation at home and abroad? * in spite of the 
government's denial that the arrest was a political retaliation.11* 
In addition to the Song incident? on September 7? General Kim 
Chae-ch'un? the arch rival of Colonel Kim Chong-pil and critic of 
the DRP for the irregular fashion of its creation? was forced to 
quit the Liberal Democratic Party (the party of General Song's 
candidacy) which he created originally as a rival to the DRP and
12.to go abroad for a temporary exile until the elections were over.
The departure of General Kim Chae-ch'un was also regarded by the 
opposition parties as a suppression of the opposition as well as 
a device to silence a star witness on the illegitimate organization 
of the DRP.11*
In spite of the repeated assurance of the government and the 
DBP that fair and free elections were their supreme goal in the 
elections?14* the appearance of various militant youth organizations 
such as the Patriotic Corps (led by Kim Tu-han? a onetime leader 
of hooligans in Seoul), the United Youth Corps (Kim Ung-cho), the 
Korea Youth Society? and the Hew Peoples Society --  aroused the
10. For the protests of the opposition parties, see? e.g. 
Chosun Ilbo? September 5 and 20? 1963* For the reaction abroad? 
see? for example? the statement of the U.S. Department of State? 
in Chosun Ilbo? August 12? 1963.
11. See the statement of the SCHR? Chosun Ilbo? September 5? 
1963? and the editorial of The Korean Republic? August 22? 1963.
12. The SCHR spokesman? General Lee Hu-rak? was known to have 
pressed General Kim to leave the country? Chosun Ilbo? September 
7? 1963. General Kim stated in Tokyo that his departure was 
involuntary? Chosun Ilbo? September 8? 1963.
13. E.g., the statement of the Liberal Democratic Party?
Chosun Ilbo? September 8? 1963$ the campaign speeches of Yun Po-s^n 
and H# Chtfng? Chosun Ilbo, September 28? 1963? and "Three Dimen­
sional Mirror?" a political commentary of Chosun Ilbo? September 
11? 1963.
14. See? e.g.? item 4 of the DRP's Election Pledges, The 
Democratic Republican Party? The Democratic Republican Party of the 
Republic of Korea (Seoul? 19^577 P* 53*
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the fear of the people* Against the past experience of the
political terrorism during the elections "by the various front
youth organizations of Rhee's Liberal Party such as the Anti-
15Communist Youth Corps and the Anti-Communists Artists Corps, the
appearance of the new youth organizations in support of the DSP
in the 1963 elections revived apprehension of possible terrorism.
16In particular the Patriotic Corps (Aekuktan), * which was organ­
ized along a paramilitary structure with 27,000 members and dhly 
registered as a social organization with the Ministry of Public 
Information, made a threat, in August, to the former politicians
in its pamphlet that "recapture of political power by the old
17politicians will be prevented to our death". * Later its head
Kim Tu-han disclaimed any intention of using violence and the DHP
also officially disassociated itself from the Patriotic Corps.
But the DBP’s chairman and Park's presidential campaign manager
Tun Ch'i-yong's close friendship with Kim Tu-han and Yun's praise
of Kim's activities had unquestionably intimidated the opponents
of the military junta and cast a dark shadow on the forthcoming 
18
elections. * Fortunately the main activities of these youth corps 
during the election campaigns were confined to condemning and 
exposing (with photographs) the "evils" of the former politicians."^*
15. See the court records of trials of 17 terrorists of the 
Anti-Communist Youth Corps and the Anti-Communist Artists Corps, in 
Hankuk hy&lonybng chaep'an sa, Vol. II, oju cit., pp. 927-51* Also 
Hankuk hy6kmy5ng chaep1 an sa, Vo. I, oj). cit., pp. 120-2; Paek Hytfn-su, 
"Kwak Yftng-ju and Political Hooligans," Kim In-kuk, "Shin To~hwan 
and the Anti-Communist Youth Corps," Yang My8ng-dong, "Im Hwa-su and 
the Anti-Communist Artists Corps," in Shint/aeyangsa, edited, Hukmak, 
op. cit., pp. 88-91, 92-5, and 132-5; and Minjutang, T'ucheng&i 
ohokj^k, pp. 134-5 and 165-6.
lF. For a detailed examination of the Patriotic Corps, see 
Cho Yong-chung, "Reappearance of Terrorism," Sasangge, October 1963, 
pp. 44-8.
^7* Kyunghyang Shinmoon, August 6, 1963. Bee also Tong-A Ilbo, 
August 11, 1963.
18. Cho Yong-chung, og. cit., pp. 46-7*
19. The CEMC, Taehanminkuk s8nk6 sa, op. cit., pp. 365-6; and 
Chosun Ilbo, September 18, 1963.
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The bitter 1963 presidential elections of October 15 opened 
with seven candidates - - six opposition candidates against Park 
of the PEP. The large number of opposition candidates in the race 
was the result of the failure of earlier efforts of the opposition 
leaders to agree on one unified opposition candidate against Park, 
even after they formed the Party of the People as their unified 
party. The failure is known as the "fiasco of the Party of the 
People" and became a symbol of factional strife in Korean politics.^* 
Among the six opposition candidates, Park’s chief opponents were?
Yun Po~s&n of the Civil Rule Party (Minchongtan) - - former President 
of the Second Republic and, for a short duration, of the military
regimej Ho Ch&ng of the Party of the People (Kukmin ui tang) --
former Acting President of the interim government which followed 
the collapse of the Khee government in April I96OJ and General 
Song Yo-ch*an of the Liberal Democratic Party (Chamintang) - - 
former Army Chief of Staff and once premier of Park’s military 
government. The Democratic Party (Minjutang), which lost its 
leader Chang My&n through the Political Activities Purification Law 
but was rejuvenated under the new leadership of Madam Pak Sun-ch’on, 
did not proffer a candidate in order to preserve its strength for 
the general elections for the Rational Assembly,
In the middle of the campaigns H& Chc5ng and Song Yo-ch’an (who 
was conducting his campaign in prison) withdrew their candidacy in 
favour of Yun Po-s6n. Thus, in the final phase of the presidential 
campaign, the elections became practically a contest between Park 
and Yun.
20. See So Byong-jo, Chongsang eui toch&nja (The Challengers 
for the Pinnacle of Power)(Seoul? Byok]b1asa, 1966), pp. 158-60|
Song ICon-ho, "A Hew Political Force is Desirable," _o£. cit., p. 66. 
See also Yun Po-s&n's ovm account of the fiasco in which he was 
the stoimcenter, in his Kukuk ui kashipat*kil, op. cit., pp.149-56*
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THE ELECTION RETURNS AND THE INDECISIVE MANDATE 
OF PARK'S GOVERNMENT
21.The final presidential election returns * showed that of 
12,985,015 registered voters? 11,036?175 (85$) participated in the 
elections. Victorious Park received 4,702,640 votes (46.6$) and 
Yun 4>546?6l4 (45*1$) ‘fc*16 10,081,198 valid votes. The margin
of Park’s victory was 158,034 (l.5$)«
TABLE Is RESULTS OF 1963 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 
Candidates Votes Received $ of Votes
Park Chung-hee
(HEP) 4,702,640 46.65
Yun Po-s5n
(Civil Rule Party) 4*546,614 45.10
0 Chae-ycSng
(Ch'up’ung Hoe) 408,664 4.05
Py&n Y&ng-tae
(Chongmin Hoe) 224?443 2.22
Chang Ri-s8k
(Shinhung Party) 198,837 I .98
Totals 10,081,198 100.00
Sources The CMC, Taehanminkuk sftnkff sa, op. cit., p. 491 
Percentages are computed.
In the general elections which were held on November 26, 976
candidates (825 for single-member electoral districts and 151 for
the national constituency on the list of proportional representation)
of twelve parties competed for 175 seats (131 in single-member
I
districts and 44 for nationwide seats) of the National Assembly.
Among 13,344*149 registered voters, 9,622,183 (72.1$) participated
22.in the general elections. * Participation in the general elections
21. For the results of the presidential election% see the 
C1MC, Taehanminkuk s'6nk6 sa, op. cit., pp. 490-1 and 713-20.
22. For the results of the general elections, see ibid., 
pp. 453-66 and 863-914*
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was 12.9 Per cent lower than that in the presidential elections.
The results of the general elections gave 110 seats (62.8$) of the 
seats to the PEP which received only 33*5 P®33 cent of the total 
valid votes. In extreme contrast the opposition parties which 
drew altogether 66.5 P©^ * cent of the valid votes occupied only 
65 (37*1$) of the Assembly seats.
TABLE II s RESULTS OF 1963 G M R A L  ELECTIONS 
Party Votes Received $ of Votes Seats (district + PR) $ of seats
PRP 3,113,935 33.5 110 (88 + 22) 62.8
Civil Rule Party 1 ,870,976 20.1 41 (27 + 14) 23.4
Pemocratic Party 1,264,285 13.6 13 (8 + 5) 7*4
Party of People 822,500 8 .8 2 (2 + 0) 1.3
Lib. Pemo. Party 752,?026 8.1 9 (6 + 3) 5*1
Other oppositions 1,576,558 15*9 0 ( 0 + 0 )  0.0
Totals 9,298,830 100.0 175 (131 + 44) 100.0
Sources The CMC, Taehanminkuk sonic# sa, op. cit., p. 458 
There were a number of reasons why the opposition forces to 
Park and his party failed in both elections of 1963. Among them, 
the foremost factor was an excessive proliferation of opposition 
parties and their candidates, as a result of the inability of the 
opposition to unite themselves in the elections despite their 
common slogans “Let's put an end to the military rule". As Tables 
I and II indicate there was a considerable popular opposition in 
both elections. Had Yun Po-son been able to unify the opposition 
or had a unified opposition presented one candidate, the margin of
23.that slim victory would have easily turned against Park Chung-hee. 
The inability of the opposition to unify and its consequences were
23* This was the consensus of election analysts. See, for 
example, the comments in the editorial of Chosun Ilbo, October 
17, 1963*
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more obvious in the results of the general elections which gave a
disproportionately large number of the seats (62.8f>) to the DKP
in spite of the fact that the opposition had 66.5 per cent of
popular support.
Actually a minority party government has been a permanent
feature of Korean politics, ever since political parties in Korea
began to play vital roles in elections and politics in the 1954
general elections. Either due to manipulation of elections,
extreme proliferation of political parties, or the combination
of both, the ruling parties have won the ©lections and become the
majority parties in the National Assembly. But they have never
received the majority of the total valid votes cast. Nevertheless
the ruling parties have been commanding an unproportionately large
majority of the seats in the National Assembly. In the 1954
general elections, the ruling Liberal Party received 36.8 per cent
of votes and occupied 52*2 per cent of the Assembly seats? '* in
the 1959 general elections, the Liberal Party drew 4-2.1 per cent
25.of votes and captured 54*1 per cent of the seats? in the i960
general elections after the April Student Revolution, the
Democratic Party received 4-1*7 per cent of the votes and became
26the ruling party with 75*1 P®** cent of the Assembly seats.
24. The CMC, Taehanminkuk sonko sa, op cit., p. 407* 
25* Ibid., p. 420.
^ 0 ? P* 436.
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TABLE III s PERCENTAGES OP VOTES AID SEATS OF THE 
GOVE3MMT PARTY II THE ASSEMBLY .
Election yr. Ruling; Party jo of votes ja & no, of seats Total seats
The disproportion in distribution of seats in favour of the
ruling party unrelated to the popular support in the elections was
^ */described by a late politician;, Om Sang-sop, as "our abnormal 
political situation where the majority of the Rational Assembly
discrepancy between the strength of the;majority party in the Rational
Assembly and the popular expression in the elections was as extreme
as in the case of the 1963 elections,, the ruling party was not only
far from being a competent consensual majority with popular support,
but had to meet a determined opposition who could easily appeal or
resort to an extra-parliamentary mass movement in order to counter
28.
or supplant the unnatural majority in the Rational Assembly,
This was particularly true if the majority party, with an over­
whelming number of seats but with less popular support, and the 
determined opposition, with some popular support, could not resolve 
their differences on important issues such as the issue of the 
ROK-Japan treaty. In this mathematical view alon^ e both the elections 
in 1963 were too inconclusive to give any semblance of clean victory 
to the Park government and his ruling party.
27. $m Sang-sbp, oj). cit., p. 259*
28. See Lee Kuk-oh'an, "The problems of Operating Parliamentary 
Politics," Sahoe kwahak ronjip (Collection of Theses in Social 
Sciences), of Yonsei University, Seoul, Vol. I, Ro. 1, 1965s P» 51*
Lib.
Lib.
Democ
BSP
203
233
233
175
Sources The CMC, Taehanminkuk sonko sa, op. cit., pp. 4-07?
420, 436 and~4587
27.
disagrees with the majority of the people". * Especially when the
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Because of the poor showing of the DRP in spite of all political 
advantages in both the elections, political observers warned that 
moderation and compromise between the ruling party and the oppo­
sition and responsiveness of the ruling party to the public
29.
opinion were the keys to political stability in the Third Republic*
THE ISSUE OF ELECTION IRREGULARITIES 
Although on the election days no irregularities of any signi­
ficance nor violence of any scale in voting and vote-counting
30.procedures were reported, * the opposition parties refused to 
accept the results of the elections, charging that the DRP rigged 
both elections. As to the general elections, the four main 
opposition parties (the Civil Rule Party, the Democratic Party, 
the Liberal Democratic Party, and the Party of the People) had 
immediately declared that the elections were ’’rigged ones unpre­
cedented in history”, while the DRP claimed them a victory through 
31.’’fair elections”. The opposition parties accordingly expressed
32their determination to repudiate the results of the elections*
As to the presidential elections, Yun Po-s&n claimed that Park 
Chung-hee was illegally elected, first, by his illegal candidacy 
and, secondly, by rigging vote-countings. Yun asserted that ”1 
am the spiritual President of the people”, because ”1 won the 
election in voting but lost it in vote-counting" which was
29. "Analysis of the Characteristics of the Hew Rational 
Assembly,” Tong-A Ilbo, November 28, 1963s and "Balance Sheet of 
the October 15th Election,” Series Ho. 2, Chosun Ilbo, October 19® 
1963.
30. See the report on the elections by t'he UNCURK, United 
Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, 18th Session, 
Supplement No. 12 ’(a/5512/Add. l), 1963? and the editorial of 
Chosun Ilbo, October 17, 1963*
31. Hankuk Ilbo, November 28, 1963*
32. Ibid.
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33.systematically rigged, by pre~med.it at ion. * He also declared his
unlimited determination to unseat President-elect Park.
35.In two separate law suits against Park in the Supreme Court, 
Yun charged that Park was ineligible to be elected, because Park 
was still technically serving his suspended term of life imprisonment 
sentenced by a military court in 1949 I*01* alleged involvement in 
a Communist rebellion when Park was a majors and because his member­
ship in the PEP and his acceptance of the presidential nomination 
of the PEP while serving as Acting President and Chairman of the 
SCNR were in violation of the existing provisions of the Consti­
tution (Article 53)? the national Assembly Law (Article 19) and the 
Law Concerning Extraordinary Measures for national Reconstruction 
(Article 9)? which all prohibited partisan political activities
of both President and Speaker of the Rational Assembly - - in
36 •both capacities he headed the military junta. President-elect 
Park was also accused of rigging vote-counts to get his 150,000 
plurality by invalidating, destroying or stealing Yun’s own and 
other dandidates' votes or by activating invalid votes for Park.
Yun also demanded that the whole presidential elections be declared 
void because? (l) the Central Election Management Committee was 
biased in favor of Park's election; (2) the public officials
33. His statement on November 13? 1963? Chosun Ilbo, November 
14? 1963. Yun also maintained that the military junta had already 
decided to elect Park by a margin of 150,000 votes by manipulation. 
See Yun Po-son, Kukuk ui kashipat'kil, op. cit., pp. 174-5*
34* 0bosun Ilbo, November 14? 19^3.
35. One suit was to invalidate Park's election to presidency; 
and the other was to invalidate the presidential elections. See 
the texts of Yun's suits against Park and Sa ICwang-uk, the chairman 
of the Central Election Management Committee, in Chosun Ilbo, 
November 15? 1963*
36. All these provisions were changed with the new Constitution 
of the Third Republic. But when Park accepted the DRP nomination 
on August 30, 1963? the military junta was still technically 
operating under the old Constitution and the old laws with supple­
ment of the Law Concerning Extraordinary Measures and other decrees 
of the junta. In order to legalize Park's candidacy, the SCNR 
amended the Law Concerning Extraordinary Measures on September 3? 
1963 (See Chosun Ilbo, September 4? 1963)*
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were partisans for Park in violation of laws which guarantee 
political neutrality of public officials? (3) the national broad­
casting stations were impartially mobilized for Park’s candidacy?
(4) the local authorities denied to the opposition use of public 
facilities? (5) "the PEP and public officials illegally utilized 
various social and cultural organizations which were prohibited 
from political campaigns; (6) other various violations of the 
election laws were committed.
Although all the charges alleged by Yun and other opposition
parties were hard to prove, and they were undoubtedly exaggerated
37.in order to discredit the PEP and the military junta, * some of
the accusations made by the opposition parties were not entirely
without evidence. Particularly during the campaigns for the
National Assembly, suspicion of irregularities was wide and deep.
In the history of Korean elections, the foremost cause of
election irregularities has been always civil servants, especially
national police, even though the pattern of their involvement
38.varies from one election to another. * At this point of discussion, 
it may be appropriate to examine briefly the role of civil servants 
as an instrument of political power in Korea. All constitutions
37* E.g. Chosun Ilbo, October 27, 1963, reported from one 
source connected with the Civil Eule Party that the law suit 
against Park being prepared by the party was partly intended for 
publicity against the PEP and restraining it from unfair campaigns 
in the forthcoming general elections.
38. See various court records at the trials of former officials 
of the Liberal Party government in the revolutionary courts in 1961, 
in Hankuk kybkmyffhg chaepfan sa. Vol. II, _oj>. cit., pp. 119-32,
178-201 and 295-318. See also the eyewitness reports of newspaper 
reporters in Lee Sang-chong, ed., Y&ksa ui taum tankyes naega 
kySkun 9.2 ch1&n#s&nk5 (The Next Stage of History? The General 
Elections of May 2, 1958 which I saw) (Seoul? Ch'angp’y&ng Munko, 1958).
39* See especially No Chbng-hybn, ’’Anatomy of Korean Bureaucracy 
and Elections,” Sasangge, April 1966, pp. 70-5? No Ch&ng-hy'6n, ’’The 
Korean Bureaucracy From the Point of View of Behavior,” Sasangge, 
Supplement, May 1966, pp. 41-9? ”The Pulse of Korea? Permission 
to Political Activities for the Classified Civil Servants,” Shindong-A, 
November 1965, PP» 142-4•
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and. civil service laws that have existed in Korea have always 
provided for the political neutrality of civil servants as one of 
the constitutional virtues of bureaucracy. The present Consti­
tution (Article 6) states that "All public officials shall be 
servants of the entire people and shall be responsible to the 
people” and "The status and political impartiality of public 
officials shall be guaranteed in accordance with the provisions 
of law". This constituional spirit is further stressed in detail 
in the National Civil Service Law (Article 69) and the Local 
Civil Service Law (Article 57)*
But as in other developing countries, one of the salient 
aspects of Korean bureaucracy is that it is an important factor in 
the political process as a "servant of the ruling political party". 
Embryologically the tradition and attitudes of Korean bureaucracy, 
which started with the feudalistic bureaucracy of the Yi Dynasty 
had been greatly influenced by the authoritarian civil service of 
the Japanese colonial government and later by the extreme 
"personalism" and the centralism under the rule of Khee Syngman 
(see Chapter l).^* 7/ith this background, one of the traits of 
Korean bureaucracy is a great instinct of self-preservation. As 
a measure of self-preservation, civil servants are inevitably 
involved in politics by paying their extreme loyalty to political 
groups in power. Professor No Chbng-hy&n describes the relation­
ship between the ruling party and civil servants as follows?
40. For the development of Korean bureaucracy, see Lee Won-sul, 
op. cit., pp. 271-851 Lee Mun-y&njg, "The Korean Bureaucracy From 
the Point of View of Enactment of Laws," Sasangge, Supplement, May 
1966. pp. 29-40? and Pak Tong-so, Hankuk kwanryo chedo ui yoksachok 
chbnkae (The Evolution of Korean Bureaucracy) (Seoul 3 Hankuk y6nkn 
tosokwan, 1961).
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The characteristic trait, of Korean civil servants is their 
strong bond with /the ruling*/ political party. Self- 
preservation and the short-cut to higher position, are possible 
depending on the degree of civil servants1 cooperation and 
involvement in politics on behalf of the ruling party, as 
demonstrated during the past regimes of the Liberal Party and 
the Democratic Party. It has been generally acknowledged by 
the general public that the degree of cooperation between 
civil servants and the party is directly the degree of the 
party’s success in elections. Among civil servants the 
election times are the real opportunities for flattering 
politicians, and this was the only way for them to stay or 
advance in the hierarchy of the government.,
The importance of civil servants in deciding the fortune of a
political party was shorn by an official report of the Liberal Party
submitted to President Hhee after Ehee's vice-presidential running
mate Lee Ki-bung was defeated by Chang My&n of the Democratic
Party on a separate ticket in the 1956 presidential and vice-
presidential elections, in spite of the extensive rigging of
ballot boxes. In this report the Liberal Party cited that one of
the seven reasons for Lee Id-bung's defeat was "the betrayal of
police and other public officials" who were dependent for their
42livelihood on the party and yet did not "perform their duties." * 
According to a compilation of Lee Ung-hui, the pattern of 
election irregularities in the 1963 elections was small-scale but 
more subtle and e f f e c t i v e . H e  listed the following irregu­
larities, based on the actual exposures or confessions by public 
officials themselves who, in some cases, produced originals of 
the directives issued by their superiorss
41. ho Ch^ng-hy&n, crp. cit., p. 72.
42. About the report, see Lee ICwan-ku and Chu Yo-han, ed., 
5«15 s&nkiY nons&L 3ip (Collection of Editorials Concerning the 
Elections of May 15) (Seouls Kyftnghyang shinmoonsa, 1956), PP* 
182-65 &n(3- also Pae s8ng-y6ng, "The Basic Pattern of Korean 
Politics in View of the Policies after the Elections of May 15?" 
Sasangge, August 1956, p. 1?«
43• Lee Ung-h&i "The Mew Pattern of Irregularities in the 
Bleotions," Sasangge, December 1963, pp. 39-45° See also Chosun 
Ilbo, November 9y November 10, November 12 and November 21, I963.
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(1) Enlisting supporters for the DRP by local policemen 
by using implied threat.
(2) Directing local officials at the levels of "kun" or 
"ku" (county) to help DEP candidates.
(3) Making lists of voters who could be bought out for 
the DRP by local police and penetrating into them.
(4) Investigating by police past weaknesses of voters that 
could, be sources of trouble with the authorities.
(5) Utilization of absentee votes in the polling stations 
installed in the military camps or installations where 
electoral observers had little access.
(6) Buying votesj utilizing absentee votes, and sub­
stituting voters by officials of "ri" and "tong" (the lowest 
level of local adminstrative units in rural and urban areas.
(7) Stepping up public works such as water systems, bridges, 
irrigational dams, pavements and housing in localities and 
advertising the benefits of such projects in order to demon­
strate how the present government was effective and, on the 
other hand, to remind the local people that these projects 
might be jeopardized if they elected opposition members.
Besides the above list of irregularities, it was an open secret
that the DRP was illegally conducting campaigns among and by members
of such national, non-political organizations as the Korean Youth
Association, the Korean Women’s Association, 4-H Clubs, the Soil
Improvement Society and other rural, social and cultural organi-
45zations which were dependent financially on the government. The 
opposition parties suspected also that the notable increase of the 
number of eligible voters in the general elections by 350?000 from 
12,985,015 in the presidential elections in October to 13,344,149
A 9
in the general elections in November, * was another method of
47.election manipulation, as it had been standard technique in past 
elections*^*
The Central Election Management Committee reported that the
44- About-the last item (7 ), see especially, "Tropical Areass 
The Frontier of the November Elections," Chosun Ilbo, November 9, 
1983? and "Comments on Current Events of Society," Sasangge,
October 19&3, p. 88.
45* See the statement of the opposition parties* Consultative 
Council for Struggling against Irregular Election, Chosun Ilbo, 
November 20, 1963®
46. The figures are from the CEMC, Taehanminkuk s6nko sa, op. 
cit., pp. 458 and 490*
47* E.g., the protest of the Party of the People, Chosun Ilbo, 
November 14, 19^3*
48. E.g., see such cases in the 1958 general elections, Lee 
Sang-chong, ed., op. cit., pp. 117-20,
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presidential elections had 'JQl cases (involving 931 persons of both
the DRP and the opposition) of various violations of the election
law, of which 173 cases were prosecutedj and the general ©lections
had 1,064 cases (involving 1,5&2 persons of both the DRP and the
opposition) of violations of the election law, of which only 19
4 9 .
cases were prosecuted.  ^ In terms of the number of cases reported 
for violation, the 1963 elections were one of the most disputed 
elections in Korea. Ydienever there are a large number of the 
people who believe that the elections are not fair or the validity
of the elections is challenged --  whether or not their beliefs
are based on actual irregularities, not only do the elections 
produce political bitterness but the foundation of a popular govern­
ment is in serious jeopardy. But the restilts of the 1963 elections 
in Korea not only provoked bitterness from the opposition but also 
cast a dark cloud on the legitimacy of the new DRP government in
the minds of the people who have always associated the elections
50.with irregularities, * When the opposition felt that they were 
cheated in the elections, a political crisis of the future was^^ 
already in making even before the Third Republic had officia^r begun,
49* Ike CIMG, Taehanminkuk sonko sa, op. cit., p. 646. All 
cases and prosecutions were dropped after the elections by State 
Council (cabinet) Decree No. 1678 on December, 1963.
50. According to Yun Ch'on-ju’s survey in I96I, 55*4$ of the 
voters he sampled responded, "There should not be irregularities," 
when they were asked "What do you think about the elections?"
Yun Ch’on-ju, Hankuk chongoh1i ch1ekye (Korean Political System) 
(Seouls Koryo taehakkyo, 1961), p. 236,
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"FUNDAMENTAL PIGGING"i ABSENCE OF ESSENTIAL 
CONDITIONS FOB. FAIR COMPETITION 
Existence of an opposition is essential in determining whether 
or not there is democracy. But viability of democracy depends on 
whether the opposition is equipped with the rights and the political 
resources essential to its free and competitive functioning. The 
opposition parties in the 1963 elections emphatically felt that 
they were not only ill-equipped in these essentials but also 
deliberately denied them by the manipulations of the military junta. 
Ever since Park Chung-hee declared his candidacy, which itself
was one of the important campaign issues the opposition raised
51. iagainst the DRP, * the notion of "fundamental election rigging" had
52.been widely circulated. * The notion referred to the initial,
fundamental disadvantages and various restrictive political and
legal measures that the military junta and the DPP had created or
organized against the opposition well before the 1963 elections
53in order to insure continuation of Park’s rule. * These were the 
factors that the opposition parties attributed to their defeat in 
the elections, and the bases on which the opposition parties argued 
that the elections were meaningless as their results were foregone 
conclusions well before the elections were held*
(l) Illegitimate Creation of the DPP 
The foremost case of the opposition parties against the DPP was 
the fact that the DPP was illegitimately organized in violation of
51. For the repeated protest of six opposition parties (which 
during the elections organized the Struggling Committee for Fair 
Elections) and for the military junta1 reply, see The Korean Republic, 
August 17, 1963? Chosun Ilbo, September 1, September 3, September 4? 
and September 22, 1963*
52. The CEMC, Taehanminkuk s$nk6 sa, op. cit., p. 3?2j and the 
statement of the Struggling Committee for Fair Elections, October 21, 
1963j Chosun Ilbo, October 22, 1963.
53* For the DPP’s advantages, see Yim Hong-bin, "An Analysis 
of the General Elections in 1963/' op. cit., pp. 120-8.
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the military junta*s own decree which banned all political
54.activities before January 1, 1963. Kim Chong-pil and his group
in the CIA started organizing the DRP as early as the early summer
of 1962 while all other political parties and activities of the
opponents still remained disbanded and suppressed under a military
decree and were waiting for the resumption of political freedom 
55.from 1963. The pre-emptive illegal organization of the DRP prior 
to January 1, 1963 was revealed on January 21, 1963, by Marine 
Corps General Kim Tong-ha, a leader of the anti-Kim Chong-pil 
faction who resigned from the founding committee for the DRP in 
protest against Kin Chong-pil*s dominance of the new party.
General Kim Tong-ha, who also resigned from his post of the SCHR 
as the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Rational 
Defence, expressed his deep dissatisfaction with the military
revolution which, in his own words, "betrayed the trust of the
57. 58.pehple". * One of his complaints * was explained as follows;
The DRP was reported to have already completed establish­
ment of local party branches nationally by the early part 
of January ^963/. We heard also that it was not democrat­
ically organized! instead, organized by the Central
54* E.g. the accusation of the Struggling Committee for Fair 
Elections, September 21, 1963, Chosun Ilbo, September 22, 1963*
55» The secret organizational activities during$he summer of 
1962 were limited to activities of recruiting local party 
functionaries and influential personages for the planned party.
These activities were sometimes known as the "V (Victory) Operation" 
in the CIA.
56. See General Kim Tong-ha's statement in Asahi Shimbun, 
January 22, 1963. General Song To-ch’an also claimed during the 
presidential campaign in September 1963? "that he knew the illegality 
of early organization of the DRP. See "Justification of Candidacy", 
Series Ho. 5 (Song Yo-ch'an), Chosun Ilbo, September 22, 1963*
57* See Asahi Shimbun, January 22, 1963*
58. His motive in denouncing his military colleagues should 
be also viewed in the light of power struggle among the members of 
the junta who were fighting for hegemony of the new party, in 
which the faction of Kim-Chong-pil was already well entrenched and 
refused to share control of the party with his rivals who came 
belatedly to realize what Kim Chong-pil had already accomplished 
as the head of the CIA.
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Intelligence Agency. In order to find out the truth* five 
of us upon retiring from the military joined the party as 
promotors for the establishment of the party. What we have 
heard was all true. And we realized that we five were 
powerless to undo what they had already done. ;59»
hue to this early start and with backing of the much feared 
and resourceful political instrument the CIA, the DRP under the 
leadership of Kim Chong-pil (now retired from the army and the 
CIA) could immediately emerge in the early 1963 as the supreme 
contender for political power in the Third Republic. On the other 
hand the former politicians and the opponents of the military
junta, who were crippled by the blacklist and condemnation under
the political purification law, divided by factionalism, and 
impoverished without political funds, were still in the stage of 
assembling their forces to form opposition parties. Aside from 
its prestige of being the party of General Park with more than 
two years of absolute military rule behind him, the DRP*s•advantage 
m s  clearly demonstrated by its phenomenal growth in party member­
ship. For example when Park Chung-hee formally joined the DRP 
on August 30, 1963, bo became the 706,6llfc& member of the DRP.
Ten days later on September 9? 'the DRP!s total number of party 
members passed the mark of one million. In other words the DRP 
averaged an increase of membership of 30,000 a day. Between 
August 30 and October 15, 1963, the-membership increase was o,n 
average 17,000 a day as Table IV indicates. Chosun Ilbo daily 
commented that the DRPfs rate of expansion was "an unheard of 
thing in the past," and that at this rate (30,000 a day) the DRP 
was absorbing a city of fair size (in terms of number of voters)
a 60,a day.
59* Asahi Shimbun, January 22, 1963*
60. Chosun Ilbo, September 10, I963.
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TABLE IV* GROWTH OP DRP MEMBERSHIP
Date
March 5j *63 
May 10, *63 
May 20, ‘63 
July 31, ’63 
August 28, *63 
August 30, ‘63 
September 9j *63 
October 15, *63
Humber of Members Remarks
154,982
179,033
200,000
296,837
596,970
706,611 Park joined
1,020,000
1,568,000 Pres, elec
Sources? Minukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa nybn sa, op. 
cit., pp. 76-7? 106 and 563? Minjukonghwatang, Kybkrang hi 
hech*iko t min jukonghwatang j. nybn sa (Wading Through Rough 
Waters? The Two-Year History of the Democratic Republican 
Party)(Seoul, 1964), P» 455 The Korean Republic, August 30,
1963| and Chosun Ilbo, September 10, 19^3*
This phenomenal growth of the DRP was attributable to the
efficient utilization of semi-officials of ”tong” and ”ri”
(equivalent to “block1*) in enlisting voters in their areas to the
DRP, ' * in addition to the invaluable help rendered by former heads
of local branches of the People’s Movement for Rational Reconstruction
(PMHR), which was hierarchily organized by the military junta to
instill the “spirit of self-reliance” and to arouse moral support
for the goals of the junta and which had established contact with
6 2.people of all levels down to the level of tong or ri. “ A political 
potential of the PMNR of 3*9 million members was implied by its first 
Chairman Yu Chin-o when he referred to it as "an organization similar 
in structure to a totalitarian system.“ * At the time of the
elections in 1963, the interlocking relationship between the local
61. See the protests of the opposition in Chosun Ilbo, August 
30, 1963.
62. See “Law Concerning People*s Movement for Rational Recon­
struction1* (Law Ho. 622, June 12, I96IJ its amendment, Law Ho. 1171, 
November 20, 1962), I-Iankuk kunsa hy$km,y&ig sa, Vol. I, Ho. 1, op. 
cit., pp. 615-9.
63* Yu Ghin-o, Minju chongch1i eui kil, op. cit., p. 80^  For 
a criticism of the PMNR for its authoritarian structure, see Pak 
Un-dae, "The Structure and Remnants of the Military Government 
That Must Be Discarded,” Sasangge, December 1962, pp. 35-6°
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64*administrative units and the PMNR was admittedly non-existent. ■ 
Nevertheless the grassroots strength of the DRP had already been 
solidly constructed by those who were once engaged in the local 
branches of the M E .
Although the Central Election Management Committee rendered 
its view that political activities of the heads of tongs and ris
65.were proper since they could not be classified as public officials,
the undue influence of these heads was beyond question when the DRP
66.utilized them to its best advantages. * Ostensibly the heads of
these local units are not on the payroll of the government $ they
are the administrative representatives elected by the people of
tongs and ris. However because they maintained close relationship
with local governmental authorities and were backed by them, it
was possible for the heads of tongs and ris to exercise some
67coercive powers over the people in their areas. * As of December
/JO
1963, there were 18,510 tongs and ris in Korea.
(2) Pi’eponderance of Political Resourcess 
Political Funds of the DRP 
The DRP’s enormous basic advantage over the opposition was its 
political fund. The DRP stated that the "timely and efficient
64. Cf. Lee Kwan-ku, Director of the PMNR, "The People's 
Movement Stands at the Point of Historic Transition," Chaekbn 
t1 ongshin (The Reconstruction Press), the organ of the PMNR, No.12, 
December 1963, p. 6.
65* Chosun Ilbo, September 7? 1983. See the controversy of 
their political activities in Chosun Ilbo, August 30, 1963*
66. For example, some heads of tongs in Seoul organized in 
their area the so-called "Hyangu Hoe" (Home Area Friendship 
Society) and entertained the people in the area on behalf of Park’s 
candidacy. See Chosun Ilbo, September 25, 1963.
67. See Lee Man-gab, "Korean Village Politics and Leadership," 
op. cit., p. 399* See also Lee Man-gab, "Social Strata in Village 
Society, Hankuk nongch’on sahoehak ybnkuhoe, ed., ogo. cit., p. 1925 
and Chu s6k-kyun, "Rural Areas and Democracy," Chi bang haengchfoig 
(Local Administration), Vol. 9? ^0 . 7, August i960, p. 143.
68. The U.S. Department of Army, o£. cit., p. 216.
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distribution of the campaign funds" during the campaigns was one
69.
of the factors contributing to its victory in the 1963 elections.
On the other hand, all opposition parties cited the "lack of money"
70.as one of the key factors in their defeat. The political 
fund has been a perennial problem for the opposition, and monopol­
ization of this key political resource has been-in a sense the 
cause and effect of both inter and intra-party struggles throughout 
Korean political history. The degree of financial ability of a
party or a factional leader has directly corresponded with the
71.degree of political success. ’ As Tables V and VI indicate, the
$
correlation between money and electoral success in the 1963
72*elections was rather remarkably high.
According to the financial statements submitted to the Central
Election Management Committee by the political parties in compliance
73.with the election laws, * inequality of political funds between 
the ruling party and the opposition parties was extreme even if one 
is to take these official figures at their face value. In the 1963 
presidential elections, the DSP and the opposition parties spent 
the total amount of 110,767,924 won,*^* of which Ppnk Chung-hee's 
share was 85,207,440 won (76*9$), in comparison to his main rival 
Yun Po-stfn‘s 19,135,297 won (17*3$) as Table V indicates. The
69* Minjukonghwatang, Min.jukonghwatang sa nyffn sa, op. cit., p.146.
70. E.g., Yun Po-sbn, KulmkT^Li kashipat*kil, op. cit., p. 146| 
and- Chosun Ilbo, October 18, 1963.
71.See Ko Y$ng-bok, "Political Parties and Factionalism in 
Korea," _op. cit., p. 33? "The Bottom of the Controversy of Special 
Favors," Series Ko. 1, Chosun Ilbo, February 14, 1965*
72. Beginning with the I963 elections, candidates and parties 
were required by lai/y to submit financial statements on their campaign 
expenses. Bata on campaign expenses before the 1963 elections are 
not available.
73* About the election laws concerning campaign expenses, see 
Chapter 7 of the Presidential Elections Law (Law Wo. 1262, February 
1, 1963) and Chapter 7 of the Rational Assembly Election Law (Law 
Ko. 1256, January 16, 1963), the Central Election Management 
Committee, .ROIC, Korean Constitution, Election and Political Party 
Laws (Seoul, 1964), pp. 103-67 and 209-308.
74* Tbe official exchange of Korean won to U.S. dollars was 
at the time 130 won to 1 dollar.
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amount spent by Park was within the maximum limit of 96? 323? 100 won
set by the Central Election Management Committee? but no one would
be naive enough to believe the figures submitted by the parties?
7 5.especially in the case of the ruling party.
TABLE Vs CAMPAIGN EXPENSES AND ELECTORAL SUCCESS
IN 1963 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Candidate Expenses (in won) % of expenses Order by votes
Park Chung-hee 65?207,440 76.9 1
(DRP)
Yung Po-s6n 19?135?297 17.3 2
(Civil Rule Party)
Ho Ch&ng 3?847?782 3.5 withdrew
(Party of People)
0 Chae-yong 1,450,139 1.3 3
(Ch’up^ng Hoe)
Pyon Yc5ng-tae 521,476 0.5 4
(Ch&igmin Hoe)
Song Yo-ch’an 471,620 0 .4 withdrew
(Lib. Demo. Party)
Chang Ri--s6k 134?170 0.1 5
(Shinhung Party)
TOTAL 110,767,924 100.0
Sources the CE1C? Tahanminkuk s6nk6 sa? op. cit. pp. 491 627*
The story of money was raucfc the same also in the 1963 general 
elections. The total amount spent by 976 candidates (for 175 seats)
of 12 parties officially reported as 324?170?992 won --  an
average 332,142 won for each candidate? which was far less than the 
amounts limited by the election committees.^* Of the total expenses
75* Ko Yhng~bok? "Political Parties and Factionalism in Korea?" 
op. cit.? p. 33* See also "Political Funds?" Series No. 3 
^Campaign Funds for Presidential Election^? Chosun Ilbo, June 7? 1966.
76. The expenses were limited to 1?131?300 won on average for 
eaoh candidate running in single-member districts and to about 
45?000,000 won for each party on behalf of its candidates on the 
proportional representation list. The CMC? Taehanminkuk sonko sa, 
op. cit.? pp. 629 and 636.
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reported, the DRP spent 123,877,947 won (38$) in comparison to
its nearest rival the Civil Rule Party's 48,889?114 won (15.1$).
The DRP's expenses were 2.5 times higher than those of the Civil
Rule Party as Table VI indicates. Undoubtedly all candidates'
expenditures exceed these figures and the limited amounts set by
77*the election committees. The official amounts set by the
election committees are always far too small to warrant any serious
attention. In order to be a serious candidate for the Rational
Assembly, it was estimated that for the 1967 general elections,
for example, the amount of at least 15,000,000 won in the case of
a ruling party candidate, or at least 5?000,000 won in the case
78of an opposition party candidate, was necessary.‘ *
TABLE Vis CAMPAIGN EXPENSES ARP ELECTORAL SUCCESS
II 1963 GENERAL ELECTIORS
Ro. of Ho. of $ of Av. exp.
Party Candi- elected Expenses Expenses per ____
dates Candidate Rec'vd,
DRP U 2  110 1 23,877,948 38.2 T & 4 7 ~ T
Civil Rule 158 41 48,889,114 15.1 309,488 2
Democratic 142 13 44,578,011 13 .8 313,929 3
P. of People 129 2 41,525,281 12.8 321,901 4
Lib. Demo 128 9 29,350,013 9.1 227,519 5
Conserv. 82 - 17,446,834 5.4 212,766 6
Liberal 41 - 7,166,813 2.2 174,800 7
Ch&jgmin Hoe 40 - 3,595,072 1.1 89,876 8
Shinmin Hoe 31 - 3,457,514 1.1 111,532 12
Ch'up'ung Hoe 36 - 1,736,022 0 .5 48,222 10
Shinhung 12 - 1,701,826 0 .5 141,818 9
Korea Ind. _1J> 836,540 0.2 55,767 11
976 175 324,170,992 100.0 332,142
Sources the CEEffC, Taehanminkuk sonko sa, op* cit., pp. 458 and 638.
77* See "Political Funds," Series Ro. 4 (Campaign Funds for 
General Elections), Chosun Ilbo, June 9, 1966.
7 8. Lee Chin~ui and Lee Kyong-shik, "Preparations for the 
General Elections /in 19677," Shindong-A, June 1966, p. 67.
The official exchange rate of Korean won to U.S. dollar was in 1966 
272 won to 1 dollar.
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The extreme constrast between the rich ruling party and the
poor opposition parties, as reflected in the official statistics
of campaign expenses, is also evident in their campaign styles
and procurement of political funds. For example, during the
presidential campaign the DEP candidate Park Chung-hee had his own
luxurious special campaign trains with a huge staff of aides,
while his rival Yun Po-s&n depended on regular passenger trains.
The sources of political funds are officially enumerated as
donations, party membership fees, revenues from party business,
80and voluntary contributions, * In the case of the opposition 
parties their leaders donate their personal property in many cases, 
and invariably candidates themselves pay their own campaign expenses. 
The problem of funds was so acute for the opposition that the major 
opposition parties, for example, literally sold to wealthy men the 
seats on the lists of proportional representation in the 1963 
general elections - - the higher the payment, the higher on the list.
As a ruling party the DEP had no problem as regards campaign 
funds, since the ruling party in previous regimes had always been
82able to find sufficient funds for its needs from various sources.
As however big or small they may be all interest groups and business
firms in Korea are dependent upon the whim of the government for
83.a license or protection in order to survive, a ruling party 
always finds willing donors for political funds in anticipation
79* See Chosun Ilbo',' October 5j 1963*
80. Ko Yc5ng-bok, "Political Parties and Factionalism in Korea," 
op. cit., p. 33.
* “ST. E.g., the cases of the Civil Rule Party and the Democratic 
Party in "The Ko. 2 Strategic Map," Series Ko, 2 and Ko. 3, Chosun 
Ilbo, October 23 and October 25, 1963. tl
82. See Chung Chong-shik (or Ch&ng Chong~Ep.k), "Political 
Parties and Funds in Korea," Korean Affairs, Vol. Ill, Ko, 3, 
December 1964, PP» 286~95»
83. See 0 By&ng-h&n, "Political Pattern of Korea", op. cit.,
PP* 74-55 kee Kuk-ch'an, "The Problems of Operating Parliamentary 
Politics," op. cit., p. 55*
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of special favors. In addition to these willing sources, a ruling 
party is quite capable independently of raising political funds 
by manipulating budgets, foreign exchanges, public works, import 
licences, bank loans, public sales, etc.
According to the well documented evidence, to cite a few 
obvious instances, for the 1952 presidential elections Rhee's 
Liberal Party procured, in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, about 24 million won
Qa
($4 million at the 1952 exchange rate) by illegally disposing
the government reserved U.S. dollars at higher rates to fourteen
trading firms and collecting commission fees from them. They in
turn made excessive profits on fertilizers and grains imported
85.
with those dollars. For the 1956 presidential elections, the
Liberal Party, through the Ministry of National Defence, procured
at least 100 million won ($2 million) by illegally disposing of
imported raw cottons which were earmarked for the winter clothes
of the s o l d i e r s . F o r  the 1958 general elections the Liberal
Party, in collusion with the national Industrial Bank, made
80 million won (^1.6 million) by illegally making industrial loans 
87.
to twelve firms. * For the infamous i960 presidential elections, 
the Liberal Party made 670 million won (p(l0.3 million), besides
84. All amounts in U.S. dollars in parentheses hereinafter 
are calculated at the exchange rates at the times.
85° Hankuk hyokmyong cheep*an sa, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. I36--7. 
See also Kim In-ik, },Paek Tu-jin and the Case of Tung^sten Dollars," 
Shint'aeyangsa, ed. Hukmak, op. cit., pp. 166~9°
86. Hankuk hybkmybng chaepTan sa, Vol. I, ibid., pp. 138-9*
See also Pak Chae-il, "Son Won-il and the Case of Haw Cottons,"
Shint’aeyangsa, ed., ibid., pp. 202-5*
87. Hankuk hyffkmybng chaep’an sa, Vol. I, ibid., pp. 139~40.
See also "Activities Inside the Nation," Sasangge, October 1958,
pp. 158-63.
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other funds, with the help of the Ministry of Finance and national
and commercial hanks in the form of bonds and loans to fifty-two 
88*firms. * After the Democratic Party government of Chang Myon 
was overthrown, the military junta also accused its predecessor of 
procuring 4-55 million won (^4*5 million), by extortion from the 
same businessmen who were accused as ‘'illicit fortune accumulators1' 
by the revolutionary courts set up after the April Student 
Revolution, for the i960 general elections and for securing the 
premiership for Chang My&n in the Rational Assembly.^*
As a result of the DHP's generous spending in the early 
periods of its organization and in the 1963 elections and, afterwards, 
in maintaining its massive structure (l to 1«5 million strong), 
with the salaried national and local secretarial offices, there 
have been speculations that the DHP's methods of procuring political 
funds are not much different from those of the previous ruling 
parties. It has been generally believed by observers and the 
opposition, who made some partial investigation in the Rational 
Assembly in early 1964? "that the so-oalled "Four Great Scandals"
- - which were all connected with the CIA during the military rule
90.- - were the initial sources of the funds in creating the DRP.
88* Hankuk hyokmyong chaep'an sa. Vol. I, ibid., pp. 140-4*
See also the court records of the trials of the bank presidents 
in the revolutionary court in Hankuk hyffkmy&ng chaep'an sa,
Vol. II, ojo. cit., pp. 3^0-73*
89. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 201-4? and see also Park Ghung-hee,
Our Ration's Path, op. cit., p. 175* Hut the ca.se against the 
Chang government was never proved in the courts. The charges were 
exaggerated by the military junta.
90. See "The Four Great Scandals," Hong S&ig-man et al, ed,, 
Haebang iship nyon, Vol. for Records, op. cit., pp. 664-5?
Daniel Wolfstone, "Park Goes to the Polls," 0£. cit., p. 683? and 
Lee Chin-ui and Lee Kybng-shik, crp. cit., p. 67. According to a 
Japanese source, $20 million disappeared for Kim Chong-pil's 
political funds? see Kiyomiyo Ryu, "Inside the ROIC Supreme Council," 
-2R* cit» * PP» 249-51*
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Yifhen General Kim Chae-ch’un? the arch rival of Colonel Kim
Chong-pil? became later the Director of the CIA? suspicion of the
DKP’s involvement in the ‘’Four Great Scandals” was further
strengthened by General Kim’s own investigations* After he resigned
from the CIA post? General Kim Chae-ch'un had repeated his threat
of revealing the whole truth about the scandals? as a part of his
91.attempt to purge Kim Chong-pil from the DRP. It was not a 
coincidence that both Kims? one as the prime suspect in the scandals 
and the other as a man who knew too much about them? were forced 
to leave Korea for extended trips abroad in order not to embarrass 
the military junta and the DRP in the 1963 elections.
Along with the ’’Four Great Scandals”? the DEP was also sus­
pected of receiving about 1?250 million won ($9*6 million) as 
commission fees when it arranged in 1963 importations of $2 ,569
million worth of capital and goods belonging to Korean residents
92.
in Japan into Korea. The DEP was also accused by the opposition 
parties of having collected a huge amount of political funds from 
a few privileged industrialists by condoning their excessive 
illegal profits? In connection with.the so-called “Three Flours 
Case” (sugar, flour mill? and cement industries)? which amounted 
to, about 5?000 million won ($38 million).
Due to these extremely large amounts of political funds which 
were obtained through illegitimate sources? the opposition parties
91. See? e.g.? Kim Chae-ch’un’s statement on September 5? 19^3? 
Chosun Ilbo? September 6? 1963. On September 7 be was forced to 
leave the country.
92; Hankuk Ilbo, January 26? 1964? the editorial of Kyunghang 
Shinmoon, January 28? 1964? the statement of Kim Y&ng-sam? Kukhoe 
hoefcirok? 3 9^  Session? Plenary Meetings? Ho. 7 (December 26? 1963)? 
p. 5«
93- ’’Excessive Profits on the Three Flours?” Hong Sung-man et 
al? ed., Haebang iship nyon? Vol. for Records? o£. cit.? p. 692.
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charged the DEP - - in spite of the latter1 s claim to clean 
politics because of its establishment through the military revo­
lution --  with ruthlessly conducting the so-called "campaigns
94.
by unlimited tactics'* by financial means. The above is one 
of the main reasons why the opposition parties claimed that the
1963 elections were invalid.
The sharp contrast in financial capacity between the DEP
and the opposition parties was further reflected in their monthly
expenditures for party operation. For example in 1966 the DEP
was reportedly spending monthly at least 40 million won ($fl50,000)
for its routine expenses, which did not include the expenses for
publicity and other secret projects. In contrast with the DPP's
monthly expenses, the Mass Party (at the time, it was the unified
party of all oppositions in the National Assembly) was reportedly
spending about 1.5 million won (^5?500) per month, which came
95.largely from party leaders and its Assembly men. In January
1964 the Party Council of the DEP adopted a resolution on "Party
Fund Collection Eegulations1''^ * and in December 1965 the Central
Committee reaffirmed it and stipulated that political funds of the
97.party were to be collected from among the members of the party.
The step taken by the DEP was certainly important because it was 
the first of such movements towards reform of party operations in
94* lun Po-s&n, Kukuk ui kashipat *kil, op. oit., p. 169; and 
Lee Kuk-ch'an "The Task and Pathology of the Opposition Parties," 
op. cit♦, p. 79*
95* Lee Chin-ui and Lee Kyong-shik, op. cit., p. 67; Chosun 
Ilbo, February 13, 1966.
96. "A Brief History of Our Party," The DEP Bulletin (English 
edition), Vol. I, No. 6, July-August 1966, p. 10.
97* Chosun Ilbo, December 29, 19^5*
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Korea* But so long as the irregularities, as in the case of the
massive political corruption in the Office of Railroads, in June
98. 99.1964? still remained a:s the major sources of political funds,
such a step taken by the DRP in December 1965 was to remain a sham.
Unless sources of political funds are regularized with some 
measures of legitimacy and they are fairly shared among political 
parties, the fundamental inequality in access to this key political 
resource will continue to be a factor that would diminish legitimacy 
of a government that came into existence by monopolizing it. So 
long as political power equates with monopoly of political resources 
or vice versa, a political competition such as election would be a 
naked struggle for survival. The outcome of such a struggle will 
be always a totality typical of the ’'two-person zero-sum game"
(the amount that one player loses is equal to the amount that the 
other one wins), not only in terms of thq political capabilities 
that have been just examined here, but also in view of the permanence 
of the political dominance by one party until it is physically overthrown.
(3) Legal and Electoral Devices against the Opposition
Another main reason why the opposition parties complained of 
the "fundamental election rigging" was that the laws and regulations 
concerning political parties and elections were too stringent and 
restrictive for opposition parties to compete with the DRP.
98. See Paek Ram-ju, Uihok sok ui iship nyon, op. cit., pp. 282-4.
99* Lee Chin-ui and Lee Kybng-shik reported that the DRP, through 
its factional bosses and government ministers, was collecting 5!% 
commission fees for its political funds for the 1967 elections from 
business and construction firms in return for governmental contracts 
and bank loans. See Lee Chin-ui and Lee Ky&ng-shik, _oj). cit., p. 67*
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Kim Yong-sam, a veteran opposition politician and the spokesman 
of the Mass Party charged that "The 1963 elections were onesided 
affairs which were held in accordance with the electoral system 
and the laws conveniently made for the perpetuation of the rule 
of the military junta.
The laws that governed political activities, political parties
and elections were the Political Activities Purification Law of
101. 102*1962, ’ certain provisions of the Constitution, * the Election
Management Committees Law (Law No. 1255? January 1963), the
Political Party Law (Law lo. 1246, December 1962), the Presidential
Election Law (Law No. 1262, February 1963) and the National Assembly
103Election Law (Law No. 1256, January 1963). * These various laws
on political parties and elections were in spirit created, first, 
to foster orderly politics by a sound party system and to prevent 
reappearance of mushrooming political parties, and secondly, to 
guarantee fair elections by eliminating conditions detrimental to 
equal opportunities for candidates and to freely-expressed popular 
elections.
These are the most prominent features of the lawss (1) the 
stringent requirements in forming a political party^^^1* and the 
requirement of party nomination to be candidate either for
100. Kim Y&ig-sam, Chftngoh1 i nun kilko chbngkwon -tin tchapda, 
op. cit., p. 99*
101. This law became a part of the Constituion as Article 4 
of Supplementary Buies.
102. Article 7 (guarantee of free and plural party system, 
and definition and function of party), 36 and 64 (requirement of 
party nomination to be candidates for presidency and the National 
Assembly). See interpretations of these provisions in Mun Hong-chu, 
Hankuk h&npfrb, op. cit», pp. 327-43. For criticism, see Kim Ki~-b8m, 
"Certain Features of the Constitution," op. cit., pp. 25-6.
103. For these various laws and the decrees implementing these 
laws, see the CEMC, Korean Constitution, Election and Political 
Party Laws, op. cit.
104. See Articles 3? 25 and 27 of the Political Party Law.
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105.
presidency or for the national Assembly - -- in other words, 
discouragement of minor parties and prohibition of independent 
candidates? (2) strengthening the role of the election committee 
at each level in conducting, managing and supervising election 
campaigns and e x p e n d i t u r e s (3) severe limitations and 
restrictions 011 the methods of and expenditures for campaigns,
107and accompanying steep penalties for violations of these provisions.
The laws limit drastically the number and qualification of campaigners 
and the number of campaign publications and speeches5 they restrict 
the use of publicity and news media, public address systems and 
transportation facilities? they prohibit the door-to-door canvass, 
soliciting or accepting donations for campaign funds and remarking 
critically on the career and personality of an opponent? and tjiey 
forbid campaigns for a candidate by other than his own party members.
In spite of the avoT/edly good intent of these laws, the pro­
cesses of making the Constitution and the laws concerning political
parties and elections were neither normal nor democratic. In the
100creation of the Constitution, ' the military junta solicited 
advice from various scholars and experts in the related fields in 
drafting the Constitution and was successful in getting approval 
by registering 78.78 per cent of the voters in the national refrendum 
for the Constitution held on December 17, 1982.-^9* Birj- fa0^
105. See Articles 38 and 64 of the Constitution.
106. See Chapters 6 (Election Campaign) and 7 (Election
Expenditures) respectively of the Presidential Election Law and 
the national Assembly Election Law? and Article 6 of the Election 
Management Committee Law.
107. See Chapters 6, 7 and 12 of the Presidential Election 
Law and Chapters 6, 7 and 13 of the national Assembly Election 
Law. See also, for special features of the election laws, the 
CEMC, Taehanminkuk sonk6 sa, crp. cit., pp. 85-9 anc^  93-6.
108. See Mun Hong-chu, ’’The History of Korean Constitution,"
££• PP* 23-5»
109. For the returns of the refrendum, see Hankuk Icurlsa 
hybkmybng sa. Vol. I, Mo. 1, jog, cit., pp. 550-3.
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remains that the Constitution was drafted while the opponents
of the military junta were still voiceless under the martial law
and the decree which banned all political activities. For
instance. Professor of Law Hwang San-d’ok of Seoul National
University, an editorial vrriter for a Seoul daily, Tong-A Ilbo,
was arrested by the CIA for his criticism of the draft of the '
new Constitution and of the national refrendum in an editorial
Jt*
of Tong-A Ilbo (July 28, 1962), entitled "National Rei^rendum is 
110.not a Panacea". * If the important Constitution of the Third
Republic came into existence without sufficient and free debates,
such important laws as the political party and election laws were
also enacted unilaterally by the SCNR without participation by
other political groups who had vital interests in the future party
111#activities and elections. * The imprudence and high-handedness
of the military junta in making these basic legal and- procedual 1 *1
foundations of the forthcoming civilian government were not only 
to diminish the dignity and effectiveness of the laws but also to 
prepare a ground of bitter debates on the merits of the laws.
On these same grounds, a case can be made against a part of the 
preamble of the present Constitution. This part reads?
We, the people of Korea .... now being engaged in the 
establishment of a new democratic Republic on the basis of 
ideals as manifested in the April 19th Righteous Uprising 
and May 16th Revolution, have determined ....
A preamble as an important part of any constitution usually bears
the spirit or the ideal of a/ nation. The above preamble says that
110. For the case, see Lee Bybng-su et al, ed., Haebang iship 
nybn sa, op. cit., pp. 1142-3. See also Hwang's own account of the 
case, in Hwang San-d6k, Chahwasang, op. cit., pp. 11-82.
111. Cf. Kim Y6ng-sam, Chffngoh1 i ndn kilko ch&ngkwon un 
tchapda, op. cit., p. 101.
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the Third. Republic of Korea is partly based on the ideal of the 
military revolution. However the opposition parties during and 
after the 1963 elections had continuously condemned and repudiated 
the "ideal" of the military revolution as nothing but a "seizure 
of power" by a military group. This was an outright denial of a 
part of the spirit of the Constitution by a considerable number 
of the people.
For various reasons (mostly for their artificiality,
resti’iotiveness and undemocratic nature), the constitutional
provisions and the laws concerning political party and elections
112.had been criticized, ’ Before and during the 1963 elections 
the opposition parties, through their united body of the Struggling 
Committee for Fair Elections, especially demanded elimination of 
such restrictive measures as the provisions limiting the number of 
campaigners, campaign posters, campaign literature, and campaign 
speeches? the provision prohibiting the use of public address 
systems in the streets? the provision prohibiting critical remarks 
or attacks on the opponent’s career and personality? the provision 
prohibiting campaigning for candidates by others than their own 
party members? and other special laws and decrees issued by the
113.SCNR which in various ways limited basic rights of the citizens.
The opposition viewed that the above limitations and restrictions 
reduced the effectiveness as well as the choice of their campaigns
112. See Shin Sang-ch'o et al in a discussion, "Constitutional 
Amendment As we See," Sasangge, December 1962, pp. 61-6| Xu Chin-o 
"My Belief is Still Against It", Sasangge, January 1965, PP« 66-9;
Kim Ki-ok, "A Proposal for Revision of the Election Laws," Chosun 
Ilbo, November 15, 19663 "Seminar on the Party and Election Laws", 
Series No. 1 (Chosun Ilbo), No. 2 flun ICun-shik), No. 3 (Han Tong- 
s^p), No. 4 (Ku BcSm-mo) and No. 5 (Kim Ch!6l-su) in Chosun Ilbo,
March 29 through April 12, 1966; and the positions taken by the 
DRP's chairman of the Policy Committee (Paek Nam-ok) and by the Mass 
Party's counterpart (Lee Ch'ung-hwan) in Chosun Ilbo, April 9? 1966* 
Lee Hyo-sang, Speaker of the National Assembly, was also unusually 
critical of some of these provisions, see his "Historic Meaning of 
Constitution Making and the Task faced by the Constitution," Kukhoebo, 
No. 46, July 20, 1965, pp. 4-8.
113. E.g., the statements of the Struggling Committee in Chosun
Ilbo, September 21 and October 22, 1963. ~ ~ — "
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against the disproportionately (and unfairly) well-organized and
114-well-endowed campaign machines of the DEP*
■^laG Sasangge magazine, for example, commented that while the
opposition parties were unable to attack the candidate Park Chung-hee
because of the provision that forbade any critical remarks about
an opponent, the pro-Park May Comrades Society was improperly
conducting campaigns for Park Chung-hee by praising the military
revolution and candidate Park, under the cover of educational
115lectures through its vast membership of 300,000. The May
Comrades Society was a friendship organization of military junta
members including Park as its president and their civilian friends.
The above activities of the society, the Sasangge magazine claimed,
were in violation of the laws which prohibited election campaigns
IL16by other than certain qualified party members.
According to one analysis Yun Po-son did better than Park
Chung-hee among the voters in the areas where the Tong-A Broadcasting
Station in Seoul, a large private station sympathetic to the
117»opposition, could reach during the campaigns. * Prom this example 
it is difficult to establish a general pattern of voting behavior 
in the 1963 elections in such a proposition. However the inability 
of the opposition parties due to the laws to rely on certain 
publicity media and personal contacts such as public address systems 
in the streets and the door-to-door canvass had certainly created 
problems for them to appeal directly to voters.
114. See the report on the election campaigns in Chosun Ilbo, 
September 24, 1963? and the analyses of the elections in Chosun 
Ilbo, October 18 and October 20, 1963.
115. "Comments on the Current Events," Sasangge, October 1963?
p. 88.
116. Ibid.
117. Chosun Ilbo, October 18, 1963*
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Although withdrawal of presidential candidates Ho Ch&ng and 
Song Yo-ch'an made Tun Po-son the sole major opponent of Park 
Chung-hee, the provision forbidding aid or campaign for other than 
their own candidates also prevented the opposition parties from 
forming an effective coalition machinery against Park in the 
presidential elections. This is not to say that the provision 
was the only factor that prevented a concerted effort of the 
opposition camp. Actually the opposition camp after the "fiasco 
of the Party of the People” was too deeply divided by mutual 
animosity to unite themselves, even had they been legally per­
mitted to unite. However the legal requirement of party nomin­
ation for candidates was undoubtedly a factor directly 
contributing to factional struggles in the opposition camp and 
indirectly preventing unification of the opposition leaders.
The purpose of making party nomination mandatory for can­
didacy was to develop a party system in which preferably two or 
three major parties would compete. In view of the fact that 
factionalism and personal ambition were the main traits of 
politicians and parties in Korea, the provision requiring party 
nomination forced opposition parties to bring many heterogenous
factional elements into a party, in order for them to stay in
118.politics and to get party nomination of a large party.
Dr. Yu Chin-o, who served in the constitution draft committee in 
1962, recalled later that he was at the time opposed to the 
provision requiring party nomination on the following grounds:
118. Shin Sang-ch'o in a discussion, "Problems of Political 
Party Activities," Shinsekye, January 1963, p. 76; Lee Kuk-ch'an, 
"The Task and Pathology of the Opposition Parties," op. cit., 
pp. 81-2; and Kim Ch'&l-su, "New Dimension of Korean Political 
Parties," op. cit., pp. 81-2.
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Independent candidates will disappear as a result of 
development of political party system. Prohibition of 
independents by law will not necessarily develop political 
party system ... If disappearance of independents is the 
result of development of political party system, the members 
of the party will voluntarily submit themselves to party 
discipline. However in the event that independents are 
artificially barred from politics, it will hamper development 
of political party because it will forcibly bring many of 
them to join a party for the sake of running for offices 
even if they have little loyalty to the party and its leader­
ship. If this is the case, it will not only weaken unity of 
the political party but will also hamper the development of 
the political party ... Prohibition of independents from 
politics will instead increase the chance of proliferation 
of minor parties.-^9*
Dr. Yu's skepticism was soon borne out by the disasters of the Party
of the People and, later, of the Mass Party during the BOK-Japan
treaty crisis. The fact that, in spite of the legal barriers
against multiplication of parties, seven parties competed in the
presidential elections and twelve parties in the general elections
in 1963 proved that no legal prescription can develop a political
party system. Instead the legal prescription had greatly weakened
the opposition camp and the party system in Korea.
A more important aspect of the requirement for party nomination
in the present context of discussion is its by-product. In the
process of a forcible amalgamation of heterogeneous factional
groups into a semblance of a party under this law, a party becomes
a "party of parties” - - this is even true in the case of the
ruling DBP. Unlike the ruling party which has enough political
and economic leverages to appease or suppress open defiance of
factional groups, an opposition party built on various factional
groups under this legal pressure is susceptible to open factional
120strifes which have usually led to division of the party, *
119. Yu Chin-o "My Belief is Still against it," op. cit., p. 69.
120. Cf. Pak Ky<5ng~sok and Ham Shi-uk, "Pactions of Korean 
Political Parties," Shindong-A, February 19&7? P* 217*
224
particularly when the prospect of political reward (such as party
nomination for presidency) or political and emotional stress
(as in the case of the ROK-Japan treaty issue) is great. Mien a
cycle of amalgamation factional struggle., break-up and formation
of a new party or parties by dissenters is completed? the ability
of future cooperation among the opposition parties is already
greatly damaged. This was certainly the state of the opposition
camp in 1963 after the disaster of the Party of the People? and
they could not wholeheartedly unite on behalf of Yun Po-s&n!s 
121.candidacy.
THE PRIMACY OP MlhlTAHT POLITICS t THE CASE OF
THE MASS PARTY *S ROLE PJ THE TREATY CRISIS
Because of these various actual and imaginary grounds on which
the ruling party had rigged the 1963 elections in advance as well
as during the elections? the opposition parties flatly refused to
accept the results of the elections and? more significantly? the
establishment of the Park government. Kim Yong-sam had singularly
traced the direct cause of the continuing instability of the Third
122Republic to the unfairness and irregularities in the elections.
He said that? for example? the main reason for the militant
political attitude of Yun Po-s&n? who personified the entire
opposition movement in the treaty crisis? was Yun’s belief that he
123.was defeated by the rigged elections. * As to the frequent
121. See Kim KySng-rae? “Korean Political Parties in Transition?" 
op. cit.? pp. 46-53.
122. Kim Y&ng-sam? ChSngch*i nun kilko ch5ngkwon un t chapda ?
0£* cit., p. 99.
123. Ibid.? p. 100.
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violent confrontations between the members of the ruling party and 
of the opposition in the National Assembly, he attributed them to 
the same elections as follows?
Only when both the ruling party and the opposition recognized 
that the elections by which they were elected to the National 
Assembly were fair, the members of the opposite parties would 
have mutually respected each other’s political ihtegrity and 
recognized each other's existence. Only such a National 
Assembly could be operated smoothly...
Prom the beginning of its adminstration the DRP government 
had been advocating political stability, cooperation, and 
contest based on issues. But such advocation had been in 
vain. The cause of the failure lay in the irregular processes 
through which the DRP gained power. 124-8
Yun Po~son once declared that "I am convinced that the
political opposition we are waging today in this country is a
patriotic m o v e m e n t A n d  his conviction is widely shared by many
opposition politicians, especially among those whose political
struggles date from the days of Rhee’s dictatorship. Why are
opposition politics patriotic? In the history of more than two
decades of the Republic, Koreans have never experienced a peaceful
change of government by election. During this period, defeat of
the opposition 1ms been seemingly always pre-determined in spite
of its vigorous challenge and, in some cases, in spite of the
overwhelming popular support it received (See Chapter l)P Thus
the opposition party became a part in the so-called "one and a
half party system,"
Rather conditioned by this frustrating experience, the
opposition has increasingly been losing patience and faith in a
peaceful change of government and has instead been resorting in
elections and politics to extreme struggles by extolling its role
124. Ibid.
125« Yun Po~s'6n, Kukuk ui Icashipat !kil, op. cit., p. 229*
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as a defender of the Constitution, a champion of democracy and
126.
a watchdog for fair elections and just politics* * The repeated
failures of the opposition to gain a majority had made it less
responsible as an opposition and made it the last desirable group
127,
with which the ruling party would share the task of government.
As a perpetual underdog fighting for political democracy, the
opposition largely views its struggle against the government as
patriotic duty - - the more extreme the struggle, the more
patriotic the struggle for democracy of the country. This is one
of the fundamental reasons why in the times of political crises
the militant factions in both the opposition party and the ruling
party have been dominating the whole complexion of the situations,
with one as the challenger and the other as the defender.
As it was proposed earlier that the treaty crisis was a cidsis
of political legitimacy, the examinations of the origins of the
present political leadership and of the opposition revealed that
there existed a great division between the two opposite political
forces, regarding both the natures of the military revolution and
of the present government. The division was accentuated by, and
further developed into, the primacy of hostilities as motivation
in politics. Any crude content analysis of the statements of
both the sides quoted earlier in the previous chapter might be
128.enough to establish certain motivations of hostility,' * Separated
126, See Lee Kuk-chVan, "The Task and Pathology of the 
Opposition," op. cit,, pp. 78-9*
127, For certain conditions for an opposition to be respon­
sible, see Ferdinand A, Hermens, The Representative Republic 
(Dotre Dame, Indiana? University of Hotre Dame Press"7™195^77 P* 170*
128, About what constitutes a hostile statement, see, for 
example, the three sets of hostile themes - - (l) rejection or 
manipulation, (2) hostile -aggressive, and (3) suspicious| in 
Dina Zinnes, "A Comparison of Hostile Behaviour of Decision Makers 
in Simulate and Historical Data," World Politics, Vo, XVIII, Ho, 3S 
April I966, p. 480,
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by hostility and emotionalism and fortified with different views
on the 1963 election returns, the start of politics in the Third
Republic, i.e. the political climate preceeding the treaty crisis,
was in a sense a renewal of the political struggle carried over
129.from the elections.
The continuing crisis of legitimacy was further intensified
when the militant faction of the opposition party openly declared
its intention to overthrow the Park government during the treaty
crisis. The attitude of the militant faction was well exposed
when it had to make its political stand clear in the course of
factional struggling against the moderate faction inside the Mass
Party (see Chapter 8). In June 1969 Tun Po-s8n’s Civil Rule Party
and Pak Sun-ch'&n’s Democratic Party merged in the Mass Party in
order to consolidate the opposition forces against the ROK-Japan
treaty ratification. At the time of the merger the Mass Party
was composed largely of the two factions — - the moderate and the 
130.militant factions.
The main point of the militant argument was that the Park
government had to be overthrown at any time and by all means if
an opportunity arose, unrelated to the Park government’s con-
131.stitutional terms of office. * Here is some of the reasoning 
of their arguments t
129. For the political climate in the early 1964? see “One 
Month of the Civilian Government, " Chosun Ilbo, January 17, 1964?
"The Stage of Struggle to Eradicate the Military Rule," Tong-A 
Ilbo, January 15, 1964, an^ editorials of Tong-A Ilbo,
January 15 and January 30, 1964*
130. See "Factional Struggle In the Mass Party," Shindong-A, 
September 1965, PP* 304-8; and "Is It Possible to Terminate Factional 
Struggle?" Kyunghyang Shinmoon, June 22, 1965.
131."The Return of the Mass Party to the Rational Assembly As 
a Sign of Division of the Party," Shindong-A, November 1965? PP* 
138-9* See also the two excellent articles "The Opposition Parties 
in Korea," Series Hos. 4 and 5, Chosun Ilbo, October 23 and October
26, 1965.
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The Park government set a "bad. precedent of military coup 
d’etat which hinders political development of a developing 
country ... To oust the Park government which has its 
embryo in a coup d ’etat is to sweep away this bad precedent.
It may be inevitable to use even unconstitutional means to 
bring the Park government down.132.
Any regime? either established by a coup d ’etat or con­
ceived by a seed of a coup d’etat can never be justified in 
a historical view, even if it was sanctioned by elections.133° 
The ’’militant line" is the resultant reaction to the uncon­
stitutional means employed by the Park government ... Suppose 
the opponents in a soccer game play the ball with both feet 
and hands, we should not be unilaterally forced to observe 
the rules of the game by playing the ball only with the feet.
On the other hand Pak Sun-ch’on's moderate faction did not 
agree with the extreme position of the militant faction for tactical 
reasons, although they shared with the militants the basic distrust 
in the Park government. The argument of the moderate was arti­
culated by Yu Chin-san, a brilliant strategist and a talented
135.organizer. He argued that in spite of the illegitimate nature
of the Park government, the overthrow of the Park government either 
by violence or other irregular methods would further contribute 
to political instability of the country by setting up a vicious 
cycle of coups. He further took the view that the Park government 
was so well entrenched that it was practically impossible to be 
thrown out. Even granting that it could be overthrown, the ouster 
of the Park government would not guarantee invitation of the 
opposition politicians to powerj thus, Yu urged the militants to
132. The statement of Assemblyman Chong Hae-yong, a Yun Po-s&n’s
top lieutenant. Quoted in ’’The Opposition Parties in Korea,” Series
^°* 4? ibid. See also the similar statement cited by Chong Chong- 
Shik in ”A Round Table Talkj Inquiry for Change of Party Politics," 
op. cit.9 p. 164*
133. The statement of Assemblyman Kim Chae-kwang, Quoted in
"The Opposition Parties in Korea," Series Ho. 5? ibid.
134* The statement of Assemblyman Kim Su-han, Quoted in ibid.
135« For his views, see "The Return of the Mass Party to the 
Rational Assembly as a Sign of Division of the Party," op. cit., 
pp. 138-9? and "The Opposition Parties in Korea," Series Ho. 4 
and Ho. 5s cit.
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adhere to the constitutional principle of peaceful change of power 
and to avoid the futility of extreme tactics in the treaty struggle.
In order to facilitate collapse of the Park government or at
least to bring it down to its knees, the opposition party, under
the leadership of the militant faction, adopted the so-called
"unlimited maximum struggle" strategy both inside and outside the 
136.National Assembly in struggling against the ROK-Japan treaty.
The strategy involved, at the first stage, the maximum employment 
of delaying and obstructive tactics to halt deliberation on the 
treaty ratification bill in the important Special Committee of the 
Rational Assembly? and, secondly, upon failure in the Special 
Committee, resignation of the opposition members en masse from 
the Rational Assembly either through individual resignation from 
the Mass Party or through dissolution of the party, and leading 
a massive popular struggle in the streets by mobilizing the maximum 
moral pressures as well as demonstrations against the "one-party 
Rational Assembly" of the DRP and the government.
The argument behind this strategy was that ratification of 
the treaty by the "one-party Rational Assembly", without the 
opposition, would be not only morally wrong but also unconstitutional 
in view of Articles 7 (l) and 36 (2) of the Constitution.1"^ *
Article 36 (2) stipulates that "The number of the members of the 
Rational Assembly shall be determined by law within the range of 
no less than one hundred and fifty and no more than two hundred
136. See "The War Without a Retreat Routes Strategies of the 
Ruling Party and the Opposition", Chosun Ilbo, July 11, 1965? and 
"The ROK in Upheaval," op. cit., p. 13#
4 /  II I « r I «  * a -
137. Yun Po-son, Eukuk ui kashipat*kil, op. cit., p. 243j 
Assemblyman Ch6ng Eae-yong’s statement of resignation from the 
Mass Party, Chosun Ilbo, August 11, 1965? and the arguments for 
and against resignation from or dissolution of the Mass Party in 
Chosun Ilbo, August 14, 1965-
230
persons"* Article 7 (l) provides that "The establishment of 
political parties shall be free and the plural party system shall 
be guaranteed". In other words, the legal points that the oppo­
sition (the militant faction) raised were that, first, the 
"one-party National Assembly" with only 110 members of the DEP 
was contrary to the provision of "no less than one hundred and fifty"
and that, secondly, it was also in violation of the spirit of the
138.constitutional guarantee of the plural party system. * The 
argument was a two-edged weapon, (l) to halt ratification of the 
treaty and (2) to dissolve the National Assembly. It was also to 
find some moral and legal grounds to carry their struggle to the 
extremity in order to bring down the government. If the treaty 
bill was put aside and the government agreed for new general
elections --  though the possibility of this concession from the
government and the IBP was entirely remote, the concession itself 
would have constituted a great political victory for the opposition. 
If there were elections the opposition felt that they could win 
such elections.
Parallel with the development in the Mass Party, the strategy
of the DEP for the treaty was also dictated by its militant faction
(or the "main stream") hand in hand with the militant group in the
139.cabinet of Pa,rkTs government. For example, Lee Hyo-sang,
Speaker of the National Assembly, and his followers in the moderate
138. This argument of the militant faction was challenged by 
the moderate faction. See the arguments in Chosun Ilbo, ibid.
139. See Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa~~ny^n sa, op. cit., 
pp. 179“8l and Kim Yong-t’ae, "The National Assembly During the
56 Days of the Martial Law," Sasangge, September 1964j PP* 58-63. 
About the strategy meeting between the militant leaders of both 
the DEP and the government at the presidential Blue House in 
preparation of the forthcoming confrontation with the opposition 
on the treaty ratification bill, see Chosun Ilbo, July 16, 1965*
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faction (or the "non-main stream") of the DEP were more receptive
to the Mass Party's proposal for dissolution of the National
Assembly and for new general elections in the place of a national
refrendum on the treaty issue.^40* Some moderates of the PEP
also suggested to the government, in order to accommodate the
views of the opposition and the people, that they make some
reservation on certain provisions in the treaty which were the
141.targets of attacks of the treaty opponents. 0 The suggestions
of the moderates of the DEP were completely ignored by the militants
and were even interpreted as a challenge to the supreme leadership
of Park Chung-hee.
As the street demonstrations against the treaty and the
government grew fast and furiously, the militant faction of the
Mass Party immensely strengthened its position and prestige, enough
to carry the party along its pre-determined course although it was,
in number, the minority in the party. The PEP believed that the
opposition was actually plotting a violent overthrow of the
government by using the treaty issue as a rallying point of popular 
143.insurrection. Because of this belief that the opposition party
was merely using the treaty issue to ferment a revolution, the 
resultant feeling of insecurity in the PEP had naturally strengthened
140« Chosun Ilbo, April 13? and "The Two Theories on 
Resignation," Chosun Ilbo, July 4? 1965*
141. Chosun Ilbo, July 7? 1965*
142. "The Two Theories on Resignation," ojo. cit.
143. See the statement of the PEP spokesman Shin Bom-s^k which
revealed the alleged insurrection plot of the Civil Rule Party,
Chosun Ilbo, April 13? 1965? Minjukonghwatang, Chonjin un tang gwa 
tbburff . op. cit., pp. 28-9? and the speech of Park Chung-hee at
the Central Committee of the PEP, on May 13? 1965? Minjukonghwatang, 
Minjukonghwatang sa ny&n sa, op. cit., p. 263.
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the initiative of the militants, which in turn made the position 
of the DEP and the government on the treaty issue more inflexible.
Thus the predominance of the militant faction in both parties 
radically reduced the chances of compromise.
The outcome of the treaty struggles both in the National 
Assembly and in the streets have already been mentioned. However 
as to the basic political aspect of the treaty crisis, it can be 
concluded that the prime motivation of the extreme opposition against 
the ROK~Japan treaty was not so much that the treaty was ’’humiliating” 
and "treacherous”, but that the issue of the treaty could have 
been deadly ammunition for the opposition to topple the Park 
government. Conversely, upon failure of the opposition in halting 
ratification of the treaty, the ratified treaty would immensely 
strengthen the power and prestige of the Park government and the 
DRP and it would enable them to control a vast amount of grants 
and credits that would flow in from Japan - - the very same reason 
that also motivated the opposition party, the lew Democratic 
Party, in the Second Republic when it opposed Chang MycSn’s efforts 
to bring about a conclusion to the ROK-Japan negotiations.^^*
One of the grave consequences of the treaty crisis was, of 
course, the complete disintegration of the Mass Party. After the 
Mass Party resigned from the National Assembly on August 12, the 
day after the DRP members forcibly concluded deliberation on the 
treaty ratification bill in a lightening coup in the Special 
Committee, factional disputes between the militants and the moderates
144* See Hwang San-d&k, "Resumption of ROK-Japanese Diplomatic 
Relations and Our Expectation,” Shindong-A, January 1966, pp. 64-5?
Lee Hang-ui, "Tsfhen the ROK-Japan Relations are Normalized,” Series 
No. 2, op. cit.
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145,developed on the problems of the future course of the Mass Party*
The resignation submitted to the National Assembly on August 12 
was rejected by the "one-party National Assembly" of the PEP, and 
the only remaining way to resign irrevocably was either to resign 
individually from the Mass Party or to dissolve the party itself, 
as prescribed in Article 38 of the Constitution, which provides 
that a member of the National Assembly can lose his seat "when he 
leaves or changes his party or when his party is dissolved*"
The militant faction argued that the only effective course 
remaining for the opposition to take was to dissolve the Mass 
Party in order to prevent possible "resignation dodgers" (pointedly 
the moderates) and to maintain solidarity of the opposition members, 
and to carry on the struggle among the people^^* in compliance
147
with the several resolutions adopted earlier by the party.
Eight opposition Assemblymen of the militant faction, including 
Yun' Po-son, resigned from the party and lost their seats in the 
National Assembly. But the moderate faction and a majority of the
145* See especially "Pactional Struggle In the Mass Party,”
££. cit., pp. 304~8§ ‘The Return of the Mass Party As-A ;Sign/ of 
Division of the Party,11 ojd, cit., pp. 139-41? and the summary of 
the disputes in the Mass Party in Chosun Ilbo, August 14, 1965- 
See also an excellent account of the Mass Party’s discords by the 
DEP, in Minjukonghwatang, Chfcngjin un tang gwa toburo, op. cit.,
pp. 142-54*
146. For the militant view, see Assemblyman Oh&ng Hae-Y&ng’s 
statement of resignation from the Mass Party, Chosun Ilbo, op. cit.3 
the militant faction’s statement of departure from the Mass Party, 
November 1, 1965? Chosun Ilbo, November 2, 1965? and Yun Po-stm, 
Kuknk ui kashipat’kil, op. cit., pp. 244-56.
147. These resolutions pledged resignation from the National 
Assembly if the Mass Party failed to halt deliberation of the 
treaty ratification bill in the Special Committee. See the 
resolution at the National Convention, June 14? 1965? Chosun Ilbo, 
June 15? 1965? 'fcbe resolution of the Central Committee of the 
party, August 4? 1965? Chosun Ilbo, August 5? 1965? and- the 
resolution of the Mass Party Parliamentary Group Conference,
August 7? 1965? Chosun Ilbo, August 8, 1965. The texts of these 
resolutions are also available in "Factional Struggle in the Mass 
Party," jag. cit., pp. 304-8.
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militant faction Assemblymen refused to abdicate their seats, 
and argued that since the treaty was ratified, neither individual 
resignation nor dissolution of the party would be anything but 
self-destruction and that the supreme duty of the Mass Party was 
now to continue its vigilant opposition against the government 
in the National Assembly and in the constitutional framework, ^ 48* 
Blaming each other for the responsibility of the failure in 
stopping the ratification, the Mass Party after August 12 became 
the scene of invective and violence between its opposing factions.
On October 11, exactly two months after they walked out from 
the National Assembly, the Mass Party (the moderate faction and 
"the resignation dodgers" among the militants) returned to the 
National Assembly. In her return speech Madam Pale Sun-ch’on, the 
leader of the moderate faction,.made a self-criticism on the Mass 
Party's ineffective, extravagant and irresponsible ways in the 
struggle against the treaty and on the discords in the partyj 
blamed the party’s failure upon the "misguided leadership" of 
Yun Po-son1 s militant faction^ and promised that the Mass Party
149.
would be a constructive and loyal opposition. The return of
the moderate faction to the National Assembly prompted the 
departure of the militant faction from the Mass Party, after 
accusing the moderates as the group of "bankrupts of national spirit" 
and "the Machiavellists".^0* On March 30, 1966, Yun Po-s&n and
148. For the moderate views, see the statement of Ho Ch8ng, 
Ohosun Ilbo, August 18, 1965? the announcement of the moderate 
faction Assemblymen in Chosun Ilbo, August 24, 1965? Pak Kwon-sang, 
"Interview with Pak Sun~ch'6n," Shindong-A, August 1^66, pp. 250-60^ 
and ICLm Yong-sam "Retrospect on the Parliamentary Politics in 1965," 
Kukhoebo, No. 50? December 20, 1965, PP* 6-7*
149* Poi* the text of her speech in the National Assembly, see 
Chosun Ilbo, October 12, 1965.
150. For the accusation, see the militant faction’s statement 
of departure from the Mass Party, Chosun Ilbo, November 2, 1965.
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his militant faction formed Shinhantang (the New Korea Party) as 
a "clean-cut opposition party" in contrast to the Mass Party.
Thus the opposition struggle against the ROK-Japan treaty ended 
with the division of the Mass Party - - only to repeat the fate 
of its illustrious predecessors in the old Democratic Party and 
the Party of the People. It was a sort of a return to status quo 
ante-bellum.
CONCLUSION
Throughout these two chapters (5 and 6) the characteristic
feature of the contemporary Korean politics has been the political
instability caused by lack of legitimacy, largely generated by
hostility between the major political groups, the extreme imbalance
in the power relationship and in the distribution of political
resources between the ruling party and the opposition, and lack of
a basic consensus regarding the nature of the government and
important issues. This created perpetual tensions and conflicts
in which the extreme views and groups were bound to control
political hegemony. The situation under these conditions impaired
the political capacity of Koreans to resolve important issues such
as the ROK-Japan treaty issue through normal political process.
Bruce M. Russet, in his empirical study of politics of the United
Nations, set forth a proposition, "If those who hold the most
extreme attitudes also hold them most intensely, a serious threat
to the system’s stability may exist, especially if the extremists
151.are numerous. His proposition neatly explains the characteristic
instability of Korea that these two chapters have just examined.
151® Bruce 1. Russet, op. cit. „ p. 62.
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CHAPTER 7 
POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICS:
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN PARTI
INTRODUCTION
The confrontation Between the government (the ruling party) 
and the opposition during the ROK-Japan treaty crisis had drama­
tized the problem of political instability stemming from the 
lack of legitimacy. The struggle between them was the renewed 
conflict between the two elites? the ruling versus the deposed.
The consequence of the extreme confrontation was the paralysis 
of the capacity of the political system to solve the issues 
through the normal political processes. Much of this incapacity 
was attributable to the inordinate functioning of the two major 
rival political parties. At the height of the treaty crisis in 
the summer of 1965j the major parties in the struggle were the 
ruling Democratic Republican Party (DRP) and the Mass Party (MP).
Why did the parties not function? With this as the focus 
of the investigation of the following two chapters (7 and 8), the 
two parties will be closely examined in terms of their origin 
and history, goals and programs or ideologies, recruitment and 
composition, leadership and organizational structure, and internal 
political processes. In the case of the MP, less attention will 
be paid to the organizational structure, for it had never developed 
proper structure, and, instead, greater attention will be devoted 
to its history because it provides an insight into the problem of 
the MP.
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THE OHIGBT M D  THE IDEALS OF THE HEP
It can be said, as a general rule, that a military junta
established as a cure for political instability in a democracy may
be successful in the short run. But it fails to achieve stability
in the long run, because it has no “institutional basis such as an
1
effective and representative political party would provide*"
When military officers take over the power of a democratic country,
they invariably make the promise that they will return to their
original duty as soon as they achieve their purpose. By the time
they decide to restore a constitutional government to civilians,
it is very difficult for the military to refrain from entering into
civilian politics. The reasons are obvious. The first is their
feeling of insecurity because they have made so many embittered
political enemies in the course of securing the short-run political
goal. The second is their taste of power. The prospect of
relinquishing their power seems too unpleasant to honor their
original pledge of "return to original duty." The third is the
problem of succession. It is very difficult to ensure that the
civilian successors would guarantee their political security and
their professional careers and would continue their military
2.revolutionary ideals and tasks.
Incapable of solving these problems, they have to continue in 
power. But they cannot rule the country indefinitely by military 
dictatorship if internal and external pressures develop for a 
democratic form of government. They then need popular consent.
1. Prank Tannenbaum, Ten Keys to Latin America (Hew Yorks 
Vintage Books, 1966), p. 153* The notable cases of the military 
juntas1 failures, outside of Latin America, were* Burma, Greece, 
Iraq, Pakistan, South Korea, South Vietnam and Turkey.
2. Cf. the nine conditions set forth by General Park in his 
"The February 18th Statement to Beal with the Political Situation." 
The conditions were already cited in Chapter 5*
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For this reason, they, if prudent, begin to build a strong political
party as the vehicle of legitimate politics replacing the politics 
3.based on force. * In the light of the above circumstances, the
HEP was officially launched on February 26, 1963, as an instrument
for the leaders of the junta to continue their rule in the name of
revolutionary tasks.
The PEP asserts, "The party would not have existed now, had
it not been for the military revolution. In this sense our party
is the direct offshoot of the military government.'1^* In other
words the DEP claimed to be the heir of the ideals of the military
revolution, committed to "modernization of the fatherland" by
bringing about social order, political stability, and economic 
5.prosperity. * In order to achieve these goals, the organizers of
the DRP saw the task of their party as the primary vehicle of
6reform and modernization. *
In a certain sense the PEP is the child of the turbulent past 
of Korean politics. After the unsuccessful experiment with demo­
cracy in the First Eepublic and the Second Republic, an increasing 
number of people began to think that the critical element of a 
successful democratic government was the men who operated a given 
political system. Thus Kim Chong-pil and his fellow organizers of 
the PEP maintained that the establishment of a new leading political 
force representing a "new generation," imbued with new ideas and
3. See F. A. Hermens, The Representative Republic, op. cit.,
P. 37*
4* "The Pemocratic Republican Party Moves Toward Stability," 
The PEP Bulletin, Vol. 1, Ho. 4> April 1966, pp. 5-6.
5« Ibid., p. 6; and see also Kim S6ng-hiii (the Pirector of the 
Policy Research Office of the PEP), "The Third Republic Moves 
Toward Stability* PEP," Korean Affairs, Vol. Ill, Ho. 1, April 1964?
pp. 52-62.
6. "The Peclaration of Inauguration of the PEP," in Minjukong­
hwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa ny8n sa, op. cit., pp. v-ix.
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proper social values, was the prerequisite for modernisation and
7.democracy. This new leading force had to he hased on a stable 
and responsible political party without which a stable democracy 
could not be realized. Cognizant of the importance of leadership, 
the IBP was created to be the; master of political affairs and the 
innovator of changes.
THE! STRUCTURE .OF, THE. IHP 
The master plan of organization of the DBP adopted at the 
Founding Committee on January 18, 1963 strongly reflected the above 
thinking in an attempt to create a modern and stable party. The 
eight-point master plan stressed the following principles:
(l) open and mass party; (2) proper party structure suitable for
party politics; (3) ideological cohesion and party discipline --
and elimination of factionalism; (4 ) centrally directed hierarchical 
leadership; (5) a greater role in formulating and implementing 
policies; (6) capacity for continuous recruitment; (7 ) permanent 
party executive structure in charge of party administration and 
implementation of party policies; and (8) education and training
Q
of party members. * In particular, the founders of the DBP stressed
that theix’s should be a ’'modern party" based on organization,
professional skill and dedication, as opposed to an "old party"
q
which depended on factional bosses and money. This was the gist
7« Ibid.; and see Yang Ho-min, in "A Round-Table Talks Inquiry 
for Change of Party Politics," op. oit., p. 152.
8. See Minjhkonghwatang, ibid., p. 38. An English translation 
of the eight-point plan is available in the Democratic Republican 
Party, The Democratic Republican Party of the Republic of Korea, op. 
cit., p. 15* ”
9* "A Brief History of Our Party," The PEP Bulletin, Vol. 1,
Ho. 2, February 1966, p. 14.
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10*of the so-called “Kim Chong-pil Plan.11 * According to this plan, 
the DEP was to become a highly centralized and disciplined party 
with a single command directed from the central party headquarters 
down to provincial or city and district branches of the party, 
through the establishment of a hierarchically organized and 
powerful executive secretarial structure that would control party 
affairs, personnel and finance of the entire party from the center 
down to districts. The central secretariat was to have the 
director-general and at each subordinate level a secretary was to 
be appointed by him. Kim Chong-pil's idea was, in principle to
11.operate the party by a stable party bureaucracy (the secretariat),
in order to check the National Assembly-centered operation that
had marked the operation of the old parties, and to prevent the
party from degenerating into a group of factional cliques centered
12.around National Assemblymen.
But the DEP had hardly lived up to its original promise, des­
pite some basic features of the original structure which distin­
guished it from other parties. Again the task of building a massive 
modern party out of the old political heritage of Korea was as 
difficult as the attempt to elevate politics to a higher plane 
overnight. In this sense the DEP was not much different from the 
parties in the past and from present parties, although as a ruling 
party the DEP had been able to ride out major internal crises
10. For the details of the "Kim Chong-pil Plan," see Kim Y&ng- 
su, "Creation of the Democratic Republican Party Before the Legal 
Date," Shindong-A, November 1964, pp. 168-73
11. For the secretarial structure and function, see "Introduction 
on A Party Structure: Secretariat," The PEP Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 10, 
December 1966, pp. 25-8. This article was written after the power
of the secretariat was considerably weakened, but still reflected 
the original ideas kept by the secretariat members.
12. See "Organizational Principles of Our Party," The DEP 
Bulletin, Vo. 1, No. 3, March 1966, pp. 4-5*
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without a breakdown and. 3had maintained a semblance of unity.
The major difficulty of the DRP was evident when the party
had to undergo major modification of the original organizational
structure even before it was officially launched. As mentioned
elsewhere, the DEP was the brainchild of Kim- Chong-pil and his
associates in the CIA. The anti-Kim Chong-pil faction in the
junta, who had not been consulted on the matter of creating the
party, strongly objected to the Kira Chong-pil Plan which would
certainly transform the party into machinery for Kim*s "one-man
show." In such a party structure, there would hardly be a
guarantee of new political status for other junta members who had
distinguished themselves in the military revolution. Many of
the anti-Kim faction took the plan as a threat to their personal 
13.status, * This was the reason why General Kim Tong-ha resigned
on January 21, 1963 from the founding committee of the DEP.
General Kim argued that a party power struoture resembling a
Communist "democratic centralism" would not only endanger democracy
in the party, but would also entail an enormous amount of expense
to maintain such a system and was likely to invite political
c o r r u ption.The  disputes over the party structure and Kim
*
Chong-pil!s alleged involvement in the "Pour Great Scandals" 
eventually led to his resignation from the party and to his 
departure from Korea (from February 25, 1963 to October 23, 1963)* 
Kim Chong-pil*s departure inevitably led to some modification of
13. "A Brief History of Our Party," Vol. I, No. 2, op. cit,, 
p. 15.
14. "The DEP: Yesterday and Today," Series No. 4> Chosun Ilbo, 
May 5> 1964? and Pak Ky&ng-siSk and Nam Shi-uk, "Pactions in Korean 
Political Parties," op. cit., p. 200, See also the criticism of 
General Yu Won-shik, former Chairman of the Committee on Finance 
and Economic Affairs, SCNR, in Chosun Ilbo, January 16, 1963? and 
Lee K&i, "The Real Pacts in the Retreat of Korean Military Regime," 
op. cit., p. 106.
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the power and the structure of the secretariat.
After the 1963 elections the issue of the party structure again
became the main issue of intra-party strife when the anti-Kim groups
(or the non-main stream faction) demanded in November 1964 abolition
1*5.of the secretarial structure. The intra-party struggle ended
on February 24, 1965? when both factions finally agreed on a settle-
16ment that amended the party Charter. * The change of the party
charter had considerably decentralized the party power structure
and established a collective type of leadership by diffusing the
highly centralized power in the hands of the central Secretariat
among various non-oranizational sectors of the party. The change
had also considerably strengthened the parliamentary wing of the
party on which the strength of the non-main stream faction rested.
According to the current charter (see the organizational chart 
17.of the DEP below), the party's supreme governing body is
theoretically its National Party Convention, annually convened by
the Party President. The National Party Convention elects the
Central Committee which consists of less than 1,800 representatives,
who in turn elect the Central Standing Committee as the highest
representative body. The Central Standing Committee which consists
of 300 to 500 is, however, largely a sounding body which approves
18what the party hierarchy has decided. *
5^* See Chosun Ilbo, December 11, 1964, Jamaary 15? I965 and 
January 22, 1965*
16. Minjukonghwatang, Chbnjin tin tang gwa toburh, op. cit., 
p. 17.
17- See the charter and the organizational chart of the DEP 
in Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa ny&n sa, op. cit., pp. 
655-78 and 672-82.
18. See Article 17 of the charter.
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As the head of the party, the Party President is the supreme
19*leader who superivses and controls the party affairs. The actual
operational head of the party executive is the Party Chairman who
is appointed by the Party President and approved by the National
Party Convention. He controls and executes all party affairs by
20.order of the Party President. * He presides over the powerful
Party Council and nominates all important party officers including
the Director-General of the central party’s Secretariat, subject to
approval of the Party President.
The most important collective body that governs the party is
the fifteen-man Party Council consisting of the Party Chairman and
21,
the highest .'-ranking party members. All major matters pertaining
to the party are debated and decided by the Party Council. However
its power can be circumscribed by the Party President's veto or
intervention (which happens very often) and in principle its
decisions need the approval of the Central Standing Committee of
the party. Its important power includes decisions on the party’s
basic policy and on party finance and budget and recommendation of
22party nominees for the National Assembly to the Party President.
The Secretariat of the central party, under its Director- 
General, is under the supervision of the Party Chairman. It 
executes the administrative affairs of the central party and main­
tains and controls local party secretariats. The original power of 
the Secretariat was considerably weakened since the Director-General 
lost his appointive power on local party cadres to the local' party
19- See Article 20 of the charter.
20. See Article 24 of the chart ex*.
21. See Article 21 of the charter.
22. See Article 22 of the charter.
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23.
chairmen by the charter amendment of February 19&5* * ^  also
became a common practice after late 1964 that the DEP National 
Assemblymen automatically became the local party chairman.
Because of these developments, the local party affairs have been 
more or less independently managed by local party chairmen. But 
the Director-General is still primarily responsible for routine 
operations of the central party and, to some degree, of local 
party secretariats.
As the DRP had professed to be the "party of policy," the
party charter provides an elaborate set-up for policy-making bodies.
The Policy Committee is responsible for initiating party policies
and advising the Party Council as well as coordinating the party
and the government in order to translate the party policies into
24.
governmental policies. The fifty-member Policy Committee com­
prises the key DEP National Assemblymen, the government ministers 
belonging to the party, and the party members appointed by the 
Party President. Under the Policy Committee there are the Policy 
Review Board of thirty members and the Policy Research Office of 
specialists which is in charge of research, study and formulation 
of policies.
The power structure of the party has undergone a considerable 
change under internal stresses since its inception in 1963*
Although there are still some remnants of the originally planned 
structure, which stressed centralism and strong leadership, based 
on a stably organized party bureaucracy in the secretariat structure, 
the DEP of today is a federation of factions under the tight personal 
grip of Party President Park, who as the President of the country 
acts as the balancer among the factions by commanding the absolute 
loyalty of all the party members.
23. See Article 26(b) of the charter.
24* See Articles 27 through 31 of the charter.
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THE PARTY SECRETARIAT: RISE AND FALL OF THE DRP
Erosion ofthe central power of the party is best illustrated
by the steady decline of the secretarial structure. This also
explains the dilution of idealism of the party. Originally conceived
as the “operational headquarters" of the party which would control
not only its local party branches but also its Rational Assemblymen
and the government, the DRP organized in March 1963 the Secretariat
with 1,300 permanently salaried staff members (300 at the center,
20 to 30 each at provincial/city branches, and 6 each at 131 district
offices) at the estimated cost of (100 million won) per
25.month. The central Secretariat consisted of 4 departments,
26.1 board, 1 office and 1 bureau which altogether had 48 sections.
In April 1963 after ICim Chong-pil*s departure, the number of the
secretarial staff was reduced to 600 and its organizational structure
27.was also reduced to 4 departments and 1 bureau. * In June 1964?
the number of the central party secretarial departments was further
reduced to three (the Departments of General Affairs, Organization,
28and Public Relations), * In the face of the increasing challenge 
of the discontented DRP Rational Assemblymen of the non-main stream 
faction. The irrevocable weakening of the single command structure 
by the central Secretariat was sealed finally by the charter amendr- 
ment of February 1965 which took away the substance of the power 
of the Director-General and gave a more or less free hand to local 
chairmen in operation of their local party branches.
25. "The DRP: Yesterday and Today," Series Ro. 4> op. cit.* 
and "One Year of the DRP," Hankuk Ilbo, February 27, 1964.
26. "The DRP: Yesterday and Today," ibid,; and Minjukonghwa- 
tang, Minjukonghwatang sa nybn sa, op. cit., pp. 55-6.
27. Minjukonghwatang, ibid., p. 88.
28. Ibid., pp. 187 and 573.
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According to the original plan the local party offices were 
to be staffed entirely with "new faces" recruited from the.'..new 
generation of politicians who would be the backbone of the DEP.
But incapable of constructing a massive party aimed at capturing 
political power with only inexperienced secretarial members, the 
DBP had to recruit a greater number of the politicians of the old 
generation who had the necessary political experience and indi­
vidual bases in constituencies. The influx of the old politicians 
either as candidates or cadres generated frictions between the new 
and the old faces - - the new faces primarily attached to the
secretarial organization, and the old faces to the parliamentary
29.
wing or the non-main stream faction. The duality of these two 
essentially different groups in the party soon became one of the 
early factors that contributed to emergence of factional struggle 
in the party.
Although by the time of the 1963 elections the Secretariat,
as the important instrument of party control, was less than that
which the original plan had conceived, it was nevertheless a potent
31.machine as its strength and effectiveness in the elections showed*
After the elections it tried to carry its momentum of power into
the new era of civilian politics and to impose its will on both
32the legislative and executive branches of the government* * But 
as soon as a number of oenters of power emerged with the civilian
29. See Chong Chong-shik and Kim Ki-ch16l in "A Round-Table
Talk; Inquiry for Change of Party Politics," ojd. cit., pp. 152-6.
30. See Kim Ki-oh'&L , p. 154; and "One Year of the
DRP," op. cit*
31. See "One Year of the DRP," oj>. cit.
32. "The DRP and the Secretarial Organization," the editorial
analysis of Tong-A Ilbo, January 8, 1964*
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government and politics, by virtue of the constitutional separ­
ation of power and with the manifestation of the .heterogeneous 
composition of the party, the decline of the secretarial power 
was inevitable. As diffusion of power became a reality, the share 
of political funds for the Secretariat became smaller and smaller. 
This was an important factor that militated against the mainten­
ance of the secretarial structure which required an enormous amount
33.of political funds.
Today the polycentrism with respect to control of the party 
and decision-making is more or less an accepted phenomenon, 
although the factional alignments are still in flux depending on 
issues, policies, distribution of posts in the party and the National 
Assembly, and personality differences. Thus the extent of the 
decline of the Secretariat was a measure of the degree of trans­
formation of the DRP from the idealism of its founders to the 
realism of its political life in Korea.
THE RECRUITMENT AND THE COMPOSITION OP THE DRP
The most pervasive problem of the DRP has been factionalism.^* 
The structural change of power from the central control by the 
Secretariat to the dispersion of control among various sectors and 
groups in the party had been largely the work of factionalism.
This has been one of the main reasons why intra-party conflict 
continued even after the seemingly over-riding issue of the secre­
tarial power was in fact settled in February 1965* A study of the 
DRP's recruitment and composition sheds much light on the aspects
33* "The DRP! Yesterday and Today," Series No. 4> RR* cit.
34* Nor the factionalism in the DRP, see an excellent study 
by two political reporters of Tong-A Ilbo, Pak Ky&ng-sblc and Nam 
Shi-uk, "Pactions in Korean Political Parties," cir. cit., pp.
199-209.
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of the factional politics, of the leadership, of the relationship 
between the party and the government, and of the extent and the 
degree of participation by the party in governmental policy matters* 
Although the nucleus of the party comprised Kim Chong-pil!s 
factional group of the junta origin, the DSP recruited at the 
initial stage of its organization a large and impressive number of 
new faces of various political, social and professional origins at 
both the high and lower echelons of the party. The composite 
picture of the DRP reflected the diversity of the founding members 
of the DRP in February 1963, as indicated by the following Tables 
I and II which are compiled from the biographies of 70 of 78 
founders of the DRP.
TABLE Is FOUNDING MEMBERS OF THE DRP- - WHEN AND HOW 
ENTERED POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
Year Junta Party Bureaucrcy Cabinet Pol. Mov. Nat. Ass. Total
Pre-1945 
1945-48 
1948-60 
1960-61 
1961-  16
16
22
22 15
7
9
11
4
39
70
TABLE II * PRINCIPAL OCCUPATIONS OF FOUNDING MEMBERS
OF THE DRP
Occupation
Military
Education
Politics
Press
Commerce
Bureaucracy
Legal profession
Banking
Medicine
Artist
Number
20
13
8
7
7
7
4
2
1
1
70
Sources for Tables I and II: Lee Chong-sik, Political Parties _in 
Korea, an unpublished monograph, April 1967? Philadelphia, pp. §0-1.
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Especially in its central secretarial organization, the!,-basis 
of the DEP was a group of political amateurs such as former bureau­
crats, young businessmen, journalists, college professors, and re­
tired army officers. Although the rank and rile of local party
branches of the party were recruited in large number from the
35.ranks of the former Liberal Party, the men who were responsible 
for the organization of the local party branches were also political 
amateurs as indicated by their original occupations. * Their 
intention was to place the party under the control of the new 
faces who were installed in the central and local secretariats, 
while acquiring necessary experience and skill in politics and 
electioneering by recruiting' former politicians. Characteristic 
of the early composition of the party was thus the conscious efforts 
to entrust the control of the party to political amateurs who were 
recruited after the coup d'etat. This is evident by the small 
proportion of the former politicans as indicated by Table III below.
TABLE III: PREVIOUS C0HHECTI0HS OF THE DEP LEADERS
Previous Party Connection Percentage
Former Democratic Party 2
Former Hew Democratic Party 2
Former Liberal Party 8
Independents 10
Military 26
Hew comers 50
Others 2
100$
Source: Kyunghyang Shinmoon, Hovember 1, 1963.
35• Han Hae-bok, "The Korean Elections," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, Vol. XLII, Ho. 1, October 3, 1963, pp. 16-UI
36. Among the eleven men responsible for organization of party 
branches in their respective provinces and "special cities," five 
were professors, three bureaucrats, two lawyers, and one businessman. 
See Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa nybn sa, op. cit.,
PP. 37-8.
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Evidently special care was taken in recruitment not to allow
faotional cliques to form within the party by selecting the well-
known civilian leaders individually without considering the past
37factional or political connection* In spite of this conscious 
attempt, there were already four groups when the DEP was created: 
the Kim Chong-pil faction of the junta origin, the anti-Kim Chong-pil 
faction of the junta origin, the former politicians, and the young 
political amateurs representing the party secretarial organisation.
THE SHAPING OP FACTIONALISM
The first factional struggle in the DEP was between the Kim
Chong-pil faction and the anti-Kim Chong-pil faction of the junta
39.origin who injected their old factional feud into the new party.
At the time of organizing the DEP in early 1963? Ike junta members 
were roughly divided into two factions: the Kim faction which 
supported Kira Chong-pil was composed of young officers, belonging 
to the 8th Class of the war-time military academy; and the anti-Kim 
faction consisted of two groups.^* The first group of the anti-Kim 
faction was the so-called May Comrades Society led by Chang Hyong-sun 
and 0 Ch’i-s&ng. The second group was an assortment of senior 
ranking junta generals such as Kim Tong-ha and Kim Chae-chlun who 
were in favor of dissolution of the DEP in order to form a broadly 
based "pan-national11 party^* which was at one time in the mind of
37• "The DEP: Yesterday and Today," op. cit*
38. Pak Ky&ng-sbk and Nam Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean Political 
Parties," op* cit., p. 200.
39* See Kiyomiya Eyu, "The Inside of the EOK Supreme Council," 
op* cit., pp. 250-1.
40. See Pak Ky8ng-s&k and Nam Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean 
Political Parties," op. cit., p. 200; and "The Balance of the 
Military Rule: Power Structure and Political Forces," Tong-A Ilbo, 
December 14? 1963.
41* Another important opponent of Kim Chong-pil, Lee Hu-rak 
(then spokesman of the SCNR) also advocated a "pan-national" party. 
See his "Why is A Pan-National Party Necessary?" Koreana Quarterly, 
Vol. 5? 2, Summer 1963? PP* 11-6.
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42.the vacilliating General Park. * The second group of the anti-Kim 
faction finally severed their relationship with the PEP, hut the 
first group returned to the DEP in October 1963 just in time to
43.participate in the general- elections under the banner of the DEP.
The first group (the May Comrades Society) later became the back­
bone of the "non-main stream faction" in the party to challenge 
the hegemony of the "main stream- faction".
The complexity of factional alignment in the DEP was further 
increased following the February 27th oath-taking ceremony at which 
General Park, pledged his non-candidacy. Following the oath,
General Park urged formation of a "pan-national" party which would 
include all political forces subscribing to the ideals of the 
military revolution. General Kim Chae-ch’un, then the Director, 
of the CIA, immediately started to organize such a party, which 
became later the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).44* General Kim 
and anti-Kim Chong-pil faction had not only succeeded in rounding 
up various groups and individuals within and outside the existing 
political parties but also made-such a deep inroad into the DEP 
itself that the DEP was almost on the verge of dissolution in April 
1963.45*
The appearance of the LDP and the crisis of the DEP under the
impact of General Park's momentary decision in favor of a "pan-
national" party shed light on the capacity of Korean parties to be
made or unmade over-night by the decision of a personal leader like 
46.Park. * The point is further illuminated by the fact that the LDP
42. "The DEPs Yesterday and Today," op. cit. g and Pak Kyong- 
s&k and ham Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean Political Parties," op. cit.,
p. 200.
43. See Chosun Ilbo, October 22, 1963.
44* Por the circumstance of the formation of the Liberal 
Democratic Party, see Han Hae-bok, "The Korean Elections," op. cit., 
p. 17? and Kim Chong-shin, Y^ngshi ui hawetbul s Pak ch&ng-hHi taet1 
ongny8ng tt *ara ch'il nyon (A Torchlight at Zero Hour: Seven Years- 
with President Park Chung-hee)(Seouls Hanlim ch'ulpansa, 1966), pp.209-15*
v, 45- Han Hae-bok, ibid.; and Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa
nyon sa, op. cit., p. 209.'
46. See Kim Chong-shin, op. cit., p. 209*
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turned against General Park in October when Park decided to side
with the DRP and run for the presidency on the DEP ticket. The
transformation of the LDP from a pro-junta party to an opposition
was largely an emotional reaction of the former junta members who
lost the favor of General Park to the rival faction of Kim-Chong-pil»
However Park ordered in May the merger of the two parties by
using a slightly modified version of the existing DEP structure and
by equitably distributing party posts between the two partisan
47 •members in the merged party. * General Parkfs order for merger
did bring another influx of anti-Kim Chong-pil elements and other
individuals into the DEP, although the bulk of the LDP members
chose to remain with their party when the merger negotiations with
the DEP were not successful.
By the time of the 1963 elections the factional alignments
were however so fluid, due to a massive injection of heterogeneous
groups, that a clear distinction of factional alignments was
impossible to make. Nevertheless, broadly speaking, there were
two main factions? the main stream faction and the non-main stream
49.faction.  ^ The main stream faction comprised the original party 
members who had participated in the creation of the party and had 
faithfully upheld the party throughout the dissolution crisis in
50.
April and May. The backbone of the main stream faction was the 
secretarial members who were recruited and protected by the founders
47. Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa nyon sa, op. cit.,
p. 83.
48. The merger negotiations were not successful because the 
Liberal Democratic Party demanded dissolution of the DEP's 
secretarial organization. See The Korean Republic, August 23, 1963*
49• See Pak ICy&ng-sok and Nam Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean 
Political Parties," op. cit., pp. 201-2.
50. "The Current Map of the Political Street," Series No. 1, 
Chosun Ilbo, March 16, 1965*
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in the main stream faction. The non-main stream faction comprised 
(l) all other individuals and groups in the party who did not 
belong to the inner circle of the party and who joined the party 
at late stages, and (2) those who were either members of the anti- 
Kim faction in the military junta or ..sympathizers with the anti-Kim 
faction. The non-main stream faction was at this time a federation 
of various groups roughly representing the May Comrades Society,
the former leaders of the pro-Park Chung-hee faction of the LDP,
and former members of the defunct Liberal Party, who all joined
the DEP in time for the 1963 elections.
In the general elections of November 1963, the DEP gained an 
overwhelming majority in the National Assembly. But the composition 
of the DEP Assemblymen represented a variety of origins. There 
were five factions? (l) the main stream faction, (2) the secre­
tarial faction (pro-main stream faction), (3) the May Comrades
faction, (4 ) the old Liberal Party faction, and (5) former
51.Democratic-New Democratic Parties faction.'
The resultant factional struggle was immediately reflected
in December 1963, in the distribution of posts in the National 
52.
Assembly. * The struggles for the posts were so intense that 
President Park intervened to balance the distribution of the posts
53# ^  ^
among the factions. * Former Party President Chong Ku-yong and 
former Party Chairman Yun Ch'i-y&ng, both of whom belonged to the 
main stream faction, competed for the speakership; but under the
51. See Pak Kyong-s&k and Nam Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean 
Political Parties," op. cit., p. 202.
52. The exact information on the factional connections of the 
individuals who occupied the posts are not available. Nevertheless, 
see ibid., pp. 198-2095 and Hahkuk Ilbo, December 25, 1963* There 
were two Vice-Speakers 1 One was occupied by a member of the DEP and 
the other was given to a member of the opposition.
53. See Chosun Ilbo, December 7, 1963*
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instruction of President Park the post went to a relatively 
unknown former university professor Lee Hyo-sang who was yet to 
be identified with any faction. The vice-speakership was given 
to Chang Hyong-sun, the leader of the anti-Kim May Comrades Society. 
The post of the floor leadership went to Kim Chong-pil*s right-hand 
man, Kim Yong-tae. The twelve chairmanships of the standing 
committees were also distributed according to the strength of each
faction --  with six posts to the main stream faction and the
remainder to other factions. President Park's distribution of the 
posts among the factions was made to check complete domination of 
the main stream faction which could have easily controlled all the 
posts.
Although the main stream faction made concessions in the al­
location of the posts to the non-main stream groups, the former 
under the leadership of Kim Chong-pil and Kim Yong-tae and in 
alliance with the secretarial faction had not only completely 
controlled the DEP but had also dictated all party policies and
strategies in the matters of legislation as well as in the
54*operation of the National Assembly. The members of the non- 
main stream and non-secretarial factions thus intensely resented 
the domination of the main stream faction and were awaiting an 
opportunity to rise against it.
PARTY POLITICS AID FACTIONALISM DURING AND AFTER 
THE ROK-JAPAN TREATY CRISIS
The opportunity came in March 1964 when the ROK-Japan treaty 
issue triggered the wide-spread student demonstrations and oppo­
sition campaigns. By this time the factional alignments, formerly
54• Pak Ky&ng-s&c and Nam Shi-uk, '•Factions in Korean Political 
Parties," op. cit., p. 202.
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comprising a group of five, were by amalgamation reduced to a 
group of twos the secretarial faction merged into the main stream 
faction, and the remainder became formally the non-main stream 
faction. The moderate non-main stream faction favored decentral­
ization of the party leadership and demanded an increased voice 
and participation of the parliamentary wing in party affairs. The 
non-main stream faction also favored peace with student demon­
strators and some compromise with the opposition on the treaty 
issue. On the other hand, the militant main stream faction felt 
that any undue compromise with the students and the opposition 
would undermine the party’s position on the treaty issue and that 
any soft-line approach in dealing with the students and the
opposition would invite further weakening of the government instead
5b.of settling the differences. For instance, the reconciliatory 
meeting between the President and the student leaders on Marph 31, 
1964 was conducted under the influence of Vice-Speaker Chang 
Hy&ng-sun, the leader of the non-main stream faction.5 *^’ This 
directly countered the strong measures recommended by the main 
stream faction to President Pakk on the night of March 24.5 *^ In 
spite of these ostensible differences, the real cause of the 
factional rift between the two factions was largely the issue of 
party hegemony.58*
The open rebellion of the non-main stream faction against 
the leadership of the main stream faction was staged in March 1964
55* The U.S. Department of Army, op. cit., p. 259*
56. Kim Chong-shin, op. cit., pp. 260-1.
57. Ibid., p. 258,
58. See Kyunghyang Shinmoon, March 31? 1964*
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in connection with the motion for the vote of non-confidence in 
Minister of Interior Om Min-yong. The motion was introduced by
V
the opposition which charged that Minister Om was responsible for
the police brutality in the March 24th demonstration* In this
crucial vote, twenty members of the DEP voted for the motion, and
the government only saved the day by a bare majority of eleven
v o t e s . T h e  incident was known as the "rebellion by vote."6 *^
The rebellion of the non-main stream faction Assemblymen continued
in April with the subsequent opposition's motions of non-confidence
in Vice-Prime Minister Kim Yu-taek and Minister of Agriculture
Won Yong-sok.6 *^ The additional cause of the "rebellion by vote"
was a deep-seated discontent of the non-main stream faction
Assemblymen with the secretarial organizations in local party
branches of their own constituencies.62*
The revolt of the non-main stream faction in the National
Assembly brought about the resignation of the first team of the
DEP floor leadership of Kim Yong-tae and the appointment of the
second team of Kim s6ng-jin (a relatively moderate member of the
63.main stream faction.) * Both factions, however, wanted some 
drastic change of power holding in the party. Vice-Speaker Chang 
Hy#ng-sun strongly demanded that President Park should retire
59* According to Article 59 of the Constitution, the National 
Assembly can recommend the removal of a minister by a simple majority 
vote - - at present 88 votes constitute the simple majority. The 
President is bound by the non-confidence decision of the National 
Assembly unless he has an impelling reason to object it.
60. See Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa ny%n sa. op. cit., 
p. 179? and Kyunghyang Shinmoon, March 29, 1964*
61. See Minjukonghwatang, ibid.
62. Pak Kyong-s8k and Nam Shi-uk, "Pactions in Korean Political 
Parties," op. cit., p. 203.
63. Por the ensuing DEP's internal struggle after the revolt, 
see ibid., p. 2035 Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa ny&n sa, 
op. cit., pp. 179-85; and Kim Chong-shin, op. cit., pp. •
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Kim Chong-pil from all party posts including his party chairmanship,
on the pretext of the need to pacify the students and the opposition.
Vice-Speaker Chang also urged President Parle to divorce himself
from the party should the solution of the treaty crisis necessitate
this. In other words, the non-main stream faction was using the
treaty issue and its crisis as the opportunity to weaken the position
65of Kim Chong-pil and his faction.
In conjunction with the rebellion within the party, the enemies
of Kim Chong-pil outside the party - - the former anti-ICim junta
members and the anti-ICim group in the administration - - also
marshalled and coordinated their pressure on President Park to dis-
66miss Kim Chong-pil from the party. * The recall of Kim from Tokyo
on March 28 to pacify the treaty opponents was thus partly the work
67.of this coalition of the anti-Kim forces. In the confusion of 
this political development the second team of the DBP floor leader­
ship resigned again on April 27, only two days after its formation.
The third team of the PEP floor leadership was formed on the same
day with Hyon O-bong, a member of the non-main stream faction.
The persistent challenge of the non-main stream faction with 
a certain degree of success had established itself as a formidable 
force to be reckoned with in the party, in spite of the fact that
the main stream faction still controlled ninety per cent of 131
68district party branches and 11 provincial city branches. * In
64. Minjukonghwatang, ibid., p. 179? and Pak Ky^ng-s&k and
lam Shi-uk, "Pactions in Korean Political Parties," op. cit., ip. 203.
65. See "A Weather Map," Tong-A Ilbo, March 31, 1964*
66. See Kyunghyang Shinmoon, March 31, 1964*
67. The visit of former Kim Chong-pil!s foes in the SC1E,
Generals Kim Tong-ha, Kim Chae-ch’un and Pak Won-bin, to the
presidential Blue House on the day (March 28) of Kim Chong-pil*s 
recall from Tokyo to Seoul was one of the anti-Kim movements.
See ibid.
T H 7  Ibid.
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order to stave off the challenge of the non-main stream faction
and its allies outside the party, the main stream faction tried to
rebound by using their power base in the party. One of the
maneuvers was the rally of some 500 secretarial members in support
of Kim Chong-pil to condemn Vice-Speaker Chang in the party head-
69.quarters on April 29. The counter-attack of the. main stream
faction was directed not only at the non-main stream faction but
also at the administration. The main stream faction's grievances
against President Park were the latter's condoning of the activities
of the minority (i.e. the non-main stream) dissenters in the party,
his allowing non-party members' (pointedly, Chief Presidential
Secretary Lee Hu-rak's) intervention in party affairs, and his
70.reliance on the non-partisan cabinet of Ch'oe Du-son.
On May 9? 19^4 a part of the grievances was redressed by 
replacing the non-partisan cabinet of Prime Minister Ch'oe Du- s&rJ1' 
wijrti that of Prime Minister Chong Il-kwon, whose cabinet included
69* See Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa nyon sa, op. 
cit., p. 180.
70. See ibid., pp. 181-4*
71. The non-partisan cabinet of Ch.'o&Du-son was appointed in 
December 1963 when the various factions in the party could not 
agree on the nominees for the premiership recommended by them. 
Ch'oe's cabinet was also purported to be a transitional cabinet 
from the military rule to the civilian government until the DEP 
could consolidate its governing capacity. But it was, from the 
beginning, not well received by the main stream faction which 
wanted to install a partisan cabinet of its liking. See Cho Yong- 
Jun, "The Path of Ch'oe Du-s&n Cabinet," Sasangge, April 1964,
PP* 74-81? and also Chosun Ilbo, December 3 and December 5?
1963.
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72.eight DHP members. * But as the street demonstrations against
the treaty reached a climax on June 3 when the army was invited to
quell them under martial law, Kim Chong-pil was forced to resign
from his post of the party chairmanship on June 5 and to leave
73.Korea for his second "exile" to the United States on June 18.
The main stream faction was at least successful in installing
former Party President Chong Ku-yong in acting party chairmanship
in the absence of Kim Chong-pil. However the main stream faction's
position was already on the decline, particularly since the
reshuffling of the important Party Council on May 15 had increased
the number of the non-main stream faction members to such an extent
74that numerically they almost equalled the main stream faction.
Thus the retreat of the main stream faction was aggravated by the
series of events following the March 24th demonstrations and the
"rebellion by vote." In the face of the mounting opposition to
the EOK-Japan treaty President Park could not afford serious party
disunity or possible defection of tthei,non-main stream faction in
75*the National Assembly. Despite these accommodations and the 
roughly equitable balance of power, the intensity of factional 
strife increased because the achievement of balance of power made 
factional struggle more competitive*
The continuing feud within the party was further evident during 
the period of martial law (between June 3 and July 29, 1964)* On 
June 15, in order to resolve the political crisis, Speaker Lee Hyo-sang
72. See Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa nyc(n sa, op. 
cit., p. 185.
73* Bor the circumstance of Kim's resignation under pressure 
of the non-main stream faction, see Kim Chong-shin, op. cit.,
pp. 264-80.
74* See Minjukonghwatang, Min j ukonghwat ang sa ny£n sa, op* 
cit., p. 185,
75* See ibid., pp. 180-1.
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(now a prominent leader of the non-main stream faction) took the
initiative in creating the "Bipartisan Consiiltative Conference for
Resolving the Situation" with opposition leaders in the National 
76.Assembly. The Bipartisan Conference held a series of nego­
tiations throughout the months of June and July 1964 to normalize 
the situation. The negotiations were extremely difficult. The
opposition demanded the immediate lifting of martial law. Under
77pressure from the militant faction (the main stream faction), 
the DRP maintained that, as the conditions for terminating martial 
law, the opposition should cooperate in enacting laws that would
rj O
control student demonstrations and political activities * and
79.that would limit activities of the press.
Initially the Bipartisan Conference made some substantial 
progress and on June 28 Speaker Lee announced that the deadlock 
between his party and the opposition was almost resolved, and that 
he was ready to recommend that the government withdraw martial law.
7 6. See Kim Yong-t'ae, "The National Assembly During the 5 6  
Days of the Martial Law," op. cit., pp. 58-9 and 62.
77* "The Settlement of the Press Law Uproar Must be Brought 
by the Government’s Retreat," Tong-A Ilbo, September 9? 19&4*
78. The government's proposal for a law controlling students' 
demonstrations and political activities was formally introduced 
to. the National Assembly on August 4n 19&4* But the bill was dead 
immediately when the opposition vigorously fillibustered it. For 
the text of the bill, see "The Proposal for Enactment of the Pro­
tective Law for Academic Institutions," Kukhoe hoeuirok, 44th 
Session, Plenary Meetings, No. 17 (August 4? 1964)j PP* 1-4*
79* On August 2, 1964? the National Assembly passed the "Law 
Concerning the Press Ethics Committee" by the DRP majority, and 
President Park proclaimed it on August 5* Por 'the text and. the 
debate on the law, see Kukhoe hoeuirok, 44th Session Plenary 
Meetings, No. 13 (July 31> 1984)» No. 14 (August 1, 1964)? and No.
15 (August 2, 1964). But in the face of the intense and widespread 
protest of the press and intellectuals, President Park withdrew his 
proclamation of the law on September 9* Kor criticism of the law, 
see Mun Hy8ng-s8n, "The Press Law is Abuse of the People's 
Sovereignty," Sas&ngge, September 19&4? PP* 83-7? and Hankuk shinmun 
yunri wiwonhoe (The Korean Press Ethics Committee), Hankuk ui 
shinmun yunri (The Ethics of the Korean Press) (Seoul, 19677™PP*27-85
SO. Kim Yong-t'ae, "The National Assembly During the 56 Days 
of the Martial Law," op. cit., p. 62.
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He stated also that if the government rejected the recommendation,
81the Hational Assembly would act independently of the government.
In the afternoon of the same day, the government rejected Lee’s
recommendation and stipulated that the laws controlling the
students and the press should be legislated prior to the termi-
82.nation of martial law, * The failure of Lee’s effort to resolve 
the political situation strengthened, in consequence, the deter­
mination of the militant factions of the opposition parties*
Finally, on July 28 the Bipartisan Conference succeeded in 
bringing about a compromise and in lifting martial law on July 29, 
1964* The government and the militant main stream faction were, 
towards the end of July, in a mood to normalize the political 
situation in the capital as the student demonstrations were 
markedly receding since the government had practically given up 
the timetable for the early conclusion of the treaty within the 
year. Caught -in their earlier stubborn positions, all militant 
parties concerned (i.e. the government, tfrejmain stream faction of 
the DEP, and the opposition) had found, under the pretense of a
compromise, a face-saving device in Speaker Lee’s Bipartisan
Conference.
The initial failure of the Bipartisan Conference in June 
was partly attributable to the factional struggle within the DEP, 
Since the Bipartisan Conference was organized on the initiative 
of Lee Hyo-sang, the main stream faction regarded it with
indifference and suspicion. One indication of this was that Kim
Yong-tae of the main stream faction had never attended the Bipartisan
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
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Conference j although he was designated as the leader of DEP
83*representatives to the conference. * It was also common know­
ledge that the difference of personalities between Speaker Lee 
and acting Party Chairman Chong ICu-y&ng had rendered the nego-
QyJ
iations difficult. Had the ruling DEP been a united party 
speaking as one authoritative voice to both the opposition in the 
negotiations and to the government in that recommendation, the 
effort of the Bipartisan Conference could have brought an early 
lifting of martial law and could have relaxed the political tension 
in Seoul. But at the time of the June negotiations, the DEP as a 
ruling party was utterly divided by factional strife. In fact the 
main stream faction sharply differentiated between its militant 
position and the moderate position of the non-main stream faction 
on the treaty issue in order to check the rising power of its 
intra-party foes who might buttress their power if the prestige
85.of success in the Bipartisan Conference were to be accorded. The
suspicion that the non-main stream faction’s engagement in the
negotiations was motivated by its factional strategy for party
hegemony had undoubtedly strengthened the argument of the main
86stream faction against lifting martial law. * In time of crisis, 
therefore, the factional conflict within the ruling party was one 
of the factors that prevented any constructive discussion not only 
within the party but also between the opposite parties.
After the amendment of the party charter in February 1965 
there developed a sub-faction inside the main stream faction. The
83. Pak I(y6ng-s6k and Ham Shi-uk, ’’Factions in Korean Political 
Parties,” op. cit., p. 204*
84. See ibid.
85. "The DEPj the Direction of Intra-party Conflict," Series 
Ho. 2, Tong~A Ilbo, August 25, 19&4*
86. See Hy&n 0~bong (then the DEP floor leader), "Surroundings 
of the Uproar," Series Ho. 8, Chosun Ilbo, December 16, 1964*
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sub-faction - - sometimes referred to as the ''moderate main stream" 
in contrast to the main parental faction as the "militant main
stream" was a group dissatisfied with Kim Yong-tae, under whose
leadership, the sub-faction argued, the main stream faction suffered 
the series of defeats which, in turn, were responsible for frag-
017
mentation of the party* * The development of the sub-faction was
also partly a personal challenge by Kil Chae-ho to the leadership
of Kim Yong-tae who happened to have controlled the provincial
88(Ch'ungch’&ng Namdo) party hierarchy to which Kil belonged.
The sub-faction of Kil relaxed its militant political position to
one a shade closer to the non-main stream faction in order to form
a coalition with it in preparation for a challenge to the powerful
position of Kim Yong-tae's "militant main stream."
Nevertheless the main stream faction was able to maintain its
unity throughout the ROK-Japan treaty crisis. This was one of the
factors that helped the achievement by the DRP of complete unity
among its National Assemblymen in passing the treaty ratification
bill in August 1985* There were, of course, other important
89.factors that induced unity.  ^ First of all, the fate of all in 
the DRP and the government was so directly involved with the crucial 
treaty issue that a defeat would jeopardize the positions of all 
concerned. Another factor was that President Park could, to some 
extent, alleviate the deep-seated grudge of some non-main stream 
members by diverting part of the sources of political funds, hitherto 
heavily concentrated in the hands of the main stream faction, to
87. Pak Ky&ng-s&k and Nam Shi-uk, "Pactions in Korean Political 
Parties," _op. cit., pp. 204-5*
88. Ibid., p. 206. This is also of my personal knowledge as 
an intimate of Assemblyman Kim Yong-tae.
89. See "The Pulse of Koreas the Crisis After the Ratification 
of the ROK-Japan Treaty," Shindong-A, September 1965? P* 309*
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the non-main stream f a c t i o n . I n  addition President Park could 
effectively exploit personal and factional ambitions in connection 
with the forthcoming reassignments of various posts in the National 
Assembly.
After the ROK-Japan treaty was ratified, the main stream 
faction desperately tried to recover its weakened position by re­
asserting the old principle of "party supremacy" over the admini­
stration andthe dissenting minority faction in the party. As a 
first step towards this, Ch6ng Ku-y&ig demanded of President Park
the replacement of non-cooperative members of the administration
92.who frequently bypassed or ignored the authority of the party.
President Park refused Chang’s demand. On August 24 Chfmg
resigned from his post of acting party chairmanship, expressing
his deep disappointment at "erosion of the original ideals that
93.created the p a r t y . O n  September 25 another demand of the main
stream faction was put forth when the Central Standing Committee,
under pressure from the secretarial members, urged reinstatement
94.of Kim Chong-pil to party chairmanship. The main stream faction 
attributed the fading of the party from the central stage of 
politics to the lack of leadership and it argued that such a nece-
QR
ssary leadership could be supplied only by Kim Chong-pil.
Asvalast resort the main stream faction had attempted to purge 
the leaders of the non-main stream faction in the forthcoming 
elections for various posts in the National Assembly. The main
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92* Chosun Ilbo, August 17 and August 18, 1968.
93* See an excerpt of .Chbng’s.resignation speech of August 
25? 1965, in Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa ny6n sa, op. 
cit., p. 299.
94* "Three Dimensional Mirror," Chosun Ilbo, September 25,
1965.
95* Ibid.
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stream faction, in alliance with some elements of the non-main
stream faction who had their own reasons for dissatisfaction, had
planned to replace the incumbent Lee Hyo-sang and Chang Hyong-sun
with ChcJng Ku-yong and Min Kwan-shik (a leader of the non-main
stream faction who shared the militant view on the treaty issue
as the Chairman of the Special Committee) for the posts of speaker-
96.ship and vice-speakership respecitvely, The main stream faction
also planned to reorganize the fifteen-man Party Council into a
smaller but powerful body which could effectively exercise the
leadership of the party over party affairs as well as over the
97.government ministers. But President Park again overruled these
plans and favored the non-main stream faction in the allocation of
the posts in the National Assembly.
On December 16, 1$)65> reportedly with the tacit encouragement
99.of Kim Chong-pil, x Kim 'Yong-tae led the main stream faction in
support of Chbng Ku-y8ng for speakership against the incumbent
Lee Hyo-sang in the elections in the National Assembly, in spite
of the personal pleas and warnings of Park Chung-hee who ordered
party solidarity in support of Speaker Lee and Vice-Speaker Chang.
In the second ballot Lee was barely re-elected by the required
101minimum majority of 88 votes. * Vice-Speaker Chang was also 
barely re-elected over Min Kwan-shik in the second balloi?^*Had
96. See Chosun Ilbo, September 16 and November 4? 19&5- 
97* Ibid., November 4? 1965*
98. For President Park's selections for the posts, see 
Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa ny'8n sa, op. cit., pp. 350-1.
99. '’The Dynamics of Today's Puling Power in Korea,” Series 
•^ °* Chosun Ilbo, August 30, I966.
100. Pak Ky8ng~s8k and Nam Shi~uk, '’Factions in Korean Poli­
tical Parties,” jog. cit., p. 206.
101. In the first ballot, Chong received 69 votes and Lee 55 
votes among the total present votes of 162 (the DKP 105, the MP 
52, and 5 Independents). In the second ballot Ch&ng received 66 
votes and Lee 88 among the total present votes of I64 (the DBP 108, 
the MP 51? and 5 independents), in spite of Chong's withdrawal and 
the appeals of solidarity. See Chosun Ilbo, December 17* 1965.
102. Ibid.
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there been no support from the opposition members who tended to
prefer the moderate stand of Lee and Chang? their re-election
103,
would probably have been impossible. * The rebellion by the
main stream faction was known as the "disobedience incident."
For the responsibility of the incident? Kim Yong-tae and Min Kwan-
shik had their party privileges suspended for six months and two
other rebels were reprimanded by the Party Disciplinary Committee
by order of an angry President Park,^^°
At the National Party convention on December 27? 1965? Kim
Chong-pil was successfully reinstated to his former post of party
chairmanship. But the non-main stream faction (now including Kil's
sub-faction and the middle of the road faction) took advantage of
the main stream faction’s retreat to inactiveness after the
105."disobedience incident?" by capturing important posts such as
the posts of the Director-General by Kil Chae-ho and of the
Chairman of the Party Finance Committee by Kim Song-kwon of the
non-main stream faction.'*'^0 Thus? through reorganization of the
posts of the National Assembly and of the party in December 1965?
the non-main stream faction replaced in reality the main stream
107,
faction as the majority faction, * (See the chart of factions 
below.)
THE RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE DRP 
Since the "disobedient incident" the DRP had maintained an
103. Chosun Ilbo, December 19? 1965* Kim Yong-tae’s main 
stream faction was known to have commanded solidly 59 votes and 
attempted to negotiate with the MP for additional 30 votes in 
order to elect Ch’6ng and Min,
104* Chosun Ilbo? December 25? 1965.
305* Chosun Ilbo? December 19? 1965*
106. Pak Kyftng-sok and Nam Shi-uk? "Factions in Korean political 
Parties?" _o£. cit. p. 205.
107. See ibid., pp. 205-6. Sometimes the non-main stream 
faction (or the coalition) was referred to as the "new main stream 
faction?" while the main stream faction was referred to as the"new 
non-main stream faction."
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outward tranquility through the 1968 presidential and general
elections up to May 1968. • But underlying the tranquil surface
there presisted an intense power struggle for party hegemony. On
May 30, 1968, Kim Chong-pil suddenly resigned from the party
chairmanship and from his seat in the National Assembly. The
i*eason for his resignation was his disenchantment with the purge
ILOSof Kim Yong-tae from the party on May 24? 1968. * Assemblyman
ICLm Y o n g - t a e a  member of the powerful 'Party Council, was 
ousted from the party when his secret activities for organizing
110.supportershfor Kim Chong-pil1s presidency in 1971 were discovered.
The two-term presidency of Park will end in 1971* According to
the indictment of the Party Disciplinary Committee, Kim Yong-tae
and his lieutenants had for some time been recruiting about 900
loyal supporters most of them from the present and past nucleus
of the DPP secretarial members under a cover organization known
111.as the Korean People’s Welfare Research Institute. * He was 
charged with a factional activity creating "a party within the 
party" and outrightly disobeying President Park’s order which for­
bade any activity for succession of his leadership until at least 
1970* A position paper of the institute had reportedly maintained
that they would oppose any constitutional amendment that would make
113*Park eligible for a third term of presidency.
108. For the circumstance of Kim Chong-pil’s resignation, see 
Chosun Ilbo, May 31? I968.
109 . After the expulsion from the DRP, he was automatically 
became an independent in the National Assembly. Although Article 
38 of the Constitution disqualifys a person’s membership in the 
National Assembly "when he leaves or changes his party, or when 
his party is dissolved," the article however excepts a person 
from losing his membership in the cases of loss of his party 
membership caused by amalgamation of parties or by expulsion from 
his party.
110. See Chosun Ilbo, May 26, 1968  ^ and "Three Dimensional 
Mirror," Chosun Ilbo, May 26, 1968.
111. See "Three Dimensional Mirror,"' ibid.
112. "Three Dimensional Mirror," Chosun Ilbo, May 31, 1968,
113* "The DHPs Today's Current of Air," Series No.l, Tong-A
Ilbo, May 27, I968.
At the time of writing, it is unpredictable whether Kim Chong- 
pil and his faction will be able to maneuver for a political come­
back to succeed the mantle of Park’s leadership in 1971* The 
main stream faction was reportedly even considering, if necessary,
defection from the party (which fell under the tight control of
1TA
the non-main stream faction) and a rally around ICim Chong-pil 
115*for a new party* The personal setbacks suffered by Kim
Chong-pil and Kim Yong-tae suggested not only a sound defeat of 
the main stream faction in the power struggle but also a bitter end 
to the original idealism of the founders of the party.
IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE PEP’S FACTIONALISM
In essence, the factionalism in the DEP was miumuch different 
from that in other parties. What had distinguished the factionalism 
of the DEP from that of other parties was that there had been at 
least some ideological and political contention between the two 
rival factions. The ideological aspects of factionalism of the 
DEP were frequently overlooked because its.factionalism was 
predominantly that of personalities.
As the founders of the party, the main stream faction repre­
sented a "new politics" for modernization of politics and nationj 
while the non-main stream faction, as a "mercenary" recruited by 
the DRP for political expediency, represented an "old politics" 
and was generally skeptical about the idealism of the main stream
114. The non-main stream faction completely controlled all key 
posts in the party, the National Assembly and the administration: 
the Director-General of the party Secretariat by Kil Chae-ho, the 
Chairman of the Party Finance Committee by Kim s8ng-kwon, the 
Chairman of the Policy Committee by Paek Nam~ok, the floor leader­
ship in the National Assembly by Kim Chin-man, Speakership of the 
National Assembly by Lee Hyo-sang, and the Chief Presidential 
Secretary by Lee Hu-rak, See ibid.
115* "The DRP: Today's Current of Air," Series No. 3, Tong-A 
Ilbo., May 29, 1968.
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f a c t i o n U n d e r  control of the main stream faction, the DEP's
ideological slogan was "nationalistic democracy" (or, sometimes,
"Koreanized democracy"). However, "nationalistic democracy" was
too fragmentary and incoherent, to be defined as an ideology and
to be properly understood even by the party members themselves.
But its central theme, gathered from various and often contra-
117.dictory pronouncements of Park Chung-h.ee and Kim Chong-pil, 
is interesting: it bears directly on the factional positions in
the party.
"Nationalistic democracy" may be outlined as follows: It
is difficult for an Asian nation like Korea to import "pure"
Western democracy for her political development under the prevailing 
social and economic conditions. Liberal democracy has been incapable 
of tackling such problems as poverty, unemployment, political 
confusion and external influence. Liberal democracy must be Kore- 
anized to fit the peculiarities of Korean society and must be based 
on a constructive nationalism. Only this tailoring can enable the 
Korean society to free itself from foreign domination and from its 
past, to recover its self-consciousness (or "subjectivity"), and 
to adapt itself to a new world. In order to Koreanize Western 
liberal democracy, Korea needs at this transitional period a strong 
driving force (elite) imbued with a nationalism for modernization 
and dedicated to creating a liberal society. Liberal democracy by 
an elite, in an extreme form, was once advocated by Park Chung-hee
116. Cf. the editorial of Chosun Ilbo, February 9? 1965*
117. See, e.g., Park Chung-hee, Our Nation's Path, op. cit., 
pp. 207-10| "This is My Belief," Presidential Candidate Park's 
Policy Speech, (of April 15, 1967)5 the DKP Bulletin, Vol. 2,
No. 5, May 1967, PP* 8-10j Kim Chong-pil, "Modernization of Korea 
and A New Leading Force," op . cit., pp. 28-373 and Kim Chong-pil, 
"Leadership in Developing Democracies," Hankuk Ilbo, September 22, 
1963 (This was his speech delivered at Fairleigh Dickinson 
University, New Jersey, U.S.A., on September 20, 1963*)*
2?2
in his concept of "administrative democracy." Park foresaw that 
in the course of creating favorable conditions for democracy, poli­
tical freedom might be compromised, even though every effort would 
be made to maintain a democracy at the level of the governing elite.'
Thus it seems that the DRP's "nationalistic democracy" is, 
to state it simply, a formula,...that combines liberal democracy with 
nationalism for modemization under the guardianship of a nationlist 
elite. As the two concepts of nationalism and liberal democracy 
are often incompatible, the formula is not tenable as a coherent 
ideology. This is especially true in view of the tendency of a 
nationalist elite to overdevelop jealously its authority into an 
authoritarianism when the task of modernization is formidable.
However its main justification of the "nationalisticdemocracy" 
here is the transitory nature of nationalism which calls for a 
strong political leadership by an elite which educates, harnesses 
and leads the masses for the task of modernization. The,need of 
strong leadership by an elite was strongly expressed by Kim Chong- 
pil in his speech in September 1963:
In order to respond instantaneously to changing situations, 
advanced democracies are today markedly expanding the power 
of central leadership and exercising it more strongly than 
ever. The securing of strong leadership is necessary to 
overcome the cumbersome effect of centrifugal force inherent 
in parliamentary democracy. In view of this development, it 
is superfluous to stress once more the importance of strong 
political leadership in small, weak democracies that are 
striving to shake off the yoke of their underdevelopment.
Only those advanced democracies which enjoy economic and 
political stability and which have attained a high cultural
118. Park Chung-hee says, "We cannot, as a matter of fact, 
enjoy complete political freedom in this ^military/ revolutionary 
period. Nevertheless, democratic principles must~be maintained 
at least at the administrative levels, and the opinions and rights 
of the people should be respected in accordance with democratic 
principles." His Our Nation’s Path, ibid., p. 209*
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standard can afford politics responsive to public opinion.
But in underdeveloped democracies the leaders must provide 
guidance to public opinion and must arouse the aspiration, 
determination and courage of the people.... The leaders 
must impart the true value of democracy, which is often 
regarded as a "burden*' by the masses in the midst of their 
poverty.*.» Progress prerequisites establishment of proper 
institutional structures, but it depends invariably on the 
leaders and their leadership.^-9*
The above concept of strong political leadership was initially 
reflected in the organization and operation of the DRP, as envisaged 
by the "Kim Chong-pil Plan," It led to the advocation of a hier­
archical power structure under control of the new generation (i.e. 
the main stream faction). This was subsequently the focal point 
of contention of the main stream faction in the intra-party struggle.
In a meaningful sense, the factional struggle between the two 
rival factions was thus the struggle between one political group 
which had embraced the above concept of leadership in the quest 
for control of the party, and another group which had regarded it 
as a pretext of maintaining the former's position in the party.
On the part of the main stream faction, the factional struggle was 
a defensive operation to prevent erosion of party ideology and 
diffusion of power from the central leadership. On the other hand, 
for the non-main stream faction, it was an insurgent movement 
refusing submission to the arbitrary discipline and will of the
party which were largely regarded as the products of the main stream
120faction in the name of party ideology. *In a final analysis, 
"nationalistic democracy," which was neither sufficiently articu­
lated nor widely acceptable, was thus reduced to a factional 
ideology for party hegemony and became one major polemical item in 
the factional struggle.
119. Kim Ohong-pil, "Leadership in Developing Democracies," 
op. cit. This is my English translation of the Korean text.
120. Cf. the editorial comment of Chosun Ilbo, February 9j
1965-
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FACTIONAL ARGUMENTS; FUNCTIONAL AIL DYSFUNCTIONAL 
ASPECTS OF FACTIONS
In spite of the fact that every annual resolution of the DRP*s
national party convention since 1964 had repeatedly condemned
factionalism and.baxL stressed party unity as an important yearly 
121.
goals * and in spite of the stern disciplinary measures
personally directed by President Park himself against factional
leaders such as Kim Yong-tae, factional activities in the IRP
became more or less legitimate with the amendment of the party
charter in February 1965*
The main stream faction hah often asserted that its struggle
for the establishment of a strong leadership and for control of
party hegemony was "bhe struggle of one and a half million party
123.members against twenty." 0 (The "twenty" was a deprecating
reference to the non-main stream faction National Assemblymeh.)
The main stream faction maintained that the party could perform
its proper role only if the party could forget its preoccupation
for compromise with the minority non-main stream faction on every
issue and only if the party could be firmly united under its
124.
banner. These assertions by the main stream faction were
certainly exaggerated. But they provided a good indication of the 
anxiety and frustration of the main stream faction who had founded 
the "modern" party only to find it soon deadlocked in a factional 
stalemate.
On the other hand, the non-main stream faction had persistently
121. See, e.g. the resolutions of the national conventions 
of 1964 and 1965 in Chosun Ilbo, December 29, 1964 an -^ Lecember
28, 1965.
122. See "Three Dimensional Mirror," Chosun Ilbo, February
28, 1965.
123. Chosun Ilbo, December 31, 19^4*
124. See ibid.| and Chosun Ilbo, January 8, 1965.
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argued for formalization of factions. The main point of its 
contention was that as long as Kim Chong-pil’s group was exclu­
sively organized for and under his personal leadership and aimed
at maintenance of his grip over party affairs* it was* in reality*
125.a faction. Therefore, the non-main stream faction had to he
also legitimately recognized as an equal faction with full rights
to he heard and to participate in party affairs. So long as the
main stream faction was recognized as the sole voice of the party,
the non-main stream faction argued that it would betnot only
unrealistic and self-righteous* hut also tyrannical of the majority 
126.faction. * It further argued that formalization of factions and
their proper representation through institutionalized channels
to the party decision-making bodies were desirable in order to
127.have a competitive intra-party democracy. Further, it was
felt that vigorous factional competition would modify the main
stream faction’s militancy in relation to the opposition party by
128the moderate approach of the non-main stream faction.
The members of the non-main stream faction felt so strongly 
about the need of formal recognition for their faction that they 
even threatened defection from the DEP and organization of a
125. See "The DEPs the Direction of Intra-party Conflict," 
Series Eo. 2* op. cit.
126. On this ground the non-main stream faction, for example* 
had continuously threatened to boycott the national convention which 
was re-scheduled in December 1964 after it rejected the originally 
scheduled convention in April 1964* It charged that the convention 
would be manipulated by the secretariat. It also charged that the 
Director-General was even manipulating the agenda of the Party 
Council in favor of the main stream faction. See Chosun Ilbo * 
December 11, 1964? and "Three Dimensional Mirror," Chosun Ilbo, 
February 28* 1965*
127. "The DEPs the Direction of Intra-party Conflict," Series 
Do. 2, jog. cit.,
128. Ibid.
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separate negotiating body in the National Assembly.  ^ The amend-
ment of the party oharter in February 1965 institutionalized
certain guarantees of independent political bases of the non-main
stream faction and of collective leadership in the party. The
amendment initiated tacit toleration of factional activities, to
the point where the two rival factions could maintain their separate 
130.offrees.
To sum up the arguments of both factions against the back­
ground of factional politics, it may be said that recognition and 
formalization of factions to a certain degree is functional, at 
least in the short run, in mitigating the party*s internal crises 
stemming from the diverse composition of party membership. But 
factionalism is certainly dysfunctional for the party in providing 
a necessary leadership for solving national issues and in per­
forming certain requisite functions that are expected from a party 
in a normal sense. The dysfunctional effect of factionalism is 
more apparent in the following examination of the relationship 
between the DEP and the administration.
THE RULING PARTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION 
Party politics in the DRP were further complicated by the 
existence of a group of administrative associates of President Park 
- - such as Chief Presidential Secretary Lee Hu-rak, key cabinet
ministers, and other top advisors --  who had great political
influence with President Park. Although not organized into a solid 
third bloc, they were nevertheless powerful enough to be instrumental
3.29. Ibid.
130. *'Three Dimensional Mirror," Chosun Ilbo, February 28,
1965.
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in thwarting the attempts of the main stream faction to impose
the principle of party supremacy over the administration and to
131 *discipline the minority faction within the party. * In oppo­
sition to the main stream faction's drive for party supremacy, 
this group found a natural ally in the non-main stream faction 
and helped the latter prevent complete domination of the party hy 
Kim Chong-pil's faction. However this group had shared few of 
the vital national problems - - such as the ROK-Japan treaty issue 
- - with the non-main stream faction.
This group was, for example, largely credited for persuading
13?.President Park to recall Kim Chong-pil from Tokyo in March 1964
and, again, to dismiss him from the party chairmanship and send
133.him to his second exile in June 1964* * During the martial law
period of June 1964? this group was known as "the sponsors of 
martial law.1"^^* In concert with the non-main stream faction in 
the party, the group credited Kim Chong-pil and his faction with 
aggravating the political situation to the point of necessitating 
the introduction of army rule in Seoul,
There were a number of differences that caused friction between 
the main stream faction and the group of presidential advisors - - 
i.e. between the party and the administration. Their basic diff­
erence centered on the role of the DRP in the governmental policy­
making process. As mentioned earlier, the DRP, as the "party of
131. See "The Dynamics of Today's Ruling Power in Korea,"
Series Ho. 2, _o£. cit.
132. See Kyunghyang Shinmoon, March 29, 1964*
133. Pak Ky$ng-s8k and Ham Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean Political
Parties," op. cit., p. 207? and Kim Tong-t'ae, "The Hational Assembly
during the %  Days of the Martial Law," _op, cit., p. 58.
134« See Pak Ky&ng-s^k and Ham Shi-uk, ibid,, pp. 207-8j and
"The Dynamics of Today's Ruling Power in Korea," Series Ho. 1 and
•^ °* Chosun Ilbo, August 28 and August 30, 1966.
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policy.," had maintained a complex of bodies in charge of research,
review and formulation of governmental policies, spearheaded by
135.the specialists in the Policy Research Office, In April 1964?
in response to party pressure, and impelled by party unity in
preparation of the impending treaty crisis, President Park issued
the "Directive for Improving Organic Cooperation between the
136*Government Party and the Government." * The directive instructed 
the cabinet to strengthen mutual consultation and cooperation with 
the party in matters pertaining to appointment of key administrative 
posts and to establishment and implementation of important govern­
mental policies.
But the contribution of the party to formulation of governmental
policies had so far been minimal. The party had, in fact, often
been excluded from participating in a number of important govern- 
137*mental decisions* * Many party leaders frequently complained
of the situation in the following terms:
The DRP is the ruling party only in name. We don't know 
how the party operates, how party policy is being made, nor 
what is the direction of the party policy... Thus we can 
often see disagreements and confusion in policy matters 
between the party and the government. -^38.
The record of the Policy Research Office verified the fact that
the party played a secondary role by reviewing legislative and
policy proposals already decided by the government, instead of the
139.primary or equal role of initiating and formulating them. y
135* See "A Policy-making Body," Series Ho. 1 (the Policy 
Research Office of thb DRP), Chosun Ilbo, May 6, 1966.
136. For details of the directive, see Minjukonghwatang, 
Ch6njin ftn tang gwa toburo, op. cit., p. 34*
137* See "A Policy-making Body," Series Ho. 1, op. cit.; and 
"Three Dimensional Mirror," Chosun Ilbo, December 23? 1964*
138. Tang Ho-min in "A Round-Table Talk; Inquiry for Change 
of Party Politics," op. cit., p. 154.
139* "A Policy-making Body," Series Ho. 1, op. cit.
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The weakening of the DRP’s role in policy-making was strongly 
contrasted by the ascendance of the Presidential Secretariat. In 
principle the Presidential Secretariat was established not as policy 
advisory machinery; it was conceived to provide administrative 
and secretarial assistance for the President.^40 • But as the 
principal machinery that exclusively assisted the President, it 
rapidly emerged as an integral part in exercising presidential 
power itself with an organizational and functional structure 
closely corresponding to that of the c a b i n e t . B e c a u s e  of this 
similarity to the regular cabinet, the Presidential Secretariat 
was sometimes called the "small cabinet,1 and was generally
142recognized for its vital political and administrative role. ’
One usual but important example of the Presidential Secretariate 
participation in policy-making is the preparation of the President’s 
annual message on the state of the nation and other important 
policy speeches.'^3«
Thus the conflict between the main stream faction, which 
vigorously asserted the principle of party supremacy over the 
administration, and the Presidential Secretariat, which with equal 
vigor clung to its independence, became inevitable. The overall 
effect of the emergence of the strong Presidential Secretariat 
had been the forcing of the party to surrender the responsibility 
of government to it.
140. See Article 9 'tke Governmental Organizational Law {.Law 
No. 1506, promulgated December 14j 19^3) in the Ministry of Public 
Information, ROI^  Structure of Government, Korea Series No. 4 
(Seoul, undated), pp." 3$-52. For details of the duty of the 
Presidential Secretariat, see "A Policy-making Body,11 Series No. 6 
(The Presidential Secretariat at the Blue House), Chosun Ilbo,
May 15, 1966.
141* "A Policy-making Body," Series No. 6, ibid.
142. Ibid.
143. Ibid.
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The second point of conflict between them was the matter of 
controlling political funds. The ability or inability of fac­
tional bosses to procure their own political funds has been one of 
the factors responsible for the continuing existence or decline 
of factions, or vice versa.^^4* jn princippe political funds in 
the DEP were to be collected and distributed through the single 
channel, the Party Finance Committee. But all the individual
factional leaders had maintained their own sources of political
145.funds to command their own groups. As a measure to check
factionalism, President Park had recently tightened the dispersed 
factional "pipelines” of political funds by placing them under his 
control. The PBP explained that this would ultimately lead to 
the centralization of fund raising activities into one official 
channel and to the systemization of administration of political
-p * H7. funds.
As a result of this measure, the primary responsibility of
raising and distributing political funds initially fell to two main
channelss (l) the Party Finance Committee chaired by Kim Song-kwon
of the non-main stream faction and (2) the presidential advisors
in the administration under the control of Lee Hu-rak and Chang 
1 A Pi
Ki-yong. ‘ In other words, the reform meant that all major 
sources of political funds were placed under the control of the 
groups hostile to the main stream faction.
144» See especially "Political Funds," Series Bo. 6 (The 
Genealogy of Political Funds and the Factions), o£. cit.
145. Ibid.
146. Pak Ky8ng-s&k and Bam Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean 
Political Parties," o£. cit., p. 207.
147• Shin Tong-jun, the PEP spokesman, "The PEP and Political 
Funds," Chosun Ilbo, June 16, 1966.
148. See Chosun Ilbo, February 7? 19^5? "Political Funds," 
Series Bo. 6, jog. cit.g and "The Pynamics of Today's Puling Power 
in Korea," Series Bo. 1, 0£. cit.
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Because of the direct impact of political funds on the fac­
tional position in the party, the increasing control of political 
funds by the non-main stream faction and by the group in the 
administration, aroused a great deal of resentment and anxiety 
among the main stream faction members. The diminishing control of 
political funds by the main stream faction was partly reflected 
in the decreasing number of the party’s secretarial members. In 
March 1965 ^he discontent of the main stream faction was openly 
expressed by the motion of non-confidence in Vice-Prime Minister 
Chang Ki-yong by thirty-three members of the PEP Assemblymen, who 
charged Chang ostensibly with granting special loans to a handful 
of big business firms. "^9* But the real reason behind the motion 
was believed to be the main stream faction’s discontent with Chang’s
’’non-cooperation1 in policy matters end with his increasing power
150.over sources of political funds.
The decline of the main stream faction was also caused, to a
large extent, by President Park’s personal views on the operation
151.of the government and on the exercising of political power.
’’The kind of politics we need today,” President Park once said, "is
productive politics. There cannot be any politics other than 
152.productive ones.” * His concept of "productive politics” is the
149* See Chosun Ilbo-, March 25, 1965* The motion was defeated 
by votes of 54 "yeses," 16 "nos" and 65 abstentions. In view of 
84 PEP Assemblymen and 51 opposition members present at voting, 65 
abstentions plus 3 "yes" votes cast by the PEP members were, in 
reality, a massive revolt of the party against the leadership of 
Park Chung-hee. For details of the vote, see Chosun Ilbo, March
26, 1965.
.3.50. Ibid., March 25, 1965.
151. Cf. Park Chung-hee, Leadership (Seouls Ministry of 
Public Information, ROK, undated)”.
152. Quoted in "The Pynamics of Today’s Ruling Power in 
Korea," Series Ho. 4, Chosun Ilbo, September 1, I966.
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gearing of all political activities to contribute to the supreme 
goal of "modernization of the fatherland," a goal which may be
I (T')
attained chiefly through economic development. * He sees in
himself the embodiment of this goal? he justifies the exercise
of his enormous authority in this light 5 and, accordingly, he
demands absolute obedience from all governmental officials and
154.party members to his leadership.
Because of his "productive politics," which gives priority
to administrative efficiency, President Park dislikes "things
overtly political" and tends to rigidly separate his administrative
155.affairs from political affairs so as to allow his administration
to perform to its fullest ability without fear of intervention by 
156,the party. J * His dislike of politics is farther mirrored in his 
activities as Presidents he rarely attends "meetings political" 
held in the party or related to the National Assemblyi and, instead, 
he concentrates his attention on details of administration and party 
affairs through his associates or through direct contacts with high
I57
officials in the administration and the party. J Against this 
background, it was no wonder that he openly expressed distrust of
158his own party which was torn apart by factionalism. * He might 
have reached the conclusion that his party was not a party but an
assemblage of factions --  neither able to function as a driving
force for modernization nor able to be a hierarchical command capable 
of supporting his program. In view of his long career in the army,
153. Ibid.
3-54. Ibid.
155* Ibid.% and Glen D. Paige, "1966s Korea Creates the Future," 
Asian Survey, Vol. VII, No. 1, January 1967, p. 21.
156. "The Dynamics of Today's Ruling Power in Korea," Series 
Ho. 3, Chosun Ilbo, August 31, 1966.
157 • "The Dynamics of Today's Ruling Power in Korea," Series 
No. 4<> op. cit. | and Glenn D. Paige, op. cit., p. 22.
158. See Kim Ki-ch'bl in "A Round-Table Talks Inquiry for 
Change of Party Politics," ojd. cit., pp. 156-7*
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President Park appears to be more oomfortable in the political scene 
with a hierarchical order of leadership than a turbulent order of 
leadership he saw in his party. His liking of a military type of 
leadership has been evident in his intolerance of any political 
challenge to his leadership as well as in his establishment of a 
military command-type of administration in which he delegates res­
ponsibilities to trusted subordinates so long as they remain loyal 
159.and capable. Consequently he has been relying more on his
close advisors and associates in the administration whom he regards 
as being less "political" and more "productive."
Another factor that tended to separate his administration from 
his party was perhaps his confidence in the exercise of power and 
authority. In spite of the fact that Kim Chong-pil and his main 
stream faction were largely credited with Park Chung-hee's poli­
tical success, President Park steadily gained confidence in his 
ability to rule the party and the country without Kim Chong-pil or
people like him - - having discovered this ability during Kim's
1(50
six-month exile in 1964* * Assertion of this capacity was demon­
strated by his total resistance to the main stream faction's 
numerous pressures which aimed at reshuffling his cabinet and his 
Presidential Secretariat in order to install more of Kim's own 
followers who could be more amenable to the PRP's views.
The chief beneficiaries of President Park's personal concepts 
of administration, politics and leadership were, thus, his close 
associates in the administration who enjoyed not only the President's 
personal confidence and protection but also outlived their political
159* "The Pynamics of Today's Puling Power in Korea," Series 
No. 4? op. cit.j and Glenn P. Paige, op. cit., pp. 21-2.
160* See The New York Times, November 14, 19^4*
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rivals in the party. This had worked chiefly against the main 
stream faction in the party. It may also he said that a general 
result of Park's indifference to his party and its politics had 
contributed, in some degree, to perpetual tension and rivalry 
between the party and the administration. It is certain that his 
attitude had contributed to relegating the party to a position 
subordinate to that of the administration in policy matters.
The resignation of Kim Chong-pil and the purge of Kim Yong-tae 
in May 1968 may have ended the very controversial struggle of the 
main stream faction to establish the party supremacy. Their 
ousting may have lessened factional tension among the rival groups 
in the ruling circle of Park's government. But, in spite of the 
relatively formidable and calm appearance of the party at present, 
the DKP, like other political parties in Korea, is not a unified 
party with a certain degree of institutional stability. It is 
indeed a "dormant volcano" dangerously pent up with factional 
tension. The critical test of survival of the party lies ahead 
when the PEP will have to find a successor to the leadership of 
President Park Chung-hee.
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CHAPTER 8.
POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICS: THE MASS PARTY
THE ORIGIN AMD THE IDEALS OF THE MASS PARTY
The Mass Party (Minjungtarsg) was formed on May 3? 1965 * when the two
leading opposition parties, the Civil Rule Party and the Democratic Party,
which jointly controlled all opposition members in the National Assembly,
2
merged their forces for the struggle against the ROK-Japan treaty. ’ The 
merger was the final phase of unification of all opposition forces, following 
the mergers of the Liberal Democratic Party into the Civil Rule Party in 
November 1964 and the Party of the People into the Democratic Party in December, 
1965* As a result of the final merger in May 1965? the politics of the National 
Assembly became those of a two-party system —  the ruling DRP with 110 seats, 
the opposing Mass Party, 62, and three independents.
Because the leaders of both opposition parties felt that their supreme 
duty was to halt ratification of the treaty and to harness their forces against 
Park's government on this critical issue, they could put aside momentarily 
their personal differences and could easily agree on the formation of the Mass 
Party (MP). This was the culmination of one and a half years' joint struggle 
against Park's government and, in particular, against the ROK-Japan treaty 
negotations. Furthermore, the widespread popular opposition to the treaty 
generated a tremendous moral pressure to opposition leaders to unite. In any 
case, it was axiomatic that cohesion or concentration of opposition forces 
provided more organizational strength and a better chance in any opposition to
1. The MP was formally inaugurated with registration with the Central 
Election Management Committee on May 8 and the merger was ratified by the new 
partys* national convention on June 14.
2, For the purpose of the merger, see, e.g. Tun Po-son, Kukuk ui 
kashipat‘kil, op.cit., p.228. See also the merger resolution of the MP,
May 3? 1965? and the resolution adopted at the national party convention,
June 14? 1965? in Chosun Ilbo, May 4 and June 15, 1965.
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the government —  the latter possessing superior political resources. 
Naturally there was considerable reluctance to accept the merger among the 
older powerful leaders in both parties who were still mentally inhibited by 
their past personal animosity and factionalism. The movement for the success­
ful merger was initiated and sustained by relatively younger "intermediate"
3leaders of both parties.
in terms of long-range significance, the merger was greeted by the people
and the press as the "realization of fervent wishes" of the people,who
wanted to see major opposition parties united into one party capable of
materially becoming the alternative to the governing DEP and of establishing
5
itself as a constructive part in shaping a true two-party system. * in this 
respect the merger was a most significant development of opposition politics 
since the resumption of party politics in 1963, regardless of the unique 
circumstance that gave birth to the IP. ihe merger had also measurably 
repaired the image of the opposition which had been badly damaged in the fiasco 
of the Party of the People.
As the genealogy of opposition parties in Korea below shows, the MP was 
in reality a reconstruction of the old Democratic Party (DP), fhe Civil 
Rule Party (CRP) and the Democratic Party (DP) were, in origin, the direct 
descendants of that old DP. After Rhee and his Liberal Party government were 
overthrown in I960, two warring factions divided the old DP.
3. See the editorial comment of Chosun Ilbo, February 11,1965.
4. See the editorials of fong-A Ilbo, May 4, 1965, and of Chosun Ilbo, 
May 4, 1965.
5. See, e.g., the editorial of Chosun Ilbo, February 25, 1965*
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GENEALOGY 0F OPPOSITION PARTIES
Korean Democratic
Party
Democratic Rationalist Youngmen Education Parliamentary faction Independents 
Party^^ Corps of M b e m l  Party
DemocraticParty 1955
Hew Democratic 
Party 1960Democratic Party
Military junta period
Civil RiYLe Party 1963Democratic Party
Lib. Demo. Party- -Party of People 1964
1965
Hew Kore^fParty Mass Party
New Democratic Party 1967
Sourcess Chosun Ilbo, May 2, 1965? and Gho Il-mun, "The Genealogy
of Our Political Parties since Liberation,1* Sasangge, October 
1966, p.163* For a conscice view of Korean political parties’
genealogy, see "The Brief History of Political Parties for
Twenty Years," Chosun Ilbo, August 15? 1965*
The reconciliation of the two parties in 1965 thus represented the merger 
of these two old factions of the old DP. Because these two large factions
together represented practically all current opposition forces in Korea, the
long term political potentiality of the reconciliation was more meaningful than 
the immediate strength against the treaty brought about by the merger.
The MP was launched with the solemn pledge to restore freedom to the 
peoples (l) it would be "the ultimate rallying point of all liberal democratic 
forces" that opposed "the militaristic power group" of Park Chung-hee; (2) it
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would oppose the particular interests and the privileged business enterpreneurs
in favor of the middle income strata, farmers and toiling* masses; and (3) it
6.would wage an all-out struggle to halt the "treacherous" ROK-Japan treaty.
Besides various economic and social reforms, the MP adopted the following basic 
policies as immediate taskss (l) to revise the Constitution to replace the 
presidential system with a cabinet system, and to repeal parts of the party and 
election laws in order to safeguard political freedom and to insure fair 
elections; (2) to guarantee political neutrality of the armed forces and the
ry
police; and (3) to make independent the government's personnel administration.
In self-criticism the MP also promised that it would purge "all remnants 
of the old reactionary habits/* of the past politics, would halt chaotic faction­
al struggles, and would strive to be a truly progressive democratic party
8.
contributing to the modernization of Korean politics.
In spite of this determination to depart from the anachronic old politics 
that had been the mark ofthe opposition, the MP ended in disaster when it could
not withstand the renewed factional struggles that immediately started with the .
merger and climaxed with ratification of the RGK-Japan treaty in August 1965.
As previously stated, the party was finally split in November 1965 when the 
dissenting militant faction seceded altogether to form a new rival party.
The failure of the MP could be attributed to the failure of its extreme 
campaigns against the treaty. The underlying cause of the party's disintegration 
lay, however, in the inability of the opposition groups to overcome their own 
old political habits. Although the desire to halt the treaty was so over-
6, See the declaration and the resolution of the merger, lay 3* 1965,
Chosun Ilbo. May 4, 1965.
7, See "The Basic Policies" of the MP announced on June 14, 1965,
Chosun Ilbo, June 15, 1965.
8, See the declaration of the national convention of the MP, June 14,
1965, ibid.
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whelming as to have brought these diverse groups together into one party, the
desire was not sufficient to overcome other issues that deeply divided them.
As always, the most serious issue yet to be compromised was that of party
leadership or party hegemony. Indeed, this issue was the key reference point
of various political motivations that made the factional groups differentiate
sharply on the means and extent of the strategy against the treaty and the
government during the treaty crisis. Because of this serious division and the
resultant intrigues within the IP, the opposition during the critical hours
of the treaty crisis reached its weakest point in terns of its political
effectiveness and its popularity, in the history of Korean opposition parties,
no opposition party had, in fact, ever reached such a degree of feebleness and 
9»unpopular! ty.
THE GENEALOGY OP PACTIONS AID THE! COMPOSITION OF THE M S  PARTY.
The Civil Rule Group (the "Old Paction) s Although the MP was a new partyinname 
and in some minor aspects, it was in reality an old party with respect to
10.leadership and factional composition which had once dominated the old DP.
Generally speaking, the GRP group of Yun Po-s&n —  the militant faction, later, 
in the MP —  could be traced to the oldest conservative anti-Communist Korean 
Democratic Party, or KDP (September 1945 - February 1949) (see Chapter l).
In alliance with other opponents of Rhee - notably Korean Nationalist Party of 
then National Assembly Speaker Shin Ik-hiii and Great Solidarity Youth Corps of 
nationalist Chi Ch’bng-ch'&i, the KDP was reorganized into the Democratic 
Nationalist Party, or DNP (February 1949 - September 1955) in February 1949.
In September 1955 the DNP broadened its political base and reorganized into the 
old DP (September 1955 - May 1961). The old DP brought in still other 
important opposition groups, and it emerged as the most powerful opposition party
9. "The Opposition Parties in Korea", Series No*3» Chosun Ilbo,
October 22, 1965.
10. See especially "The History of the Mass Party," Chosun Ilbo, May 2, 1965.
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that Korea has ever had. After the death of its powerful leaders Shin 
Ilc-hui and Cho Pyong-ok, the “old faction” (the main stream of the KDP and 
DMP) seceded from the old DP in November i960 and formed the New Democratic 
Party or MDP (November I960 - lay 1961). The MDP was finally dissolved by 
the military in May 1961. With resumption of political activities in 1963? 
it re-emerged as the CEP under the leadership of former President Yua Po-s&n.
The Democratic Group (the “New Paction)* On the other hand, the group 
which revived the DP in 1963? without its former leader Chang ly&n, originally 
joined the old DP in 1955* The group in 1955 was a coalition of various non- 
KDP and non-DNP origins the remnants of the old patriotic organization 
Youngmen Education Corps (Hungsadan) and the “parliamentary faction” of the 
Liberal Party who had lost President Rhee's favor since 1953. This new group 
became the “new faction” in opposition to the orthodox "old faction.” in 
the Second republic the "new faction" became the majority faction in the old 
DP (and also kept the party when the "old faction" departed from it) and took 
control of the government under the leadership of Prime Minister Chang My&i 
until it was disbanded by the military coup in 1961* This was essentially 
the same group which revived the DP in 1963 and which became the moderate 
faction in the MP.
Thus the MP, created in 1963 by the merger between the GRP and the DP 
was in an authentic sense the reunion of the two rival factions that contended 
for the hegemony of the old DP prior to the division of the party in I960. 
Interestingly enough, if one traces further the origins of these two factions 
in history, the factions date back to the Independent Club (Tongniphy^phoe) *  
which was established in July 1896 in Seoul and continued for many years at
11. About the Independent Club, see especially Chong-sik Lee, The 
Politics of Korean Nationalism, op.cit*? pp*58-66.
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1 o
around the close of the Yi Dynasty (see the chart below) • * The Independent
Club was a nationalist movement whose purpose was to reform the anachronic and 
corrupt Yi Dynasty in the face of challenge from the West and Japan.
GENEALOGY OF FACTIONS
Kyongld.^ChBlla 
Faction
Faction of 
Lee Sang-ga© 
Rhee Syngman
National 
Association 
Rhee Syngiasn
Liberal Party 
Rhee Syngman
Independent Club 
Chae-p’il 
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Faction of 
Yu Kil - jun 
Kim S8ng-3u
Korean Demo.
Party 
Kim S&ng-su
Demo* Nat‘1 
Party 
Kim S&ng-su 
Shin Ik-h&L 
Cho Pyong-ok
Northwest
Faction
Youngman Education 
Corps 
An Ch*ang-ho
t
(Old
Democratic Party 
faction) (New faction)
Shin Ik-hui 
Cho Py^ng-ok
Civil Rule 
Party
Tun Po-siSn
Chang My&n
Democratic 
Party 
Pale Sun-ch’<&i
Mass 'Party 
(Militant (Moderate
faction) faction)
Yun Po-s&n Pak Sun-ch*c5n
12. For the lineage of factions in Korean politics, see Kim Kytfng-rae, 
"Korean Political Parties in Transition," op. pit*, p.52. The genealogy 
diagram of the factions, though modified by me, is also from the above 
source.
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As the general lineage of factions among the contemporary Korean 
opposition leaders reveals, the factions in the present opposition parties 
date bach to the past century* The problem of factionalism has become, in 
the course of time, further complicated by the cycle of unity, division, 
and reconciliation of opposition forces under the impact of volatile 
political changes. This has steadily contributed to proliferation of factions 
and generated dome deep-seated emotional and political animosity among them.
SOME OHARACTMSTIGS OF THE OPPOSITION
In general all opposition parties in Korea were formed by the factions or
groups who had been either eliminated through power struggles or had splintered
33from the original inner group of power, rather than by those who were moti­
vated by political and ideological differences. Whenever a faction or group 
failed in the struggle for party hegemony or for control of the government, 
the loser separated from the mother party and formed its own new party to 
become an opposition party whether it was opposed to a ruling party or to a 
mother party. This was the case of the KDP which left Hhee’s ruling coalition; 
of the KDP which separated from the old DP; or more recently, the LDP which was 
the coalition of those who had been defeated in power struggles in the junta, 
the DRP, and the Civil Rule Party, Therefore, a generalization about the cause 
of formation of an opposition party can be made; an opposition party in Korea 
is the product of factional power struggles and is largely motivated by 
resistance. Along with this generalisation, it must also be remembered that a 
majority of the early opposition leaders were formerly nationalists and, as 
such, they were schooled for resistance and revolution and were rarely trained 
for politics.^”
13. See Pak Kyifog-sbk and warn Shi-uk, “Pactions in Korean Political 
Parties, op. c it., pp.218-9
14. CfP. Richard L« Park, Problems of Political Development, ■’ Philip 
W. fahyer, ©&., Rationalism and progress in Free Asia (Baltimore; The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1956771)*103.
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Prom this motivational origin, the opposition parties have been thus 
essentially and inevitably too negative in outlook and too limited in 
potentiality to be constructive oppositional groups. Furthermore, having 
been perpetually confined to a minority status with little prospect of 
becoming a ruling party —  not to mention their possession of little or no 
experience in government, the negative attitudes which have been best 
illustrated by extremism and irresponsibility became a permanent fixture of 
the opposition.
The negative mentality has be eh compounded by factionalism, which the
opposition party, without political power and substantial means of rewards
15.and punishment, has been hardly able to suppress and discipline. There 
were, of course, the times when factions could put aside their differences. 
These were only when they were all extremely ©motional about their external 
enemy (the government); or when the balance or stratification of power 
between the factions was more or less stablized; and when reorganization of 
party leadership was not immediately the pressing issue. These exceptional 
periods of dormancy of factional strife were seen in the days of the 
desperate struggle of the old DP against Rhee in 1956 and I960.
Due to this negative mentality and helpless factionalism, the opposition 
parties have most of the time been the prisoner of their own inertia and are 
unable to break away from their pre-modem pattern of politics manifested in 
extremism and irresponsibility. This is one of the reasons why the factions 
that advanced the most militant line of argument and tactics against the 
government have usually dominated the direction of the opposition politics. 
Under the domination of extreme factions, the strategy of the opposition has 
often been committed to the destruction of the existing government or regime
15. Pale Kybng-stfk and Ram Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean political Parties," 
op.cit., p.23.9.
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by using whatever resources available. This type of opposition is what Robert
16A. Dahl calls the "revolutionary opposition" * or what Otto Kirchheimer calls
17the "opposition of principle."
THE HISTORY OF THE OPPOSITION;
THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY DURING THE RHEE REGIME
in order to understand the perspectives and the limitations of the MP,
an examination of the MP should begin with the old DP. Just as the MP started
as a protest movement against the RQK-Japan treaty and was created largely
under the external pressure of popular demand, the old DP in 1955 was also
18
developed under similar external pressure. ’ The DP started as a pan­
opposition movement of diverse groups who had rapidly erystalized their common
iq
ground on the issue of "defense of the Constitution" against Rhee's dictatorship. 
The direct impetus that prompted the formation of the DP was the highly irregular 
constitutional amendment in November 1954 made by the Liberal Party. Spearheaded 
by the Comrades Society for Safeguarding the Constitution (Hohontongjihoe) of 
sixty opposition National Assemblymen, the old DP was formally established on 
September 19, 1955, by the progressive dissolution of the DNP.
The old DP was a coalition of diverse political veterans and their
cliques which had, in various capacities, dominated the political scene of
Korea since the liberation* They had been elected to the National Assembly 
at some point of their political career and had maintained their own political 
bases independent of parties or political institutions which were then quite
16. See Robert A. Dahl, "Patterns of Opposition," Robert A. Dahl, ed.,
Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven and London; Yale 
University Press, 1966J7 PP* 344-7.
17. See Otto Kirchheimer, "The Waning of Opposition in Parliamentary 
Regimes," Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, ed., Comparative Politics;
Notes and Readings (Homewood, Illinois; The Dorsey Press, 1961), pp.216-7.
18. See, e.g., Cho Py&ng-ok, Minjujuui wa na (Democracy and Me)
(Seoul; Yongshin munhwasa, 1959), pp«208-9.
19. For the circumstance of formation of the DP, see Han T'ae-su,
Hankuk chongdang sa, op.cit., pp*150-3; and Lee Ki-ha, op. cit., pp.241-53.
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20 oincapable of supplying stable political bases. ° Having been brought up 
during this era of extreme instability of political institutions, the leaders 
that made up the top stratum of the old DP were, in a sense, the political 
institutions themselves.
Even today these leading personalities are quite rigorous and constitute 
the hardcore of the opposition. Some of the most colourful personalities of 
the old DP, such as Shin Ik-hiSi, Cho Pyong-ok and Cheng Myon disappeared from 
the scene. But such recent leaders of the MP as Tun Po-sun, Kim To~y6n, Pak 
3un-ch ‘ Sn, S8 Min-ho, Yu Chin-san and H£S ChcSng had all been the bosses of 
factions or sub-factions for at least two decades. The degree of control by 
these old generational politicians also suggests a corresponding degree of 
anachronism in the political attitudes, styles, and modes of behavior of the 
MP in contrast to those of the ruling DRP which has a more progressive out-
21look and modernity in certain aspepts of leadership and organisational structure.
From the beginning, the most difficult task of the old DP was the solution
of the problem of satisfying the two major factions —  the "old” and "new”
22factions —  in allocation of party posts. * The structure;.of collective 
leadership in the form of the ’'Supreme Council" of the party reflected this 
problem. Although Shin Ilc-hui of the majority "old faction" headed the party 
as the head of the Supreme Council, the party was collectively controlled by 
five men (including Shin) of the Supreme Council which was divided three to two 
' in favor of the "old faction."^’
20. See Chong-*sik Lee, "Institutionalization of Political Parties in 
Korea," op. cit., pp.13-4.
21. See Yang Ho-min in "A Round-Table Talk: Inquiry for Change of Party 
Politics," o£. cit., p.159*
22. See "The Democratic Party in Pain for Unity," Chugan Huimang, Ho.33,
v  v  f witeMia»*iiirw»;<W*i| nnimwHjyiiiii nw ■■Wi f f
August 10, 1956, p.4.
23. The members of the council were Shin Ik-hfti, Cho Pyong-olc and Paek 
Nam-hun of the "old faction" and Chang My&n and Kwak Sang—hun of th4 "new 
faction," see Lee Ki-ha, op. cit., p*250.
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The reason why the formal launching of the DP was delayed for nine 
months since the merger movement started in November .1954 with the formation 
of the Comrades Society was to achieve this balance of power. Another con­
troversy in forming the party was, ostensibly, the question whether the new 
party should include the so-called “progressive elements” of Cho Bong-am
who was potentially a threat to the leadership of the conservative coalition
24of the two major factions. * The exclusion of Cho Bong-am's group from the 
new party, on the ground of ideological difference, had certainly removed
pp;
another potentially powerful faction from the DP. But the problem of 
resolving the power struggle between the two rival factions remained never­
theless .
The intense power struggle came into the open in March 1956 during
preparation for the presidential elections of May 15, 1956. The physical
violence which occurred between the two factions in the organizational meeting
of the provincial party in Ch&Lla Bukdo in December 1955 provides an example
of the intensity of the power struggle in the ultimate showdown for the party 
* 26«
nomination. However, the party's national convention in March 1956 was
successfully concluded by providing a balanced ticket by nominating .Shin 
Ik-hfti and Chang My$n for the presidential and vice-presidential candidates 
respectively.
The sudden death of popular Shin (caused by a cerebral hemorrhage)
24. Cho Pytfng-ok, Ha ui hoegorok (My Memoirs) (Seouls Minkyosa, 1959), 
pp.566 and 372-3: Kim Chun-y&n, Tokrip nosftn (The Independent Hoad) (Seoul:
Shisa shibosa, 1959, 6th ed.), pp.190-35 &nd S6 By&ng-jo, Chukwfoija ui chungffn 
(The Witness of the Sovenign) (Seoul: Mot£mch1 ulp * ansa, 19637, pp* 189-92.
25. Qm Sang-s&p, op. cit., p.185.
26. See “The Democratic Party in Pain for Unity," op.cit., p.6; and
Paek Kwang-ha, ed., Tansang tanha (On and Off the Stage), Vol.4 (Seoul: Paetanunsa 
1958), p.176. A "tansang tanha" was a short political commentary carried daily 
on Tong-A Ilbo, and the above work is a collection of these commentaries.
27. Had he lived, he might have been elected. His popularity was such that 
his historical campaign rally on the beach of the Han River in Seoul on May 3 
attracted 300,000 people. About Shin, see Kim S6k~y&ng, Shin £k-h&L s&nsaeng 
ildaeki (A Biography of Mr.Shin Ik-hKi) (Seoul: Waseda taehak touch1anghoe, 1956) 
About 1„5 million 1^6fo) of voters cast their votes in the memory of the late Shin 
on the election day. See CEMC, iaeharaalnkuk sbnk8 sa, op.cit., p*477.
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V
just ten days before the elections, left only Chang jyjyon to be elected
28.
against ilhee's running-mate Lee Ki-bung to the vice presidency. * The 
circumstances brought about^che death of Shin and the election of Chang to 
the vice-presidency, in conjunction with the necessity of expansion of the
party organization after the elections, rapidly plunged the party into an
29.
intense factional struggle over the leadership vacated by the late Shin.
The ’’old faction'1 regrouped behind Cho Py&ig-ok while the "new faction"
strengthened its ranks behind Vice-President Chang Mybn.
Clio Py&ng-ok was elected head of the party and his resourceful "old
faction" retained the numerical superiority in the Supreme Council by three
to two through a series of tactical maneuvers in the Central Committee in 
30.July 195^. * However the victory of the "old faction" came only after
31.the "new faction" had totally exhausted its long list of tactical maneuvers.
The defeat of the "new faction" was so bitterly received that the National
Assemblymen belonging to the "new faction" immediately demanded resignation
of Kim fo-y&i and film Chun-y8n of the "old faction" from the Supreme Council
32.and threatened to form a separate party with Chang My&i. ”* The threat of
defection was, however, subdued when it was learnt that the Liberal Party was
33.contemplating a constitutional amendment for a cabinet system. The amend­
ment would have deprived Vice-President Chang of the existing constitutional
right to succeed President Rhee in the event of the latter*s death, and would
34have made Lee Ki-bung President via premiership. * The serious division
28. The election law did not permit replacement of candidate during the 
election.
29. See Paek Kwang-ha, Vol.4. op.cit., p.176.
30. See Lee Ki-ha, op. cit,, pp.3Q8-8.
31. See ibid.. and "The Democratic Party in pain for Unity," op. cit.»pp * 6-7 •
32. Paek Kwang-ha, Vol.4. op.cit.» p.205. Cf.the editorial of Kyunghvang
Shinmoon, July 20, 1956*
33* Lee Ki-ha, op.cit., p.309.
34* See the draft and explanation of the amendment by one of its sponsors, 
Kim Su-sbn, in his IMmrhl wihan ch&ngch'i inka (Politics s Por ’Whom) (Seouls 
T'ongil ch'&agny&n unhy&ihoe, 1958), pp.120-39. Por the reaction of the DP, see 
the DP's statement of July 4, 1956, in Minjutang, T*uchaeng ui chokch&c, op.cit., 
pp. 168-9.
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between the two .factions was averted in September 1956 when the "old faction”
made a drastic concession that enabled the ”new faction” to control the
35*Supreme Council by the majority of three to two* But Cho Pybng-ok
retained his post of the party headship.
The old BP was again in turmoil in the fall of 1959 when the party had
to solve the problem of selecting the party's standard bearer from Cho
Pyong-olc and Chang My&j, as the presidential elections, scheduled in the spring
36of I960, were approaching. * The factional rivalry was much more intense
now than four years ago* First of all,there was a really good chance of
winning the presidential elections. The whole country was in a mood to revolt
against Rhee's rule. In contrast, during these intervening years, the old DP
had increased its popularity as the party fighting for democracy with the
benefit of relative internal calm maintained by the intricate balance of power
within the party. The second main factor was that the "new faction” was no
more the helpless minority, especially in the Supreme Council and local party
37.organizations. * Unlike in 1956, the "new faction” had a really good fight­
ing chance. In preparation for confrontation in the forthcoming national 
party convention in November 1959» the two factions spread their antagonism
38all the way down to district party branches in the hunt for favorable delegates.
The depravity of the factional struggle was such that they did not even hesitate
\
39.to publically accuse each other of corruption and graft. As an extreme
example, the provincial party in Kyongsang Namdo was unable to hold a party
35. See lee ICi-ha, op. cit *, p*311j and Paek Kwang-ha, Vol.4, op.cit.p.325* 
The members of the council were Cho Pyclng-ok and Paek Nam-hun of the "old faction” 
and Chang MyiSn, Kwak Sang-hun and PakSun-ch'&i of the "new faction."
36. See Lee Ki-ha, ibid., pp*379“91j and M n  Kwan-shik, Nakchaesaeng (The 
Failed Student) (Seoul% Chungsbkwak, 1962), pp.132-3. M n  was a devoted follower 
of Cho Py&ng-ok and as a Democrat he served two terms in the National Assembly. In 
the Third Republic, he joined the DRP. His work above is a recollection of his 
ten years with the old DP.
37. See Lee Ki-ha, ibid., p*380; and Kim To-y&h, Na tti insaeng paeks# (A 
White Paper on My Life) (Seouls Kangu ch'ulp'ansa, 1968), p.327* Kim To-y&i was 
former Chairman(head) of the New Democratic Party and the above work is his 
political memoirs (unfinished at the time of his death in July 1967).
38. See Lee Ki-ha, ibid.
39. Ibid., pp*381-2
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plenum before the national convention due to repeated incidents of violence.
in the final showdown of strength on November 26, 1959, Cho captured the
41presidential nomination by 484 votes to 481 —  a margin of three votes,
and his rival Chang became his vice-presidential running-mate against the
Liberal Party ticket of Rhee and Lee Ki-bung. After settling the nomination,
the two factions again clashed for the control of the party in election of the
head of the Supreme Council. The attempt of the "old faction" to retain another
important prize. was, however, thwarted when the convention elected Chang Mybn
to replace Cho Pyong-ok as the head of the party. Some seventy delegates who
had earlier voted for Cho for his presidential candidai^hip shifted their
allegiance and voted for Chang, when they sensed an imminent split of the
party —  this split being amply clear in the desperate efforts of the "new
42.
faction" to remain in the party only as an equal partner, * Thus the "new
faction" captured the headship of the party for the first time, and in so
doing put itself in a favorable position should it fail in the nomination
contest. As soon as the two main issues were settled, both sides could
amicably settle on the allocation of various party posts by dividing them 
43evenlyr
The distrust between the two factions was well indicated by the equivocal
attitudes taken by the two factions on the constitutional amendment for the
!
cabinet system. The old DP had been advocating the amendment ever since its 
inception as its key program, because it believed that the presidential system 
was partly responsible for the rise of Rhee's dictatorship.^ * In spite of this
40. Bee ibid., pp*383-4 and 388-9, and Min Kwan-shik,op.cit.$pp»140^ 1«
41. Lee Ki-ha, ibid., p*390.
42. See ibid.? and Min Kwan-shilc, op.cit., pp*311-5■>
43. See Lee Ki-ha, op.cit.,p.351* The number of the membership of the
Supreme Council was increased to six in order to give each faction three seats; 
Cho Pyong-olc, Paek Ham-hun and Yun Po-sbn of the "old faction" and Chang My&i, 
Kwak Sang-hun and Pak Sun~ch'on of the "new faction."
44. aee an excerpt of Chang Mybn's speech at the inauguration of the DP on
September 19»1955, in his "On Chang Mybn," J^.cit,.* PP*360-1j and a part of Cho
Pybnsr-ok's "An Open Letter to President Rhee," in his ittn.iu.iuui wa m, op.cit., 
pp.223-39. Cho's open letter, an indictment of Rhee's dictatorship, was carried 
in five instalments on Tong-A Ilbo between May 31 to June 8, 1957.
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strong commitment, the two factions differed their views according to their
political expediency. While Chang Myon was serving the vice-presidency with
45a good chance of succeeding old President Rhee, * the ‘’new faction” had not
only tacitly opposed the amendment but also regarded any advocation or move-
46raent for the amendment by the "old faction" with uneasiness and suspicion*
When the "new faction" advocated the amendment in 1959? it was, however, only
on the condition that Chang Myc&t would be designated as the future Prime
Minister in case of his defeat in the contest for the presidential nomination.
In contrast, it was not coincident that during Chang's vice-presidency the
most ardent advocators of the cabinet system were the members of the "old
faction." It was time, Min Kwan-shik says, "that some persons in the 'old
faction1 dreaded the idea of Dr. Chang becoming the President, should anything 
47
happen /to Rhee/£" 0 hut in 1959 it itfas the "old faction" which took the 
lukewarm attitude toward the cabinet system, because the "old faction" was 
then confident that Cho would get the nomination and would be elected to the 
presidency, ihe contrasting positions and the opportunism of the factions 
shown on the issue of the cabinet system revealed; how the extreme factional 
distrust made the opposition politicians irresponsible and how the politicians 
put their factional interest ahead of the integrity of the party's key 
political stand.
The death of presidential candidate Cho Py#ng~ok on February 15, I960 (just 
a month before the election day, March 15), from a heart attack, created 
similar disarray in the party as the death of presidential candidate Shin Ik-hui 
did four years ago. The death of Cho was the irreplaceable loss of the party's
45* The importance of the vice-presidency was attest&Sby the assassination 
attempt on Yice-President Chang's life by the Liberal Party at the DP's 
national convention on September 28, 1956. The Liberal Party and the govern­
ment tried to convince the public that the three assassins were hired by the 
"old faction." See the indictment of former Liberal Party Assemblyman im 
H&ig-sun, former Rational Police Chief, Kim Chong-won and others by the Seoul 
District Prosecution Office in June I960, in Hankuk hy&cmy&ig chaep'an sa,
Vol.I, 211* cit., pp.333-”6.
46. Min Kwan-shik, op. cit., pp.122-3*
47* Ibid., p.122.
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48*
presidential candidate since the election law forbade a replacement.
Especially for the nold faction," his death was a fatal blow because M s  death
was tantamount to the loss of the party hegemony to the "new faction" which
had just won the headship of the party in the last convention* For this
reason, militant members of the "old faction" took indifferent attitudes to
Chang's vice-presidential campaign and even urged Chang to withdraw from the
elections by arguing that the whole elections without the party's presidential
49candidate were meaningless, * The militants argued for a set of immediate 
actions —  including non-cooperation in the campaign, a forcible purge on 
the hardcore of the "new faction" and overthrown! of Chang's party leadersMp —  
in order to immediately restore the balance of power in the party.^ * If these 
actions failed, the militants also recommended the formation of a separate 
party.
The grave effect of the prolonged intra-party feuding in the old DP was
also the weakening of party loyalty among its members* This was visibly
evident in the shrinking of the number of seats held by the old DP in the
National Assembly. In the general elections in May 1958? despite extensive
ballot rigging, the Liberal Party failed to elect 156 or more seats —  the
necessary two-thirds of the total 233 seats for a constitutional amendment
51.
that would lay down a foundation of its permanent rule. * The results of the
52*elections gave the Liberal Party 126 seats, the old BP 79? and independents 28. 
Since then, both the Liberal Party and the old DP had increased their holdings 
of seats by absorbing the bulk of independents. By the summer of 1959 the 
distribution of the seats (at the time 232) was the Liberal Party 141 seats, 
the old DP 83, and independents 9*^ But as of March 1, I960, the old DP's
48. Sometime in 1959 the Liberal Party, mindful of the health of octogenarian 
Rhee, proposed to the old DP a revision of the election law to permit replacement 
of a deceased candidate. The old DP rejected it cognizant of a mortality table 
that was highly against old Rhee. See Min Kwan-shik, op.cit.s p.144*
49* Chang My&i,"Qn Chang Mycfn," op.cit., p.371? and Lee Ki-ha,op.cit., p.419*
50. Lee Ki-ha, ibid., pp.419'~21
51. See Kim Tbng-mytfng, "Criticism of the May 2nd General Elections," in 
Lee Sang-chong, ed., op.cit., pp.20-1.
52. CEMC, Taehanminkuk,s&akft sa, op. cit., p.420*
53. For the change of distribution of the seats, see the chart "The 
Changes of Political Parties in the 4th National Assembly," the Secretariat of 
the National Assembly, "The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, op.cit.,
p.120.
strength was reduced to 74 seats, while that of the liberal Party was
54.increased to 148 seats mainly at the expense of the old DP. This 
development meant that the old DP's strength fell four seats short of 
maintaining the absolute necessity of 78 seats for defeating any con­
stitutional amendment bill proposed by the Liberal Party. Taking the 
opportunity of the decline of the old DP's strength, it was reported
that, at the time, the Liberal Party was planning a constitutional amend-
55ment in the forthcoming session of the National Assembly in April I960.
However Rhee and his Liberal Party government were overthrown by the
April Student Revolution in I960. The revolution was triggered by the
students* anger at massive election irregularities organized by Rhee's
56.government and his Liberal Party. * The 1'evolution eventually thrust the 
old BP into power in the Second Republic.
TUB HISTORY OF THE OPPOSITIONS THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN P O M  
As the old DP was the only alternative to the discredited and shattered 
Liberal Party to control the forthcoming new government in the aftermath of 
the revolution, it was only natural that the factional struggle became 
Intensified because whoever controlled the hegemony of the party would also 
control the government.
With the enactment of the new Constitution for the cabinet system on 
June 15? I960, the immediate focus of their factional struggle was party 
nominations for the National Assembly in the general elections of July 29* 
Under the cabinet system the National Assembly became much more important 
than ever, because it selected the Prime Minister. Despite the official
nominations for both the House of Representative and the House of Councillors
54. See ibid.
55. "The Korean Presidential Elections and the Uprising in Masan," 
Sekai, May I960, p.212. The planned amendment was intended to elect, in 
the future, Rhee and his apparent successor Lee Ki-bung on the same ticket 
by an indirect election in the National Assembly where the Liberal Party 
could line up its own 148 members and perhaps 9 independents.
56. By rigging votes, unopposed Rhee received 88„7$ of the total 
valid votes, and his running-mate Lee Ki-bung on a separate ticket had 79$ 
while the incumbent Chang Mybn received a meager 16$. The whole results of 
the elections were, however, invalidated by the National Assembly on April 
26, 1960. See CEMG, Taehanminkuk s5nko sa, op.cit., pp.482-3*
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which were equally divided between the two factions, the two factions had
virtually opposed each other in the general elections when the defeated of the
opposite faction in the nomination ran at least 110 districts as independents
57.with the tacit sanction of their own factions. The party was thus already
58.quite divided into two separate entities.
In the elections, the DP as a single party won 175 of the 233 seats ^75*1$)
in the House of Representatives and 31 of the 58 seats (53*4$) in the House of 
59.Councillors. * Qfthe 175 elected to the House of Representatives, the exact 
factional strengths of the two factions were not known because of extremely 
fluid factional alignments in the aftermath of the elections. Because of this 
uncertainty of factional strengths, each faction believed that it could muster 
a majority of votes to control the new government. Under the new Constitution, 
the President was the ceremonial head of state with the authority to nominate 
the Prime Minister who was to wield, the real power as the head of the govern­
ment. The "new faction" had decided to divide the above two offices between 
the two factions by electing Tun Po-s&i of the "old faction" as the President 
and its own faction’s Chang Mytfn as the Prime Minister. The "new faction15s" 
strategy was obviously to eliminate Yun, the most eligible contender for the
office of Prime Minister, well in advance. The "old faction" had decided,
6o
however, to monopolize both offices with Yun Po-stfn and Kim To-y&i,
On August 12 along these lines of strategies, both factions had joined in 
electing Yun Po-s&n as the President of the Second Republic in the joint 
session of the Rational Assembly. In view of the serious threat to the stability 
of the new Republic in the aftermath of the revolution, newly-elected President 
Yun should have suppressed factional considerations in nominating a Prime 
Minister. Instead, the President designated his former factional friend Kim 
To-y&n to the premiership in accordance with the earlier decision made within
57. Ibid., p.430; and Min Kwan-shik, op.cit., p.152. See also Yun Po-siJn, 
"On Yun Po-sbn," H^imang ch'ulp’sa, ed., SashilTi chbnpu rfefl ld.su! handa, op. 
cit., p.301.
58. Min Kwan-shik, ibid., p. 153.
59. CEMC, Taehanminkuk sShkff sa, op.cit., pp.435 and 448. _
60. See Yun Fo-stin, Kukuk tii kashinat*kil, op. cit., p.84; and Kim To-yon, 
op. cit., p.362.
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61the "old faction." * On August 17 Kim To-yon, however, failed to get the 
consent of the House of Representatives by three votes. On the next day 
President Yun then designated Chang My bn and on August 19 Chang did get the
62consent of the House by the votes of 117 "yeses," 107 "nos" and 1 abstention.
The series of frantic confrontations had clearly demonstrated the lack of 
internal party cohesion even at the very moment when the situation within the 
new Republic most urgently demanded party solidarity. The artificial unity of 
the party, so far maintained by the intricate arrangements in allocation of 
party posts during the days of opposition to the common enemy Rhee, was no lon­
ger 'relevant after the party was brought into power. The DP had neither 
machinery to reconcile factional conflicts nor a capable leadership to instill 
a new sense of purpose. ' If the victorious "new faction" had displayed 
magnaminity by forming a truly non-faetional cabinet, as it pledged during the 
contest for the premiership, there would still have been a thin thread of hope 
for the continuation of the single party. But the first cabinet of Prime 
Minister Chang was completely dominated by his own faction, apart from two 
independents and one pro-Chang "old faction" member.
61. Yun Po-son recalled that the "old faction's" decision to monopolize 
both offices was "too greedy." However he defended his nomination of Kinn
he thought that the "old faction" was the majority in the House of Representatives, 
as the House had earlier elected So Min-ho of the "old faction" as a Vice-Speaker 
by the plurality of 15 votes. See Yun Po-s&n, ibid., pp*84 and 90. On the other 
hand, Kwak Sang-hun, then Speaker of the House of Representatives, claimed that 
the "new faction" was slightly stronger than the "old faction." He also accused 
Yun that the latter betrayed the "gentlemen's agreement" by designating Kim 
To-yon. See his"Qn Kwak Sang-hun," Huimang ch'ulp'ansa, ed., Sashil ui chbnpu 
rul kisul handa, op. cit., pp.262-3.
62. For the votes in the house, see Hankuk hy&kmybng chaep'an sa, op.cit., 
and Mun Ch'ang-ju. , Hankuk chbngch1 i ron (On Korean Politics) (Seouli llchokwak, 
1965), p-324.
63. Kwak Sang-hun, one moderate leader of the "new faction" said that if 
such heroic leaders as Kim S&ig-su, Shin Ik-hui and Cho PycSng-ok (incidentally, 
of the "old faction") were still alive, the DP might have survived the crisis 
in the aftermath of the April Student Revolution. See his "On Kwak Sang-hun," 
op. cit., p.268.
64. See Hankuk hyokmyong chaep'an sa, Vol.I, op.cit., p.194.
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The defeat of the "old faction" precipitated execution of its earlier 
proposal for division of the party. The opponents (especially among the members 
of the "new faction") of division argued that there was no significant difference 
between the two factions in national policies or ideology to justify the separa­
tion and that the BP had been entrusted with power as a single party with a
65 *single platform and should remain so. On August 31 the "old faction" 
formally registered with the House of Representatives as the Comrades Society 
of the Old Democrats (Minkutongjihoe) and started earnestly to hamper Chang's 
legislative programs including the much needed budget bill. The two factions 
finally separated when the "old faction" formed a separate party, the Hew 
Democratic Party, on November 14, I960 under the leadership of ICLm To~yon (the 
head) and Yu Chin-san. Thus the great coalition of anti-Rhee forces formed in 
1955 Nad ended by nothing less than an internal power struggle.
Some conclusions may be drawn from the history of the old DP. The most 
serious problem that prevented the party from developing into a cohesive and 
effective organisation was its lack of internal unity largely stemming from the 
persistent factionalism that bred distrust, suspicion and intolerance between 
the factions.
Decause it was the coalition of the two major incompatible, conservative 
groups —  brought together into a single party only by the common detestation 
of Rhee1 s dictatorship, there was no durable common ground on which they might 
forego their factional differences, and integrate themselves into a party with 
a strong common identity. Neither ideology nor national policy was the issue 
that separated them: it was the issue of leadership or hegemony of the party.
In the absence of an articulated set of common perspectives, a semblance of 
party unity was maintained therefore by intricate arrangements in the distribu­
tion of power. Whenever the balance of power was threatened, conflicts 
followed not only to restore it but restore it for preponderance.
Since factions were.constructed from leading personalities, the usual 
mechanism available for resolving factional conflicts was direct personal
65. See Kwak Sang-hun, "On Kwak Sang-hun," op.cit., pp.266-8; and 
"Report of the UNCURK," United Nations, 16th Session, Supplement No. 13 
(A/4900), op.cit., p.3.
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negotiations between the leaders of antagonistic factions. 3uch negotiations 
were made possible by bypassing the formal party mechanism which was always 
rendered ineffective by deadlock between the factions. This practice was 
hardly conducive to institutionalizing the party as the final authority in 
the matters of arbitrating conflicts, instilling party discipline, and integra­
ting the diverse elements and their interests for the larger interest of the 
whole party. This was the most critical area of functional failures of the 
party. Consequently, forceful showdowns usually accompanied by denunciations, 
invectives, intrigues and even physical violence had often occurred when 
personal negotiations between the factional leaders failed to settle the major 
issues.
The failure to institutionalize the party inevitably made the factions 
the loci of loyalty and activities of individual party members who could not 
find institutional loyalty and security in the party per se. In this sense, 
the old BP was not a party but a collection of the factions which in the end 
could no longer accomodate each other. The instability of the old BP thus caused 
to a considerable degree the political instability of the Second Republic.
THE OPPOSITION POLITICS BEFORE FORMATION OF THE HASS PARTY.
With the advent of the military government in May 1961, all political groups 
were disbanded and their political activities remained wider suspension for the 
next two and a half years. With the resumption of political activities on 
January 1, 1963? the two groups of the old DP immediately emerged prominent 
among opposition parties against the military leaders who were about to organize 
their own party. But in spite of their identical goal in opposition to the 
"extension of the military rule", it soon became apparent that they had to regroup 
separately under the old factional banners for exactly the same reason that they 
had to split the old BP in the Second Republic.
66.
In the early stage of political activities, there were several movements
66. For an excellent summary of political party activities in the early 
part of 1963? see "Report of the UNCURIC," United Nations. Official Records of the 
General Assembly, 18th Session, Supplement No.12 (a/5512), 1963, pp".9"-^ 0j and 
GEMG^ Taehanminkuk s$nk# sa, op.cit., pp.355-61.
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for the formation of a "pan-opposition1* party to consolidate civilian 
opposition forces against the military, i'he first serious effort for the 
formation of a "pan-opposition'* party was the creation of the Civil Rule 
Party (CRP) on January 3, 1963, by four prominent leaders: former President
lun Po-son, Rim Hyong-no ^former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court), Lee 
In ^former Minister of Justice and an independent), and Chon Chin-hah 
^former Minister of Social Affairs and the former head of the Labor and 
Agrarian Party). i'he composition of the initial participants in the CRP 
appeared to be a grand coalition including the two rival factions of the old 
DP, a number of independents and social leaders, and some Liberal Party 
members.
However, the proposed CRP was in reality the revival of the former New
Democratic Party under the leadership of Yun Po-s’&n and his friends Kim To-y&i
and Yu Chin-san. The predominance of the lew Democratic faction (the "old
faction") in the CRP became clear when the entire contingent of former members
of the New Democratic Party came out in support of the new party on January
67.
14 and joined it as soon as they were released from the political blacklist
68.
after February 1963. * Having been deprived of its boss (former Prime
Minister Chang) and of a number of prominent leaders either through the junta's
69 /blacklist or retirement from politics, * the Democratic faction (the "new
faction") was no match for the New Democratic faction in the CRP. Its own
lack of factional strength was obviously the reason why, on January 17* the
Democratic faction withdrew from the CRP. The withdrawal of the Democratic
faction made the CRP far removed from a "pan-opposition" party and rapidly
accelerated its transformation into de facto a revival of the former New
Democratic Party. At its inauguration convention on May 14, the CRP, as
expected, nominated Yun Po-s&a as its presidential candidate.
67. See the statement of former members of the New Democratic Party in 
Chosun Xlbo, January 15, 1963•
68. Sb Byong-jo, Chongsang eui tooh&ija, op* cit., p. 157.
69. Chang Mybn, Kim Y6ng-s(£TXMinister of Finance), Kim Sang-don (Mayor of 
Seoul), Kim S^n-t*ae (Minister without Portfolio) and Lee Ch'&l-sdng (Chairman 
of the National Defense Committee in. the House of Representatives) were on the 
blacklist; while Kwak Sang-hun, Hy6n S6k-ho (Minister of National Defense) and 
0 Wi-y&ig (Minister without Portfolio) were in retirement. See "The History of 
the Mass Party," op* cit*
308
After withdrawal from the CRP, the Democratic faction decided to revive
and re-develop the old party. However, due to the lack of a leader prominent
enough to he presidential candidate, it was losing a significant number of 
v TOparty members to Ho Ch&ig. * Ch&ng, the former Acting President of the
interim government, commanded vast prestige for his political integrity and
administrative experience and was generally considered the alternative to Yun
Po-son as the strongest presidential candidate of the opposition. Ho was also
about to form the Hew Rule Party (Shiajongtang) with his own followers.^1.
But the group of the Democrats which joined H&'s Hew Rule Party in March
nevertheless withdrew from it in May when the Hew Rule Party failed to give it
proper ”consideration” in the distribution of party posts and in the organiza-
72tion of local party chapters. ’ On July 18 the old Dp was revived and 
inaugurated under the collective leadership headed by PaK Sun-ch'&n
Thus the hope of forming a "pan-opposi ti on” party was effectively dead 
when the two leading groups that comprised the old DP could not unite into a 
single party and they had practically reconstructed their old parties by re­
grouping respectively under the CRP and the DP (see fable l).
TABLE lg COMPOSITION OP OPPOSITION PARTIES IN 1963
Former parties Civil Rule Democratic Party 01 People Lib. Demo,
New Demo, Party 67 »7$ 34.t$
Democratic Party 6.5 91*4# IQ.Ofo 15*8
Liberal Party 6.5 19.0 12.6
Unification Party - 6.3
Independents 12.8 - 4-5.0 6.3
Military origin - - «. 6.3
New comers 6.5 8 .6 16.0 18.7
Others 2 .0 —
ioo.q T " ~“l0 0 ^ 1 100. Ofa 100,
Sources Kyunghyang Shinmoon, November 1, 1965•
70o CMC, Taehanminkuk s&nko sa. op. cit., p.358»
71. About the New Rule Party, see ibid.; and United Nations, 18th Session, 
Supplement No. 12 (ii/5512), og. cite, p.10. The New Rule Party was reorganized 
into the Party of the People in September 3-963 after the failure of a mei’ger
movement among the CRP, Popular Friendship Party (Minutang) of Lee B&n-slSk and 
Ho's own party. Ho became the presidential candidate of the Party of the People.
72. CMC, Taehanminkuk s6nko sa, ibid., p«360.
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In the view of their similarities in political ideology and programs, of
their common experience in the single party in the past, of the compelling need
of their unity against the military rule, and above all, of their mutual know-
73.
ledge of effectiveness of collective action, * these two groups had more 
reasons for uniting into a single party than for separating into two parties.
Certain moves to voluntary integration occur more easily if previous integra-
. . 74
txve experience has been adequately and equally beneficial to all participants,
However, the integrative experience of the two major factions in the old DP had
hardly been adequately and equally beneficial. It was rather an experience of
perpetual struggle for gaining power by a stronger faction at the expense of a
weaker faction. The relentless challenge of the “new faction11 to the dominant
"old faction" in the quest for an equal share of power in the party in the pre-
April revolution period, or the monopoly by the “new faction” of governmental
power in the Second Republic had clearly demonstrated that the fruits of their
long cooperation were not for the all to share but for the strongest to grab.
Because of this unhappy integrative experience in the past, it was natural
that the weaker Democratic faction refused to join the stronger Hew Democratic
faction in the formation of a “pan-opposition” party which would inevitably be
controlled by Yung Po-sbn and his faction. This was also the reason why the
revived DP chose H6 Chbng for the presidential candidate against Yun Po-sbn
during the height of the nomination struggle within the Party of the People in
75August and September 1963-
, THE PACTIONAL COMPOSITION AMD THE STRUCTURE AMD LEADERSHIP 
OP THE m m  PARTY
As the above review of the career of the opposition in Korea revealed,
73. About some sociological and psychological factors for political 
integration, see Philip E. Jacob and James Y. Toscano, ed,, The Integration of 
Political Communities (Philadelphias lippincott, 1964).
74- for general ideas suggestive of this hypothesis, see Karl ¥. Deutsch, 
“The Price of Integration,” and Henry Teune, "The Learning of Integrative 
Habits,” ibid., pp.143-78 and 247-82.
75; Yun's candidacy was formally opposed by the DP when its "Consultative 
Conference for Promotion of A Single Presidential Candidate for the United 
Opposition” outlined the five categories of fitness of persons running for 
the presidency. See Chgsun Ilbo, August 27, 1963-
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the MP was indeed- the latest version of the oldest party in Korea which had 
survived the cycle of unity and division over many years. Although some 
changes in leadership and internal alignments occurred under the stresses of 
political ehanges during this period, the internal problems that confronted 
the MP in 1965 were, however, essentially the same ones in nature that had 
continuously plagued the opposition. The most serious problem was again the 
lack of internal cohesion stemming from factionalism and personal ambition.
The factional strife in the MP was, in fact, more intensified than ever 
because the restrictive party and election laws made the control of party 
hegemony more important than anything else (cf. Chapter 6). The reason was 
this: the laws required party nomination mandatory for prospective candidates,
and the number of the aspirants for elective offices exceeded the number of 
nominations for the seats or offices available. Whenever parties merged, the 
competition for party nomination thus became keener because each party 
participating in the merger brought with it its own aspirants for party 
nominations of the merged party.
Just before the inauguration of the MP in June 1965* it was generally
76
known that the MP was composed of 11 two corps and eight divisions.1’ * The 
two "corps” meant the two parties —  the CRP and the DPj and the eight 
"divisions," the eight major factions under the two parties —  three factions 
within the CRP and five factions within the DP. The factional alignments 
and their approximate strengths (among 1,055 convention delegates) just 
before the inauguration of the party were reportedly as follows:
76. For the factional composition of the MP, see "Is it Possible to 
Terminate Pactional Struggles?" Kyunghyang Shinmoon, op. cit., and Kim 
Byong-su, "The Analysis of the Mass Party," Chibang haengch&ig, Vol.14, No.7. 
July 1965, pp.133-7.
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TABLE II; FACTIONS II MASS PARTY BEFORE) INAUGURATION. 
Party & Strength Faction and Strength Group & Strength Total
Civil Rule 615 
(Yun Po-s8n)
Yun Po-s&l 
Kim To-y&i 
Yu Chin-san 
Others
Democratic 440 
(Pak Sun-ch'bn 
& Ho Cheung)
■Yun Group 460 
■Yu Group 200
Bemo*group 330
Cho Chae-ch'cSn 120>
(Pak Sun-ch' 6n)
Lee Chae-y6ng 85 
Hong Ik-pyo 80- 
Ch’6ng Il-hy6ng 70 
Lee Sang-ch'bl 45/
Others 40
Total Delegates  1,055
Sources The table was constructed mainly based on
"Is It Possible to Terminate Factional Struggles?"
ICyunghyang Shinmoon, June 12, 1965.
To group them again cross-sectionally in terms of major issues in the
party, the MP was composed of three large groups: (l) the Yun Po-s&n group
(the coalition of the factions of Yun Po-s&i and Kim To-ytfn of the CRP and of
the faction of Ch&ng Il-hyong of the DP): (2) the Yu Chin-san group; and (3)
the Democratic Group (the four factions of the DP which supported Pak Sun-ch'6n 
v 77
and Ho Ch&ng). ‘ Later the Yun group was also known as the "militant faction,"
and the coalition of the Democratic group and the Yu group as the "moderate
faction." Their political differences and different strategies against the
ROK-Japan treaty have already been discussed in Chapter 6.
The complexity of factional alignments and accompanying factional claims
presented a considerable problem to organizing a leadership structure of the
MP* In making the charter of the party, the guiding principle was, first, to
construct a collective leadership in order to prevent domination of the party
by the T-rill of one man or one faction, and, second, to accomodate the bosses
7ftof the major factions in order to maintain party unity.
Based on this principle they constructed a "dual collective leadership," 
by creating the Supreme Council of three men (one to be the head of the council,
i.e.,the head of the party)as the highest leadership body reserved for the top 
leaders and the Leadership Council of 12 men for the important factional bosses.79*
77. "is it Possible to Terminate Factional Struggles?" ibid.
78. "A Hypertrophy of the Upper Part: the Leadership Structure of the Mass
Party reflected in the Party Charter," Chosun Ilbo, June 13, 1965^ t y
79. For the organization and the structure of the MP, see ibid.; Kim Byong- 
SUf op. cit., p.136; and "Is It Possible to Terminate Factional Struggles?"
op.cit.
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All important party affairs and policies were to be made by the Joint 
Conference which consisted of the entire membership of both the Supreme 
Council and the Leadership Council* Under the control of the Joint 
Conference, the Party Council of twenty-eight men was to supervise the 
Office of General Affairs which was in charge of operating the daily 
routine of the party. In short, the leadership structure was custom-made 
exclusively to accomodate important factional leaders, rather than to create 
a dynamic leadership to lead the party (see the chart of the party organiza­
tion above).
There was however, from the beginning, an intense struggle for the hege­
mony of the MP. This was well reflected in the positions taken by the three 
major groups, for example, on the issue of the number of the membership in 
the Supreme Council. The largest Tun group wanted to limit the number to 
two? the second largest Democratic group, to fives and the smallest Yu group,
Q q
to nine. 4 The group which believed that it could control the hegemony of
the party attempted to exclude others from the party leadership as much as
possible, while the group which regarded itself as weak wanted to diffuse it
as much as possible*
The decisive and clear factional division between the Yun group, on the
one hand, and the coalition of the Democratic group and the Yu Group, on the
other hand, was established in the HP's first national convention of June 14,
1965* In the election for the head of the Supreme Council, Yun Po-s&n was
unexpectedly defeated by Madam Pak Sun-ch* of the Democratic group by votes 
8 Xof 513 to 460. * By a face-saving device, Yun was, by acclamation, elected
to the "Advisor” post (the post instantly created by the convention when Yun
\ 82. declined a seat in the Supreme Council) which he declined to accept. ° The
80. "Is It Possible to Terminate Pactional Struggles?” ibid.; and
"A Hypertrophy of the Upper Parti the Leadership Structure of the Mass Party 
Reflected in the Party Charter,” op*cit.
81. For the elections, see Chosun Ilbo, June 15, 1965, and Tong-A•  *■. I.«u,,■,.»!< 11 '■ eme-em-Wiw/ *  *  —nrtn .Mn.iJegi .a.tcw-
llbo, June 15, 1965.
82. Chosun llbo, ibid.
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convention also elected Ho Chong (the Democratic group) and So Min-ho (the 
Kim io-yon faction in the Yun group) to the membership of the Supreme 
Council.. In the ensuing elections on the following day for the Leadership 
Council, five members of the Democratic group, four members of the Yu group 
and three members of the Yun group were elected. The decisive defeat of 
Yun Po-s&n and his group in both the elections was due to the alliance of 
Pak Sun-chlon‘s Democratic group with the Yu group. As a result of the 
elections, the coalition of the Democrat!c-Yu groups took control of the
84-party by outnumbering the Yun group by 11 to 4 in the important Joint Conference. *
The defeat of Yun Po-son and his group meant the sudden collapse of his hitherto
unchallenged personal leadership in the opposition camp as well as the defeat
85.
of his militant line by the moderate line of the coalition. This also 
meant the disappearance of the central force which had led the opposition move­
ment in the 'third Republic, and replacement of it by a loose coalition of the 
two groups.
the result of the elections was bound to have a serious impact on the 
future of the MOP. The immediate question was? How would the still largest 
and relatively cohesive Yun group take the defeat? As mentioned earlier, the 
leadership structure of the party was deliberately constructed to reflect the 
strength of each group in the dual collective leadership. But the distribu­
tion of the seats in the Joint Conference after the elections was tantamount 
to self-defeat of the purpose of the party, because the cornerstone of stability 
of the party had to be realistically based on the strength of each group whose 
cooperation was essential for party unity. When the militant faction (the Yun 
group) refused to accept its minority status and tried to impose its will
83. See Chosun Ilbo, June 16, 1965? and “The Fight Without Compromise 
on Allocation of the Posts,’* Chosun llbo, of the same date.
84. About the new leadership of the HP, see "The Pilots of the Mass Party,” 
Chosun Ilbo, June 17, 1965.
85. “The Female Head of the Party and the Road Ahead," Chosun Ilbo,
June 15, 1965.
86. One of the most revealing stories about the extreme factional antagonism 
generated by the defeat of the Yun group was told by Pak Sun-ch’bn in her vivid 
description of the atmosphere of Yun’s camp when she visited Yun’s residence
after the elections. See Pak Kwon-sang, "Interview with Pale Sun-ch’&i," op.cit., 
pp. 259-60.
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on the party during the treaty crisis, the intense intra-party struggle 
between the militant faction and the moderate faction (the coalition) was 
thus initiated.
THE I8S13ES AMD THE POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF FACTIOUS.
Oneimportant aspect of the new factional alignments after the elections 
was that for the first time the factional division between the rival groups 
in the opposition was, at least in appearance, demarcated by the difference 
of political attitudes rather than by the traditional factional loyalty.
The distinction between the "militant" and “moderate'1 factions could be 
determined from their respective political attitudes as to the degree and 
means of opposition to the ruling DHP and the government or the question of 
collaboration with them. On this ostensive ground, the Yu Ohin-san group 
of the CRP crossed the party line and joined the Democratic group, while
oty
the Chbng ll-hy&ng faction of the DP likewise joined the Yun Pq-s&i group.
Although the factional alignments in the IIP appeared to be based on the 
difference of political attitudes, it was in fact the by-product of the 
continuing factional struggles in both the GRP and the DP before the merger 
took place. In other words, the new alignments in the HP were the result of
the defection of the minority factions (the Yu group and the Ch&ig Il-hy&ig
88faction) which were disowned by their respective former parties. ’ Yun Po-s&n's 
defeat in the convention was thus due to the defection of the Yu group. This 
was a factor that had certainly contributed to the intensification of faction­
al rivalry between the militants and the moderates under the pretext of
89political difference.
In this connection, the reason why Yu Chin-san defected his former boss
87. See the analysis of the elections in "The Fight Without Compromise 
on Allocation of the Posts," op. cit.
88. See, e.g.* "The Democratic Party Hoists Sail," Chosun Ilbo,
December 15, 1964? and "The Civil Rule Party i The Factions in Motion,"
Chosun Ilbo, March 17, 1965-
89* See "The Return of the Mass Party to the Rational Assembly As a 
Sign of Division of the Party," op, cit., p.139.
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Trai Po-sbn sheds a certain light on the nature of the new factional align­
ments in the HP. When the CRP was formed in early 1963? there were two 
main rival factions among the members of the former New Democratic Party* 
the Yun Po-son faction under the command of the field-general Yu Chin-san; 
and the Kim To-y&n faction under the command of the field-general So S#n-kyu.^* 
Kim '1 o-y$n, in view of his former capacity as head of the New Democratic Party, 
naturally resented Yun's hegemony in the CRP which was practically the re­
construction of the old party, This resentment finally led to the defection 
of So S&n-kyu (in June 1963) and Kira To-y&i (in September 1963) from the CRP
and to their participation in the Liberal Democratic Party, after the Kim To-
v 91.yon faction had been defeated in the struggle for party hegemony. After
the elimination of the Kim To-y&n faction, Yu Chin-san began to assert his 
independence, notably by trying to persuade Yun Po-s&i to give up his presi­
dential ambition in favor of Ho Ch&ng when the Party of the People was dead-
92,locked in September 1963« " This was the beginning of their personal
animosity that culminated in the expulsion of Yu Ghin-san and his thirteen
supporters from the CRP on October 8, 1964.
This was the so-called "Yu Chin-san uproar" which flared up on August 5s
1964, three days after the National Assembly enacted the controversial press
law. This law, proposed by the DRP, was supposedly a part of the legislative
package deal agreed upon between the DRP and the opposition parties in the
Bipartisan Consultative Conference in exchange for the lifting' of the martial
law declared on June 13? 1964. The opposition opposed the press law bill,
93,but did not register its dissent by casting negative votes. * Since Yu was 
the leader of the parliamentary wing of the CRP at the time and had been known
90. S& By^ng-jo, Ch&ngsang eilt tochdn.ja? on * cit., p,157*
91. Ibid., p.158? and Kim To-ybn, op, cit,, p»436.
92. See the advertised statement of the Yu Group, "The Statement
concerning the Reckless Act of Mr. Yun Po-s&i," in Chosun Ilbo, December 22, 1964.
93. See Kira To-y&i, op. cit,, pp.486-7.
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94.
for some time to Toe a moderate in dealing with the ruling DRP, Yun 
immediately took the case of the feeble opposition of the GBP shown in
the press law, as a good opportunity to brand Xu as a traitor to the party
95.and to the press, and lodged a vigorous purge campaign against Xu and
his faction in the name of ’’unification of the party’s political orienta- 
96tion." 0 With this uproar the militant political position of the Xun 
faction and the moderate position of the Xu faction became sharply arti­
culated .
Much the same can be said about the case of the Cli&ng ll-hy5ng 
97faction in the PP. ‘In the course of factional struggle against the dominant 
Cho Chae-ch'&n faction, Ch&ig also sharpened his militant line to attack Cho, 
by accusing him also of collaborating with the DRP, for instance, in the 
press law. As the two cases cited above alone attested, the true nature of 
conflict between the militants and the moderates was the struggle for party 
hegemony rather than the contest between two “true believers.”
PARTY POLITICS M D  FACTIONALISM DURING THE! RQK-JAPAN TREATY CRISIS.
In view of the above genesis of the factional alignments in the HP, the 
strategy and tactics for halting the ROK-Japan treaty naturally became the 
central issue in the factional struggle. Although defeated, the militant 
faction was in an excellent position to regain party hegemony by taking the 
initiative in the treaty struggle which was itself the main purpose of forming 
the IP, Since the struggle against the treaty was also directly connected with
94. For instance, Xu was in favor of participation in a non-partisan 
diplomatic mission to the United States in January 1964. But the Party Council 
of the CRP vetoed it. Tong-A Ilbo, January 25, 1964.
95. Xun capitalised the attack of the press and intellectuals on the 
opposition for its failure to halt the press law. For criticism of intellectuals 
see, e.g., S$n U-h&L, ’’Advice to the Opposition,” Chosun Ilbo, June 30, 1965.
96. For the Xu case, see 85 By&ng-jo, Ch5ngsang evil toch6aja9 op. cit., 
pp.168-70; Yun Po-s&i, Kukuk ui kashipat’kil, op. cit., pp.205-7; the Xu 
faction’s "The Statement concerning the Reckless Act of Mr. Yun Po-s&i,” op. cit. 
"The Civil.Rule Partys the Direction of the Intra-Party Conflict," Series No.l, 
Tong-A Ilbo, August 24, 1964 j and "Three Dimensional Mirror," Chosun Ilbo. 
December 8 , 1964.
97. See "The Democratic Partys the Direction of the Intra-party 
Conflict," Series No.3, Tong-A Ilbo, August 26, 1964j "The Gloomy Political 
Streets at the End of the Year," Chosun Ilbo, March 18, 1965.
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the ultimate overthrowal of the Park government, an extreme opposition to 
the treaty was regarded as the best potent weapon for the militant faction
OQ
to attack their enemies within and outside of the party."'
This strategy was apparent even before the merger took place. The 
proposal for dissolution of the National Assembly by Tun Po-s6n on May 7,
1965, was reportedly decided by his strategists who had calculated that only 
by political commitment to an extraordinary extent, they could, first, 
maintain Yun's eminent leadership in the opposition camp, and second, they 
could arouse the masses, who were indifferent to usual political slogans,
99.to a sense of extreme urgency in opposing the treaty and the government itself.
Obviously Tun's strategy was sensationalism. Nonetheless it proved to b©
effective as the opponents to the treaty grew in number and in intensity.
Because of the overwhelming support for the militant line of Tun Po-s&i
from the treaty opponents in the streets, the moderate faction could neither
consolidate its majority position in the party nor could it assert its
moderate line of struggle against the treaty. The initiative of the militant
faction in the treaty struggle was felt when the same national party convention,
which only a few hours ago had entrusted the party leadership to the moderates,
had to adopt unanimously the following resolution calling for resignation of
the opposition members en masse from.the National Assembly?
If a treaty bill, unacceptable to the Mass Party, is introduced 
into the National Assembly ... , the opposition membersa should 
resign from the National Assembly should.it become impossible to
halt ratification of the treaty in spite of having struggled
against it to the last minute. 100.
If this resolution was to be carried out despite the objection of the 
DRP majority to such resignation, the opposition would also have to resign
98. See, e.g., Kim T&ng-sam, "Retrospect on the Parliamentary Politics 
in 1965," op. cit., p«6.
99. See "Three Dimensional Mirror," Chosun Ilbo, May 9> 1965*
* iM'H lJ n irrw  * V  *
100. For the resolution of June 14, 1965, see Chosun Ilbo, June 15,
1965.
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from the HP in order to make their resignation irrevocable. Furthermore, 
in order to enforce this resolution uniformly to include potential 
"resignation dodgers," the only remaining possibility was to dissolve the 
party itself. The dissolution of the party would automatically lead to the 
loss of the seats of the entire opposition members in accordance with a 
constitutional provision. Because of this potential danger in the resolution, 
a few days later lak Sun-cb'<$n belatedly warned against an extreme extension
of the resolution by saying that "resignation is not the best way" for the
101.party. ° But armed with this resolution, which was, in effect, the
official endorsement by the party of the militant strategy, the militant
faction had decided to enforce its will on the majority moderate faction.
The first serious confrontation between the two factions commenced with
the issue of the allocation, of about 250 seats in the party's Cehtral 
102Standing Committee. ° In spite of the urgency of immediate functioning
of the party to give an effective opposition to the treaty, the disagreement
on the allocation of the seats prevented the formation of the Central Stand-
103.ing Committee until July 24. The Central Standing Committee was
empowered to organize various operational departments of the central party. 
Without the functioning of the Central Standing Committee the 1V1P was thus 
without a propei1 party apparatus to operate it or to deliberate and decide 
a single strategy against the treaty. It was during this factional
bickering that the DRP had forcibly introduced the treaty ratification bill 
to the Rational Assembly on July 14®
In the state of extreme indignation at the DRP's forcible manner in the 
introduction of the bill, on July 15 the party's Parliamentary Croup Conference
3.01® Kim By&ig-su, op. cit., p. 137.
102. The head of the party Pak had allocated the seats in the following 
ratios the moderate faction 60$ (the Democratic group 40$ and the Yu group
20$) and the militant faction 40$ (the Tun group 30$ and the Kim To-y&n faction 
10$). But the Yun group demanded 35$. See Chosun Ilbo, July 4, 1965.
103* The Central Standing Committee was finally formed after militant 
faction agreed to accept 42.4$ of the seats. See Chosun Ilbo, July 15 and 
July 25, 1965.
104* Cf. the editorial of Chosun Ilbo, July 6, 1965*
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105.had reaffirmed the national party convention's resolution on the resignation.
'i'he National Assemblymen had also resolved to submit by 10® a.m. of the next 
day their letters of resignation from the National Assembly to the head of
the party, who would then decide the time of submission of their letters to
1
the Speaker of the National Assembly. ‘ * The above step was a substantial
concession on the part of the moderates to meet the extreme demand of the
militants. But the militants were not satisfied with this measure and insisted
further on their immediate resignation from the National Assembly by either
107resignation from the party or dissolution of the party. In a counter-move,
the moderates, who controlled the party's leadership in the Joint Conference, 
issued a statement to the effect that the militant faction's movement for
dissolution of the party had not been snactioned by the official party
l nff
machinery and eonstitued a "treacherous act" against the party. * The moder­
ates claimed that the dissolution movement of the militants was motivated purely 
by a desire to capture party hegemony.Because of this factional distrust, 
the National Assemblymen‘s resolution to submit letters of resignation to the 
head of the party was. not fully carried out."^^*
Their difference was further widened when Pak Sun-ch'bn, as the head of 
the NOP, had committed the party to the "five-point compromise" at the summit 
meeting with President Park on July 20. The suffimit meeting was arranged to 
find a way of avoiding the imminent head-on collision between the government 
and the opposition on the treaty bill.. The important points of the compromise 
were l^) both the government and the opposition should avoid an extreme confron­
tation, and any confrontation should be made within the framework of the con­
stitutional order; and (2) there should be sufficient time to debate the
111bill in a special session of the National Assembly. ‘ * This compromise by
105. Chosun Ilbo, July 16, 1965.
106. Ibid. See also Chosun Ilbo, July 17, 1965.
107. "The Opposition Party in Agony," Chosun Ilbo, July 18,1965.
108• Chosun Ilbo, July,17, 1965.
109. "The Opposition Party in Agony," op. cit.
110. Among the 62 members, no more than 50 members had actually submitted 
their letters of resignation. Chosun Ilbo, July 17, 1965.
111. See Chosun Ilbo, July 21, 1965; and Tong-A Ilbo, July 20, 1965.
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the moderates was directly opposed to the strategy of the militants who had
rejected any compromise with the government. The militants denounced the
compromise as contrary to the earlier resolutions of the HP.
Although the moderates apologetically explained away the compromise as
a tactical victory in that it gained a respite without necessarily modifying
112.the existing strategy, ~ by this compromise the moderates tried to check
113the initiative of the militants and to assert their position in the party.
As expected, the compromise prompted the intensification of the separate
intra-party strategies? the "dissolution of the party" by the militants
114.
versus the "consolidation of the party" by the moderates. The militants
attacked the moderates with a bellicose statement that "the Mass Party was
occupied by the 1 salcuras1.« ("Sakura" is a Japanese word for cherry blossom;
and here used as a reference to fifth columns sent in by the ruling party to
subvert the opposition party). * They even spread a rumor that the moderates
117.were being financed by the government after the summit meeting of July 20*
The Central Standing Committee was, for the first time, convened on
July 26 (exactly 42 days after the inauguration of the party), first, to
organize the party's operational departments and, second, to decide the specific
steps of the strategy against the treaty. Since the militants had already
decided to wreck the party, they did not see any utility in organizing the
il8departments which they could not in any case control* * The militant faction
thus vetoed organization of the departments and, instead, insisted on a show-
119down on the issue of the strategy. The issue of the strategy was officially
112* See the statement of Cho Chae-ch1Sn, the spokesman of the moderate 
faction, in "The Prospect of the 52nd Session of the Ratification Rational 
Assembly," Chosun Ilbo, July 22, 1965• For an excellent summary of the argu­
ments between the two factions, see "The ROIC in Upheaval," op* cit., pp.13-4• 
113* See "A Dialogue Opened," op* cit *, pp.13-4.
114. Ibid.
115. See "From the Lobby," Chosun Ilbo, July 25, 1965»
116. The term "sakura" was so slanderously used that anybody who made 
friendly contact with members of the DRP or of the government was called by it. 
For the abuse of this term, see Lee Hyo-sang (Speaker of the Rational Assembly), 
"A Message Bidding the Old Tear," Kukhoebo, Ro*50, December 20, 1965, p*2.
117. See "From the Lobby," Chosun Ilbo, July 25, 1965.
118. The militant faction earlier demanded at least 50^ of the 27 posts 
while the moderate faction was willing to give only 4($>. See Chosun Ilbo,
July 25, 1965*
119- Chosun Ilbo, July 27, 1965*
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decided after nine hours of heated debates by the adaptation of the moderates*
120.version of the resolution by 151 votes out of the 252. ' The entire text 
of the resolution of the Central Standing Committee was as follows i
(1) In order to halt ratification of the ROK-Japan treaty 
the Mass Party should utilize all possible means by concentra­
ting its entire power and capacity.
The Mass Party demands general elections before any ratifi­
cation to form a (ratification) Rational Assembly that shall 
reflect th© will of the people.  ^The party rejects any negotia­
tion that might compromise the party's position against 
ratification of the treaty.
(2) The party's Rational Assemblymen should develop to the 
maximum the parliamentary struggle in accordance with the above 
principle. If such a struggle becomes useless and if it becomes 
apparent that the treaty will be forcibly ratified, all the 
party's National Assemblymen should resign from the National 
Assembly in accordance with the resolutions of the National 
Party Convention and of the Parliamentary Group Conference.
(3) Resignation from the National Assembly must be carried 
out. In the event of the letters of resignation from the 
National Assembly being rejected by the Democratic Republican 
Party, the party's National Assemblymen should not reconcile 
themselves to such rejection.
(4) As a means of implementing that resignation, it is 
recommended to the party's National Assemblymen that they submit 
their letters of resignation from the party. The floor leader 
of the party shall collect such letters and hand them to the 
head of the party.
(5) Hereafter no argument concerning dissolution of the 
party as the means of halting ratification of the ROK-Japan 
treaty should be made. 121.
Although both factions -were in complete accord with the ultimate aim 
of the struggle against the treaty, the moderates sharply differed from the 
militants by stressing the "parliamentary struggle" instead of the "struggle 
in the streets." The moderates were also opposed to the dissolution of the 
party and to the forcible resignation of the National Assemblymen against 
their wishes, although the party would "recommend" that they resign from 
the party in order to finalize their loss of membership in the National Assembly.
In spite of the differences in technicalities between the two versions of 
the strategy, there was actually very little substantial difference in terms 
of the political and moral commitment implied in both versions —  assuming
120. ibid. 5 and "A Civil Nar in Pront of the Enemy," Chosun Ilbo,
July 27, 1965.
121. Chosun Ilbo, July 27, 1965* The text of the minority version 
submitted by the militant faction is also available in the above issue of 
Chosun Ilbo.
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that both factions were sincere in their common struggle against the treaty. 
However, each version had been selfishly designed, The moderates were as 
much opposed to the treaty as the militants were; but they were also pre­
occupied with preserving their hegemony in the party. In contrast, the 
militants saw little chance either for capturing party hegemony or for defeating 
the treaty and the government, unless they had the party and its moderate 
leadership wrecked and made the entire opposition go out and join the struggle 
in the streets, in the streets the militants could easily regain the hegemony 
of the opposition in alliance with such extreme straggling groups as the 
students, the Struggling Committee and the Consultative Council.
Because of the serious division within the MP, the DRP could immediately 
exploit the situation. The DRP announced that it would not only refuse to 
accept the letters of resignation if submitted to the Rational Assembly but 
would also immediately fill the vacancies in the National Assembly by by-
elections if opposition members individually lost their seats via resignation 
122.
from the IP. ’ Since the moderates had already decided neither to resign
from the party nor to dissolve the party, the DRP's awioiincement made It doubly 
clear that the moderates were going to keep the party and to remain in the 
National Assembly whatever happened to the treaty ratification bill. Thus the 
resolution of the Central Standing Committee of July 26 was now clearly 
unacceptable to the militant faction.
In defiance of the resolution of the Central Standing Committee, the 
militants attempted to convene another national party convention by protesting
that the resolution of July 26 was contrary to the instruction of the resolution
123adopted by the national convention on June 14. in conjunction with this
movement, on July 28 Tun Po-sftn suddenly submitted his letter of resignation 
from the party, and other militant members immediately followed suit. Although 
Yun declared that his resignation had nothing to do with the issue of the hege­
mony of the party, he explained his resignation as a step towards dissolution
2^2• Chosun Ilbo, July 27, 1965.
123. Chosun Ilbo, July 28 and July 29, 1965.
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of the party.
In order to pacify the militants, the Central Standing Committee met
again on August 4 and succumbed to the demand of the militants by passing
another resolution that order«4the MDP's National Assemblymen to submit their
125.letters of resignation from the party by noon of August 18.' This
resolution was in fact illegal, as the moderates pointed out, in view of the
Political Party Law which provides that "No person shall be forced to
affiliate with or to resign from (excluding expulsion) a political party
126without his consent being freely given."' ’ However on August 7 the party's 
Parliamentary Group Conference, where the moderates were the majority, modi­
fied this resolution by resolving that they "should take the advice" of the 
Central Standing Committee "only when" the LHP rejected the letters of
resignation, which were submitted to the National Assembly as soon as the
127.likelihood of ratification of the treaty became apparent/ 6 Even though the
opposition Assemblymen's resolution was conditional and less drastic than the
resolution of the Central Standing Committee, it was nevertheless a victory
for the militant faction.
This latest reversal of the HP's strategy in favor of the militant line
was unquestionably due to the intense pressures generated by the resignation
of Yun Po-sbn and exerted by the militant opponents of the treaty. On August 2
the militant Consultative Council warned the opposition National Assemblymen
that they "must uphold the pledge made voluntarily before the people" by
128throwing away their seats in the National Assembly. In reference to this
tremendous external pressure, La. Yong»kyun? of the moderate faction, said,
"'Under the pressure of extra-parliamentary threat and agitation, the National
124. See Yun1s statement of July 29, 1965, in Chosun Ilbo, July 30, 1965* 
See also "Pactional Struggle in the Mass Party," op. cit., p.304.
*^ 5. Asahi Shlmbun, August 5, 1965; and Chosun Ilbo, August 5, 1965.
126. Article 19 of the Political Party Law.
127. for the resolution of the parliamentary Group Conference, 
see Chosun Ilbo, August 8, 1965.
128. See Chosun Ilbo, August 3, 1965*
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Assemblymen were compelled to submit the letters of resignation from the
National Assembly and from the party. Under these circumstances the National
Assemblymen cannot discharge their duty?*^* Another moderate faction
Assemblyman Ch'oe Hui-song flatly declared that he would remain in the National
130Assembly because the resignation affair of the MP was a "political show o'*
As a consequence to this statement he was expelled from the party.
Due to the disunity in the party, as of August 9 only five members 
(including Yun Pq-s& i) submitted letters of resignation from the party? fifty-
three members submitted letters of resignation from the National Assembly;
131and one member declared he would remain in the National Assembly. * Because 
of this serious internal strife and confusion, the MP had never developed a 
common strategy against the treaty and was hardly effective in debate on the 
treaty ratification bill in the Special Committee during the 52nd Session 
(July 29 - August 14).152*
The DEP's successive forcible steps leading to the ratification of the 
treaty caused only intensification of the factional strife in the MP. The MP 
resigned en masse from the National Assembly on August 12 in accordance with 
the resolution of the party's Parliamentary Group Conference. Nevertheless 
the moderates refused both to resign from the party and to dissolve the party 
when the DRP in the "one-party National Assembly" declined to accept the 
letters of resignation. Caught between their previous pledge to resignation 
under pressure from the militants and a strong desire to remain in the National 
Assembly, the moderates were in a deep dilemma.
The result was a prolonged political and constitutional crisis, mani­
fested in the so-called "one-party National Assembly." The MP was full of 
recurrent scenes of vicious factional struggle between the militants committed
129. See Chosun Ilbo, August 10, 1965*
130. For his speech to this effect in the National Assembly, see Kukhoe 
hoe^irok, 52nd Session, Plenary Meetings, No.10 (August 12, 1965) p.l.
131. Chosun Ilbo, August 10, 1965* Two members were at the time travelling abroad
132. See the advertised statement of the DRP, August 12, 1965, in Chosun Ilbo. 
August 13, 1965* The statement purported to justify the DRP's forcible manner in 
the Special Committee. Nevertheless, it revealed that the Special Committee was 
almost daily idle at least for 5 to 8 hours, because of the incessant conferences of 
the MP to settle factional difference on the strategy. When the opposition members 
finally showed up in the committee, they were preoccupied with filibustering 
instead of debating the bill.
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to the destruction of the party and the moderates preoccupied with finding
face-saving devices to pave their return to the National Assembly. Betrayed
by the opposition politicians and fed up with the MP*s prolonged factional
struggle which shamelessly exposed its true character, the public was more
angry with the opposition than with the ruling party which was no less
responsible for this crisis. The mood of the country was best expressed by
the editorial of Chosun. Ilbo which reads in part as follows;
In short, it is too elementary to stress that the National 
Assemblymen ought to return to the National Assembly, for 
it is also common sense that normalization of representative 
government cannot be achieved without the opposition ....
However there are questions that you have to answer.
Why did you have to place yourselves in this dilemma by 
producing the extreme show of “resignation1* which you did 
not really intend? Why do you have to now go through the 
pain of devising some absurd 11 excuses11 to bail yourselves 
out of this dilemma? Don't you think that you owe the people 
a totally sincere explanation at least?
Whatever you decide, you must keep the following things in 
minds First, if you are to return to the National Assembly, 
repent and rehabilitate your political attitudes so as not 
to repeat such a reckless mi stales in the future ...; second, 
take this advice —  never abuse again the sacred names of 
"the people" and "the constitutional government"i and lastly, 
if you are not to return, make your course of action clear. 133.
As it has already been detailed in Chapter 6, on October 11 the MP 
(except the eight members of the militant faction) returned in disgrace to 
the National Assembly by eating their own words of pledge to resignation. 
The return of the moderates to the National Assembly and the departure of 
the militants from the HP to form; a new party of their own brought the 
turbulent career of the HP to an end.
CONCLUSIONS POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY POLITICS.
To be ideal, a political party must be stably organized with sufficient
internal cohesion, with the objectives of (,l) securing or maintaining control
of the government and giving ideal and material benefits to the members of the
134
party through such control, '* and (2) mobilizing and expressing mass opinion
133. The editorial of Chosun Ilbo, September 15, I965. See also Che 
Chae-yang, "The National Assembly in 1965 Observed from the Press Box," Kukboebo, 
No.50, December 20, 1965? pp*50*»3.
134« See Carl J. Friedrich, op.cit., p*419? and E.E.Schattschneider,
Party Government (New York; HoltT-lkmehart & Winston, 1942), pp*35~6.
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135aon public issues and bringing forth and carrying out programs to which
136it commits itself. * in order to have a party "stably organized” and to
provide the above objectives, the party in a full sense must satisfy certain 
prerequisites, such as the following four criteria suggested by William N. 
Chambers: (l) durable and regularized structures (2) performance of certain
key political functions, aside from the primary function of capturing political 
power by nominating and campaigning, such as mediating and aggregating 
conflicting interests, providing links between the branches of government, 
and management of the government; (3) command of a certain degree of stable
support both in range and depth; and (4) articulation of a set of
the examination of the selected aspects of the DRP and the MP.
The examination of the two parties has revealed that both parties were, 
although different in degree, extremely unstable. For they were fundamentally 
not institutionalized to be cohesive parties, especially with respect to 
leadership and organizational and operational structure. This was attested 
by the chronic factional strivings for party hegemony that had not only under­
mined the existing party structures but had also prevented development of 
proper structures of the parties.
The DRP still boasts that it is a modern party with advanced structural 
features such as the secretarial organization and the elaborate policy-making 
bodies. But this claim is not supported by the performance of the party during 
the period under consideration in this paper. It is, to a certain extent, true 
that the DRP was in theory a modem party especially in view of the fact that 
no Korean party had ever been launched as meticulously structured as the DRP 
had been,
135. See Robert M. Maclver, The Web of Government (New York; The Macmillian 
Co., 1947), p.209.
136. See American Political Science Association, Committee on Political 
Parties, Toward A More Responsible Two Party System (New Yorks Holt, Rinehart 
& Winston, 1950), p*l»
137. William N. Chambers, Political Parties in A Nexf Nationfc The American 
Experience, 1776 - 1809 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), PP*45~8.
or ideology.137. Using these criteria, certain conclusions may be drawn from
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The secretarial organization was the case in point. But in the course of 
factional struggle and with the inevitable ascendancy of the parliamentary 
wing of the party, the party's highly centralized leadership and control 
structure was all but decentralized in order to provide a collective leader­
ship of factions as well as to accomodate individual ambitions of the party's 
National Assemblymen particularly in their own constituencies. Instead of 
operating the party by a set of rules or by the party charter, the DRP was 
operating mainly to satisfy the feuding factions. The difficulty in 
institutionalization of the party's power and organizational structures was 
clearly evident in a number of revisions in the party charter and the frequent 
reorganization of the party's leadership by the personal intervention of 
President Parks
On this same structural aspect, the ill-fated MP was from the outset 
hopelessly fragmented. Unlike the ruling DRP which had enough material and 
disciplinary resources at the hands of President Park, the MP had neither 
these resources nor a single strong leadership to submerge the rival factions 
into a semblance of a party. The leadership and organizational structure of 
the MP, as reflected by the party charter, was constructed to reconcile these 
factions which had been in continuous existence from the early days of Korea's 
independence. The prolonged difficulty, due to factional disputes, in organi­
zing the Central Standing Committee —  which as a result had never fulfilled 
its given task of organizing the party's operational departments — » 
illustrated well the non-institutionalization of the MP. The several contra­
dicting resolutions on the issue of "resignation" formulated by different 
sections of party machinery were another indication of the extreme instability 
and confusion of the leadership.
In the area of the essential political functions —  namely, formulation
of public opinion and policies, aggregation of various interests, and management 
of the government (in the case of the DRp); both parties had utterly failed.
The reason for the failure of the parties in this critical area is self- 
explanatory, if one sees the extreme instability of the parties due to the 
vicious factional strife. As the examination of factionalism in both parties
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indicated, a factional position or alignment at the center was purely an 
affair among the leading personalities in Seoul on the issue of party 
hegemony instead of on the issue of politics. Unlike such political terms 
as "liberal” and '‘conservative" in the Western democracies, such labels as 
"militant1’ and "moderate" in Korea were the indications of the differences 
of intensity of emotion or attitudes rather than the differences of political 
values. "Main stream" and "non-main stream" were indicative of the power 
position of a faction at a particular moment. As these Korean political 
terms imply, the factions in Korean politics were mainly identified with 
their power positions within parties and with their differences of intensity 
of feeling. Depending on how their power position changed, the intensity of 
their designs for power also changed.
Since politics within the parties were founded on this basis of political 
expediency, the parties seldom reflected even the wishes of the rank and file, 
not to mention public opinion. So long as the parties were constantly torn 
apart by factionalism, they were hardly able to respond to public opinion, 
to formulate consistent policies, or to aggregate various interests, because 
there were simply no persistent centripetal forces to make party policies.
This is attested by the factional politics in both parties during the treaty 
crisis. When the parties appealed to the public, the appeals were often not 
those of the parties, but those of the factions that controlled the parties.
The appeals were also rather framed to elicit emotional response from certain 
sectors of the public in order to strengthen their internal positions in the 
parties, This was certainly the case with the MP.
In the early days of the DRP, there was some indication that the DRP was 
eager to solicit public opinion and to formulate policies for the government.
But these efforts were wasted as the party became increasingly shaky in the 
midst of factional turmoil. The doom of King Chong-pil‘s main stream faction’s 
struggle for "party supremacy" was a frustrating admission that the party could 
not function as the policy-maker and the manager of the government. Ihren though 
it was granted that under a presidential system the performance of these 
functions by a ruling party was normally difficult (particularly if the personality
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of the president was dominant), the poor performance of the DRP in these 
two areas was below normal expectations. The fai3.ure of the DRP to perform 
these functions eventually led to a virtual breakdown in communication 
between the party and the government. President Park's aggressive 
assertion of his independence from his chaotic party as well as his complete 
subjugation of the party had more or less proved that the "ruling0 party 
had been existing in name only and had been demoted to a mere electoral 
instrument of Park who preferred the more efficient governmental administra­
tive machinery to the party in ruling the country.
As a consequence of this incapacity to perform certain essential
functions, the parties could not generate stable and diffuse support
not only among the public but even among the members of the parties. Often
the DRP proudly refers to itself as a mass party with one and a half million
138members (about 11$ of the total eligible voters in Korea), ’ and with some
139institutional decives for invigorating local party activities. But the
massive membership-did not reflect the actual degree of political support 
from these members. As to this, one should remember, for instance, the 
manner in which the DRP had recruited them at unbelievable speed in the 
early stage (see Chapter 6). The opposition was typically a collection of 
factions which represented virtually nobody except themselves. Especially 
at grass-roots, local party branches were hastily organised as the Political 
Party Law required a minimum of forty-four local party chapters each with a 
minimum membership of fifty, and they were merely assemblages of a hand­
ful of supporters of certain personalities such as their own National 
Assemblymen or a few factional leaders of long association in Seoul, (see 
Chapter l).
138. As of March 1966, the DRP membership was 1*467,903 (males 1,182,684 
or 85$ and females 255,219 or 14«5$). See "Organization Principles of Our 
Party," _opu cit., p«6.
139# See, e.g., "Organizational Diagnosis: First of its Kind in Political 
Party History," The DRP Bulletin, Vol. 1, No.4, April, 1966, pp.20-1.
140. Articles 25 and 27 of the Political Party Law.
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Lastly, on the problem of articulation of a set of perspectives or 
ideology, the first thing that has to be mentioned is that Korea has not 
been fertile political soil for the development of progressive ideologies 
or ideas, mainly because the ideological division of the country and the 
continuing subversion from the north has severely limited freedom of 
thought (see Chapter l). The development of ideologies and ideas has been 
further limited by the inarticulate socio-economic structure inherent in 
the pre-industrial society of Korea. The combination of these limitations 
bred a monotonous conservatism which had tendencies towards authoritarianism, 
as President Rhee could have manipulated anti-Communism against his political 
foes. One indicator of the effect of these limitations at present is the 
virtual non-existence of a viable progressive or socialist party in Korea. 
Another grave consequence of the lack of a free market of political ideologies 
has been the tendency to exuberate political contests into personality or 
factional contests.
Another condition adverse to the development of ideologies was also 
implicit in the recruitment and the composition of the parties. Since the 
parties were no more than collections of diverse elements and factions brought 
together either through the selfish objectives of electoral victory and of 
material benefits (as in the case of the DRP), or through external pressures 
and the ulterior motives of the factions (as in the case of the Mp), they 
needed to develop stable centripetal forces which could provide certain 
consistent party ideals and programs (if not ideologies) to which these 
diverse elements could be committed. The Kim Chong-pil group in the DRP had 
tried to assume the role of this centripetal force and to provide an ideology 
to the party. But as his group was, in origin and on the record, no more 
than a faction, it soon lost its vitality in the power struggle. The DRP’s
"nationalistic democracy” advanced by Kim and his associates thus degenerated 
into a factional polemic as it was suspected of being a high-powered
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rationalization of the main stream faction in maintaining party hegemony.
This may he a part of the inevitable phenomena that Robert Michels observed 
in modem mass parties: "As the organization increases in size, the struggle
for great principles becomes impossible. ... /"the great conflicts of 
view/ therefore degenerate more and more into personal struggles and 
invectives, to be settled finally upon consideration of a purely superficial 
character Admittedly the MP never had a set of perspectives. However
the coalition of the moderates in the MP made some efforts to consolidate 
the party along its moderate line of opposition to the government. But this 
also failed because their political position was rather motivated by factional 
consideration. Moreover, the habitual marriages and divorces for political 
expediency among the factions in the opposition, and their narrow conserva­
tism moulded in negativism had contributed to the creation of a condition 
that was hardly ideal for the cultivation of constructive ideas and programs.
The final analysis of party politics during the ROK-Japan treaty crisis 
may be concluded by commenting on the factional politics. It may be difficult 
to accept the notions that the history of the Korean parties was that of 
factionalism and that the internal dynamics of Korean parties were singularly 
generated by factional struggles. Nevertheless, factionalism was the factor 
that had critically weakened the capacity or the potentiality of the parties 
to institutionalize themselves structurally and to perform certain vital 
functions.
In his study of the parties in Western democracies, Maurice Duverger 
argues that the development of factions is not necessarily an indication of 
the liberty of party members or of increase of intra-party democracy, because 
each faction is itself authoritarian in structure and because the nature of 
factional struggle is essentially "an attempt by subordinate leaders to oust 
leaders of high rank, or of certain high-ranking officials to obtain the 
majority in collective executive b o d i e s T h i s  argument is also valid in
141. Robert Michels, Political Parties (New Yorks Dover Publications, 
1959)f p*366.
142. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (Londons Methuen & Co.,
1954), p.174.
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the Korean parties. Nevertheless, it may also be added that in the case 
of Korean parties, which were constantly under the threat of disintegration, 
factionalism at best had some functional utility in maintaining a semblance 
of party unity and in providing some degree of intra-party democracy 
however fragile or sham these may be. But the overall effect of factionalism 
in the Korean parties was devastating. It bred (l) intolerance and suspicion 
among party members? (2) inflexibility and solidification of attitudes 
detrimental to the politics of compromise; (3) opportunism rather than 
principles on vital issues; and (4) general chaos of the parties detrimental 
to rational deliberation and formulation of party policies, These attitudes 
led tos “The interest of my faction is more important than that of the 
party or the nation,'* or “if you don't agree with me, you are a ‘sakura1 
or myQiemyo" Because of the irrational and intolerant nature of factional 
conflicts, the parties could hardly develop certain neutral forces which 
would be sufficiently strong to moderate the factional differences and to 
stabilise the parties in order to commit them to a road of constructive and 
responsible politics.
There was strong evidence that certain positions taken by the factions 
in both parties during the ROK-Japan treaty crisis were rather motivated by 
factional considerations. For example the two major inter-party negotiations 
—  the Bipartisan Conference in June-July 1964 and the summit meeting in 
July 1965 -—  were largely ineffective, because of the strong factional 
opposition to them by both parties1 militant factions who had ulterior 
motives. Equally, the moderates of both parties who sponsored these nego­
tiations were motivated by the desire to enhance their relatively weak intra­
party positions. The absence of constructive centripetal forces to moderate 
and to check these extreme factional rivalries eventually led to breakdown 
of rational communication on the vital treaty issue, not only between the 
rival factions but also between the opposite parties. Thus the severe
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political and constitutional crisis in 1965 was also attributable to the 
incapacity of the political parties to function responsibly and to provide 
necessary political leadership and rational deliberation.
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CHAPTER 9.
MAJOR GROUPS M D  POLITICO; THE MILITARY 
AMD m ’W M K
In spite of the alleged mass basis of party politics, the Korean parties
have evidently failed to mobilize and express mass opinion in orderly fashion
and to mediate and aggregate conflicting demands on the treaty and related 
1.issues. The parties were incapable of functioning responsibly and of 
providing the political leadership necessary for the solution of national 
issues through the existing constitutional framework.
The treaty issue itself was, of course, so grave and emotional that it 
aroused an unprecedented degree of public awareness to the extent that it had 
mobilized some three and a half million people representing important segments 
of Korean life. However it can be concluded from the outset that the mass move­
ment in the streets during the treaty crisis was rather a clear manifestation 
of the inherent weakness of the existing Korean political system than a healthy 
sign of growing political awareness of the masses. In other words, the mass 
movement was an effort on the part of the significant segments of society to
supplement the inadequacy of the democratic process or to supplant politicians
2.and the existing political institutions. This was a situation of political
3,instability stemming from the “participation crisis" in absence of an 
effective relation between the political elites and the people.
In turn, this indicated that the existing political institutions —  the 
government and the parties —  were not effective elements in the political 
process of Korean society. The breakdown of political institutions and the
1. The by-product of this failure was the widespread apathy of the people 
to politics after the treaty crisis. This was evident in the unprecedented low 
voting rate (26.1$) in the by-elections of November, 1965, which were held to 
fill five district seats in the National Assembly vacated by resignation of the 
five MP members. See Chosun Ilbo, November 10, 1965? and Shin Sang-ch* o, "The 
People * s Yiew on Parliamentary Politics Reflected in the November 9th By-Elections," 
Kukhoebo, No.50, December 20, 1965, pp*66-8.
2. Cf. Lee Ung-h&i, "Direction of the Upheaval," Sasangge, December,
1965, p.138.
3• See Lucian w. Pye, Aspects of Political Developments, pp. cit., 
pp*65-78.
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appearance of extra-political forces that replaced the former in the 
political process raised the question whether the instrument of power and 
control in Korean politics may he found outside the framework of the 
existing political institutions.^' The danger of such phenomena is that 
very often the groups that function as extra-political forces are not 
instrumental for mediating conflicts between various social and economic 
groups and, above all, between political elites. They are rather instru­
mental in intensifying political conflicts between the opposing; political 
elites, as in the case of the military and the students during the treaty 
crisis in Korea.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine such extra forces which 
relegated the political institutions to a secondary importances the military 
which had to come out to support physically the government and the students 
who had not only contributed to the main force of treaty opponents but also 
threatened the life of the Park government. This examination will illuminate 
the folloifing aspects of their potential significance in politics? Why were 
they so potent in politics? Why did the opposition rely on the students?
Why did the government have to combat the students with the military? What 
are their future political potentials as they have already demonstrated their 
power? However, the actuality and potentiality of these two groups must be 
seen first against the level of development of other major interest groups 
that nevertheless play certain roles largely through their inertia in Korean 
political process —  namely, as instruments of the ruling party.
An interest group (voluntary group, pressure group, or lobby group) as
an intermediate between the individual and the state provides continuous
consultation between the government and the people all the time by checking
5.and balancing and advising or warning the government. As the prime means
4* £f. Roy CL Macridis, The Study of Comparative Government (New Yorks 
Doubleday, 1955) 5 p*48.
5° £LE. Finer, Anonymous Empire, Second Edition (London: Pall Mall
. i"- i i n iiii imr   ~i * i ~ >■>■■■■ ■1tJ«unawhi
Press, 1966) pp o 112-3 •
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of the right to participate in policy-making and of the right to demand 
redress of grievances, the role of interest groups is also crucial in a 
mass society in helping the individual avoid “the dilemma of being parochial, 
cut off from political influence, or an isolated and powerless individual, 
manipulated and mobilized by the mass institutions of politics and govern­
ment . ’
The development of interest groups is dependent upon three main factorss
(l) development of socio-economic structure with its attendant social division 
of labor| (2) better communication that enables groups to amalgamate and to
coordinate their pressures and (3) increasing scope of public responsibilities
7
and control which necessitates formation and greater activities of the groups.
Considering these factors, not only are interest groups in Korea infant and
weak due to the underdevelopment and inarticulation of socio-economic structure,
but also their actions are hardly spontaneous as their formation and actions
8.are dependent upon government authorization. Therefore, political participa­
tion by both the masses (see Chapter l) and groups in the Korean political 
process is hardly open and free and not sufficiently mature enough to narrow 
the gap between the ruling elites and the people.
During the treaty crisis literally 'several hundreds of names of local 
and national interest groups appeared in newspapers —  if not in the streets 
—  to register their voices in support of or in opposition to the treaty and 
the government. This was totally a new experience in Korea. As of 1963 the
number of interest groups registered with various ministries and agencies
9
of the central government was about 650, 8 and if all groups registered with
6. Gabriel A.Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston and 
Toronto3 Little, Brown, 1965), p.245.
7. S.E. Finer, op. cit., pp.7-8.
8. For interest groups in Korea, see especially Pale Mun-ok, op.cit., 
pp*557-70; 0 By&ng-htfn, “Political Pattern of Korea,” op.cit., pp.74-5; Shin 
Sang-ch'o, "Interest Articulations Pressure Groups," C.I.Eugene Kim, ed,, A 
Pattern of Political Developments Korea (Kalamazoo, Michigans Korea Research 
and Publications, 1964)*,” pp.41-7; and An Hae-kyun, “The Administration and 
Pressure Groups,“ Sasangge, December, 1966, pp.50-6.
9. An Hae-kyun, ibid., p.54. According to the Hapdong News Agency,
Korea Annual 1966 (Seoul, 1966) pp.325-35, there were as of 1965 253 nationally 
organised groupss 156 promotional (civic, professional, cultural, religious and 
welfare) groups and 97 special interest (farmers, labor, business, industry, 
and finance) groups.
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provincial and local governments were tabulated, the number would reach at 
least to a thousand. Among them only 16 to 20 groups are considered to be 
reasonably effective as interest groups.*^’
While expression of views by some of these groups on the treaty issue 
was voluntary and genuine, that by most of them was involuntary and mani­
pulated by the government and its ruling party or by their own leaders who
11.were eager to line up their support for the government. For example,
while the majority of fishermen in Pusan (the largest center of Korea's
fishing industries) demonstrated against the treaty, ° their own local and
national organization leaders supported the government treaty position.
This was a typical example that leaders of interest groups failed even to
represent the wishes of the rank and file of their own groups. As expected
the groups that supported the government position were those of labor,
business, fishermen, farmers, veterans, dead soldiers* families, and anti-
13Communist functionaries. * These groups were all highly dependent for 
their formation and existence on the government which maintains systematic 
control on them through license, registration, legal and administrative 
protection, subsidies, loans, grants and special favors.^0 On the other hand, 
those who opposed to or, at least, exercised their independent judgement on 
the treaty issues were students, professors, the press, writers and artists, 
lawyers, clergymen, former generals and former politicians (see Chapter 4), 
whose existence was more or less independent collectively and individually 
and whose activities were less materially inclined. In short, the degree of
10. An hae-kyun, ibid., and the list of major interest groups in Pak 
Mun-ok, op. cit., pp,568-9.
11. See, e.g., Assemblyman Kang S&n-kyu's criticism of the government1 s 
manipulations of the public opinion in ICukhoe hoeuirok, 52nd Session, Plenary 
Meetings, ho.8 (August 10, 1965), pp*3~4j and Chosun Ilbo, April 7? 1965.
12. See, e.g., Tong-A Ilbo. January 22, 1964.
13. For the statements supporting the government, see the labor unions' 
in Chosun Ilbo, April 6, 1965; major economic groups' (including farmers') in
Chosun Ilbo, April 4, 1965; fishermen's in Chosun Ilbo, July 16, 1965; dead
soldiers1 families' in Chosun Ilbo, July 7, 1965; Veterans' in Chosun Ilbo, 
April £0 and July 16, 1965; and anti-communist organizations' in Chosun Ilbo,
April 20 and July 17, 1965.
14. See the editorial of Chosun Ilbo, April 6, 1965; and "For or Against
Ratifications the Third Confrontation," Chosun Ilbo, op. cit.
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their dependence upon the government for their material benefit was the 
degree of their susceptibility to manipulation and control of the govern­
ment.
As development of socio-economic structure with accompanying degree 
of social division of labor is a presupposition for the development of 
interest groups, the existence of such an extraordinary number of groups 
in Korea casts a doubt on their social and economic basis. A clear weak­
ness of such basis is reflected best in the distribution of gross national 
product (G-EP) and of labor force as indicated in fable 1. The statistics 
in fable I alone indicate sufficiently that Korea is still predominantly an. 
agricultural society were 63.2 percent of the labor force is contributing 
only 32.5 percent to the GMP, while only 11.2 percent of the labor force is 
engaged in modern industries and producing a meager share of the GHP.
TABLE i a DISTRIBUTION OF GEP AND LABOR FORGE (1963)
Indus. Sectors. GJSIP % Labor Force %
Primary 32.5 63*2
Secondary 23.8 11.2
Tertiary 43.7 25.6
Total 100. 0. 100.0
Sources? For GKP (at the I960 constant prices), Bank of Korea, 
op. cite & fable 21, p*27? and for labor force, Kim Yun-hwan,
Hankuk hi nodong mun.je y&nku (A Study of Korean Labor Problems)
(Seoul: Koryo taehak, Asea munje y&nlmso, 1967), p.232.
Without development of the secondary industries, the fact that 25.6 percent
of the labour force in the tertiary industries is producing the largest share
of the G-EP is certainly an indication of abnormal economic and social
structure, in short, the statistics suggest that Korea is economically not
yet ready to develop a society conducive to a participant democracy. They
also suggest that about 64 percent of the population has little capacity to
15,articulate their promotional or special interests through organized activiies, 
because of their extreme poverty, ignorance and political inertia.
15. Of. Yun Ha-y&Qg, "Necessary Factors in the Formation of Leadership 
Force and Organization of Political Parties," Basangge, July 1962, pp.33-4; 
and An Hae-kyun, op. cit., pp.50-1.
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Despite some remnants of provincialism and occasional provincial
•j g
rivalry, 0 Korea is also a most homogeneous country in historical, ethinical,
cultural and linguistic aspects. Politically it has been a unitary state
with a strong tradition of centralism. Korea has, thus, no serious sectional
17.
differences or cleavages to breed sectional interests and groups.
Why are there, then, so many groups whose existence, in many cases, does 
not reflect neither the low level of socio-economic development nor the high 
degree of homogeneuity of the society? Obviously, the mushrooming of interest 
groups in Korea is a sign of fragmentation of groups, instead of specialization 
and differentiation based on an ultimate sense of integration® First of all, 
this can be attributable to the peculiar political culture that is heavily 
infested with a chronic disease of factionalism that has spread to organization 
and operation of groups and that has fragmented groups to render them ineffect­
ive in pursuing their common objectives and incapable of exercising positive 
influence in political decision-making process, (see Chapter l). Because of 
internal division and ineffectiveness, interest groups hardly command loyalty 
and solidarity of their members. Secondly, it is due to the fact that the 
predominant motive of leading personalities in organizing interest groups is
18.
the desire to use them as bases for their personal political or material gains.
The internal dissension within groups can be attributed to the power struggle
among these leading personalities. it is not uncommon to find that, with few
exceptions, leadership of interest groups is closely interlocked with leading
positions of the government and the ruling party or is headed by persons who
19.maintain intimate political connections with leading politicians in power.'
Accordingly, the unique feature of interest groups is that they are not
voluntarily organized and operating autonomously. Shin Sang-ch’o describes it
16. flie most recent cases of provincial rivalry was between the provinces 
of Chollanamdo and Kyongsangnamdo. To protest the government's favor of the 
latter in allocation of new industries, non-partisan political, social, economic 
and other groups in the former formed a protest organization and vigorously 
pressed their demands to the government. See "Three Dimensional Mirror,"
Chosun ilbo, August 21, 1966.
“ “XY7 £ee Shin Sang-ch!p, "Interest Articulation; Pressure Groups." op.cit.p»42.
18. Pale Mun-ok, op-cit., p.569, and An Hae-kyun, ojd. cit. t p.56.
19. Pak Mun-ok, ibid. p.559*
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as follows*
From the outset, they are organized as a subsidiary to the 
government party, They are agents of the government or a 
political party, and the leadership within a group is 
decided not on the basis of the majority support of its 
members, but on the amount of support that one receives 
from the parent organization ... They may be said to 
exercise pressure, but their pressure is that of a govern­
ment agent, and is downward and not upward —  downward
against the general populace. 20.
The classical example of this type of formation and operation was the four
main groups —  the National Association, the Korean Youth Corps, the Korean
21farmers' Association and the Korean federation of Labor Unions —  which 
were formed by President Rhee as non-political national organizations.
However they were soon transformed into the constituent groups in founding 
Rhee' a Liberal Party, and became the most faithful agents of Rh.ee's govern­
ment in mobilizing and manipulating the "popular will", in supplying politi-
22cal funds and in delivering votes for the party.
Although major organized groups, labor, business and farmers, have
23.recently shown seme sign of presenting their demands to the government,
they are still hardly independent and free.
24.
The labor movement during the Japanese rule had virtually gained no
foothold for its development. After Korea's liberation from the Japanese
rule, the present national labor organization started as a front organization
of right-wing politicians to destroy the powerful Communist infiltration in 
25
the ranks of labor. * Under Rhee it became a subservient instrument of the
20. Shin Sang-ch1o, "Interest Articulation? Pressure Groups," op. cit.,
p.43.
21. for these organizations, see K&nkuk ship nyon ji kanhaenghoe
(Publication Society of Ten-Year History of Nation-Building), Taehanminkuk 
k&nkuk ship ny6n ji ('The Ten-Year History of Nation-Building of the Republic • 
of KoreaJvSeoul, 1956), pp. 281-310 and 317-24.
22. See Kim Tong-mySng, Chbk gwa tongji, op. cit., pp.160-4; and Cho
Py&ng-ok, Mmnjuju&i wa na, op. cit., pp.147-9.
23. On labor, see Hankuk llbo, December 5, 1963; and "Waves of Labor
Disputes," Ohosm llbo, January 25, 1966. On business groups, see Pak Mun-ok, 
op. cit., pp.546-6. On farmers, see Nongbp hy^ clong chohap chunganghoe (National 
Agricultural Cooperative federation)„ Nongop nybngam 1967 (Agricultural Yearbook 
1967) (Seoul, 1967), pp.251-8; and ICLm Il-ch'ol, "Social Cooperation and Interest 
Groups in Rural Areas," Hankuk nongch'on sahoehak y&okuhoe, ed., op. cit.,pp. 141-62
24. For the labor movement, see Kim Yun-hwan, op.cit., pp. 171-238; fak Hui-jun 
"Early Unions in Korea, 1919-1950, "Korean Affairs .Vol.I, No.l, March-April 1962, 
pp.75-80; and Kim Tae-jung, "The Road of Korean Labor Movement," Sasangge,
October 1955, pp. 136-52.
25. Kim Yun-hwan, ibid., pp.174-5.
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Liberal Party as well as the object of political spoils of the “labor
26.aristocrats. 11
As of 1964 only 10,7 per cent (294,000) of 2*7 million workers are 
organized into sixteen industrial unions under the Korean Federal Association
pry
for Labor Unions, (KFALU) * Aside from its weakness in number and organiza­
tion, the labor movement in Korea is still suffering from the crippling
effect of factionalism of bosses and from manipulation of the government
PR
and even by rivd factions of the ruling party. 6 Another major problem that
impedes development of labor unions is that they are still operating under
various} legal and administrative restrictions that prevent them from exercising
the rights of association, collective bargaining and collective action.^*
Their working conditions and living standard are perhaps best illustrated by
the government's decision in August 1965 not to allow the KFALU to join the
International Labor Organization (iLO), because the government felt that it
would not be able to observe and enforce Article 87 of the XLO which provides
30various basic rights and privileges of laborers, *
In terms of electoral votes, farmers are potentially the most powerful
economic and political group in Korea if they can be organized. But farmers
who own, in average, less than one hectre of land per household to support
33.about seven family members "’are the most impoverished masses without any
32.organizational strength predominantly due to an excessive paternalism and 
manipulation by the government and its appointed agencies.
26* Ibid a, pp.176-9*
27* Ibid*, p*225
28. See ibid*, pp*228-303; and Hankuk llbo, October 30 and November
1, 1964*
29. See Kim Ch'i-s&n, "Inviolability of Labor's Three Rights,"
Sasangge, October 1964, pp*56-60.
30* See Chosun llbo, August 21, 1965*
mrawiiiiu 11 iwn n in nr *
31. Nongop hyopdong chohap chunganghoe, op* cit*, pp. 6 and 16.
For a vicious cycle of poverty of farmers, see Kim Chun-bo, “The Portrait of 
Korean Rural Areas," Shindong-A, October, 1966, pp.60-82*
32. See Ghu Sok-kyun, "Rural Areas and Democracy,“ op* cit *, pp*141-8.
See also Chu Sok-kyunj "Political Participation of Farmers• A Discourse on 
Political Party for Farmers," Selcye (The World), May I960, pp.41-7*
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Despite ritualistic li~services of the successive governments for improve­
ment of their economic conditions, the economic policy of the government for 
industrial development has been largely at the expense of poor and illiterate
3*3
farmers. *
‘the agricultural cooperatives which in various forms have been operative
for many years are potentially the most powerful organisations to influence
the government1 s farm policy. Today the National Agricultural Cooperative
federation (MCF) is the largest organization in Korea with 10,000 full-time
officials and 20,000 local branches in villages allegedly serving the
34.interests of the 85 percent of farmers. ‘ However, from its inception the
35.MCF has not been a voluntary organization by and for farmers themselves.
All high managerial officials from the national down to local levels are 
government appointees. Most of its business are franchised or commissioned 
by the government. Naturally farmers have no access to their "own" organiza­
tions to decide and check activities of the cooperatives. Under the Rhee 
government, the majority of local heads of cooperatives were appointed from 
among local members of his party. Even today most of important positions of
the NACF are occupied by former military officers and a half of local branches
36are headed by village chiefs of ris and dongs. * Thus agricultural coopera­
tives are regarded by farmers merely as government agencies that administer 
the government's farm policies, if not as outright subsidiary agents of the
ruling party that provide jobs to its local party members and deliver farmers' 
37votes to it.
33* Chu Sok-kyun, "Agriculture in national Economys A Historical Review," 
Chosun llbo, January 25, 1967.
34« Ch'oe Sang-mi, "Agricultural Cooperatives: "Why Do They Not Belong to 
Farmers?" Sasangge, April 1966, p.92.
35.. See ibid., pp.93-5; and "Agricultural Cooperatives and Their hyper­
trophy," Chosun llbo, May 21, 1966.
36. Ch'oe Sang-mi, ibid., pp.98-9*
37. See the controversial attempt of the government in 1965 to amend the 
charter of the NACF to allow local members of the DEP to join openly the 
cooperatives, in Chosun llbo, March 30, 1965. See also long-ii llbo, January 
24, 1966.
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On the surface the most numerous and articulated interest groups in
Korea are those of business, industry, commerce and finance# As of 1963,
there were some 120 such economic groups registered with various economic
38.ministries of the central government. Among them, the Korean Businessmen's
Association of a handful of big businessmen,who virtually control Korea's
economy, and the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which comprises
28 local chapters with 120,000 members, are the most active and powerful 
39.groups# Their economic interests are largely maintained and expanded 
through speculation, price fixing, foreign exchange manipulation, special 
loans, and other governmental preferential treatmentsSince favorable 
treatment by the government and the ruling party is essential for their 
business, they are always eager to please politicians in power and high 
government officials through supply of political funds, supporting govern­
ment positions, and often delivering votes of employees in elections. 
Unmistakenly, they are most efficient in looking after their own economic 
interests largely through dubious means. But the degree of their subservience 
to the government is not much different from that of the groups of labor and 
farmers.
Since the government in Korea is in a position to create or alter basic 
conditions of existence of any group or individual, exercise of independent 
political action by interest groups is practically impossible. ' Particularly 
in view of the tendency that one group of politicians perpetuates political 
power, a prospect of interest groups to resist arbitrary pressure from the 
government and its ruling party and to assert their genuine interests is 
doubly dim. As a proposition drawn from the experience of interest groups in
38. An Hae-kyun, op. cit., p.53.
39« About these two groups, see Pak Mun-ok, pp.cit#, pp«564---5j and Lee 
U-hy&n, "Seventeen Years of Constitutional Government and Interest Groups,"
Kukhoebo, Ho.46, July 20, 1965, p*43« See also Korean Businessmen's Association, 
Korean Businessmen's Association; Its Functions, Organization and Membership, 
(Seoul, 1963}
40. See especially ICLm Ky&ig-dong, "Enterpreneurs and Politics," a draft 
chapter in Lee Chong-sik and Hong Sung-chick, ed., op.cit#, pp.15-8 and 26-32.
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Korea, it can be said that an essential condition for independence or 
constructive influence of interest groups in the political process pre­
supposes a political system in which change of power is made freely, 
openly and, above all, frequently among different political groups or 
parties.
As a conclusion, the characteristics of interest groups in Korean can 
be described in the following terms? The more massive a group is, the more 
available it becomes for manipulation and control of the government; and the 
more dependent a group is on the government, the more susceptible it becomes 
to pressure of the government. With few exceptions like the Korean Lawyers 
Association and the Korean Newspaper Publishers Association, interest groups 
in Korea have always been readily available to the government if the latter 
decides to mobilize opinions favorable to itself. This was one of the main 
reasons why so many interest groups came out in newspapers to support the 
government on the treaty issue in 1964-65®
Against this political immaturity of socio-economic groups and their 
feeble role in the political process —  i.e., also, the absence of a condition 
that could moderate the intensity of partisan political struggle, the roles of 
the military and students in Korean society, particularly in her politics, 
become extraordinary and critical. Since I960 it lias almost become an axiom 
that no government or political party in Korea can be expected to endure long 
without the support or with the antagonism of the military and the students.
THE MILITARY
In many newly emerging countries which maintain large military establish­
ments, the military is now either a revolutionary force or an instrument of the 
establishment by defending the status quo. Whichever side it chooses, it is 
apparent that the military is the most powerful force in that country. In such 
countries the influence of the military is the most pervasive in political, 
social and economic affairs, especially where civilian governing elites 
constitute a meager counter-balancing force. Because of its enormous power,
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the military is directing the rate and direction of change in such countries.^*
The role of the military in Korea must he also seen from this aspect.
After the Korean War, the military in Korea had rapidly emerged as the most
powerful group with experience and maturity, social and professional respect,
technology and expertise, and, above all, organization and discipline. On.
the strength of these capacities, the military is today potentially the most
dangerous enemy or the most reliable ally of the existing civilian, regime,
depending on how it would exercise its awesome coercive power.
After the liberation from Japan, the military in southern Korea started
as a small constabulary force under the auspices of the American military
42.
government. The initial composition of the officer corps was highly
heterogeneous —  comprising the Koreans who formerly served in the armies
of Japan, Nationalist China (including Chang lisuch-liang's army) and Manchukuo
43as well as in various Korean patriotic resistance forces in China. The
enlisted men were largely recruited from the jobless and, often, social
outcasts 4 The heterogeneous elements were gradually forced into a cohesive
army with esprit de corps, largely stimulated by a sense of glory and power
as expressed by such slogans as "defense of sovereignty" and "Unification of 
45the fatherland." Even before the Korean War, the prestige of the military
enhanced by successful internal military operations against several
46.Communist armed rebellions.
With the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the fate of the nation 
fell to the hands of the military and the military was accorded the highest
41. Bee especially Davis B. Bobrow, "Soldiers and the Nation-State,"
The Annals, Vol. 35®? March 1965, pp*65-76; Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of 
Political Development, op. cit., pp,172-87; and Morris Janowitz, The Military 
in the Political Development of Hew Nations; An Essay in Comparative Analysis 
(Chicago; University of Chicago, 1964).
42. See A. Wigfall Green, The Epic of Korea (Washington, D.C.: Public 
Affairs Press, 1950), pp.61-3.
43. See Ko Ch&ng-hun, Kun (The Military), Vol.I, (Seoul; Tongbang s^won, 
1967), pp*34-5* Those who served in Chu Teh's 8th Route Army joined later the 
North Korean Army.
44. "The Military of the Liberal Party Era," the recollections of six 
newspaper report®^ Shindong-A, May 1966, p.284.
45. Ko ChSng-hun, Kun, op. cit., p.45.
46. Lee Man-gab, "A Social History of Twenty Tears' Liberation," 
Kukhoebo, No .47, August 20, 1965, p.40.
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social status with extra privileges as well as the highest priority in 
commanding both, the total manpower and national resources. During the war, 
the military recruited a countless number of brilliant young people into 
its1 officer corps and became the most largest in number and the best in 
quality. For the officers, the military also provided higher education 
through advanced training in military schools both in Korea and the United 
States. Both the higher internal social mobility (in promotion of rank and 
in diversification of skills and responsibilities) and the easier access to 
the highest political power made the military officers an eliteo:society.
The increasing contact with high-ranking military and civilian leaders of 
foreign countries further enhanced their prestige. Furthermore, under the 
necessity of national security and by virtue of independent jurisdictional 
authority over its own manpower, the military enjoyed a unique degree of 
autonomy. ^ "
48.Today the 620,000-3trong "military establishment is so deeply and
extensively involved in all phases of Korean life that, aside from their
49.primary duty of national defense, their role is varied and important.
First, the military is one of the largest educational institutions that
has contributed to upgrading the literacy rate to the present 90 percent,
50by teaching all illiterate inductees to read and write. *
Secondly, despite a disquieting tendency to undermine democratic values
and individualism due to the military's institutional value which stresses
47. Ibid.
48. The total active strength of the armed forces was, as of 1966, 
620,000s the army, 560,000; the navy, 20,000; the air force, 15,000; and 
the marine corps, 25,000. Sources Hapdong lews Agency, op. cit.^  pp*64-5«
49. For the role of the military, see especially Kim Sbhg-shik, * 
Letter to the ^ op;oop-man Armed Forces," Sasangge, January 1965, pp»56-62.
50. Ibid., p#57.
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hierarchical order, the solution to problems through violence, the 
unquestioning obedience, and collectivism, the military service is also 
a melting pot that dissolves remnants of traditional social classes and 
that creates an equalitarian society chiefly through its universal service 
system, instillation of national consciousness, and the internal mobility 
based on competence.
51.Thirdly, the military is also the largest civic action group in Korea.
It teaches agricultural techniques; builds irrigational systems, roads,
52.
schools, medical clinics and even towns; and supplies manpower in busy 
farming seasons.
Fourth, it not only handles highly sophisticated weapons, and electronic
and mechanical gears and vehicles, but also adopts, develops and maintains
the most efficient and rational organizational and admind strative structures
unrivaled by those of civilian groups. Ever since the military coup in 1961,
the military has supplied the largest number of administrators in the govern--
55,
ment and public corporations both in the higher and lower echelons. The
growing role of the military in administration is apparent as it is, after
all, the only major career opportunity in Korea generally open to the talents
and as it is the only professional group with reasonable social mobility based
54.on skill and competence. The military is also more receptive to new ideas
and more rational in attitudes towards administration than the civilian 
55-counter-part.
51. For its civic action programs, see, e.g., H'aengchong paeks$
p‘yonch*an wiwonhoe (The Editing Committee of A White Paper on the Administration), 
Haengchong paeks# 1964 (A White Paper on the Administration 1964) (Seoul: Taehan 
kongronsa, 196477 pp.199-200.
52. Towns like Ch'unch'on, nonsan and Uich&ngpu are the prime examples of 
military creation,
53. E.g., the military supplied 61ft of cabinet ministers during the 
military government, compared with 1C$ during the Liberal Party government,
Pak Mun-ok, op. cit., p.436. In the Third Republic, the 15*26$ of high-ranking 
officials (above Grade 3: equivalentbto a section chief) are of military origin, 
Yoo Iloon (or Yu Jinn), "Social Background of High Civil Servants in Korea,"
Koreana Quarterly, Vol.10, Wo.l, Spring 1968, p.52. In the 19 public corpora­
tions, important positions are occupied by former generals and colonels,
Chosun llbo, June 17, 1965.
54. Daniel Wolfstone, "Park Goes to the Polls," op.cit., p.684.
55. Ibid. This was also my impression during my two years' experience 
in the army and the military government.
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Lastly, the military as the guardian of national security is the
56.
foremost oversee of the national ideology (i.e., anti-Communism).
Not only are the military officers trained in anti-Communism hut their 
rainson d1etre as a professional group depends upon this ideological policy, 
especially in the context of the present semi-state of war* For them any 
serious move for or debate on the issue of unification of Korea would spell
57
professional suicide* It is understandable why the military junta in 
1961 listed anti-Communism as the first of the "Six Revolutionary Pledgee".
The ideological purity was achieved even 'before the Korean War by a series 
of purges (often, witch-hunting) of Communists in the army ° and was rein­
forced by the war itself.
The growing role of the military in varied fields of Korean society
inevitably made it the foremost modernized elite group that could provide
strong leadership for modernization of Korea, as the civilian governments
of both Rhee and Chang if ere unable to operate government responsibly and
59.could not solve economic and social problems. When the military 
eventually took over government in I96I, the military could assert its role 
in the following termsj
The Korean people and their present leaders are fully aware 
of the dangers inherent in military government. However, 
there is universal acceptance of these factss (l) the Armed 
Forces, hitherto aloof from politics, were the only 
remaining organizations which retained the respect of the 
people; (2) the Armed Forces, by virtue of their training 
in organizational matters, were alone capable of reorganizing 
the Government into an efficient body functioning for the 
welfare of the nation rather than the private interests of 
officials and civil servants; (3) the Armed Forces were the
only force strong enough to eliminate the corrupt and self- 
serving interests which had brought the country to the verge
56. See Kim Song-shik, op. cit., pp.58-9.
57. Daniel Wolf stone, "The Generals Strike," Far Fas tern Economic Review. 
Vol. XXXIX, No.8, May 25, 1961, p.348.
58. See Pak S^ng-hwan, op, cit., pp.136-202; and "The Military of the 
Liberal Party Era," op.cit*, pp.287-92.
59. William A. Douglas, "South Korean Search for Leadership," op.cit.,
pp.20-36.
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of disintegration? (4) only the Armed Forces, in the 
existing- emergency, were able to stop increasing Communist 
infiltration and subversion and the growth of pro- 
Communism among some irresponsible elements among- the 
people® 60.
Of course, some of these claims were exaggerated. Like any other
groups in Korea, the military —  especially considering its size and
composition —  has also weakness to act as a cohesive group mainly due to
internal dissension. Aside from its inter-service rivalry, the military
was from its infancy an arena of power struggle for control of leadership
among groups of various origins, often externally supported by politicians 
61and parties. ° Nevertheless, due to President Rhee's absolute command of 
loyalty and his shrewd handling of generals, a potentially serious internal 
dissension was avoided. During the Rhee government the military was Rhee's
62personal political instrument rather than a potential threat to his authority.
63The generals were the least discontended elements with Rhee's government.
Their main activities were factional rivalries which were centered on the
issue of hegemony in the military through gaining the personal favor of Rhee
64and of the powerful faction in the liberal Party,
The military's intervention in politics started from 1952. In Kay 1952 
when General Lee Chong-ch'an, then Army Chief of Staff, refused Rhee's order 
for deployment of one combat division into Pusan to intimidate the defiant 
Rational Assembly which opposed Rhee's constitutional amendment bill, Rhee 
had not only fired General Lee but also had illegitimately declared martial 
law in the Pusan area under the command of a subservient general, Won Yong- 
d#k. General Won's military policemen rounded up eleven key opposition
60. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROK, The Military Revolution in Korea,
OJ) e oxi/ 4 ^ $ 3
61. See Ko Ch&ag-hun, Kun, ojo. cit., pp.54-121. General Lee Hyong-kun,
Army Chief of Staff, acknowledged in 1956 that the army was divided by various 
factions and that unity of the army was threatened by factional activities.
See "The Man of the Week: Lee Hy^ ng-ldin," Chugan Hilimang, Wo.32, August 3? 1956,p.15.
62. The U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States 
Foreign Policy: Asia Studies (Prepared by the Conion Associates, Ltd.) 86th 
Congress, 1st Session (November 1, 1959)) (Washington, B.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1959), p.115*
63- Yang Htmg-mo, "Dr. Rhee Syngman and the Military," Shindong-A,
September 1965, p«234.
64. "Military of the Liberal Party Era," o^.cit., p.315*
65* See Ch8n Song-chong, "Lee Chong-ch'an and the Incident of Refusal 
to Dispatch Soldiers to Pusan," Shint‘aeyangsa, ed., Hukmak, op.cit., pp.155-6.
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Assemblymen on the charge of conspiracy with Communists. This military
intervention was the decisive element that forced the National Assembly
to pass the first constitutional amendment in July 1952.
With the emerging dominance of the militant "main stream faction" in
the Liberal Party after 1955? the military became overtly an auxiliary of 
66the party. ’ Promotion and assignments of top generals and admirals 
were politically dictated by the Liberal Party's ruling faction. Even the 
army's counter-intelligence funds were often extorted for personal funds
67.
of the Liberal Party members of the defense committee in the legislature.
Major military contracts for civilian supplies and services were arbitrarily
68.
allocated to the friends of the ruling party.
During this era? "political generals" — - examplified by Major General
Kim CK*ang-yong (Commander of the Army Counter-Intelligence Corps) and
Lieutenant General Won Yong~d,6k (Supreme Commander of the Military Police
Headquarters) —  wielded extraordinary power under the personal protection
of Rhee. Generals Kim and Won not only ignored their own superiors in
military hierarchy but also intimidated them by abusing their security
investigatory power. General Kim was finally assassinated in January 1956
69.by fellow generals and colonels. If General Kim was the symbol of terrorism
among fellow officers, General Won was the counter-part among civilians and
politicians. One of the most flagrant involvements in partisan politics of
General Won was his plot to implicate six opposition leaders in subversion by
planting Communist propaganda materials from the north into the politicians‘
70residence. When his involvement was exposed in January, 1955? he testified
66* Hankuk hybmy&og chaep'an sa, Vol. I, op, cit.? p.914.
67.Ibid.
68.ibid. See also Kim Sok~y#ng, ed.s P1okchftng ship! nv&n (The Twelve 
Years of Despotism), Vol. I (Seoul? P1 yongjin muuhwasa, I960), pp.95-110.
69. See Yu Sifng-taek, "The End of Kim Ch‘ang-yong," Hong Sung-man et al? 
ed„, Haebang ishlp nyon, Vol. for Records, op. cit., p.455-8-
70. See "The Incident of Seditious Literature in the National Assembly," 
Lee Byong-hun et al, ed., Haebang op.cit., pp.725-7.
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to the National Assembly's investigation committee that he hatched the plot
73 .to test loyalty of the opposition leaders to the nation.
During the Liberal Party government, generals also played an important
part in delivering votes and rigging elections, including participation in
72.the infamous presidential elections in I960. 0 The standard method was to
install polling places inside military camps or installations in violation 
of the law, where the opposition was forbidden to campaign and even denied
r-fj
of observing voting. ' Where military personnel and their dependents were 
heavily concentrated, military commanders could actually decide the outcomes 
of elections.^"’
fhe effect of corruption of ranking generals and degradation of pro­
fessional pride of the military by the hands of ruling politicians resulted 
in a general decay of discipline and morale of the military as well as in
the raising of the mill tally’s political consciousness especially among a
75.vast number of young officers in the ranks of li&Utenants and colonels.
Their political consciousness was further stimulated by the military take­
overs in other countries, such as Colonel Abdel Nasser's in Egypt (1954),
*76
General Ne Win's in Burma (1958) and General Ayub Khan's in Pakistan (1958).
The growing of the military's consciousness was also inevitable after the
cessation of the Korean War. The end of the war abruptly terminated their
77wartime privileges and prestige. * The effect of the acute discrepancy 
between their status, which they had earned through the gruelling war, and the
71. See General Won's statement in ibid., p*726.
72. See John Kie^chiang Oh, Korea? Democracy on Trial althaeas Cornell 
University Press, 1968), p#99* See also Kim Chong-shin, op. cit., pp*33-44-
73. E.g., see Lee Sangchong, op. cit., pp#163-4.
74. E.g., see the role of General Lee Mytfng-jae of the 15th Army 
Division in Ch'&Lwon in electing the unofficial candidate of the Liberal Party 
to the National Assembly in the 1958 general elections in ibid., pp. 133-4.
. See also the statement of the Democratic Party pleading for political neutrality 
of soldiers in the 1956 presidential elections, "A Note to All Soldiers,"
Minjutang, T'uchaeng til chokch&k:. op. cit., p#33«
75. Son Jae-stfk, "Korean Politics and the Military," Chosun llbo, July 8,1965.
76. Hankuk hyojay&ng chaep'an sa, Vol.I, op. cit., p.915°
77. See Son Jae-s'ftk, op. cit.
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inadequacy of rewards by the society after the war began to be felt 
especially among the ranks of colonels.
The manifestation of this effect was the rise of their attitude
generally critical of privileged civilians and politicians and, above all,
their own generals who allowed themselves to be manipulated by politicians
*7ft
and businessmen in return for their luxurious living. * Their frustration
was accelerated by the increasing failure of society to provide decent
living suitable to their status. Their general dissatisfaction was put in
the following wordsj
Although the first and second lieutenants of the pre-war 
had now reached to the rank of colonels, their living 
standard remained all the same. When the past heroes of 
the military were discharged from the service, only poverty 
and starvation were awaiting for them. Borne retired 
colonels had to go out to the streets to earn living as 
"A-frame" manual workers ... In contrast, most generals, who 
had the least personal danger during the War, got promotion 
after promotion and had enriched themselves from dubious 
sources to enjoy luxurious life. 79°
Therefore, the general causes of frustration and discontent of the 
officer corps after the war were? (l) the disintegration of military 
discipline and morale due to the corruption and intrusion of politics at 
the top; (2) the rapid degeneration of their social status; and (5) the 
failure of society to provide adequate living. This made the officer 
corps of junior and middle ranks an "intellectual proletariat," filled 
with highly critical attitude towards the society, The feeling was parti­
cularly strong in view of the fact that the officer corps was largely
80composed of the men of lower social background. Obviously a quick and
78. John Kie-chiang Oh, ojo. cit., pp.,98-9* See also Song Yo-chlan, 
"OnBong Yo-cli'an, pp. cit., p*467.
79. Paek Nam-ju, HySkmy&ig chidoja pale ch&ng-hui ron. (On the 
Revolutionary Leader Park Chung-hee7*TSeoul: Inmulkesa, 1961), p.103°
80. The TJ.Bc Congress, Senate, the studies by the Conlon Associates, 
op. cit., p.115? Bon Jae-s&k, op. cit.
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sweeping remedy of these.maladies was to assume political power by themselves.
This is a part,;of the process what Morris Janowitz says that infusion of men
of lower social background into the officer corps actually weakens civilian
control, because they are ambitious and less liable to be governed by the
81traditional restraints than are men of higher social background.
Y/hen in April I960 the students demonstrated against Rhee, the military
was called upon to quell the uprising. But the military stood idle to let
Rhee's government go down, for it realized that it could not save the extremely
82unpopular government. It was however doubtful whether the military was at 
the time able to take over the government. For the military was not only
83surprised by the event but also was torn apart by factionalism of generals.
But the overthrowal of Rhee by the students and the subsequent students1.’
demands for reform in the Second Republic had undoubtedly awakened the
officers politically and made them aware of their political potentiality.
The first sign of a definite unrest of the military was the "purification
84.of the military" movement in May I960 by nine colonels, who were all
or
members of th© 8th Graduating Glass (.1949) of the Korean Military Academy.
The colonels put the following five demands to Ho Ch&ng's interim government;
(1) Scrutinization and punishment of top military officers 
who had collaborated with the Rhee government- in rigging the 
I960 presidential elections.
(2) Punishment of generals who had illicitly accumulated 
wealth.
(3) Elimination of incompetent and unscrupulous commanders.
(4) Elimination of all elements responsible for factionalism 
and guarantee of political neutrality of the military.
(5) Improvement of over-all treatment for the military 
personnel. 86.
Although the colonels' purification campaign which had persisted to the
period of Chang Myon10 government ended with the forced retirement of their
\
81. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier; A Social and Political 
Portrait (Glencoe, ill.: Free Press, 1964), pp.253-4.
82. See Song Yo-chan, "On Song To-chan," op.cit., pp«469~70.
83. See Son Jae-sok, op. cit.
84. See IIo Chong, "On H& Chong," Huimang ch’uj.p'ansa, Sashil ui chonpu
rul kisul handa, op. cit.? pp.213-7®
85. The nine colonels included Lt.Colonels Kim Chong-pil, Kim Hyong-ulc
and Kil Chae-ho who distinguished later in the military coup d'etat and polities. 
For the list, see Hankuk hySkmy^ng chaep'an sa, Vol.I, op. cit., p.916.
’ m  *  i..ii 1 ■ i n   I'l'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  i m j i ' i i  u * W  m i»* * » * • • * “
86. Ibid.
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ring leaders without producing the desired result, their movement led 
nevertheless to the ultimate retirement of the total twenty-one generals
pn
(including two Army Chiefs of Staff) and admirals from the armed forces.
The failure of the colonels' movement was chiefly attributable to the
objection of the United Wations Commander, U.S, General Carter B. Magruder,
in Seoul, who feared that the all-round purge might weaken the defense
88capability of the Korean armed forces by retiring even able generals.
The military coup d'etat in May 1961 was explained as an extraordinary 
measure to save the nation from corruption, chaos and Communist threat.
Perhaps it was a symptom of Korea's search for a stable and capable leader­
ship. However, if one looks deeper into the imbalance of the composition 
at the top stratum of officer corps, another important reason for the coup 
—  i.e. a major factor for the general unrest in the military — - may be 
found in the continuing conflict between the generals and the colonels.
The conflict between them stemmed largely from the fact that after the war
the opportunity of colonels for promotion to the rank of general —  hence,
89.
for better social privileges and better living —  was practically closed.
There has been constant pressure from the poorly-paid colonels to have an
90.all-round purge of generals in order to make some room at the top. What 
made this situation more unbearable for the colonels was the fact that the 
rax>id expansion of the military during the Korean War had promoted the entire 
members of some earlier classes of the military academy over-night to the 
rank of general, while those who had joined the academy slightly late missed 
the wholesale opportunity. Those who reached the rank of colonel at the
87. Ibid., p.917,
88. See Daniel Wolfstone, "The Generals Strike,” op. cit., p.948;
and Ch&ig, "On Ch&ig," op. cit., p.215.
89. Son Jae~s25k, op. cit,, See also Kiyomiya By try, "Lieutenant General
Chang and His Comrades," Bungei Shunju, July 1961, pp.?
90. Daniel Wolfstone, "The Generals Strike," op, cit., p.348;
91. Son Jae~s<fe, >op. cit.
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end of the war had, thus, lost, perhaps forever, their opportunity for 
promotion due to a complete saturation at the top by exceptionally young 
generals. They therefore became the most impatient and discontented 
elements.
The fact that the 1961 coup was practically masterminded by the colonels 
92.of the 8th class, who missed that opportunity during- the war and again
93failed in the purge of generals, was not a surprise. Although a few
generals like Park Chung-hee and ICim Tong-ha joined the coup, it was in a
94.sense a mutiny within the military by one group of the colonels. * The
division within the military itself even after the coup) was evident in the
six abortive counter-coup attempts by different groups in the military
95.between May 1961 and May 1963. * The example of the 1961 coup is unlikely
to be lost on other colonels who are suffering from essentially the same 
kind of frustration that precipitated the colonels who staged the coup.
Most of the colonels and generals who took part in the coup and had survived 
subsequent power struggles. are now in the locus of power either in politics 
or in the military. This had unquestionably spread tension of ambition among 
the vast number of officers still in uniform.
The possibility of future military intervention in politics is not 
diminished in view of persisting factionalism within the military.
Factionalism is based on provincial origin, military academy class and personal 
ties. The factional rivalry and discontent are closely interwined with the 
issues of promotion and assignment. * For example, in the coup plot of
92. Among the 94 officers participated in the coup, the number of 
colonels was 72, to which the 8th class supplied 36. See “Yesterday and Today 
of the 94 Key Figures in the May Revolution,'* Chosun llbo, May 16, 1965*
93. Cf. "The Background of the Coup D'Etat in Korea," Yomiurl Shimbun,
May 17, 1961.
94. See Walter Briggs, "The Military Revolution; On Its Leader and 
Achievements,1 Korean Affairs, Vol.V, Mo.2 Summer 1963, pp.22-8.
95. See "The Genealogy of Conspiracies," Hong StCng-man, Haebang- iship 
nybn, Vol. for Records, op. cit., p.736; and "Will the National Assembly 
Clarify?" Series Mo.8 (The Military Cou$ Plots), Kyunghyang Shinmoon, 
December-26, 1963-
96. See "An Inside Story of the Screening Committee for Promotion of 
Generals," Chosun llbo, December 26, 1965; and "Reassignments of the Stars 
and the Implication," Chosun llbo, March 22, 1965.
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Colonel Won Ch'ung-y&n in May 1965? the investigation revealed that the
conspirators were dissatisfied with the army's promotion and assignment
policy of 1965? which, they believed, unduly favored the members of the
97.8th class. * It was not coincident that the ten conspirators were all
98.north Koreans by birth. * So long as there exist personal frustration
and political ambition amidst of factional rivalries among officers,
there is little guarantee against military intervention into politics„
The objectivity and fairness in the government's promotion and
assignment policy have recently improved. However, in the 1966 army
promotion, the 8th class was again favored over the senior 6th end 7th 
99.classes. It was also noticeable that the three generals who rose 
from the rank of major general to that of lieutenant general in 1966 
were all President Park's classmates of the 2nd c l a s s . T h e  favoritism 
by the present government leaders (former officers) towards their fellow 
classmates was unmistakably a move to consolidate the position of the 
present government in the military. This indicates that the separation 
of politics from the military is not yet complete.
With the military coup of 1961 the military had emerged as the fore­
most political pressure group in Korea, in terms of its decisive role in 
politics. G-eneral Park's decision to run for Presidency in 1963 was partly 
due to the pressure of the military. In March the young officers of the
Capital Defsis.e Division in Seoul staged a demonstration to urge General Park 
101.to stay in power. On the following day, this demand was backed up by
102the "all military commanders conference." * The indispensability of 
support of the military for the Park government was clearly demonstrated
97- See Chosun llbo, June 27, 1965.
98. See the list of the arrested, in Chosun llbo. May 13? 1965.
99» See "An Inside Story of the Screening Committee for Promotion of
Generals," op..cit.
100. See Chosun llbo, November 17? 1965.
101. See Chosun llbo, March 16, 1963.
102. "The Dynamics of Today's Ruling Power in Korea," Series No.3? op.cit.
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during the ROK-Japan treaty- crisis when he had to depend on the military
to maintain the government against the students and the opposition. In
absence of cohesive support from. Park's own political party, the importance
of the military in the crisis "became supreme. The critical role of the
military was equally appreciated by the opponents of the government. For
instance, during the treaty struggle the former generals belonging to the
militant Consultative Council directly appealed to the military to side
103with the treaty opponents and to defy Park's government.
A great appreciation of loyalty of the military by President Park is
evident in M s  meticulous courtesy paying to the military and in his eager-
ness to solicit views of the military and to reflect them to his administra- 
104.tive policies. It was not coincident that in the summer of 1965 the
government, in anxiety to woo the military, announced its intention to
increase the salaries of soldiers by 80 percent —  an extraordinary generosity
105.compared with 30 percent increase planned, for other government employees.
Kim Chong-pil appealed for the support of the military in 1967 by saying that
the re-election of Park as President and the stability of Park's government
3-06were essential for Korea's economic and political development. 0 It seems
that insurance of absolute loyalty of the military to the present government
has become an obsessed priority. This development made the military the
ultimate political instrument of power, and, in return for its loyalty, the
military emerged as the most powerful pressure group capable of advancing
its vested interests.
Since 1965 about 50,000 Korean troops joined the Americans in the
Vietnam war. More recently military activities, including the creation of
a militia of 2*5 million men, are markedly stepped up to meet North Korea's
107increasing armed provocation and infiltration. * These developments may 
have provided an outlet to divert the attention of politically restless
103o See the statement of eleven generals, "The Appeal to the Soldiers," 
August 27, 1965, in Kyuoghyang Shinmoon, August 27, 1965®
104. "The Dynamics of Today's Ruling Power in Korea," Series No.3* op.cit. 
105* "Salary Increase for the Soldiers," Chosun llbo, August 8, 1965 «■
106. Kira's speech at the 1st Army Hdqrs., January 10,1967, Chosun llbo, 
January 11, 1967®
107. See Philip Shabecoff, "Army's (ireat Leap Forward," in a special 
report on South Korea, The Times (London), June 18, 1969.
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officers. Nevertheless, in net effect the influence of the military is 
bound to increase.
At present it seems that the military is firmly allied with the present 
government. But nobody can predict to what extent the military would 
ultimately assert its potential political power. However, it is apparent 
that if the constitutional process would fail again and the society would be 
torn apart by chaos and conflicts, the military would be able to assert 
openly again the primacy of soldiers in national life.
THE STUDENTS
Korean college students are today one of the most potent political 
forces as they have repeatedly proved their ability to act as a powerful 
pressure group although their involvement with political activities was 
motivated by varying factors at different times. Their potential as a stably 
organized force is somewhat limited by their lack of national organization 
and of coherent action programs as well as by various restrictions and penal­
ties set by the government and school authorities.
Nevertheless, in I960, they toppled Rhee and paved the way to power for 
Rhee's opponents. During the Second Republic their power virtually drove the 
country to the verge of an anarchy that eventually brought the military into 
power. During the ROIC™.Japan treaty crisis they again acted as the foremost 
opponents of the treaty and of the Park government which had to repeatedly 
protect itself from them with the aid of the military.
What makes them such a powerful group in Korea? A satisfactory answer 
to this question may require an analysis based on the following factorss 
(l) Korea's unique national problems that have frustrated students who 
constitute a large portion of the Korean intellectual elite (2) their
historical role as the vanguard, of popular movement; (3) their value
108* Intellectuals in Korea are considered to be teachers, writers, 
journalists, lawyers, preachers, artists and other professionals, besides 
students as "young intellectuals."
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orientation ©n social and political issues; and (4) the impact of the 
extraordinary degree of mass education since 1945 and their current social 
status.
The history of contemporary Korea is a history of the tragedy and 
suffering of the masses. This stems from Korea's unique national problems 
(see partially in Chapter i). These problems have decided the current 
status of Korea and have become the focus of the student movement in Korea.
The Japanese colonialism was followed by the division of Korea which was 
arbitrarily set by foreign powers. Because of the division, Koreans had 
paid a heavy human and economic toll during the Korean War. The division of 
Korea is still imposing a heavy burden on the national economy. The division 
is also responsible for the rigid anti-Communism which is not only limiting 
the perspective of Korea's foreign policy detrimentally to her national 
interests abroad, but also stifling domestically the creative energy of the 
people and their various essential freedoms as citizens. Under these conditions, 
the full potentiality of Korea's economic, political and cultural development is 
severely limited.
The soverignty and national security of Korea since its independence have 
been largely maintained by the massive American military and economic aid.
The country's economic structure was built by foreign aid and investment, which 
makes Korea economically highly susceptible to- foreign economic and political 
pressure. Militarily, Korea’s vast armed forces are logistically maintained 
by and operationally controlled by the U.S. military authorities. In this 
sense, Korea's independence has been a fiction to many intellectuals like 
students.
109* For Korea's general conditions that breed dissatisfaction of students, 
see Yu Tal-y&ng, "Concerning Student Demonstrations," Chosun llbo, July 2,
1965; Hwang Ch'an-do, "The Carrier of National Liberation," Student Power 
Series, No.3 (Korea), Asahi J&naru, Vol.10, Wo,28, July 7» 1968, p*35;
0 By6ng-hdn, "University Students and Politics in Korea," Koreana Quarterly.
Vol.9. No.4, Winter 1967, p.l; and Ch'oe SiSk-ch'ae, "Why No Self-Confidence?" 
Sasangge, September 1964, pp.50-6.
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The successive governments have been authoritarian and suffering from 
illegitimacy and, hence, hardly enjoyed a genuine popular support. Elections 
have been generally stained by irregularities and the governments which come 
to power and are maintained through such irregularities have been further dis­
credited by widespread corruption and favoritism, which have contributed, in 
a considerable degree, to the uneven distribution of wealth between the rich 
and powerful and the rest.
Against these serious problems which constantly command attention of 
students as well as of other intellectuals who are deeply concerned about the 
future of their country, the nature of the Korean student movement must be 
viewed. Accordingly, the three basic ingredients (or goals) of today's 
Korean student movement are: (l) nationalism (anti-foreign influence and
re-unifieation of Korea), (2) democracy (anti-authoritarianism) and (3)
110modernization (self-sufficiency, and just and equal society). * Since the
issues raised by their movement are closely related to the problems of Korea
and their goals of struggle are relevant to the aspirations of the entire
Korean people, their movement has a great degree of historical and social
validity that in turn strengthens the legitimacy and tenacity of their protests.
Furthermore as the social origin of today’s college students fairly well
represents all socio-economic strata of society, their reactions to social
111.and political issues often reflect the prevailing mood of the country.
Therefore it can be said that a moral strength of their movement lies in the 
fact that their view reflects, more or less, congruous views of the public 
and that their attention focuses on the historical tasks of Korea.
110. Cf. Hwang Ch'an-do, ibid., p.36; and Kim S&ng-shik, "The 
Characteristics and Directions of the Recent Student Movement," Sasangge, 
January 1961, pp.233. Also cf. John Israel, Student Nationalism in China, 
1927-1937 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966).
111. E.g., a survey on the economic strata of participants in the
April Student Revolution by Kim Song-t’ae, "The Psychology of the April 19th," 
Sasangge, April 1961, p.83.
>
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Another factor that makes the student movement a powerful pressure
group is its historic role as the vanguard of popular movement. Under the
Japanese rule students (including high school students) served as the main
vehicle of Korean nationalistic movement. All major nationalistic movements
during this period, such as the March 1st Movement in 1919, the June 10th
Incident in 1926 and the Kwangju Students Incident in January 1929, were
spearheaded by students. Nationalism is still the main ingredient of today’s
student movement.
Between 1945 and 1948 (American military government), students were
divided between the left and right. Their attention was focused, firstly, on
the ideological debate between liberal democracy and Marxism and, secondly,
on the issue of the best course for Korea's immediate independence and uni- 
112fication. ’ With the establishment of Rhee's government in 1948, students
had achieved an ideological unity and were generally content with Rhee's
government which, although representing only the southern part of Korea, served
1] •=;
as the symbol of independence. Turning serious attention to social and
political problems and asserting their role were delayed by the Korean war.
Until students suddenly revolted against Rhee in I960 and found their political 
strength, students were most of the time docile and were readily mobilized in 
support of Rhee's policies mainly through the Student Defense Corps, the 
national organization which was created and controlled by the government.
While the issue of the rigged elections of March I960 was the direct cause
y
of the April Student Revolution, it was also the catal/st that released the 
pent-up general discontent with Rhee's misrule of twelve years and prompted the
112. See 0 By6ng-h£b, "University Students and Politics in Korea," 
o-p.cit.. pp.9-10.
Ibid., p. 10.
114* See Hy&n Sung-chong, "The Direction of New Student Movement," 
Sasangge, April 1961, p. 127; and Kim S&ng-t'ae, "The Psychology of the April 
19th," op. cit., p«82.
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115.masses to rally around, the leadership of students. ’ What had insured
the success of the student revolt was thus the existence of a revolutionary
condition in the country. But why did students, not other groups, play the
leading role in overthrowing Rhea?’ With the exception of the students there
were no organized groups that were strong enough to directly challenge Rhee *3 
libgovernment. * The military, as mentioned earlier, was indulging in its own
"brand of factionalism and its top generals were eargerly serving Rhee's
government. Although the popular Democratic Party played a leading role in
opposing Rhee and in educating the masses, it was not only organizationally
too weak, due to severe persecution, to lead a revolt, hut also too cautious
117to take such a drastic step. * Therefore at the time,, only the students, 
who had the strength in number of one million members (including high school 
students) and certain common democratic ideas inimical to Rhee's dictatorship, 
were in the position to" lead a revolution.
The April Student Revolution was a significant landmark that saw the 
emergence of students as a formidable political force with increasingly 
articulated demands. Elated by their power and prestige by ousting the 
dictator and taking advantage of newly gained freedom, the students put 
excessive demands on Chang's government often by resorting to direct action 
which had greatly undermined the stability of the Second Republic. The inherent 
difficulty of Chang's ruling group lay in the fact that it was not the main 
body of the revolutionary force but the main beneficiary of the students'
115. Por the factual account of the April Student Revolution, see especially 
Cho Dok-song, ed., Sawbl hy&kmyong (The April Revolution) (Seoul: Ch'angwonsa, 
I960). See also Lee Hwa-su, "An Analysis of the April Revolution in Korea," 
Koreana Quarterly, Vol.8, Ho.2, Summer 1966, pp.96-110; Sawol hy&kmytfng ch'bngsa 
p'y&nch'anhoe (The Editing Board of the History of the April Revolution), Min.ju 
hankuk saw6l hy&kmybng ch'Sngsa (The Brief History of the April Revolution in 
Democratic Korea') (Seoul, 1961), pp,470-88 and 499-541; Hankuk hybkmy&ng 
chaep'an sa, Vol. i, op.cit., pp. 140-76; and 0 So-paek, "The April Revolution," 
Lee Kang-hybn, "The Demonstration of Korea University," Lee Sang-foi, "Professors 
Also Rose," and Chang S&k-,jin, "The Surrender of the Dictator," in Hong Sung-man 
et al, ed.* Haebang iship nyftn, Vol. for Records, op.cit., pp.543-79*
116. Cf. Kim SSng-t'ae, "The Psychology of the April 19th," op. cit., p.82; 
and 0 Bybng-hbn, "University Students and Politics in Korea," op. cit., p*13»
117. Por a criticism of cowardice of the Democratic Party, see Ko 
Ch&ng-hun, "An Untold April 19th Story," Sasangge, April 1966, p.188.
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118revolution. ’ Such was the power of the students that the National
Assembly was, for example, occupied by a group of extreme students in
October. I960 and was forced to enact retroactive laws in order to punish
119Rhee's officials and party leaders. ’ In spite of this and other incidents,
the students' pressure was instrumental in producing quickly some revolu-
120tionary enactments including amendment of the Constitution.
During the Second Republic, the objectives of the student movement
clearly emerged. Their movement was focused on the following four areas:
(l) consolidation of democracy by purging anti-democratic and corrupt
elements; (2) reform of academic institutions (purge of incompetent and
corrupt teachers); (3) enlightenment of the people for new morality
(austerity and self-help); and (4) search for steps leading to eventual
121re-unification of Korea based on neutrality. * The military take-over
of 1961 was a severe setback to the student movement, However, even under
the military rule which banned all organized activities, the students
could demonstrate in June 1962 to demand a speedy conclusion of a status of
122.forces agreement with the United States. This indicated that the student
movement, though unable to openly rebel against military rule, could still 
express nationalism with which the military rulers then closely identified 
themselves.
The motivation of student opposition to the ROIC-Japan treaty is too 
complex to be discussed here (see Chapter 4). However, aside from their 
distrust of Japan as the prime motive of their opposition, the series of
118. See Cho Ka-ky&ng, "Spiritual Confusion of the Revolutionary 
Mainstream," op. cit., pp.71-2; and urn Ki-hy&ng, "Pre-Modernism of Korean 
Politicians," Sasangge, March 1961, p.131.
119. See Chang' My&n, "On Chang My&ny op. cit., pp.381-2.
120. See Tun Ch'&n-ju, "The Role of Students: A Social Stimulus,"
Sasangge, January 1961, p. 108; and Ko Yong-bok, "The Meaning of the Social 
Movement After the Revolution," op. cit., p.91.
121. See Hy&n Sdng-chong, op*cit., p. 128; Kim S6ng-shik, "The 
Characteristics and Directions of the Recent Student Movement," 0£. cit.» pp.233-5 
Pak D&k-man, op. cit., pp.147-8; and Han Nae-bok, "April Anniversary in Korea," 
op. cit.. p.209*
122. See Bankuk llbo, June 8, 1962.
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slogans ‘ against the treaty and the government revealed their deep
dissatisfaction with the conditions of growing economic difficulties,
chronic scarcity of job opportunity, foreign (American) influence, lack of
freedom and police brutality, and prevailing corruption in the government
124and business circles. The demand by some segments of students for
certain steps for gradual rapprochement with North Korea, instead of with
Japan, was a symptom of despair in search for an outlet from these condi-
125.tions, rather than a naive demand for unification at any cost. In
analysing the student's unification movement during the Second Republic,
Professor Kim S&ng-shik saw that the Tonification movement was essentially
an intensive form of protest against the society and the older generation
(i.e., politicians) who, in the students* eyes, had perpetuated the status
126quo with indifference and for selfish interest. ’ This same sentiment
reappeared during the treaty crisis. In short, the moral strength of the
student movement in Korea derives from the nature of their protest that has
a great degree of relevance to the critical problems of Korea, and which
hence elicits popular support.
As Korea is in the midst of transition to modernization —  the process
which generates a conflict between traditional values and modern values^
the values held by Korean students naturally reflect this. Politically,
their values are highly selective! they still retain certain Confucian
127values such as "rule by virtue and example," while they cherish modern
123democratic values such as government by constitution ‘and participation
123. See Hong Simg-man et al, ed., Haebang iship nyfon, Vol. for Records, 
op. cit., pp.688-9.
124. See also The New York Times, April 26, 1964*
125. See Kameyama Akira, op. cit.. pp.197-8.
126. Kim Si$ng-shik, "The Characteristics and Directions of the Recent 
Student Movement," op. cit.t p.235* See also Lee Hang-y&ng in "A Discussion!
A Revolution Without Main Body Is A Political Change," Sasangge, April 1962, 
p.163; and Stephen Bradner, "Korea: Experiment and Instability," Japan 
Quarterly, Vol. VIII, No.4, October-December 1961, p.414.
127. See Kim T' ae-kil, Hankuk taehaksaeng ui kach'ikwan (Values of 
Korean College Students) (Seoul! Illchokwak, 19677, pp.223-5*
128. Kim Song-t'ae, "The Psychology of the April 19th," op. cit.,
pp.80-1. Kim's survey among the participants in the April revolution indicate 
that they are overwhelmingly opposed to unconstitutional rule.
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in de ed s ion-making. However, a substantial number of students doubt that
129.Western democracy without modification is quite suitable to Korea.
Their pessimism with respect to Western democracy is undoubtedly based on
the experience of Korea under such democracy. What kind of democracy is
suitable to Korea under the present condition? According to Professor Kim
T‘ae-kil*s survey data (1964-1965), students are, of course, opposed to any
political system that is oppressive, corrupt and Machiavellian, even if it
130promises economic progress and stability. * They would equally reject
131any form of Western democracy, if it fails to solve economic problems.
On the other hand, they would accept a paternalistic or guided democracy if
it can provide a strong but virtuous leadership instrumental for national 
132development.
As their type of government suggests, their social values in general
are highly idealistic and ambivalent although they may reflect the dilemma
of an under-developed country. As their values are selectively assembled —
largely in reaction to the present social and political conditions —  from
legacies of Confucianism and Western liberalism, their attitudes on public .
issues tend to be abstract, moralistic and universal, instead of specific,
133realistic and particular. * Because of this, students are often not only
confronted with the difficulty of explaining their political activities with
logical consistency and rationality, but also are frequently criticized for
the lack of constructive criticism addressed to specific problems and for the
134.naivity that overlooks the defects in their own idealistic inclination.
Students feel that under present conditions they have a distinctive role
129. To the question of whether or not Western democracy was suitable 
to Koreas 38^ expressed "unsuitable" and 30fo "suitable." And 29^ took the 
middle of the road position. See Hong Sung-chick, "Values of Korean College 
Students," Asea y&nku, Vol. VI, Wo.l, May 1963, pp.70-1.
130. See Kim T*ae-k±l, op. cit., pp.25-3o and 39-58.
131. See ibid., pp.28-30.
132. See ibid., pp.28-32.
133. 0 By&ng-h&n, "University Students and Politics in Korea," op.cit.pp.35-6.
154. Ibid.; and "The Student Movement Since the April 19th," a summary view-
of the xn,ofessors at an UWESCO seminar in April 1967 in Seoul, Chosun Ilbo,
April 25, 1967.
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to play in national affairs. According to, again, Professor Kim T’ae-kil,
about 79 percent of them believed that politics should not be left to
politicians, and about 62 percent expressed that they should speak out even
135if this may penalize them. Students regard themselves as the nation's
political conscience and believe that the masses should be led by younger
intellectuals like t h e m s e l v e s . M a n y  older intellectuals^hink this
138attitude is justified, while others, * disturbed by the excessive student
power, regard it as an illusion from their exaggerated sense of eliti&t role.
The excessive participation of students in politics is certainly a sign
of political or social instability. However this phenomenon in Korea must
be reconciled with the current status of Korean politics that, in a certain
sense, has impelled students to play such a prominent role as a pressure 
139.group. Political parties have continuously failed to provide solutions
to the problems and to represent public opinion. Social, economic and labor 
groups are either too weak to function as pressure groups or they survive 
only at the pleasure of the government. In this situation, the question 
arises; Who has to speak for the public and the conscience of the nation?
For better or worse, the students (along with the press and intellectuals)? 
who have the least wordly conflict of interest and are highly motiviated by 
idealism and genuine concern, come into the picture to fill the role of opinion 
maker or pressure group.
135. See Kim T'ae-kil, op. cit., pp.58-64 and 224. According to 
another survey, students expressed; 1fo for "Very active participation"; 
lAfo for "active participation"; and 57^ for "normal participation." See 
Hong Sung-chick, "Values of Korean College Students," op_. cit., pp.71-2.
136. 0 By6ng-h6n, "University Students and Politics in Korea,"
op. cit.» p*37.
137. E.g., Yu Tal-yong, op. cit., Cho Ji-hun, "President Park's Statement
in Chinhae and the Student Demonstrators, the Journalists and Intellectuals," 
Chosun Ilbo. May 5, 1965; and Kim S&ig-T ‘ae, "Subjectivity and the Japanese 
influence," Series Wo.7, Chosun llbo, August 25, 1965.
138. E.g., the views of the professors in "The Student Movement Since 
the April 19th," op. cit.
139. See Kameyama Akira, op. cit., p. 197; and Yu Tal-y&ng, op.cit.
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Their potential as political force is further enhanced by their 
strength in number as well as their heavy concentration in the capital^'^* 
where their direct action in the crowded streets always creates a maximum 
impact that spreads nationwide. Although they have neither a national 
organization to coordinate and sustain their actions nor a coherent program 
to challenge the government, their repeatedly successful demonstration of 
ability to act spontaneously as a cohesive force makes the authorities 
extremely nervous and prompts either the utmost cautious or the severest 
measures whenever a student demonstration takes place. To a certain degree, 
the exalted power of students is due to the exaggeration of the gravity of 
student demonstration by the panic-stricken government which automatically 
reacts with unnecessary harsh measures to suppress students, instead of trying 
to solve the basic causes of their unrest with sincerity."^" why? One of 
the basic reasons of the government's feeling of extreme insecurity is the 
Korean political culture in which the element of violence has played the main 
part in change of power among political elites. Another reason is that 
historically a student demonstration has been a good indication of popular 
unrest.
Another important factor that generates frequent students' revolt against 
society, particularly the government, is their deep dissatisfaction with their 
own present social status which is unfitted to them as the educated members of 
society. This is the inevitable result of the massive expansion of higher 
education since 1945 without a matching expansion of socio-economic capacity 
of Korea to accomodate them in accordance with status expectation.
140. Over IQffo of college students is concentrated in Seoul. 0 By&ng-h&i, 
“University Students and Politics in Korea," op. cit., p.18.
141. Ch'oe S&k-ch1ae, "Why No Self-Confidence?" op. cit., pp.50-2.
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In 1965 the number of college students attending 110 colleges,142-
universities and various higher educational institutions in Korea was 
143.
141,636. * There are approximately 441 students per 100,000 members of
population in a total population of 28,649,176 (1965). The proportion of
144.college students to the total population is abnormally large, ‘considering
Korea's economic and social capacity to support them both during and after
their education. At the time of Korea's liberation in 1945, the total number
145of college students was 7,819, attending 19 colleges. During two decades
(1945-1965) the number of college students thus multiplied more than eighteen 
times.
Why do Koreans have such degree of educational aspiration? The tradi­
tional importance of education can be traced to the Yi Dynasty. In the 
society of the Yi Dynasty, the ruling class exclusively consisted of higher 
government officials and their families (see Chapter l). Yet in theory, and 
to a certain extent in practice, recruitment to higher governmental positions 
in that society was made among the best educated youngmen in Confucianism who
passed the highly competitive national examinations (kwag&). Education became
1 A-fi
the major means of attaining power and prestige. * Although the opportunity
for taking national examinations was largely restricted to the ruling class,
educational aspiration was nevertheless well established in traditional society.
Even today the majority of Korean political and social leaders still come from
the elite which possesses either social status or wealth. But education is
147.the third means to attain political and social prominence. During the
Japanese rule, Koreans were discouraged from higher education, because the
142. Hapdong hews Agency, op. cit., pp.313-8.
143. Ibid., p.227,#.
144. For example, in 1963 college enrolments per 100,000 population in
the following countries were as follows* U.S., 1,987; U.S.R. 1,118; Japan 750; 
Israel, 700; France, 667; West Germany, 528; U.K, 484; Turkey, 255; and
Communist China, 25. See United Nations, Compendium of Social Statistics 1963, 
Statistical Papers, Series K, No.2 (New York, 1963); and United Nations,
Statistical Yearbook 1963, 15th Issue, (New York, 1964).
145. 0 By8ng-h<5n, "University Students and Polities in Korea," op.cit., pp.5-6.
146. Ibid., p.2.
147. Kahn Bae Ho (or Han Bae-ho) and Kim Kyu-taik, "Korean Political Leaders 
(1952-1962): Their Social Origins and Skills,1' Asian Survey, Vol.Ill, No*7,
July 1963, p.322.
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Japanese feared that an increase in the number of Korean intellectuals
T Aft
through education would increase nationalism among Koreans. * The 
liberation of Korea suddenly unleashed the traditional aspiration for 
education which was further precipitated by the American idea of mass 
education.
The effect of this massive increase in the college student popula­
tion presented many acute social problems by 1960s. Above all, this
149.lowered the social esteem of college students. The current status
of college students is radically different from that of their predecessors
who, few in number, were regarded as “select group" and commanded a high
social status. The change of their status is one major source of their
discontent, increased by the widening gap between their aspirations and
the capacity of society to meet them. The foremost problem has recently
been Korea's inability to accomodate the large numbers of college graduates.
In 1964, for example, there were 28,600 new graduates and only 39 percent of
150them were able to get employed. * In average, about two-thirds of new
151.college graduates are joining the already vast tanks of the unemployed,
whose number is estimated between two to two and a half millions. The
seriousness of the problem was pointed out by a 1964 proposal by the Minister
of Education. He proposed to limit the total college enrollment to 50,000,
in a view of the fact that the success of Korea's economic planning would not
152even create a capacity to absorb more than 9,000 new graduates annually.
As this illustrates, the immediate individual concerns of students are
153employment and livelihood in the future. One important effect of the
massive expansion of higher education was thus an increase of social tension
148. See C.I. Eugene Kim, “Japan's Colonial Education and Korea's 
Nation-Building," C.I. Eugene Kim, ed., op.cit., pp*l-ll.
149. Kim In-su, “A Campus Reports Dark Streets on College Campuses," 
Sasangge, April 1962, p,134*
■*•50. Chosun Ilho, February 4, 1965 •
151. See a summary of the study made by the Central Educational Research 
Institute, in Chosun llbo, June 16, 1966.
152. Mun Hhi-s'dk, “The Meaning of Reorganise tion of Universities, “
Hankuk 13/bo, September 14, 1964.
153. See a summary of the 1965 survey by Korea University among its 
students, in Chosun llbo, February 1, 1966.
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among the increasing number of young intellectuals who are highly dissatis­
fied with their socio-economic status. This is certainly an additional 
factor that reinforces their critical attitudes and that frequently motivates 
them to political action.
Considering the nature and direction of their movement, their historic 
role, their idealism and their deep discontent with the society, it was only 
natural that students played the leading role in opposing the R0K-Japan treaty. 
Additionally, the issue of the "humiliating*® treaty had also provided an
opportunity to release their suppressed discontent which had been accumulating
155.since the military take-over.
The potential danger of the increasingly furious student agitation
against the treaty and the government was the possibility that the student
unrest might develop into a serious popular revolt against the government.
Apparently the government was alarmed by the existence of some strong popular
156.sympathy with the student cause. * The government's anxiety was matched by
the opposition's eagerness to intensify this and to exploit and rely on the
students for their political comeback. Because of this fear on the part of
the government and the expectation on the part of the opposition, the students
were zoomed into the central stage of politics by virtually replacing politic- 
157.ians. Aware of this danger of student demonstrations which in I960 had
overthrown Rhee, the Park government was initially cautious in dealing with
student demonstrators by adopting a mixed approach of "public relations" and
158.
concessions * when the students staged their first demonstration in March
154. See Lee Joung-sik, "The Structure of Korean College Students' 
Political Consciousness," Chosun llbo. November 21, 1965*
155. "Surroundings.of the Uproar," Series No.4 (Demonstrations),
Chosun llbo, December 11, 1964.
156. See, e.g., various public opinions expressed in Hahknk llbo,
March 29, 1964.
157. See Lee Bang-s&k, "The Faded Democracy and Nationalism," Sasangge, 
December 1965, pp*38-9.
158* See "Surroundings of the Uproar," Series No.4 , op.cit.; and Henry 
Chang and David-Conde, "Tokyo-Seoul: All Normal?" Far Eastern Economic Review, 
Vol. I, No.5, November 4, 1965, p.198.
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1964. Students’ potential power was amply displayed by the fact that the
government had to abandon the hope of concluding the treaty negotiations
with Japan in June 1964.
Despite the government's cautious policy of separating the demonstration
by students from that by non-students by tolerating the former while suppress-
159.ing the latter, the student demonstrations had an inevitable tendency to 
merge with the force of the opposition. For instance, as soon as a slogan 
of student demonstrators focused their target on. Kim Chong-pil, the master­
mind of the treaty, the opposition immediately plunged into a strategy of 
developing the anti-Kim student demonstrations into a massive anti-government
revolt by agitating the students through tactics of exposing political weakness
l fin
of Kim during the military rule. * The opposition hoped that a downfall of
Kim would inevitably lead to that of the Park government. This was the reason
why that throughout the treaty crisis the opposition was mainly preoccupied
with agitating the students without even hesitation to use demagogic denuncia-
I6l
tion against the government and its leading personalities.
Unquestionably the students were initially moved by the opposition campaigns
against the treaty. However, the students' response did not necessarily mean
that they were supporting the opposition as the alternative to the Park govern- 
162.
ment. * This was evident in a slogan of the students that "We are not the
] 63
subject of the opposition propaganda" ' and in a resolution of the Seoul
National University which warned both the government and the opposition not
to exploit them as political t o o l s . m  spite of this effort to remain
independent, the government had soon reached the conclusion that the student
165demonstrations were no longer patriotic and were becoming subversive. * The
159* See, e.g., the decision of the Council of Ministers on March 25,
1964, Kukje Shinbo, March 26, 1964.
160. See Kyunghyang Shinmoon, March 29 and March 51* 1964.
161. See the editorial of Chosun llbo, April 14, 1965.
162. "A Weather Map," Tong-A llbo, March 31* 1964; and "The Background 
of Korean Student Demonstrations," Asahi Janaru. April 12, 1964, p.7.
163. Hong Stmg-man, et al, ed., Baebang iship ny6n, Vol. for Records, 
op. cit., p.688.
T64. The resolution of April 15, 1965, Chosun llbo, April 13, 1965.
165. E.g., the special statement of President Park, June 3, 1964.
See an excerpt of the speech in Hong Sung-man et al, ed,, Iiaebang iship nyon, 
Vol.for Records, op.cit., p*689.
575
government's suspic^plon that the student demonstrations were no longer 
spontaneous was based on the change of students' slogans from anti-treaty 
to anti-government, parallel with the direction of the oppositions manage­
ment of the treaty issue. The government's decision to use the military
166.against the students was partly based on this suspicion. But the more
practical reason for the show of force was the fear, that if left unchecked, 
the increasingly violent student demonstrators might physically overthrow 
the government.
Although students displayed their enormous power during the treaty
crisis, their movement had reached a certain limit by two main reasons.
The first factor was a series of harsh suppressive measures in combination
with tightening of surveillance of the campuses by the government. Even
before students demonstrated, their ranks were for some time infiltrated
and watched by agents from the CIA, the police, the Ministry of Education
and even the DRP. ’ After June 1964 the government had diligently punished
the student demonstrators by mass arrests, conscription into the army,
expulsion from colleges, and even criminal prosecution under the Anti-Communist 
168Law. * The most brutal case of suppression was the intrusion of soldiers
into the two leading private universities in Seoul and the assaults on students 
169.in August 1965. * At the same time the government adopted a more stringent
measure by instructing universities to expel "trouble makers" among students 
170and professors. Unable to resist the intense government pressure, universities 
finally expelled twenty-one professors and fifty-two students in accordance with
166. See the comment by a Japanese journalist, Matsumura Tatsuro in 
"Anti-Japanese Sentiment and Anti-Korean Sentiment," op. cit,, p.151.
167* See the content of a DRP's secret report on the government's and 
its own campus activities exposed by Maeil Shinmoon (of Taegu), September 4, 
1964; and "The Song Ch'6l-won Lynch incident," Lee Byong-hun et al, ed.,
Haebang iship ny&i sa, op.cit., p.1180.
168. See Henry Chang and David Conde, op. cit., p.198; Lee By&ng-rin, 
"Lawful Rule and Politics," Shindong-A, November 1965, pp.64-5; and the 
editorial of Chosun llbo, April 10, 1965.
169. "The Decree of Garrison State, the Terror and the Politics without 
Masters," Shindong-A, October 1965, pp.163-6; and Chosun llbo, August 26 and 
August 27, 1965.
170. See, e.g., the four-stage policy of the government, Chosun llbo, 
August 28, 1965*
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171the list prepared by the government. ’ These measures were a demonstration 
of President Park's personal determination "to exterminate the idea of the
172students that they should act for politicians on every issue and decision."
The second factor that weakened the student movement was the fact that 
the students lacked a sharp focus of protest, like the one they had had in 
I960, which could generate popular mass support. Since the characteristic 
strength of the Korean student movement lies in mass support, any realization 
of their potential power must have a specific issue that can marshall a strong 
popular support. In fact the treaty issue was so complex and controversial 
that it could not provide a clear answer to the people as to its consequences. 
As this was the nature of the issue, the people were roughly divided on it and 
the students did not have the undivided support of the people. There was also 
some awareness among the people that the excessive degree of student demonstra­
tions was not justified in producing a continuing political and social chaos
173that might lead to overthrow of the Park government. This would only
result in a political instability in the absence of capable and responsible
opposition to replace the present government. This was one main reason that
the government could at last exercise the stark force against the students 
when it suspected that the combined force of students and the opposition was 
only a part of the public opinion that acted against the treaty and the govern­
ment.
Another obvious fact was that the students were not equipped to operate
the government themselves. What was, then, the justification to overthrow
the present government which could not be replaced to their satisfaction? The
prospect of facing this dilemma in the event of ouster of Park's government
174was a deterrence to the extent of their possible action. * This was perhaps
171. See Chosun llbo, September 5, 1965 and July 14, 1966.
172. Park's statement, Chosun llbo, April 20, 1965.
-*-73• See The New York Times, June 7, 1964 and August 29, 1965*
174. Yoshioka Tadao in "Anti-Japanese Sentiment and Anti-Korean 
Sentiment," op. cit., p.152.
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one reason, as some critics said, that the political activities of students
175.began to lose constructive potentiality and to reach the point of negativity 
that made them exploitable by militant opposition politicians. In retrospect, 
this was the tragedy of the student movement during the treaty struggle.
The student movement against the treaty started initially with 
tremendous impact but ended with such a crushing defeat that it greatly reduced 
even their own academic freedom. However, in view of the current political, 
social and economic conditions in Korea, they will continue to express their 
grievances and to demonstrate in the streets as "watchdogs'* of the masses.
If and when they feel that they are obliged to act, their collective action 
will certainly have a staggering impact on the Korean political process, if 
the past experience is a measure of their political potentiality.
175. See, e.g. Kameyama Akira, op. cit., p.198.
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSIONS
Since 1945 Koreans have been experimenting with a political 
system modeled on Western democratic ideas and institutions such 
as parties, electoral contests and representative government. As 
the products of neither the masses nor of the evolutionary develop­
ment of Korean society, the Western ideas and institutions are, 
however, yet to take firm roots in Korea in order to develop a 
viable political system which would be representative, legitimate, 
stable and efficient.
Luring the past two decades (1945-1965) the characteristic 
features of the Korean political system were the recurrent crises 
of political legitimacy, authoritarian power manipulation, general 
instability of political institutions and organisations, fragmen­
tation of political elites, alienation of the masses from politics 
and government, and political changes and solutions largely through 
extra-constitutional or extra-parliamentary means.
The significance of the ROK-Japan treaty crisis of 1964-1965 is 
twofold. Firstly, it was an acute aggravation of the symptom of 
political instability latent in the Korean political system. It was 
a political crisis triggered by the treaty issue. Secondly, the 
unprecedented degree of mass participation (to be more accurate, of 
elitist participation) in the treaty struggle was a new phenomenon 
unparalleled in Korean domestic politics, for it indicated the 
emergence of a popular movement to register views of the people 
directly with the political process* Although it is unpredictable 
to what extent and in what fashion this new phenomenon will be sus­
tained, the mass movement will definitely be a factor in the Korean 
political process unless the masses find channels of expression 
through the representative process.
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In spite of the fact that some three and a half million people 
who participated in the treaty struggle were initially motivated by 
their belief that the treaty was humiliating and against national 
interests and that the process of the negotiations for the treaty 
was irregular without proper consideration of public opinion, their 
central motives which sustained their determined struggle were, 
however, their rejection of the legitimacy of the government, their 
distrust in the political elites, and their serious doubt of the 
efficacy of the political process. In short, the complex of these 
political motives was the very indication of the failure of the 
ICorean political system.
In this connection, the basic question here is: Why does the
Korean political system not function normally? Or why have Koreans 
yet to develop a political system capable of resolving such political 
issues as the ROK-Japan treaty issue through normal political and 
constitutional process? As they have been examined in the previous 
chapters, the causes or determinants that .have shaped the current 
status of the Korean political system and culture are multifold.
Among historical and social factors, democracy was alien to 
Koreans, introduced only after the liberation from Japanese colonial 
rule in 1945* Traditional ideas of government and politics were 
still prevalent from the Yi Dynasty which was ideologically, poli­
tically and socially an authoritarian society based on the principle 
of absolute obedience of the masses to the rulers. In that society, 
the masses were not only excluded from participation in political 
and social affairs, but also politically inert and socially immobile? 
the government was of and for the privileged few and was corrupt 
and despotic; and the ruling elite was utterly divided by factionalism. 
The Japanese colonial rule destroyed much of traditional political
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and social order, but it did not fundamentally alter the traditional 
social and political attitudes and values.
However, owing to the latent social transfoiraation during the 
Japanese colonial rule and under the impacts of the division of 
Korea and the Korean War, both of which uprooted the traditional 
ruling elite and erased the last traces of traditional social order, 
since 1945 Korea underwent rapid social change, coming close to 
having only one vast olass of poor peasantry. Today a new social 
elite drawn from various previous origins is emerging. However it 
is meager in socio-economic basis as a force to provide social 
and political stability? it is unstable and fragmented due to a 
series of social and political upheavals? and it lacks a progressive 
and liberal spirit still under the influence of traditional attitudes.
Despite the rapid disappearing of traditional order since 1945j 
this change has not been accompanied by substantial transformation 
of Korean socio-economic structure nor has it completely eradicated 
traditional attitudes and behavior of the masses, especially the 
rural. The strong imprints of traditionalism are more prevailing 
in political attitudes and behavior of the rural masses. This is 
the basic social condition which has enabled the political elites 
to manipulate the masses and to maintain an authoritarian political 
leadership and which has perpetuated the wide gap between the govern­
ment and the masses - - the most serious factors contributing to 
social unrest and political instability in contemporary Korea*
A further ground for the authoritarian power manipulation and 
the inhibition of progressive political development in Korea is 
rendered by anti-Communism, which has become the guiding principle 
of Korea under the continuing threat of a Communist take-over. The 
over-all effects of anti-Communism are the complete domination of
379
the political scene by extreme right-wing conservatives, the 
strengthening of authoritarianism and a repression of political 
freedom, and the construction of an ideological monolith which has 
restricted programs of political parties to a narrow sphere of 
action. With the leftist influence rooted out of the political 
scene, Korean politics have been those of the status quo by the 
conservatives.
Since 1948 the Constitution has tended to authoritarian princi­
ples as it has revolved largely around the power struggle among 
political groups for their expediency. Frequent breakdown of con­
stitutional order through manipulation, revision and abuse of the 
basic law has prevented it from becoming a force of stability in the 
political process and a basis of legitimacy of government. As a 
result, the Constitution has been ineffectual in limiting the rulers, 
providing rules for fair play, and in insuring peaceful transfer of 
political power «—  none in more than two decades of the Republic. 
This has been one of the fundamental reasons why the ruling group 
which has come to or maintained power through manipulation of the 
Constitution and laws has been suffering from a weak basis of 
legitimacy of its power.
The party system in Korea is aptly the ’’one and a half party 
system." There has been a perpetual imbalance of power between the 
ruling party and the opposition. This imbalance has been artifically 
created and maintained by the ruling party through procedures and 
means which the opposition regards as illegitimate and unlawful.
The outcome of political contests has been always in favor of the 
ruling party, unrelated to the popular expression. It has been not 
uncommon that although the ruling party has a minority of the popular 
votes, it has a disproportionately large majority of seats in the 
Rational Assembly and acts as if it were a competent consensual
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majority with popular support. Especially when the discrepancy 
between the artificial strength of the ruling party in the National 
Assembly and the popular expression in elections is extreme, a 
determined opposition can easily appeal or resort to an extra- 
parliamentary mass movement in order to counter the unnatural 
majority in the National Assembly. As a consequence, there has 
existed a serious problem stemming from the "participation crisis.1
The manipulation to maintain this imbalanced power relationship 
by the ruling party is not only one main cause of the perpetual 
failure in peaceful transfer of power by electoral means, but also 
a basis of the recurrent crisis of legitimacy and of the chronic 
political instability. The opposition, in desperation, often resorts 
to extreme militant tactics of struggle and becomes irresponsible and 
reckless, which in turn strengthen repressive measures of the govern­
ment and its ruling party. This is the major reason why party 
politics in Korea are dominated by militants, and in this atmosphere, 
political decisions and changes are often made by extra-constitutional 
and extra-parliamentary means when the opposing parties are in deadlock.
Although the Korean party system has tended towards a two-party 
system and political parties have become the primary vehicles for 
politics, Korea has yet to develop a stable and meaningful party 
system. In view of the level of socio-economic development and the 
division of Korea, the characteristics of Korean parties are not 
distinguished by ideology, program and class basis. This partially 
explains why political contests among Korean parties are based on 
personalities and factional differences rather than on programs and 
issues*
The foremost cause of the immaturity and instability of Korean 
parties stems from the difficulty in institutionalizing their structures
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as mass organizations and in developing the capacity to function 
responsibly and to provide necessary political leadership. The 
initial difficulty lies in the lack of tradition and experience in 
party or organized politics. This difficulty is compounded by the 
elements of strong personalism and authoritarianism, and by the 
extreme atomization of political elites and the constant division 
of party leadership due to factional power struggle. The pervasive 
effect of strong personalism is evident in the fact that all Korean 
parties are, without exception, dominated by one single personality 
or a few factional leaders in their establishment, organization and 
operation. It is thus common to find the life span of parties 
dependent upon the life span of current leaders, for parties are no 
more than personal organizations of dominant personalities who 
assembled their factional followers. When a party develops a certain 
degree of structure and diffuse support under the semblance of mass 
party, it is owing to the overflow of personal cult of a leader or 
leaders. As personal parties all Korean parties have shown a 
critical functional inability in adapting themselves to political 
change and in responding to popular demands. Thus, as practically 
closed parties, the weakness of Korean parties is amply clear, for 
example, in their failure to develop them into organizations with 
respectability, diffused support and identification among the masses 
at the grassroot level.
In spite of the heightening of political awareness and the 
establishment of formal institutions of democracy, the extent of the 
masses' exercise of political rights and of their political partici­
pation ends with casting votes in elections. Apart from the factors 
of poverty and ignorance, the masses are still psychologically 
inhibited from political participation by traditional social and
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political inertia and are constantly manipulated by the government 
and by political elites. In a sense their political participation 
is a totalitarian participation. Thus the overwhelming* majority 
of Koreans are practically alienated from politics and neglected 
by the government.
As the existing political institutions frequently break down,
extra-political forces --  the military and the students --  emerged
as the decisive instruments of power and control in the political 
process by relegating the political institutions to a secondary 
important. The circumstances that have brought on the military and 
the students to play the prominent roles as pressure groups shed 
another important aspect of the Korean political system and process.
Interest groups in Korea have a weak basis without sufficient 
socio-economic development and an accompanying degree of social 
division of labor. The mushrooming of interest groups in Korea is 
thus a sign of fragmentation of groups, a phenomenon attributable 
to the pervasive culture of factionalism, rather than an indication 
of specialisation and differentiation based on an ultimate sense of 
integration. In most cases, they are established and used by leading 
personalities as bases for their personal power and material gains. 
The unique feature of interest groups in Korea is that they are not 
voluntarily organized and operating autonomously. The larger the 
group is, the more available it becomes for manipulation by the 
government. The more dependent the group is on the government, the 
more susceptible it becomes to pressure from the government. With 
a few exceptions they have always been available to the government 
if it decides to mobilize opinions favorable to itself. Thus they 
are hardly exercising positive influence in the political process 
in Korea.
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Therefore, political participation by both the masses and 
groups in the Korean political process is hardly open and free, and 
is not sufficiently mature to narrow the gap between the political 
elites and the masses. The acute alienation of the masses is further 
evident in the failure of the political parties to mobilise and 
express mass opinion and to mediate and aggregate conflicting demands 
of society. In these political conditions, the roles of the military 
and the students in Korean politics have become extraordinary and 
critical.
Students feel that under the present conditions in Korea they 
have to act as the national political conscience, to speak for the 
masses, and to fill the role of opinion-maker and pressure group. 
Although students1 involvement with political activities has been 
motivated by varying factors at different times and their potential 
as a stably organized force is somewhat limited by their lack of 
national organization and of coherent action programs, they have 
nevertheless repeatedly proved their ability to act as a powerful 
pressure group.
Of course, students have their ulterior reasons for discontent 
with the government and society, such as dissatisfaction with their 
own social status. However, as idealists their main goals in 
political activities have been nationalism, democracy and modern­
ization - -- these are the historical aspirations of all Koreans.
Since the moral strength of the student movement in Korea derives 
from the nature of their protest, which has a great degree of relevance 
to the critical problems of Korea, and which hence elicits popular 
support, the student movement is not only tenacious and powerful but 
respected and feared. This is the reason why the government reacts 
to a student demonstration with extremely cautious or harsh measures.
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On the other hand, with the military coup d'etat in I96I the 
military had emerged finally as the foremost force maintaining the 
stability of the government, although there is little guarantee 
against a future military intervention into politics in view of the 
heightening of political ambition, personal frustration and per- 
sisting factionalism among officers. In the absence of solid support 
from the ruling party, the importance of the military as a political 
and physical shield for the government against the students and the 
opposition in time of crises has become supreme.
Thus it was only natural that during the treaty crisis the 
students and the military played the most crucial roles in front: 
the former as the main force of anti-treaty and anti-government by 
replacing the opposition, and the latter as the defender of the 
government by replacing the ruling party. The confrontation of these 
two leading groups with stark: force during the treaty struggle was 
one of the main elements that intensified the political crisis.
The RQK-Japan treaty crisis of 19&4-1965 a summation of two 
decades of trial of democracy in Korea. In the final analysis, the 
basic cause of the unprecedented degree of political crisis on the 
treaty issue lies in the chronic crisis of political legitimacy, in 
the extreme power struggle between the two opposing political elites, 
and in the incapacity of political parties and elites to function 
responsibly in resolving national issues through normal political 
and constitutional process. Therefore, the phenomena of the mass 
movement and the extra-constitutional and extra-parliamentary 
struggles were not only an indication of the failure of the Korean 
political system, but also a direct effort on the part of significant 
and articulated groups in society to find channels of their expression 
and to supplement or supplant the inadequacy of the existing political 
institutions and elites.
The future of democracy in Korea is however not bleak. Compared
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with the experience of the Western nations in democracy, it was only 
yesterday that Koreans adopted democracy. The record of Korea*s 
experience in this new system is so far not impressive, nevertheless, 
Korea’s record must be judged against the historical background of 
Korea’s political and social experience, and against her unique 
position in the divided world.
As the masses are awakening through education and continuing 
political and social upheavals, and as their experience in democratic 
institutions and ideas grows with the parallel development in socio­
economic capacity, Koreans will eventually overcome the traditional 
political culture and will develop a workable democracy at least 
suitable to Korean conditions. The rate of development in this 
direction will ultimately depend upon how fast and to what degree 
the masses will politically mature and the political elites will 
develop astute and responsible political attitudes. It is however 
certain that the political elites will have to reckon soon with the 
politically conscious groups who refuse to look idly on the political 
affairs managed by the undisciplined and irresponsible political leaders.
In this sense, the KOK-Japan treaty crisis is perhaps a signi­
ficant turning-point, as witnessed in the mass movement, towards a 
new political era, in which the masses will be no longer a docile 
object of manipulation but the main entity of politics, for whose 
favor the political elites will have to compete, on whose behalf they 
will have to serve, and in the face of whose opinion they will have 
to respond. Otherwise the mass movement of 1964-19^5 will have no 
meaning as a lesson except to add another new feature to the anachronic 
Korean political culture, and its recurrence in the future may greatly 
imperil the development of democracy in Korea.
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